

THE SCHOOL OF FRANZ BRENTANO

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The School of Franz Brentano

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To Enzo Melandri
In memoriam

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FOREWORD

The central idea developed by the contributions to this book is that the split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology — perhaps the most important schism in twentieth-century philosophy — resulted from a radicalization of reciprocal partialities. Both schools of thought share, in fact, the same cultural background and their same initial stimulus in the thought of Franz Brentano. And one outcome of the subsequent rift between them was the oblivion into which the figure and thought of Brentano have fallen.

The first step to take in remedying this split is to return to Brentano and to reconstruct the ‘map’ of Brentanism.

The second task (which has been addressed by this book) is to revive interest in the theoretical complexity of Brentano’s thought and of his pupils and to revitalize those aspects that have been neglected by subsequent debate within the various movements of Brentanian inspiration.

We have accordingly decided to organize the book into two introductory essays followed by two sections (Parts 1 and 2) which systematically examine Brentano’s thought and that of his followers. The two introductory essays reconstruct the reasons for the ‘invisibility’, so to speak, of Brentano and set out the essential features of his philosophical doctrine. Part 1 of the book then examines six of Brentano’s most outstanding pupils (Marty, Stumpf, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Husserl and Twardowski). Part 2 contains nine essays concentrating on the principal topics addressed by the Brentanians.

In order to facilitate cross-referencing between the various essays contained in the book, each chapter concludes with a table giving the other points in the book where the same topics are dealt with.

The Editors

INTRODUCTION.
BRENTANO AND HIS SCHOOL:
REASSEMBLING THE PUZZLE

1. INTRODUCTION

If we use the device of treating complex and ramified movements of thought as somehow unitary points of reference, then the main distinction to be drawn in twentieth-century scientific philosophy sets analytic philosophy against phenomenology — two movements which waged outright war against each other for more than half a century and which only recently called a truce.¹ And here we meet our first surprise. If we go back to the origins of these two movements, we find something that perhaps we were not expecting. If we may legitimately consider Frege to be the grandfather of analytic philosophy and Husserl the father of the phenomenological school, what would have been the reaction of a German student reading Frege and Husserl in, say, 1903?² He would certainly not have considered them to be two radically antagonistic thinkers. Indeed, despite their differing interests, he would have believed that they largely shared the same point of view. The split between the two movements that drew on Frege and Husserl for their insights and arguments only came later; their common basis remained unchanged. Giving detailed treatment of the reasons for the distinction first, and the split later, between analyticists and phenomenologists would be beyond our brief; we shall make only a limited number of remarks. However, what we wish to stress in particular is precisely the fact that two of the 20th century's most significant movements in scientific philosophy have, at the very least, a common thematic origin and a shared cultural background.

¹ See also Poli 1993-94.

² Cf. Dummett 1988.

In clarification of this point, we shall approach our subject from the following point of view. Instead of tracing the declarations of the exponents back to their sources, we shall seek to show what transpires when we consider, in purely historical terms, the state of philosophical investigation some decades before the birth of the two movements that concern us here. For the sake of convenience, we shall take 1831, the year of Hegel's death, as our point of departure. We can assume that Hegel's death marked the end of a particular period of thought. We all know full well, of course, the names of the major thinkers of the 19th century. The century began with Schopenhauer, Schleiermacher and Herbart; then Marxian thought and materialist theories of various kinds took the stage; then Kierkegaard, followed by Nietzsche, and so forth... there is no need to spell the sequence out. We wish instead to cite a number of names and to give a quantity of information that, perhaps, are less well-known but nevertheless extremely relevant to our argument.³

There are four general features of the philosophy developed in the German-speaking countries — Germany especially — from 1830 onwards that warrant particular attention.⁴

- (1) A first, frequently overlooked, feature is that, when the inebriating excesses of idealism died away, philosophy apparently underwent a significant period of crisis. Perhaps the most persuasive evidence for this is the fact that university chairs of philosophy were now increasingly and systematically awarded to psychologists, a process attended by the founding of the first laboratories of psychology.
- (2) The second development was the spread of profound philological interest in language and the simultaneous birth of linguistics. We need only mention Humboldt, the Grimm brothers, Bopp, Hermann and Steinthal.
- (3) The third feature was what we might call the revival of Kant in the form of neo-Kantianism. Of course, when we start using labels with a prefix like 'neo-', we are emphasising not only links and similarities, but also and especially differences. Characteristic of the neo-Kantians, precisely because they were neo-Kantians and not simply Kantians, was their rejection of certain important aspects of Kantian thought. In particular, they were sceptical of the doctrine of the forms of intuition as pure forms (space and time) of intuition. We should not forget that it was these years that saw alternative forms of geometry — non-euclidean geometries to be precise — achieving full scientific legitimacy. A form of intuition that claimed to be pure but which was simultaneously grounded in one specific form of

³ For an excellent outline history of 19th century philosophy, see Tatarkiewicz 1973.

⁴ Melandri 1990.

geometry was certainly not one to be relied on. We should also bear in mind Lotze's discovery that spatial knowledge originates in the localization of sensations. This localization was topical not geometrical, and it was neither metric nor projective. Therefore which geometry it was predestined for was impossible to say. According to Lotze's discovery, our knowledge of space derives from a progressive logical organization of topically distinct points which generates, through trial and error, an overall geometry.⁵

- (4) The fourth and final point we wish to make concerns the nineteenth-century revival of Aristotelian studies. In the second half of the century new editions of, and commentaries on, Aristotle were published by Schwegler, Bonitz, Tricot and others. In addition, there was Prantl's history of logic, Steinthal's history of grammar and ancient logic, Trendelenburg's history of the doctrine of the categories. All these studies, many of which resulted from a new philological sensibility, laid the basis for the modern study of Aristotle.

The four features outlined briefly above were merged together in significant fashion by several outstanding thinkers of the time, of whom we can only mention a few of them: Herbart, Trendelenburg, Bolzano, Lotze, Frege, Dilthey, Spranger, Mach and Avenarius. Obviously, we cannot give even the briefest treatment to all these philosophers, to their differences, and to the reasons why many of them are still extremely relevant today. And here arises our first problem, namely the problem of Brentano's invisibility.

2. THE PROBLEM OF BRENTANO'S INVISIBILITY

The problem of Brentano's invisibility is a phenomenon which seems to characterize his entire lifetime. Those asked to list the principal philosophers of the 19th century usually reply with the names already mentioned. Very rarely, however, do they mention Brentano. Given this state of affairs, one should consider whether the call for a 'Brentano revival' has the indisputable and indisputably circumscribed sense of an exercise in philosophical archaeology, or whether this is a much more general problem which merits at least an attempt at a reply.

In order to account for Brentano's invisibility, we must begin with a number of general observations.

⁵ See Lotze 1852.

First of all, it is obvious that Brentano's invisibility has serious consequences on assessment of his philosophical theory. As is well known, the reconstruction of Brentano's thought is still flawed and incomplete. Some of the reasons for this are today quite obvious and very familiar. Consider the following five factors:

- (1) Brentano himself published very little during his lifetime compared with his vast and still largely unpublished *Nachlaß*.
- (2) A significant proportion of the posthumous works published under Brentano's name were composed, structured and even written by his pupils using methods which, to be charitable, we may call philologically improper. The essential fact, however, is that his unpublished works exceed both in quantity and, in certain cases, in theoretical importance his published *oeuvre*.
- (3) The great importance of the exercise-books used by Brentano's pupils to take notes at his lectures should also be mentioned. For many years these notebooks were the principal source of information for other pupils and friends. When many of them were lost during the Second World War, a void was created that has proved impossible to fill. This loss is particularly tragic because Brentano laid great emphasis on oral teaching, which he regarded as more important than his written production. In his introduction to the Italian translation of the second volume of *Psychology*, Puglisi stressed this very emphatically:

The vividness of his spoken words, the varied expression of his arguments, immediately evoked that impulse which was lacking in his writings. Hence it has been rightly said that the chief characteristic of Franz Brentano's teaching was that it was oral. Perhaps, like Socrates, he preferred to teach through speech, because thus one teaches not only philosophy but also how to philosophise, thereby spurring intellectual enquiry.⁶

- (4) Another important item in the Brentano puzzle is that most of his thought was set out in his correspondence: we need only cite the 1400 letters exchanged between him and Marty and which constitute a large part of his posthumously published work; or the fact that his letters addressed to one scholar were then passed on to others, who in turn intervened in the exchange of ideas.⁷
- (5) A further aspect of the problem is the blindness that afflicted Brentano in the last years of his life. Unable to write, he was forced to dictate his

⁶ Puglisi 1913, 8.

⁷ Baumgartner 1993, 239.

thoughts. Consequently, when he had to correct, modify or supplement previous writings or dictations, he found it easier to correct an already written text by dictating it anew. One thus often finds different versions of the same argument, sometimes with minimal changes, sometimes with much more substantial differences.

We therefore find ourselves in a curious situation: on the basis of the above considerations, it would be entirely improper to confine Brentano's thought to the text that was his intellectual legacy and with which his name is universally associated. Although *Psychology from an empirical standpoint* of 1874 contains a number of key components of his thought — the concept of intentionality, the distinction between physical and psychic phenomena, the evidence of inner perception, the division of psychic phenomena into three classes — it does not encompass the richness of his doctrine in its entirety.⁸

The above features — especially Brentano's emphasis on oral teaching, and the scantiness of his published work compared with the enormous quantity of his manuscripts and correspondence — are also of theoretical importance because they are rooted in Brentano's method of 'doing' philosophy. We know that the distinguishing feature of his philosophy was its empirical bias, its insistence on rigorous and partial answers rather than on the construction of systems *by self-definition* coherent and self-sufficient. Given these features, it comes as no surprise that the same problem should be examined on several separate occasions and that different solutions should be proposed for it.

This procedure has a certain amount of inner coherence. Although Brentano always began his analysis with specific topics and problems, he proposed solutions which then reverberated throughout the entire edifice of his philosophy. This, as we have seen, is a manner of philosophising which takes the natural sciences as its model. Puglisi wrote,

Franz Brentano did not write a system of philosophy. He addressed certain fundamental problems in the same way as scientists contribute to a slowly-developing science by means of the relatively small-scale study of individual laws... For Brentano it was a contradiction to work according to the method of the natural sciences and to write a large quantity of bulky volumes.⁹

These factors also account for the different solutions that Brentano proposed for the problems he addressed. His thought, in fact, displays a continuity of method and a permanence of problems, but not a univocity of solutions. It is this aspect that allows one to talk of a *school of Brentano* among his pupils, to

⁸ *Psychologie*, moreover, was written also for reasons of career advancement.

⁹ Puglisi 1913, 16-17.

detect a ‘family resemblance’ among philosophers and scholars belonging to different disciplines. That is to say, the school is defined more by problems and the method used in their analysis than by their solutions in the strict sense. Accordingly, his *heterodox* followers, such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and Kazimierz Twardowski, were more faithful to their master’s thought than the *orthodox* Brentanians like Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand.

Another component of the ‘Brentano problem’ is its constant reference to Aristotle. One notes with interest the distinct cleavage between theoretical and historical-philological attitudes. As already said, the second half of the 19th century saw an explicit philological revival of Aristotle and, as a matter of fact, Brentano’s first work on Aristotle, published in 1862, was dedicated to Trendelenburg. But Brentano was the only thinker at the time, or one of the very few, who offered a reading of Aristotle based on the source texts which conducted not only erudite philological exegesis, but analysis within a contemporary theoretical framework. Moreover, the ‘scholastic’ atmosphere of certain of his reflections, not to mention the explicitly scholastic topics (consider intentionality) that underpinned his theory, explain why, according to Tatarkiewicz, “among his contemporaries Brentano was at first regarded as an anachronism, a medieval remnant”.¹⁰ Tatarkiewicz also points out that “his whole manner of thinking was a novelty for his contemporaries, even when he only returned to old views”,¹¹ and that “Brentano accomplished something exceptional for the philosophy of the nineteenth century: he avoided a minimalistic limitation without falling into speculative metaphysics”.¹²

A different but not irrelevant factor is that a number of Brentano’s outstanding pupils achieved their own success and founded their own schools. Suffice it to mention Husserl’s phenomenology, Twardowski’s Lvov-Warsaw school and Meinong’s Graz school. The personal success and academic recognition attained by these exponents of Brentano’s school (in the broad sense) have come to obscure their common thematic origins.

This aspect is further emphasised by the classification of Brentano as the precursor of phenomenology, thereby relegating his thought to a minor and complementary role.¹³ One of the very few authors not to have committed this error is Wolfgang Stegmüller, whose work on the currents of contemporary philosophy correctly considers Brentano to be an independent thinker and characterizes his philosophy as the *philosophy of evidence*.¹⁴

¹⁰ Tatarkiewicz 1973, 220.

¹¹ Tatarkiewicz 1973, 211.

¹² Tatarkiewicz 1973, 220.

¹³ Tatarkiewicz 1973; Spiegelberg 1984, 27.

¹⁴ Stegmüller 1978, 1-48; see also Stegmüller 1969.

3. BRENTANO BETWEEN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

We have already said that at the beginning of this century, analyticists and phenomenologists occupied the same cultural territory. Although this may seem a somewhat crude overgeneralization, at least on the ‘analytic’ side, that Brentano was one of the founders of the analytic movement and in particular of the Vienna Circle, was explicitly stated in the Vienna Circle’s manifesto. The section devoted to the historical background of the circle declared:

The commitment of physicists like Mach and Boltzmann to the teaching of philosophy testifies to the then dominant interest in the logical and gnoseological problems of the foundation of physics. From this fundamental theme also arose the requirement to renew logic; and it was at Vienna, although he moved from an entirely different direction, that Franz Brentano had opened the way. As a Catholic priest, Brentano was well-versed in scholastic philosophy, and he undoubtedly took from it its logical doctrines together with Leibnizian contributions for a reform of logic, while he left aside Kant and the systematic idealist philosophers. The appreciation by Brentano and his pupils of the work of scholars like Bolzano and others who sought to give a rigorous foundation to logic became more and more apparent. Alois Höfler stressed this aspect of Brentanian philosophy before a public which comprised, because of the influence of Mach and Boltzmann, numerous adherents of a scientific conception of the world. The philosophical society directed by Höfler held frequent meetings on the gnoseological and logical aspects of the foundation of physics at the University of Vienna... During roughly the same period (1870-1882), at work within Brentano’s Viennese group was Alexius von Meinong (subsequently professor at Graz), whose *Gegenstandstheorie* had a certain affinity with the modern theory of concepts and whose pupil Ernst Mally likewise conducted research in the field of the logic.¹⁵

This long quotation is of particular interest, for a number of reasons. In fact as soon as one discovers that Meinong had been Brentano’s pupil and that Höfler and Mally had in turn been Meinong’s, one realizes that many of the names cited above belonged to what was in many respects a unitary research group.

The subsequent split between analytic philosophy and phenomenology generated, as a side-effect, the oblivion into which Franz Brentano’s thought then fell. For this reason a necessary first step is to construct a ‘map’ of the Brentanists. This must be then followed by revitalized knowledge of the theoretical complexity of their debates, of their unitariness, beyond the partiality of individual schools, and of their style.

¹⁵ *The Vienna Manifesto*, “Historical background” (our translation).

4. THE SCHOOL

Among Brentano's outstanding pupils, mention of Marty, Meinong, Husserl, Twardowski, Ehrenfels and Stumpf is obligatory. All these scholars exerted a profound impact on their fields of study. In effect, Brentano's influence was manifest not only in philosophy, as is obvious from names like Husserl and Meinong, but in other disciplines as well: psychology (with Stumpf, Ehrenfels and Meinong again),¹⁶ logic (in particular the Lvov-Warsaw school founded by Twardowski),¹⁷ literature (here one need only mention Kafka and Musil),¹⁸ and economics with the neoclassical theory of value.¹⁹

Brentano's first pupils belong to his period in Würzburg. Most notable among his early fellow-scholars and friends were Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty.²⁰ But the largest group of his pupils — which Kraus divides between 'leftist' and 'rightist' Brentanists — formed during his lectureship in Vienna. In truth, Brentano rejected the notion of a school of Brentanists, and his relationships with his pupils were often difficult; nonetheless, he trained at least two generations of philosophers.²¹ His Viennese pupils included Graf Hertling,²² Hermann Schell,²³ Carl Stumpf, Edmund Husserl, Alexius Meinong, Kazimierz Twardowski and Thomas Masaryk.²⁴

Mention should also be made of Brentano's 'closest' pupils, those who edited various of his works both published and unpublished, and the most noteworthy of whom were Oscar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand. The work of each of these followers, as a whole and with its ramifications, constitutes Franz Brentano's cultural legacy.

But in what sense can one talk of a school of Brentano?

¹⁶ Smith 1988, Libardi 1993a and 1995.

¹⁷ Woleński 1989.

¹⁸ Smith 1981.

¹⁹ Grassl & Smith 1986.

²⁰ Among Brentano's pupils at Würzburg were also Ludwig Schutz, professor at the theological seminary of Trier, Kirschkamp, Johannes Wolff, later professor of philosophy at Trier and Fribourg, and the Viennese Ernst Commer, also a professor of philosophy.

²¹ Kraus 1929, 11-17.

²² Graf Hertling was a cousin of Brentano and often visited him at Aschaffenburg and Würzburg. He subsequently became a chancellor of decidedly conservative leanings. He also studied under Trendelenburg in Berlin and in 1871 published *Materie und Form und die Definition der Seele bei Aristoteles*, which closely resembles Brentano's *Psychologie des Aristoteles*.

²³ Hermann Schell, proponent of modernism and author of *Die Einheit des Seelenleben aus den Prinzipien der aristotelischen Philosophie entwickelt*, Freiburg i. Br., 1873.

²⁴ T.G. Masaryk published *Versuch einer konkreten Logik*, Vienna, K. Konegan Verlag, 1887, a study strongly influenced by Brentano's theory.

To begin with, we should stress that the individuals listed above, and many others besides, as well as the numerous ‘schools’ which owe a specific intellectual debt to Brentano and his most outstanding pupils, developed theories that still today warrant examination. What instead seems to have disappeared is the effect of the whole, the presence of significant common aspects.

With the disintegration of the political and geographical unity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and especially with the events that hastened its final collapse, also the sense of unity of this philosophical and scientific tradition was lost. After 1918, the centres of this tradition — principally Vienna, Prague and Lvov — belonged to different states, and the prolific network of exchanges, contacts and relationships which was one of the reasons for the cultural richness of the period, was dismantled. However, each individual component still preserved something of the philosophical style of its master, a set of features which today permit us to talk of ‘Central European philosophy’ or, in Melandri’s apt expression, of ‘Central-East-European philosophy’.

In summarizing the reasons that justify allusion to a putative ‘school’, it should again be emphasised that we are dealing here with a philosophy which lived, in the historiographical sense, only in a sequence of specific philosophical reflections which, although they were often mutually distinct and reached diverse conclusions, nevertheless shared a number of important features. These features were mainly methodological in nature and they concerned the choice of the problematics analysed and discussed.

On methodological matters, Brentano and his pupils shared a fundamental view of how philosophical enquiry was to be conducted; a view also held by Mach, and which today is the acknowledged standard for all the versions and traditions of exact philosophy. Given its now widespread and unquestioning acceptance, the benefits brought by the introduction of this new level of exactness are easily underestimated. We shall describe those of its aspects that strike us as most interesting.

Brentano instilled in his pupils the conviction that philosophy should be rigorous, scientific, exact and clear.²⁵ He not only gave his pupils direct instruction on how to philosophize with rigour, he also combined this teaching with detailed historical observation of the ways in which philosophical enquiry had been conducted in the past. One of the chief and most celebrated of Brentano’s methodological theses was his contention that description should take precedence over any kind of explanation as to the birth, development or articulation of a phenomenon. This distinction between description and genetic explanation was common to all his pupils, who developed great skill in giving detailed and accurate descriptions of the domain of phenomena being studied.

²⁵ Mulligan 1986; Poli 1993-94.

We might perhaps say that they all followed the precept: ‘First observe and consider, then read’.²⁶ Explanation and theory should be preceded by the painstaking and perhaps laborious work of description; a method that was to be applied to all areas of inquiry.

The immediate corollary to this methodology was the requirement that counter-examples should be provided. Theories distilled from analyses of the data must be verified, not only by the univocity and precision of the theoretical and non-theoretical terms used, but also by reference to a set of possible counter-examples constituting proof of the veracity of these theories and acting as a stimulus to their further development.

Examples also perform a crucial positive role. If the presence of examples is indicative of the degree of exactness of an argument, their absence leaves matters nebulous and unresolved.

Apart from the accurate description of phenomena and the search for relevant examples and counter-examples, exact formulation must be given to all components of the theory. In this sense, Twardowski’s words are exemplary:

The obscurity of the style in which some philosophers write is not an inevitable consequence of the factors inherent in the subject matter of their analysis, but has its source in the vagueness and obscurity of the way they think... An author who does not know how to express his thoughts clearly does not know how to think clearly either, and therefore his thoughts do not deserve our efforts to guess them.²⁷

Development of correct theories is also made possible by the careful consideration of rival theories. Here Stumpf adds that the method learnt from Brentano, and before him from Aristotle, is to set out a complete list of all positions and eliminate all of them except the correct one.

We can therefore summarize the Brentanian method as follows:

1. Accurate description of the phenomena;
2. Gathering of examples and counter-examples;
3. Listing theories;
4. Eliminating theories that do not match the data described.

This is obviously still the traditional Aristotelian method. And it has an immediate bearing on the requirement for an ideal language or for a calculus that systematically interconnects the phenomena of the domain under

²⁶ Meinong 1960, 116.

²⁷ Twardowski 1979, 2.

examination. It is here that the necessity to express philosophical arguments in the form of definitions arises.

Not surprisingly, therefore, all the Brentanists explicitly preferred research that was partial, precise, specific, and addressed to well-defined and circumscribed problems.²⁸ Therefore, although the Brentanists were systematic thinkers, they had no liking for systems; or, put otherwise, they analyzed problems with extreme care but never sought to build philosophical systems on this basis.

A final and important point to make in this regard is that the Brentanists were zealous drawers of distinctions. Instead of looking for analogies (typical of the hermeneutic school) they stressed differences and introduced distinctions. This procedure was succinctly justified by Meinong as follows: between two people, one of whom makes a distinction and the other does not, it is usually the case that the one who introduces the distinction has realized something that the other has not.²⁹

The foregoing discussion is immediately applicable to the analytic movement. Characteristic of the analytic position, in fact, is its emphasis on the collection and careful discussion of examples and counter-examples, its attempt to give detailed description of the field of investigation, its search for clearcut conceptual definitions, and its use of the least misleading language possible. That the work of the Brentanians was held in high regard by the analytics is frequently evidenced by the literature. We cite just one example taken from an essay by Russell. Writing on Meinong, Russell declares:

Although empiricism as a philosophy does not appear to be tenable, there is an empirical manner of investigating, which should be applied in every subject-matter. This is possessed in very perfect form by the work we are considering. A frank recognition of the data, as inspection reveals them, precedes all theorising; when a theory is propounded, the greatest skill is shown in the selection of facts, favourable or unfavourable, and in eliciting all relevant consequences of the facts adduced. There is thus a rare combination of acute inference with capacity for observation. The method of philosophy is not fundamentally unlike that of other sciences: the differences seem to be only in degree.³⁰

Further light is shed on the descriptive method briefly described above when we remember that it was regarded by the Brentanians as the application of the more general method of variation. Let us consider a simple example. If we take a quantity of gas and alter the pressure applied to it, we obtain differences in

²⁸ It could be of some interest to note that all these features became a methodological programme in the first issue of *Analysis*.

²⁹ Meinong 1921, 115; Mulligan 1986, 91.

³⁰ Russell 1973b, 22.

volume and in temperature. This much is obvious. Observation of the co-variations leads us to believe that the behaviour of the gas depends on certain rules or laws. Brentano and his followers worked in exactly the same way. They took a certain phenomenon, they examined it from various points of view, they noted the changes that occurred in it, and they tried to tie all these variations together with a set of *dependence* rules. This procedure, one realizes, was firmly rooted in the history of exact thought. It was in fact a variant of the aporetic method, which consisted in pushing a concept to its extreme limits, to the point, that is, where it became another concept (and this, too, is Aristotelian).

In what follows we describe Brentano's most significant contributions to philosophy and then move to analysis of the aspect of his thought that most explicitly influenced the analytic position.

We concentrate upon Brentano's text *Psychology from an empirical standpoint*. Psychology in Brentano's definition is empirical but not experimental. Although he did not exclude the role and value of experimental investigation, Brentano concentrated in particular on the identification and classification of the features that make up the psychic phenomenon. His work marks the transition between the Aristotelian doctrine that psychology was the science of the soul, where soul is defined as the matter or the underlying substance of presentations, and the new doctrine that held that psychology was the science of psychic phenomena understood as such without it being necessary to resort to the device of an underlying substance. Note that Brentano distinguished between physical and psychic *phenomena* (understood as acts), not between physical and psychic *objects*. One of the main features of *Psychology from an empirical standpoint* is its thesis that mental acts are characterized by intentionality, i.e. they are directed towards something. According to Brentano, every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what mediaeval philosophers called the intentional in-existence of an object, that is by its relation to a content or its direction towards an object. We may legitimately say, therefore, that we are frightened of something, or that we are amused by something, but not that we are simply frightened or amused. A grammatical criterion is of use here, one which perhaps does not apply in every case but which is nevertheless illuminating. Consider expressions such as 'see a colour' or 'hear a noise'. In these cases the verb manifests the psychic phenomenon (respectively seeing and hearing) and the noun manifests the physical phenomenon (the colour that is seen, the noise that is heard). The essential difference between these two kinds of phenomena is that whereas we may be mistaken over physical phenomena (for example, the colour we see may depend on an optical illusion, or it may be the effect of special lighting and therefore differ from the colour of the object), psychic phenomena are

absolutely evident and impervious to error (we cannot be mistaken over the fact that we are *seeing* a colour or that we are in fact seeing). When we are conscious of a presentation, we are simultaneously conscious of the fact that it is present to ourselves. We cannot hear a noise without being aware of both the noise and the act of hearing it. Hearing and being aware of hearing are not two different acts. They are one act with two different objects: (the sound (*in recto*) and the act (*in obliquo*, as a type of reflexive object)).

Thus for Brentano the mental phenomenon *a* is a type of act, and the physical object is the object to which the act is directed. A mental act is the way in which a mind relates itself to an object; an object is whatever the mind has before it as the content of its act. Brentano gives the following clear statement of his position:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence (*Inexistenz*) of an object (*Gegenstand*), and what we could call, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality in this case), or an immanent objectivity... This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything similar. Consequently, we can define mental phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as include an object intentionally within themselves.³¹

Brentano divided psychology between two fundamental branches: genetic psychology (i.e. physiology) and descriptive psychology (non-physiological). He concentrated on the latter.

The point on which Brentano perhaps seems most outdated is his theory that inner observation is systematically neutral and therefore passive. Freud, who attended Brentano's lectures for two semesters, used the method of free association to show the 'tendentiousness' of consciousness and hence its active role. A different, though not conflicting interpretation of this point can be found in Husserl's distinction between the passive and active components of the layers of consciousness.

When these various inquiries are considered jointly, one notes two elements common to them all: the primacy of inner perception over external perception, and the theory of parts and wholes.

It follows from the primacy of inner over outer perception that psychic phenomena are immediately given as evidence to consciousness. As we have said, consciousness is intentional in character; that is, it is always structurally consciousness of something. One of the theoretical problems which distinguishes Brentano from many of his pupils is the *ontological status* of this *something*, whether it is an internal object, an immanent object or a content.

³¹ Brentano 1874, 115.

By ‘intentionality’ Brentano simply meant the directing of consciousness towards something. His pupils — especially Twardowski and Husserl — distinguished among the various ways in which consciousness intentionally directs itself towards its objects. In this case, corresponding to the various psychic acts are different structures and different types of contents and objects.

With some degree of simplification, we may state that the discovery of the importance of the theory of the whole and its parts followed the formalization of the theory rather than preceded it. In particular, it was only after the construction of mereology by Leśniewski in the years 1916-1921 that an attempt was made to re-examine certain moments of the history of philosophy in the light of the parts/whole relationship.³² In effect, in the absence of an explicit thematization of this relationship, its importance had not previously been grasped. Secondly, the impulse to formalization — and to the specification of mereology as an independent area of theoretical enquiry — derived from certain specific theories, most notably psychology. Mereological considerations were given specific development within the school of Brentano, first by Brentano himself in relation to the problem of the unity of consciousness, and then by his pupils, especially Carl Stumpf, the *Gestalt* psychologists, and Kazimierz Twardowski. In particular, Brentanian experimental psychologists analysed the components of the act of presentation (act, object, content, conceptual correlate, aspects, etc.) and their laws of constitution.³³ The most consolidated theory to emerge from this tradition is

³² Mereology or theory of parts, from the Greek *meros*, part. Leśniewski constructed four different axiomatizations of his mereology, respectively in 1916, 1918, 1920, 1921, which he set out in the first chapters of his treatise “On the foundations of mathematics”. Cf. Leśniewski 1992b, I, 174-382. Leśniewski’s axiomatization of the ‘part-of’ relation reveals a number of different influences: principally his encounter with Russell’s antimony, which he read in Łukasiewicz’s book on the principle of contradiction in Aristotle. The chief aim of the theory was to examine the meaning of the term ‘class’, the ambiguity of which was regarded as the true origin of Russell’s well-known antinomy. Like Husserl, Leśniewski drew on the tradition of algebraic logic, in particular as developed in the works of Schröder. On this see Libardi 1993b. On the history of part-whole theories see Henry 1991, Burkhardt & Dufour 1991. On mereology in the school of Brentano see Smith 1982, in particular the table of influences on page 482. For observations on Twardowski and Ingarden see Poli 1992, §§ 17.4-17.10 e 17.12; as regards Twardowski see his 1894, esp. §§ 9-10; as for Stumpf see his 1873, § 5. On Husserl’s part-whole theory see at least his 1901, 3rd Investigation. On the influence of Husserl, and in particular of the *Logical investigations* on Jakobson, see Jakobson 1963 and Holenstein 1974. The 4th Logical investigation, in which Husserl presents his so-called theory of the semantic categories, depends closely on the previous investigation: a sentence is not an accumulation of words; it is instead tied together by a nexus of foundation. This thesis was subsequently developed by Leśniewski 1992b (1929) and by Ajdukiewicz 1973.

³³ Practioners of Brentanian psychology were Stumpf, Benussi and also the psychologists who belonged to the Italian school of De Sarlo. On this topic see Albertazzi 1993a, 1993b, 1993c. On the development of mereology within *Gestalt* theory see Köhler 1920; Grelling

undoubtedly Husserl's *Logical investigations*, which have been called "the single most important contribution to realist (Aristotelian) ontology in the modern period".³⁴

5. BRENTANO'S SCHOOL AND AUSTRIAN PHILOSOPHY

In recent years, thanks to the work of Rudolph Haller and to the Manchester seminars, there has been renewed interest in so-called Central-European philosophy.³⁵ In this reassessment, more accurate evaluation has been given to Brentano and to his thought. We have already cited the 'political' reasons why greater consideration was given to the parts of the school of Brentano than to the whole. There are, however, other components that should be mentioned.

In contrast to Germany, where philosophy was akin to a lay religion, in Austria — from an institutional and educational point of view — philosophy was a relatively minor sector of the country's culture. An 'official' philosophy comparable to Kantian and Hegelian thought in Germany never existed in Austria. Catholic Austria had always been 'free' from the metaphysical idealism of Protestant Germany, and, in effect, the idealist philosophy of history and historicism never took root there. The idea of a historical cement, of a mission to accomplish — as philosophy had been represented to the German world from Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* — was extraneous to the Austrian mentality.

One distinctive feature of Austrian culture was the priority it gave to analytic rather than synthetic inquiry, the latter being instead peculiar to German culture. Austrian philosophers concentrated on the particular and on disassembly, and they insisted on differences, contradictions, heterogeneity, multiplicity, rather than merging these phenomena into a totalizing system which arranged them into an overall synthesis. It was also because of this peculiarity of Austrian culture that classical German philosophy exerted so little influence over it, with the partial exception of Kant.

Indeed, although Kant's *a priori* gnoseology was alien to the spirit of Austrian philosophy, the analytical and anti-metaphysical thrust of his thought was a major influence. However, this aspect should not be exaggerated, and the

1939; Grelling & Oppenheim 1938, 1939; Rescher & Oppenheim 1955; Smith 1982, 1988; Simons 1987.

³⁴ Smith & Mulligan 1982, 37.

³⁵ Haller 1979, 1986. A list of the meetings organized in Manchester by the "Seminar for Austro-German philosophy" in the academic years 1977-78 and 1978-79 is given on pages vi-viii of Smith 1981 (the book contains a selection of the papers presented).

interpretation in Kantian terms of Habsburg culture propounded by Janik and Toulmin has no historical basis.³⁶ Haller has suggested that more accurate characterization of Austrian philosophy can be obtained by comparing analytic *Wissenschaftstheorie* — which originated in the Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre* — with *Erkenntnistheorie*.³⁷

Whatever the case may be, contemporary Brentanism must come to terms with the presence of a transcendental element within an ontology which declares itself to be strongly anti-Kantian. Indeed, not only did a number of Brentano's pupils admit, with some embarrassment, to the 'curious' similarity between certain theses of Brentanism and Kantian theory, there were others who definitively broke with the formers' basic anti-Kantianism. Husserl is the most striking example, but evidence of it can be found in Meinong's theory of production and in Twardowski's ontology.³⁸

From a theoretical point of view, the aspects of Brentanism most compromised by Kantianism are the doctrine of inner time (which concerns the formal, categorial structure of the act of presentation) and the theory of objects, in particular Twardowski's theory of the general object and Meinong's theory of higher-order objects.

Besides Kant, the German philosopher to have exerted the most profound influence on Austrian culture was probably Nietzsche:³⁹ a Nietzsche read primarily as the precursor of the critique of the foundations, as anticipating Mach; and an analytic Nietzsche, as the dismantler of the concepts of metaphysics. It was under the joint influence of Nietzsche and Mach that Austrian literature gave us, in *Man without qualities*, one of the most radical confutations of the substantiality of the Self.

Rudolf Haller, to whom we owe the expression 'Austrian philosophy', identifies its distinguishing traits as a critique of language and an insistence on a scientific method analogous to that of the sciences in the empirical verification of the particular. Distinctive of Austrian philosophy — whose leading representatives were, apart from Brentano and his school, Bolzano, Mach and Wittgenstein — is its phenomenology of detail, its logical rigour, its prevalent analyticity and its lack of ideological posturing.

Thus, within the Austrian Empire of the nineteenth century, there developed of a scientific philosophy which did not identify itself with the philosophy of science but which applied the tools of exact thought not only to epistemology, but to ontology, to metaphysics and to ethics as well.

³⁶ Janik & Toulmin 1975.

³⁷ Haller 1979, 2.

³⁸ Cf. Albertazzi's and Poli's contributions to this volume.

³⁹ Cacciari 1976 and 1980.

6. THE THEORETICAL INTEREST OF THE SCHOOL OF BRENTANO

There are various reasons for urging a revival of Brentano's thought. Even at a brief glance, the extent to which it spread its influence is astounding. Consider its most direct ramifications in Husserl's phenomenology, the theory of objects of Meinong and the Lvov-Warsaw school, and their various sub-branches. Consider also the split between the orthodox Brentanists (Kraus, Kastil, Mayer-Hillebrand) and their non-orthodox opponents, and their academic activities in the leading European universities of the time: all thinkers, orthodox or otherwise, standing to the right or the left of Brentano, who made a major contribution to contemporary scientific debate in a wide variety of fields. Recall, moreover, movements like *Gestaltpsychologie*, the Prague linguistics circle, and marginalist theories. However, although we know the major ramifications of Brentano's thought, there is still much research to be done on its more distant affiliations, for example on the relationship between the Brentanists and the *Denkpsychologie* of Külpe, Selz and Bühler, or on the analytic development of Brentano's thought.

More in general, from Brentano onwards, Austrian philosophy has furnished contemporary philosophy with tools of analysis in the fields of ontology, logic, philosophy of language, and psychology.

The neo-Aristotelian perspective characteristic of the school of Brentano was taken up, for example, in the logical systems of Leśniewski. Kotarbiński was the first to point out that Leśniewski intended his ontology to resemble the science of being *qua* being presented by Aristotle in the 4th book of the *Metaphysics*.⁴⁰ In the words of Lejewski, one of Leśniewski's most outstanding pupils:

Many centuries after Aristotle the science of being as being was given the name of ontology. In the first decade of the 20th century it was revitalized by Meinong as the theory of objects (*Gegenstandstheorie*) only to return to its earlier name in Leśniewski's system of the foundations of mathematics.⁴¹

Ontology may therefore be interpreted as a formal system which is capable of describing the world, albeit at a high level of generality.

This interweaving of philosophical and formal strands of thought represented one of the principal characteristics of Brentano and his school, and although neither he nor his pupils made explicit use of logical tools (at least in the contemporary sense), their clarity of exposition, attention to the precision of concepts, and conception of philosophical activity as the specific and detailed

⁴⁰ Kotarbiński 1966, 210-211.

⁴¹ Lejewski 1989, 34.

analysis of particular problems paved the way for subsequent formal developments. Their influence over the Polish school of logic via Twardowski, and over the early Vienna School, is evident.

Also indicative is the debate-polemic between Meinong and Russell on non-existent objects; a controversy which was closely bound up with the birth of the theory of descriptions in the early years of this century. Although Meinong's position suffered what was apparently an outright 'defeat', it was recovered in the 1970s and formalized into what are today known as Meinongian semantics. Similarly, only recently has sharper light been shed on the philosophical origins of Tarski's treatise on the concept of truth, considered by Woleński and Simons as "undoubtedly the most important result concerning truth in the Lvov-Warsaw school, indeed in the whole Brentanian tradition".⁴² Tarski himself, moreover, was well aware of the 'philosophical' value of his work.

But it is phenomenology which represents, at least in its early form, the most fertile point of contact between logic and philosophy. Not only were *Logical investigations* enormously influential, but Husserl's logical inquiry was entirely in harmony with the investigations that Frege was conducting at the same time. The phenomenological tradition also comprised a flourishing school of foundational research: suffice it to mention Husserl's *Philosophy of arithmetic*, Kaufmann's work on the infinite in mathematics, Ehrenfels' essay on the philosophy of mathematics, and above all Oskar Becker's analysis of the concept of mathematical existence and on the phenomenological foundation of geometry from an intuitionist perspective.⁴³

Subsequent phenomenological inquiry abandoned these themes and tended to indulge in an excess of scholasticism and philologism, thereby neglecting the exact sciences. Although Husserl's interest in the logical and mathematical disciplines was unwavering, his later emphasis on genetic aspects had a generally harmful effect on his disciples. Indeed, one might say that the weakness displayed by phenomenologists after Husserl was their assumption that, because their master had been interested in the subjective foundations of logic, it was not necessary to lose oneself in details of the formalisms of mathematical logic.⁴⁴

The outcome of this progressive closure was the prevalence of a hermeneutics of phenomenological origin and the growing influence of Heidegger. Thus, above all in European philosophy, hermeneutics, in its various and complex ramifications, came to resemble a real and proper *koinè*, a *natural horizon* for those who occupied themselves with philosophy, thereby neglecting other lines of theoretical research. The boundaries of an ideal map of hermeneutics mark

⁴² Woleński & Simons 1989, 408.

⁴³ Ehrenfels 1891, Becker 1927, Kaufmann 1930.

⁴⁴ Peruzzi 1988, 130.

out, in fact, an extremely broad territory which comprises a large part of French thought from Ricoeur to Derrida and in certain respects also Foucault and Deleuze, the majority of American departments of literature, dominated by the Yale critics, like De Man and Harold Bloom, an important sector of Italian philosophy, the legacy of Heidegger, and even the later developments of Wittgenstein's thought and the analytic schools associated with it. On closer inspection, however, this success seems also to have been a disadvantage: it was precisely the overwhelming predominance of hermeneutics, its universalization, that led to an impoverishment of philosophy, to its indeterminateness.

The main point of contrast between the Brentanians taken as a whole and the analytic philosophers, also taken as a whole, is the differing emphasis they placed on the role of language. For the analyticists, in fact, all issues were by nature linguistic, and their analysis necessarily entailed the use of a linguistic filter. None of the Brentanians went as far as this. Indeed, midway through this century the analytic approach underwent profound change. Analyses of concepts — which provided analytic philosophers like Moore and Russell with their point of departure and whose explicit methodology brought them into immediate contact with the Brentanians and all the proponents of scientific philosophy — progressively ramified into general analyses of language. The now dominant assumption was that consciousness is essentially linguistic in character. The meanings present in consciousness were taken to be reducible to linguistic meanings. To which an immediate corollary was the conviction that the fundamental process whereby meanings are attributed to referents is naming. Whatever the details of the various approaches may have been, their focal point was the firm belief that analysis of language is the same thing as analysis of consciousness. The weak point in this change of analytic perspective seems to have been the reasons adduced for the view that a linguistic sign may function, as a linguistic sign, in identical fashion both in the public domain and within an individual act of consciousness or individual speech act. The point on which the analyticists have been most unconvincing lies precisely in their failure to provide conclusive proof for this view.

This failure has provoked profound reflection, especially within the analytic movement as it rediscovers its 'origins' and achieves deeper historical awareness. This reflection coincides at least in part with the rediscovery of the exponents of the school of Brentano. In the United States it is above all due to the efforts of Roderick Chisholm that the theme of intentionality, in its original version propounded by Brentano, has been brought into the analytic domain. But it is from formal ontology, as the descriptive aspect of Husserlian philosophy, and in particular from the theory of parts which is currently its only formalized theory, that we may expect new insights to emerge.

7. CONCLUSION

From the foregoing discussion it should be clear that Brentano and his disciples shared many aspects of the analytic method. Further, if we consider the development both of the analytic school and of the best known of the various branches of Brentanianism, namely the phenomenological school, we realise that they not only spring from the same origin, but they also have histories with numerous features in common. Both movements were born as a reaction against the idealistic, or at least anti-realistic, standpoint. They both eventually collapsed into a sort of idealism not entirely unlike the theory they initially rejected. They both came into being as an attempt to explain the problem of concepts and meanings, understood as objective realities which enter the flux of experience without losing their objective status or their ability to reveal the objective world to us — the world as it would be even if there were no perceiving subject. And both movements eventually came to reject this objectiveness of concepts, finally assuming the position that concepts are the shared components of what is in some way common experience: a changed interpretation whose crucial contention is that concepts thus understood are incapable of conveying what things are really like beyond any effective human experience.⁴⁵

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⁴⁵ Willard 1991.

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FRANZ BRENTANO (1838-1917)

1. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Franz Brentano was born at Marienberg am Rhein in Germany on 16th January 1838 into a family of Italian origins.¹ His father, Christian Brentano, a writer of religious *pamphlets*, was the brother of the poet Clemens and of Bettina von Arnim. On graduating from high school in 1855, Brentano enrolled at the Faculty of Philosophy of Munich University (for three semesters) and then transferred to Würzburg (one semester) where he also attended courses in theology. He then moved to Berlin to study under Trendelenburg (one semester) and then, finally, to Münster where he was a pupil of Clemens and received training in scholasticism (two semesters).

Brentano was initially undecided between mathematics and philosophy: his analytical turn of mind and his philosophical style with its emphasis on precision of argument and its rejection of 'philosophy in bulk'² testify to this indecision. It is worth noting that some of his pupils, Edmund Husserl for instance, were mathematicians before they were philosophers, and that all his most outstanding pupils were inclined towards the exact or experimental disciplines.

Brentano's studies of Aristotle exerted such an influence on him that he decided in favour of philosophical studies, and it was Aristotle, not Aquinas, whom he always regarded as the fundamental referent for his philosophy; indeed, the many shifts and changes in his thought are frequent reminders of its Aristotelian inspiration. On 6 August 1864, after a brief sojourn in the Domini-

¹ For a detailed life history of Brentano, see Kraus 1919, which also contains personal memoirs and articles written in remembrance of Brentano by his pupils and colleagues. See also Puglisi 1913, Schad 1984, and Albertazzi 1989a, 7-12.

² This expression is from the Austrian writer Robert Musil.

can monastery at Graz, Brentano entered holy orders, and two years later, on 15 July 1866, he obtained his university teaching qualification on discussion of twenty-five *Habilitationstheses* written in Latin.³

Brentano's philosophy is part of the Aristotelian Renaissance which began with Bonitz's, Tricot's and Schwegler's works on Aristotle, and continued with Trendelenburg's *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*. Brentano's Aristotelian studies under the tutorship of Adolf Trendelenburg led to his first published writings: *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (1862), and *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos* (1867). His essay of 1862, which he dedicated to Trendelenburg, still occupies an important place in the Aristotelian bibliography and is an obligatory work of reference for scholars of the Stagirite.

In the meantime, the declaration of the dogma of papal infallibility, officially declared in 1870 by the First Vatican Council, had provoked Brentano's first religious doubts and induced him to withdraw to the monastery of St. Bonifaz in Munich. The dogma of infallibility, however, was only the tip of the iceberg: Stumpf tells us that Brentano's scepticism were also aroused by the question of the Holy Trinity — the concept of substance, nature and person in Catholic doctrine. Convinced that the contradictions of religious dogma were more than only apparent, in 1873 he decided to abandon his vows and thereafter professed a theism of rationalist stamp whose theoretical justification is to be searched "through an analytical investigation of the Aristotelian thought".⁴

Brentano's reflection on theological problems — only touched upon here — is important because it sheds light on his general intellectual attitudes. Mario Puglisi — a close friend of Brentano during his 'Italian' period (1895-1915) and translator of *Psychologie 2 (Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene)* — claimed that Brentano's religious problem was a corollary to his choice of philosophical inquiry.⁵ It was because of his 'need for intellectual clarity' that Brentano regarded religious dogmas as obstacles to thought and insisted that his search for truth should prevail over his religious convictions.⁶

³ Brentano 1968b.

⁴ Giannetti 1977, 92; Stumpf 1919, 110 ff., Kraus 1919, 8-9, Bergmann 1966.

⁵ Puglisi 1921; Sirchia 1964; Giannetti 1977. For the Aristotelian roots in Brentano's thought see Puglisi 1913. For Brentano's writings on religion, Brentano 1954 and 1922. A monograph entirely devoted to this topic is Skrbensky 1937.

⁶ Puglisi writes in florid style: "The desire for truth led Franz Brentano first to the study and then to the teaching of philosophy. And when this desire, which had become indomitable, induced him to verify the reality of the dogmas of the religion in which he was born and had grown up, the most tragic conflict arose in his soul" (Puglisi 1921, 7). Stumpf recalls that Brentano himself affirmed: "If I then consecrated myself to her (the Church's) service, this

The criterion with which he addressed the themes of religion is expressed in his *Habilitationstheses*, where he affirms that the philosophical method cannot be different from that of natural sciences.⁷

In 1872 Brentano travelled to England, where he met Herbert Spencer, Cardinal Newman, Mivart (Darwin's opponent), and the theologian William Robertson Smith. He did not manage, however, to meet John Stuart Mill, with whom he had been corresponding for some time, and whose works were to exert a formative influence on the whole of his thought.⁸ Very briefly, therefore, we may cite Aristotle, empiricism and Cartesian epistemology as the principal points of reference for Brentano's philosophy, although mention should also be made of the possible influence of pragmatism and Italian psychology on the reist revolution in his thought towards the end of his career.⁹

Until March 1873 Brentano taught as a *Privatdozent* at Würzburg. After a period of profound religious crisis, he decided to leave the Catholic Church and, on 11 April 1873, officially renounced his faith. On 22 January 1874, following nomination by the minister Stremayr, he was appointed full professor at the University of Vienna, where he lived until 1880. The year 1874 saw publication of the work that was to become the reference text for the whole of the Brentanian tradition: *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*.

At Vienna Brentano met Ida von Lieben, the daughter of a colleague in the philosophy faculty. Kastil describes her as artistically talented and of cheerful disposition, and Kraus as selflessly devoted to Brentano. However, his announcement of marriage provoked violent opposition and, although Austrian law was interdenominational in principle, in Brentano's case an article of canon law was given a petty-fogging interpretation that effectively debarred him from marrying.¹⁰ The controversy over Brentano's marriage hampered the career of Anton Marty and also that of Kraus, who had campaigned in Brentano's favour: in fact, Marty was turned down for the chair of the philosophy of law at Prague, which was instead awarded to Krasnopolski.

This was an extremely painful period for Brentano. He planned to open a psychology laboratory at the University of Vienna, in the conviction that only

happened because I meant to serve Truth; if later I left her, this happened because otherwise I would have behaved as an ignoble hypocrite" (Stumpf 1919, 108).

⁷ Brentano 1968d, 6.

⁸ Anglo-Saxon philosophy was an enduring influence on all Brentano's studies: Kraus 1919, 8, 93; Haller 1968, 83 ff., as well as of his disciples, particularly Husserl, where Hume occupies "a position of primary importance" (Melandri 1960, 36) and Meinong.

⁹ See on this Albertazzi 1992, 92-115; 1992-1993, 155-193; and 1993, 132-133; Poli 1993a, 71, 89.

¹⁰ Albertazzi 1989a. On Ida von Lieben, see Kraus 1919, 15; Kastil 1951, 34; Bergmann 1966. Husserl remembers Ida Brentano as a talented artist, who painted a portrait of him with Brentano (Husserl 1919, 162).

the experimental method of the exact sciences could prevent philosophical confusion. After several years, the Ministry indeed proposed the founding of a psychology laboratory, but stipulated that it should be directed by Hillebrand, Brentano's pupil, on the grounds that Brentano, like Marty (both were proposed by the Faculty), had renounced his faith.

Persuaded by this and other events to renounce his Austrian citizenship, in 1880 Brentano consequently also lost his professorship in the philosophy of the inductive sciences at Vienna. The chair was assigned first to Ernst Mach, who was then succeeded by Ludwig Boltzmann. After regaining his German citizenship in 1880, Brentano married Ida von Lieben in Leipzig on 16 September of the same year.¹¹

However, he was still a *Privatdozent* in Vienna, and he would remain so until 1895, one year after the death of his wife.¹²

The years that followed found Brentano first in Switzerland and then in Italy, where he took out citizenship and lived for more than twenty years. After brief periods of residence in Rome and Palermo, he settled in Florence with his second wife, Emilie Ruprecht, whom he married in 1897. Afflicted by serious eye disease which gradually blinded him, he was forced to dictate his last works to Emilie. It was in these years that Brentano developed the variation of his thought, of Brunian and Spinozian derivation, which goes by the name of *reism*.

During his Italian period, which was interrupted only for brief summer holidays at Schönbühl an der Donau, Brentano published a number of works, including *Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie* (1907), *Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung* (1911), and *Aristoteles Lehre vom Ursprung des menschlichen Geistes* (1911). In 1903 he planned a definitive version of all his Aristotelian studies, of which, however, only his preparatory dictations remain. At the same time he pursued an extremely wide range of intellectual interests: in Florence he participated at the meetings of the *Biblioteca filosofica* and came into contact with Franco Enriques and Giovanni Vailati, with the physicist John Stallo and the psychologist Francesco De Sarlo, while in Palermo he associated with Giuseppe Amato Pojero, Adolfo Faggi and Mario Puglisi.¹³ When Italy

¹¹ Brentano's departure from Vienna and Austria is described in Brentano 1895.

¹² The following works were published during Brentano's Viennese period: *Was für ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht* (1876), *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (1889), *Das Genie* (1892), *Vom Schlechten als Gegenstand dichterischer Darstellung* (1892), *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie* (1893), *Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr gegenwärtiger Stand* (1895).

¹³ About Brentano's influence in Italy see Garin 1960; Riondato 1961; Giannetti 1977; Santucci 1993; but above all Albertazzi 1992 and Albertazzi & Poli 1993.

entered the First World War in May 1915, Brentano moved to Zurich, where he died on 17 March 1917.

2. THE DIFFICULT EXPOSITION OF BRENTANO'S THOUGHT

Still today, reconstruction of Brentano's thought is haphazard and incomplete. A first difficulty arises because so little of his work has found its way into print; a lack of source material exacerbated by the fact that much of his vast *Nachlaß* has never been published.¹⁴

One reason for the comparative neglect of Brentano's thought is that he concentrated on questions which the text-books on nineteenth-century philosophy dismiss as minor, focusing their attention instead on theories and thinkers who drew their inspiration from the dissolution of the idealist systems or from the intricacies of neo-Kantianism. Brentano stands at the confluence of currents of thought — such as the Aristotelian Renaissance or, at least in certain respects, Italian pragmatism — which have been pushed into the background by the current interpretation of the history of philosophy.

When Brentano was engaged in writing the two volumes of *Psychologie*, his intention was to follow it with four further books giving more detailed treatment to the properties of and the laws pertaining to the three fundamental classes of psychic phenomena, and to the relationships between psychic and physical phenomena. His project never came to fruition, however, and today commentators use *Psychologie 1* to denote Oskar Kraus's 1924 edition of *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, which includes volume 1 and chapters 1-4 of volume 2 of the 1874 *Psychologie*. *Psychologie 2* denotes *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*, the second edition by Oskar Kraus, which contains published and unpublished essays from *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene* of 1911 and chapters 5-9 from the second volume of the 1874 *Psychologie* plus some appendixes. *Psychologie 3* is used to denote *Vom sinnlichen und noetischen Bewußtsein* (taken from the *Nachlaß*) in its 1968 edition by Mayer-Hillebrand.

The proposal to distinguish between an early and a late Brentano, a distinction impossible to draw without access to the *Nachlaß* texts, was made by Oskar Kraus in his long introduction to *Psychologie 1*. Kraus arranged the unpublished essays collected in *Wahrheit und Evidenz* into three sections which

¹⁴ Tatarkiewicz declares that the manuscripts published by Brentano's followers after 1924 greatly exceed the works published in his lifetime in importance. Tatarkiewicz 1973, 211. The discovery of two drawers of manuscripts containing Brentano's *Nachlaß* was made by his son Johannes (1888-1969), a scholar of natural sciences (see Mayer-Hillebrand 1969).

supposedly corresponded to the three phases of Brentano's thought: early Brentano, an intermediate transitional phase, and the reist period — even though Brentano himself rejected any such radical division.¹⁵

Kraus also sought to give a unitary account of Brentano's thought by re-reading and re-publishing his early works in the light of the final version of his theory. Kraus's distinctive contribution was his editions of Brentano's works with their detailed introductions and extensive extracts from the *Nachlaß*. But his long preface and the notes added to the text of *Psychologie* in his 1924 edition are interpretative distortions of Brentano's theory of 1874 which seek to render it coherent with its subsequent developments.

The same criticism applies to the Brentanian manuscripts edited by Alfred Kastil and Mayer-Hillebrand. An egregious example of the later distortion of Brentano's thought is provided by Mayer-Hillebrand's edition of *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*, in which she supplements Brentano's text with notes taken by Franz Hillebrand at Brentano's lectures and adds entire paragraphs written by herself.¹⁶ This state of affairs makes a philologically accurate edition of Brentano's works a matter of urgency.

This said, however, there still remains the problem of the cleavage in Brentano's thought between an *early* and a *late* Brentano. On this subject the critical literature advances, broadly speaking, two theses:

- (i) The division, accepted by the second generation of his students, between Brentano's thought prior to 1905 and the reist Brentano; a division also largely subscribed to by his commentators. Thus Chisholm distinguishes between an ontological theory of intentionality and a psychological theory, the former of which was abandoned by Brentano but not the latter, while Szrednicki has instead identified the reasons for Brentano's conversion to reism as an endeavour to achieve a more satisfactory ontology of the mind.¹⁷
- (ii) The much less widely held thesis of a continuity in Brentano's thought,¹⁸ which, however, encounters the major difficulty that one can, for instance, take reism to be 'the' position of Brentano and maintain that his studies prior to the reist period were approximations towards this final position. The real problem, though, is knowing exactly what is meant by 'a fully developed reism'. Brentano, in fact, would on different occasions offer

¹⁵ Brentano 1974, 77-78.

¹⁶ See the polemic on the criteria to adopt in editing Brentano's works in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* which ranged Szrednicki 1961-1962 against Mayer-Hillebrand 1962-1963. See also Albertazzi 1989a, 31-33.

¹⁷ Chisholm 1967; Spiegelberg 1969; Szrednicki 1966; Gilson 1955; Spinicci 1985.

¹⁸ McAlister 1974; Aquila 1977; Richardson 1983; Volpi 1976.

different solutions to the same problem, so that one cannot simply assume that his most thoroughly reist position was that set out in his last dictations.¹⁹

The controversy cannot be resolved, however, without a philologically corrected edition of the whole *Nachlaß*. Moreover, if the interpretation here adopted — according to which the philosophy of Brentano is characterized more by a style of thought rather than by specific solutions to specific problems — is valid, the question of a first, second, ..., *n*th Brentano loses most of its importance. And even when Brentano changed his mind, Aristotle was always his point of reference.

The years from 1830 to 1870 circa were a period of crisis and decline for philosophy in Germany. Although there were still some outstanding practitioners of the discipline — Hermann Lotze for example — one after the other the university chairs of philosophy were occupied by psychologists interested more in psychophysical and experimental research than in philosophy. One need only cite Theodor Fechner. Or Wilhelm Wundt, who although a scholar of psychology (which together with the social sciences was then a philosophical discipline), held the chair of psychology at Leipzig from 1875 to 1918 and oriented the faculty towards his predominantly experimental interests.

Brentano viewed his age as marked by profound philosophical decadence brought about by the influence of idealism and its consequent progressive distancing from the methods of empirical science.²⁰ In effect, these considerations find justification within a broader picture. In *Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr gegenwärtiger Stand* (1895), he divides the entire history of philosophy into three great periods (Antiquity, Middle Ages and the Modern Age) in which there are phases of progress characterized by the application of scientific method, and phases of regression caused by the abandonment of interest in science.²¹

Brentano's conception of the history of philosophy — a conception more theoretical than historical-critical — has been unjustifiably neglected.²² It both sheds considerable light on a lesser-known aspect of Brentano's influence on

¹⁹ Poli 1992b.

²⁰ Letter from Brentano to Kraus del 21 marzo 1916 in Brentano 1966, 291.

²¹ For reasons of space, Brentano's contribution to the history of philosophy, as well as his analysis of Aristotle, cannot be examined here: see *Die Geschichte der Philosophie im Mittelalter*, 1863; *Die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Bern München 1963, which gives ample treatment to Aristotle; *Über die Gründe der Entmutigung auf philosophischem Gebiet*, 1874; *Die vier Phasen der Philosophie und ihr gegenwärtiger Stand* (1895); *Über die Zukunft der Philosophie nebst Vorträgen* (1893); *Was für ein Philosoph manchmal Epoche macht* (1876); *Thomas von Aquin*, Wien 1908.

²² Gilson 1955 is one of the few exceptions.

phenomenology and clarifies his conception of scientific method, two aspects which are closely connected. In fact, his determination of the 'phases' of philosophy, a conception partly influenced by Comte, Brentano's notions of 'scientificity' and of the 'rigour' of philosophical knowledge are of fundamental importance and proceed *pari passu* with his denunciation of the 'decadence' of his age. These are concepts which also appear in Husserl, especially in *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft* and in *Krisis*, and they lie, moreover, at the basis of Heidegger's over-simplification.

The first and fourth of Brentano's *Habilitationstheses* criticise the distinction between natural and speculative sciences and consequently declare that the method of philosophy should be that of the sciences.²³ The notion of rigour in Brentano displays an empiricist component which is emphatically Aristotelian. It is, indeed, this Aristotelian inheritance that is responsible for Brentano's diffidence towards mathematicization;²⁴ a diffidence later reiterated by Husserl in his reflections on the crisis of European sciences and on the origins of geometry.

3. HIS ARISTOTELIAN TRAINING

Brentano's early philosophical studies concentrated on Aristotle. The Aristotelian revival of those years was an attempt to create a new foundation for objective knowledge regulated by the method of the empirical sciences. Although Brentano's theory of the categories set out in *Von den mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* was profoundly influenced by Trendelenburg, his general conceptualization of psychology, and in particular of the *nous poietikos*,²⁵ originated from his studies under the tutelage of Clemens at Münster, where he occupied himself with mediaeval interpretations of Aristotle. In both cases his reading was motivated by theoretical interests forcefully opposed to the historicist-systematic theories of the Hegelian school.

His dissertation is of especial importance because it shows *in nuce* the essential features of his thought. Even on a superficial reading, it seems evident that Brentano examines Aristotelian thought from an ontological point of view; one, that is, which employs the logical tools of speculative grammar. His oscillation between a plurivocal and univocal conception of being suggests that Brentano's later reism stemmed from his youthful studies of Aristotle. Finally his

²³ Brentano 1968d, 36-7.

²⁴ *Über Erkenntnis*.

²⁵ Brentano 1867.

identification of the concept of substance with that of individual is indicative of Brentano's 'empiricist' reading of Aristotle's thought.²⁶

Brentano's dissertation is an exposition of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories and being. Rejecting other interpretations, Brentano identifies categories with the different meanings with which we express the concept of being,²⁷ and in this he is entirely Aristotelian. According to Trendelenburg, Aristotle's theory of categories was formed on the analysis of language. The Greek philosopher assumed the structure of the proposition, analysed into subject and predicate, as the structure of reality, and distinguished predicates into various types corresponding to those that grammarians classify as the parts of speech. However, "because thought and language respectively analyse and describe reality, and so too does the doctrine of categories", this structuring of reality "has ontological as well as linguistic meaning, as Bonitz also demonstrated in the nineteenth century".²⁸ Hence the structure of categories also possesses linguistic, logical and ontological meaning.

If ontological meaning is to be specified, it must be deduced from a single principle. However, criticism of Aristotle's doctrine of categories, brought first by Kant and then by Hegel, focused precisely on the non existence of such a principle. In rebutting this criticism, and in demonstrating the inner systematicity of Aristotle's doctrine, Brentano attempted his own deduction of the categories. We need not dwell on his argument. Suffice it to remember that its point of departure is the division of the categories according to their reference to *pathos* or *pros ti*. While the essential predication constitutes therefore an unique category, non essential predication is a manifold.

We may now advance two considerations. To be noted, first, is that the markedly reist character of Brentano's thought is already manifest in this dissertation. The real concept is the presentation, which can be directly or indirectly addressed to the concrete object existing 'outside the mind'; while the logical operations of predication do not deal with real being, but with being as truth which completely belongs to the realm of mind.²⁹ Secondly the two principles of substance and accident are not reducible to each other but refer to a common concept, that of being. According to some authors, Brentano's simplification of the table of categories already contains *in nuce* his reist perspective which specified this concept of being (*Seiendes*) as a common, very

²⁶ See in particular the reference to Aristotle in Brentano's analysis of the continuum, *infra* § 15 and the conceptions attested in Brentano 1968c.

²⁷ This thesis was proposed above all by Bonitz 1835 and Brentano 1984, 38-39.

²⁸ Berti 1979, 74-75; the references are Apelt 1891 and Bonitz 1835. For a more detailed reconstruction see Berti 1977.

²⁹ Modenato 1979, 23.

general, homogeneous and univocal concept, which always refers to a thing (*Ding*).

It was, moreover, Brentano's reism that induced him, in this work on the several sense of being in Aristotle, to examine whether the doctrine of predication could resolve the problem of individuation. In identifying the concept of substance with that of individual, he neglected the metaphysical sense of the notion of form, defined as the cause of substantiality in the individual.³⁰ The question can be put as follows: since substance is grammatically expressed as a grammatical subject, does it counts for this reason as substance? The answer cannot be but negative, since we can talk of things — like courage, grammar, health or hygiene — that are non-substances.³¹

The categorial structure furnishes the rules of identity, but it is too broad-gauged to furnish the rules of individuation. In a certain respect, this answer to the problem was already to be found in Aristotle, in his distinction between the first category and the others. The former is ostensibly reached only through the *tode ti*.

Implicit in this passage is criticism of the logical tools and grammatical forms — codified in what scholastics called speculative grammar — of traditional logic. This criticism becomes explicit in Brentano's polemic against the traditional theory of judgment based on the identification between copula and existence. Grammatical forms, in fact, are as such ontologically opaque.

The impasse created by language's inability to grasp being induced Brentano to transfer his philosophical interest from Aristotelian ontology to psychology. He sought to develop a new approach to the gnoseological problem framed in psychological terms. This change of approach is a faithful reflection of the development of Aristotle's own thought, however, for it is *De anima* that Brentano cites in emphasising the eminently theoretical value of psychology.³² Thus, although his book of 1867, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles insbesondere seine Lehre vom nous poietikos*, was apparently an attempt to clarify the structure of the *nous poietikos* and its implications, it in fact marked the definitive passage of Brentano's interests to what we may call *psychological* ontology. For Brentano, the origin of knowledge was now sensible experience and the certainty that such experience provided.

³⁰ On the Aristotelian identification of substance with individual see Berti 1977, 230. Aristotle first assigned a meaning to 'substance' based on Platonic dialectics, according to which "substance designates a genus of predicates (i.e. that genus of predicates that can be attributed only to terms included in the same column)". He then gave a new meaning to the term, "specifically derived from his criticism of ideas as separate universals, according to which substance indicates what authentically exists in a separate way, i.e. the individual". See Zanatta 1989, 149.

³¹ Melandri 1990, 41; the examples are Aristotle's 1928, *Cat*.

³² Brentano 1977; Aristotle 1979.

Brentano's Aristotelian studies led him to conclude that a revival of Aristotle was not feasible (even though the Greek philosopher was to exert considerable influence on his thought), and they provided him with a set of premises which constituted the conceptual basis for *Psychologie I*, principal among which was the crucial nature of psychology and of inner perception. This latter aspect was reinforced by the Cartesian theory of the evidence of the inner perception of psychic phenomena, accompanied by the mediated — and therefore not immediately evident — character of external perception.

Moreover, Brentano drew on *De anima* for his first theory of intentionality,³³ by which, from a cognitive point of view, sensibility absorbs the object into the consciousness only according to the form. Brentano translates this power of the sense of receiving the sensible forms in itself without the matter as the *mental* (or *intentional*) existence of the objects which are presented in an evident way.³⁴

Brentano thus began as a metaphysical philosopher, but shifted to psychology when he found himself trapped in a theoretical impasse. His interest in metaphysics, however, continued to predominate in his psychological inquiries: the constant feature of his thought, in fact, was its view of psychology as a discipline of outstanding ontological interest, an aspect determined by his predominantly theoretical conception of psychology drawn from *De anima*.³⁵

4. PSYCHOLOGY FROM AN EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT

The fundamental feature of the new discipline that Brentano sought to develop was its *empirical* conceptualization. He maintained, in fact, that a new foundation could not be given to philosophy unless its method had been adapted to (indeed made identical to) that of the natural sciences. In particular, philosophy should begin with psychology, whose *method* was akin to that of the sciences of nature and whose *content* was coextensive with that of philosophy. In this respect, the whole of Brentano's philosophy, in antithesis to the idealism that then held sway in the German universities, was contained *in nuce* by the seventh of his *Habilitationstheses* entitled *vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia sine scientia naturalis est*.

Brentano started from the premise that psychology and the other exact sciences are similar: they are all sciences of phenomena, the source of which is

³³ Aristotle 1979, 415a 16; Brentano 1977, 75, 82; Brentano 1924, 124 and note ***) and 125 and note *).

³⁴ Brentano 1977, 79-81; 113 ff.

³⁵ This connection results particularly clear in Brentano 1867.

both perception and experience. There is, however, an essential difference between psychology and the other natural sciences: the subject is *unable to observe* psychic phenomena. *Inner observation* (*innere Beobachtung*) of the phenomena of consciousness is impossible, and instead comes about by means of a particular kind of perception: *inner perception* (*innere Wahrnehmung*). This is a crucial point, since inner perception presupposes the identity of perceiver and perceived, this being the justification for its evidence. Conversely, the inner observation which provided the basis for the experimental psychology of Wundt, Ebbinghaus and Külpe presupposed a distance between observed and observer.³⁶ In this context Brentano turned to the philosophy of Descartes, from which he took the theory of evidence, and to British empiricism, especially that of Locke and Mill, from which he derived his concept of the *empirical point of view*.

The empirical point of view is scientific method as codified by empiricism: the induction of general laws, the deduction of specific ones, and their verification by the facts of experience. But since Brentano maintained that inner observation — that is, the separability of consciousness and the phenomenon perceived — was impossible, his psychology was *empirical* without being *experimental*. However, Brentano was referring not only to the laws governing the succession of psychic phenomena — laws established inductively — but to the classification of the ultimate elements of the psyche as well.

Brentano's conceptualization of empirical method linked with Aristotelian position adopted in polemic against the nineteenth-century doctrine of physical mathematics as the paradigm of all scientific knowledge. Brentano, in fact, was arguing against Kant, who denied that psychology would not be a science because it could not be mathematized.³⁷

One of the fundamental theoretical features of *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* is its division of phenomena into *physical* and *psychic*, where the term 'phenomenon' (*Phänomen*) is not to be understood in its Kantian sense, but in the positivist sense of 'fact' (*Tatsache*). It thus denotes a state (*Zustand*), a process (*Vorgang*) or an event (*Ereignis*). In the 1874 *Psychologie* Brentano used the expression 'physical phenomena' to refer to the primary sensible objects; thereby counterposing them to 'psychic phenomena', for which he used the Aristotelian expression *idion aisteton*.

Phenomena are primarily distinguished by the grammatical form used when referring to them: thus, for example, a psychic phenomenon is a seeing, a hear-

³⁶ Brentano 1924, I, ii, § 2, 41-42.

³⁷ Brentano 1924, 95; Brentano 1979, 79.

ing, a loving, while a physical phenomenon is that which is seen, heard or loved.

The second characteristic of psychic phenomena is that they are mentally *in-existent* or *intentional*. The term is mediaeval in origin and stands for the *intentional* reference of consciousness to a *content* or an immanent objectuality.³⁸ In contrast to physical phenomena, a psychic phenomenon is an *act* and it is characterized by intentionality: thus hearing a sound, seeing a coloured object, feeling heat and cold, thinking a general concept, in short, every kind of mental presentation, is a psychic phenomenon. Hence every psychic act is accompanied in consciousness by a *something* which constitutes the intentional object of the act in question. But whereas the intentional character of psychic phenomena was progressively eliminated in the reist evolution of Brentano's thought, their second feature, that of referring to an object, persisted through all its various stages of development.

Another fundamental concept in the 1874 *Psychologie* is the evidence of psychic phenomena. These latter in fact present themselves with an immediate, incontrovertible and necessary evidence. The contrast between the character of absolute evidence pertaining to inner perception and the mediated character of external perception gives rise to further features of the two different classes of phenomena. The first of these is the hypothetical and probabilistic nature of external reality. Strictly speaking, physical phenomena do not exist in Locke's sense as applied to secondary qualities.³⁹

Also physical phenomena are given to our consciousness as intentional objects, although they are not to be identified with psychic phenomena *tout court*.⁴⁰ they are sensible objects, psychically given, never physical phenomena in the strict sense and never directly given as such.⁴¹ In particular, physical phenomena are characterized by their *qualitative* nature and by their *spatial* extension. However much Brentano's conception may have changed with the passage of time in terms of its greater or lesser degree of empiricism, the *qualitative-extensional determinateness* of physical phenomena was a constant element of his thought.⁴² From the 1890s onwards, Brentano's final studies of

³⁸ Brentano 1924, 124-125; Vanni Rovighi 1978, 275-283, "The intentionality of the knowledge according to P. Aureolo", 284-299; "A remote source of the Husserlian theory of intentionality"; Sellars 1958, 507-539; Marras 1974; Marras 1976.

³⁹ Brentano 1982, 44.

⁴⁰ Brentano 1924, 130; Brentano 1971, 177.

⁴¹ Brentano 1982, 59.

⁴² Brentano 1982, 64. See also Smith 1989.

space, time and the continuum convinced him that also physical phenomena are given with absolute *temporal* determinations.⁴³

Finally, Brentano drew a distinction within psychic phenomena between a *primary object* (for example, a sound) and a *secondary object* (the act of perceiving the sound). The psychic phenomenon, therefore, is a stratified unity consisting of various parts: consciousness of the primary object, consciousness of the secondary object, and the multiple modes in which this consciousness is realized. This conceptual system provided Brentano with the framework for his theory of parts and wholes (or mereology); a theory which provided the basis for both his doctrine of substance and accidents and his theory of judgment.

5. MEREOLOGY

Brentano's theory of parts and wholes therefore originated in the problem of the *unity of consciousness*, one of the principal topics addressed by his descriptive psychology and subsequently given further development by Stumpf.⁴⁴ Brentano framed the problem by asserting that consciousness of the primary object, that of the secondary object and the multiplicity of the modes of consciousness are parts of a unitary whole, the psychic phenomenon.

In this first elaboration, Brentano contended that a real thing cannot itself contain a multiplicity of real things, only a multiplicity of parts, which he called *divisives* (*Divisive*). He used the term *part* (*Teil*) for the elements of *collectives*, and by 'collective' he meant a multiplicity designated by terms such as 'flock', 'herd', 'swarm' and so on.⁴⁵

Consciousness for Brentano is thus *unitary* but not *simple*.⁴⁶

The same applies to collectives and to continua: these too are unitary concepts which are divisible into many parts and are therefore not simple objects. However, whereas within continua there is an interdependence among the parts, this is not the case of collectives (the analysis of the laws of dependence was one of the essential components of Brentano's mereology).⁴⁷ The parts of consciousness may disappear and reappear, and at the moment in

⁴³ Brentano's conception of space was subsequently developed by two of his pupils in particular: Marty and Husserl. Stumpf 1919, 136; Werner 1930, chap. 3, 71; Albertazzi 1992-93.

⁴⁴ Brentano 1982, 12-27; Stumpf 1873.

⁴⁵ Brentano 1924, Book 1, ch. IV; the reference is more and more Aristotelian: Aristotle 1924, *Met.* Book 3, 16.

⁴⁶ Brentano 1924, 234; Brentano 1982, 10-12.

⁴⁷ Smith 1982; Simons 1987a; Libardi 1990; Poli 1992a.

which they actually are parts of consciousness they are not distinct parts like the elements of a collective — they are interdependent parts like the subdivisions of a continuum. In *Deskriptive Psychologie*, Brentano contrasted separable parts (*ablösbare Teile*) with distinctional parts, ones that are only mentally separable.⁴⁸ For example, the separable parts of consciousness are psychic acts, which can be separable (i) *unilaterally* (thinking from seeing, from observing, and so on) or (ii) *bilaterally* (seeing and hearing, the two parts of a cut apple, and so on). Bilateral separation is also called real separation. Distinctional parts are instead “improper parts and are divided into four types: (a) in its proper sense (inner, *durchwohenende*); (b) in its weak (logical) sense; (c) related to the relational structure of consciousness (correlates); (d) related to the *Diplosenergie* (primary and secondary consciousness)”.⁴⁹ Those distinguishable parts that do not stand in a genus/species relation are interdependent parts.

Thus, as regards the mereology set out in *Psychologie I*, we have either a collective of things or a single thing in which divisives can be distinguished as its parts. In relation to substance, therefore, *accidents* are considered to be divisives. This conception, however, changes radically in *Kategorienlehre*,⁵⁰ where a substance (for example, a man) is a part of an accident (for example, a seated-man). One consequence of this theory is that every accidental modification of the substance entails a change in its individuation: a person who sees something and then ceases to see it becomes, from an ontological point of view, a different person.

According to Chisholm’s interpretation of this theory, the relation between substance and accident is conceived as a particular kind of part-whole relation (*x is a constituent of y*) which is apprehended in inner perception. Using this as his basis, Chisholm defines the Brentanian concepts of *accident*, *substance*, *exist in oneself* (*ist etwas für sich*), *primary individual* (*ein Wesen*), *aggregate* (*Kollektivum*), *ultimate substance* (*eine letzte einheitliche Substanz*).⁵¹

⁴⁸ Brentano 1982, 12-14; 20-21; Smith Mulligan 1982, 636.

⁴⁹ Albertazzi 1993-1994.

⁵⁰ Brentano 1985, particularly 1.II.3 (“Wesen, Einheit und Wesenteile”); 1.II.5 (“Das Verhältnis von Teilen und Ganzen beim Koll, Kontinuum und Akzident”); 2.II.8 (“Substanz und Akzidents: 1. Ganze mit gegenseitig ablösbaren Teilen, Kontinua. 2. Ganzes wovon nur ein Teil ablösbar”).

⁵¹ Chisholm 1982, § 8. This theory has been formalized by Gilbert Null. Null calls substances (i.e. independent objects) *individuals* while he calls dependent individuals *qualities*. Higher-order wholes are objects which are not substances but which have substances as their parts, while *accidents* are higher-order qualities. The concepts of substance and accident formalized by Null are therefore those expounded by Husserl. Since Null’s system succeeds in deriving the six theorems of Husserl’s 3rd Investigation, Simons’ thesis that the “neo-Aristotelian ideas of Brentano and the different neo-Aristotelian ideas of his pupil Husserl could be combined in a single theory” seems convincing. Simons 1987a, 315.

Brentano claimed that this theory, too, originated with Aristotle, but in doing so he entirely reversed the interpretation that he had given to it in *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden*, where he only substance constituted being in the proper sense, whereas an accident was a being in the improper, weaker sense. The reference is to Book 12 of *Metaphysics*, wherein Aristotle states: “if one considers the totality of reality (*to pan*) as a whole (*os olon ti*), substance is the prime part”.⁵² Brentano understood the whole as “all the substance together with its accidents”.

In Brentano’s last writings, the part-whole relation is correlated with three different kinds of whole:

1. The whole in the collective sense, a conception which Brentano never substantially altered;
2. The whole as ‘qualified substance’, that is, the substance and its accidents as discussed above;
3. The whole as a continuum, which will be examined in section 17.

6. INNER PERCEPTION

The first and most important feature of inner perception (*innere Wahrnehmung*), the feature that characterizes it phenomenologically, is its immediate and infallible evidence.⁵³ As Bergmann pointed out, the necessary and sufficient condition for the evidence of inner perception is that there should exist a real unity and reciprocal inseparability between perceiver and the perceived.⁵⁴ Unlike Bergmann, however, in order to guarantee the evidence of inner perception, Brentano deemed it necessary to exclude unconscious psychic phenomena; an exclusion that constitutes one of the theoretical cornerstones of *Psychologie I*.⁵⁵

Inner perception, moreover, is non-observable, and it is tied to instantaneous perception, to the moment-now, to the present; it is consciousness of whatever happens psychically, the elementary fact of consciousness. Brentano’s exclusion of the temporal extension of inner perception depends on the negation of the various levels of existence: something may be present and therefore exist, or past and therefore not exist, but it cannot be more or less past

⁵² Aristotle 1924, *Met.*, Book. 12, 1, 1069a, 20.

⁵³ Brentano 1924, 128.

⁵⁴ Bergmann 1908, 12-13; Brentano 1924, 199.

⁵⁵ Bergmann 1908, 24; Brentano 1924, Book 2, ch. 2; on this problem see Poli 1989a. Freud, in fact, was one of Brentano’s students in Vienna.

or more or less existent. The *more or less* refers to the form of the act, not to its object.⁵⁶

A further characteristic of Brentano's theory is the *non-individuality* of inner perception; a position assumed by all the members of his school. In Brentano's later writings especially, the non-individuality of the psychic act entails the non-individuality of its content (according to his reist position, in fact, the content is a part of the act). This feature of inner perception raises the problem of *intersubjectivity*, which subsequently became a central concern of phenomenology. The term does not appear in Brentano, but the problem to which it refers was raised in *Psychologie 1*.⁵⁷

As his theory evolved, Brentano's conception of inner perception accordingly changed. In *Psychologie 1*, he described inner perception as characterized by evidence, although it was confused and general. In subsequent editions of *Psychologie 1*, he propounded a view of inner perception as individual, arising from comparison, abstraction and judgment, and connected with the problem of apperception (*Apperzeption*).

Brentano therefore distinguished two meanings of inner perception. First, he defines inner perception in the strict sense, as the primary consciousness of the intentional object and as invariably accompanied by a secondary consciousness of the act. Inner perception in the strict sense is evident, it refers to an object perceived as a whole; but it is confused, general, it is not distinguished into its parts and it does not permit inner observation.

Brentano then identifies a second kind of inner perception which enables determination of the secondary object on the basis of an apprehension which is now clear and distinct, and by means of which Brentano defines the act of *apperception*.⁵⁸ This second kind of inner perception 'in the broad sense' results from a complex psychic activity which involves comparing (*Vergleichen*), noting (*Bemerken*) and distinguishing (*Unterscheiden*).⁵⁹ Brentano defines it as "a clear and distinct perception of the relations among individual parts",⁶⁰ in that this type of perception permits the apprehension of the individual parts of the whole of presentation.

In *Psychologie 1* every psychic act stands in a primary relation to the object of presentation and in a secondary relation to the act of perception. The act of perception is always given in concomitance with the intentional object, as a

⁵⁶ Brentano 1933.

⁵⁷ Brentano 1924, 51-56.

⁵⁸ Kraus introduction to Brentano 1924. See Brentano 1911, Appendix, 140, and Brentano 1982: Dictate of January 1901, § 4, 34.

⁵⁹ Brentano 1982, 17.

⁶⁰ Brentano 1982, 33.

secondary relation of consciousness.⁶¹ According to this first account, internally perceived psychic activities are only differentiated by their differing kinds of object.

After 1911, the year in which *Psychologie 2* was published, the secondary object is not solely the single object of the secondary relation, but within the psychic act it also includes all the modes of relation.⁶² Hence internally perceived psychic activities are differentiated not only by their various kinds of object, but by their diverse modes as well. Inner perception can be further characterized in terms of its differences from external perception. Just as evidence is the phenomenological and descriptive feature of inner perception, so attention (*Aufmerksamkeit*), i.e. the ability to address one's own objects, and as such is the principal phenomenological feature of external perception.⁶³

External perception, unlike inner perception, is not evident; a distinction which was the focus of Husserl's critique brought against Brentano in the 5th of his *Logical investigations*. The arguments adduced in support of this thesis can be summarized as follows:

1. The empiricist argument, as propounded by Locke for example, which asserts the illusory nature of external perception.⁶⁴
2. The argument of the non-unity of knower and known. Although inner perception is characterized by this unity — the direct contact between knower and known which is the prime source of evidence — in external perception the known object, before being such, is a transcendent object.⁶⁵
3. The distinction between the perceiver and perceived resides in the nature of external perception — that is, in the possibility of observation. Inner perception occurs entirely in the present, whereas observation takes place in time. Thus external perception involves a temporal delay which renders immediate contact impossible.⁶⁶

This account raises two difficulties. The first is the ability of external perception to provide a basis for the natural sciences. How can these sciences not have cognitive value, if it is precisely their method that Brentano advocates in construction of a scientific philosophy? The second difficulty concerns the possibility of justifying error in the phenomena apprehended by inner perception.

⁶¹ Brentano 1977, 131, 138.

⁶² Brentano 1911, 138.

⁶³ Brentano 1924, 41.

⁶⁴ Brentano 1922, 163-167; Brentano 1956, 144-154; Brentano 1924, 13-14.

⁶⁵ Brentano 1970, 163-164.

⁶⁶ Brentano 1970, 195.

As regards the first of these two problems, the exclusion of evidence does not entail that a merely hypothetical procedure, i.e. one based on probability calculus, is impossible.⁶⁷ In other words, as regards real objects, “the assertory evidence of the corresponding inner perception is represented... as a research of *probability*”.⁶⁸ Providing a theoretically acceptable explanation for error in inner perception is more difficult, and in fact requires clarification of another fundamental component in Brentano’s psychology, namely its ‘descriptive’ character.

7. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

The empirical point of view constitutes only one aspect of Brentano’s thought, and specifically the metaphysical nature of his theory of perception. The most properly *ontological* component of his theory is contained in what Brentano calls his *descriptive psychology*, which rests on the absolute and infallible evidence of inner perception that therefore constitutes the basis of psychology. This relation between psychology and theory of knowledge was already evident in the theoretical structure of *Psychologie I* and was, in fact, a concept widely current at the time. But if the human intellect possesses a mechanism to produce infallible knowledge, why is the outcome of the cognitive processes sometimes false?

According to Brentano, errors are committed not because perception is misleading, but because we deceive ourselves concerning what we actually perceive.⁶⁹ In fact, psychology, too, is based to some extent on observation, inasmuch as only psychic phenomena reconsidered in recent memory qualify as scientific observations. The elements of experience which constitute the empirical foundation of psychology are not simple internal perceptions; they are, rather, the recent memories of psychic acts. Only in memory is it possible to observe psychic phenomena, to consider their parts and their structure. Memory is not evident, however, because in recalling events, inner perception grasps with absolute evidence whatever is being remembered, but not the memory corresponding to whatever has been effectively experienced. This accounts for Brentano’s distinction between absolute infallible evidence and

⁶⁷ Brentano 1970, 237-258, 68-95; Brentano 1956, 241-286; 286-299. Brentano gives great importance to philosophical questions connected with the calculus of probabilities: see Gilson 1955, 118-154. The topic continued to attract the attention of his followers.

⁶⁸ Melandri 1990, 113.

⁶⁹ Brentano 1968a, 6.

fallible evident judgments.⁷⁰ Hence all the laws of descriptive psychology have a certain margin of uncertainty; that is, they possess only probable certainty which requires repeated observation for its argumentation.⁷¹

Closer examination of Brentano's descriptive psychology shows that it relates to one of the most widely-debated psychological issues of the nineteenth century, the distinction between descriptive and genetic method. The term 'descriptive' (*beschreibend*) was introduced into the mathematic sciences by Kirchhoff, and it was initially used in contraposition to 'explanatory' (*erklärend*). The term 'descriptive' was later used by Wundt to distinguish his psychology from atomistic psychology, while Dilthey used 'descriptive' (*beschreibend*), in the sense of 'analytical', in antithesis to 'nomothetic', to denote the method of comprehension in the sciences of spirit. In Brentano, the term *deskriptiv* assumes the specific meaning of *morphological* or classificatory; it therefore contrasts with the 'explanatory' nature of the genetic method used by Fechner and Wundt in investigation of the developmental laws of psychic facts. However, the term does not appear in *Psychologie 1*, but only subsequently in Brentano's course of lectures delivered in 1887/1888 (*Deskriptive Psychologie*). He would later adopt the term *Psychognosie*.⁷²

Descriptive is one of the key words in Brentano's philosophy, and it subsequently acquired even greater significance in Husserlian phenomenology. Generally speaking, all the ramifications of Brentano's thought relate in some way or other to this original distinction, and the concept is still of considerable importance in contemporary philosophy.

Brentano defined his descriptive psychology as an *exact* science and as a *pure* psychology (*reine Psychologie*) which analysed and classified the elements of psychic life and the laws that govern it.⁷³ The fact that he regarded his descriptive psychology as a pure psychology demonstrates that he intended it to be a theoretical science, wholly distinct from physiology. The task of descriptive psychology was to determine the elements of human consciousness and their connections.⁷⁴ By *human consciousness* Brentano meant the set of psychic phenomena given in inner perception; *connections* were the categories of (formal) ontology: part-whole relations, substance-accident;⁷⁵ *elements* were to be understood not as *atoms*, but as *homogeneous parts*, the Aristotelian

⁷⁰ Brentano 1924, 48-51.

⁷¹ Brentano 1982, 127; Brentano 1956, 161.

⁷² Kirchhoff 1874-1876; Dilthey 1894; Brentano 1982, 9; as for it see Hedwig 1989 and Albertazzi 1989b, 47-49.

⁷³ Brentano 1982.

⁷⁴ Brentano 1982, 1; Brentano 1924, 64 ff.; Brentano 1924, 13, 112; Brentano 1911b, 31. On it see Chisholm 1982.

⁷⁵ Brentano 1982, 10-27; Smith & Mulligan 1982.

*stoikeion*⁷⁶ (further confirmation of this is provided by Brentano's use of the term *Bestandteil* (*component*) as a synonym for *Element*).

Smith's comment gives succinct account of the ontological development of Brentano's descriptive psychology by the Brentanians. Brentano himself, in fact, expounded "an example of a *characteristica specialis*, a directly depicting language restricted to some specific sphere", a particular development of the endeavour by Leibniz, Descartes, and Jungius to build a *characteristica universalis*.⁷⁷ Brentano expounded some of the themes of his descriptive psychology in his lectures on logic (themes that today would be more correctly treated by formal ontology).

Brentano's first step in constructing his descriptive psychology was to *determine* the significant elements of psychic life. *Determining* is a twofold activity. Its first component is psychological and involves such operations as *experiencing* and *noting*. The second is linguistic and also involves two processes: the naming of the elements of psychic life and then their definition. Brentano's analysis of the problem of determining, in which he follows the scholastic tradition, is set out in his lectures on logic.⁷⁸

Among the concepts introduced in Brentano's descriptive psychology, of notable importance is his distinction between *determining* and *modifying* adjectives. This theory is presented in relation to what Brentano called the 'distinctional, improper, or logical parts' obtained by 'modifying distinction'. The adjective *past* is not an adjective in the same sense as the determining adjectives *red* or *circular* are; it is instead a modifying adjective like *false* or *non-existent*. A button described as red is still a button, but a diamond described as false is not a diamond. Likewise, something past does not exist, just as *existing* and *being present* are synonymous.⁷⁹ Other adjectives have a dual function: *painted*, for instance, so that 'a painted picture' is always a picture, but 'a painted landscape' is not a landscape.⁸⁰ This distinction was subsequently taken up and developed by Marty and Twardowski, in whose thought it came to occupy an central position.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Aristotle 1924, *Met.*, Book 5, 3.

⁷⁷ Smith 1992; Smith identifies in the idea of *characteristica universalis* two distinct ideas: "the idea of the characteristic as a perspicuous representation of relations among concepts, and the idea of characteristic as a mirror of reality".

⁷⁸ Brentano 1956, 85-93; on the question of names and nomination Smith 1992, Albertazzi 1990.

⁷⁹ Brentano 1971, 60 and note; Brentano 1982, 19.

⁸⁰ Poli 1993b, 42; the theory of modifying adjectives is dealt by Brentano in relation with the theory of double judgments. On this see also Poli 1993e.

⁸¹ Brentano 1924, vol. II; Book 2, ch. 7; Twardowski 1984, ch. IV; Meinong 1910, 18, 377-85; Marty 1884-1895, in particular the two articles of 1895; Husserl 1900-1901, 4th Inves-

A 'past' note and a 'seen' color are not the objects of actual observation. 'Past' and 'seen' are *modifying determinations* (*modifizierende Bestimmungen*) of the object.⁸²

8. THE THREEFOLD DIVISION OF PSYCHIC PHENOMENA

Another important component of Brentano's descriptive psychology is its classification of psychic phenomena into the three classes of presentations, judgments and feelings. Indeed, it was on the basis of this threefold distinction that Brentano's pupils went on to develop their various ontologies. It prompted Stumpf, Marty, Ehrenfels, Meinong, Twardowski, and Husserl to extend their interest in descriptive realism beyond the purely psychological sphere and to construct 'a sort of *descriptive general ontology*'.

According to the emphasis given to one or other of the three classes, we may distinguish three different ontologies: the ontology of things, of states of affairs, and of values.⁸³ The ontology of *things* arises when "one turns from the psychology of presentation to an investigation of the non-psychological correlates of presenting acts". Contributions to the development of this ontology were made by Stumpf's theory of the partial contents of visual presentation (1873), by Ehrenfels's doctrine of *figural qualities* (1890), and by Brentano's later studies of spatial and temporal continua (1933, 1976). Likewise, "the ontology of *states of affairs* arises... when one moves from the psychology of judgment to the investigation of the correlates of judging acts".⁸⁴ Responsible for the most notable developments in this ontology were Stumpf, Marty, Husserl, and the Munich phenomenological circle. Thirdly, the ontology of *values*⁸⁵ originates from investigation of the ontological correlates of feeling acts, of which the main practitioners were Ehrenfels, Meinong and the Graz school.

These developments provide indirect proof of the ontological value of Brentano's descriptive psychology, which, according to its stated purpose of furnishing exact knowledge of the structures and categories of mental life, also sought to lay a sure foundation for other branches of philosophy. It is on the

tigation; Husserl 1913, §§ 11-2. The largest available reconstruction is Mulligan 1987, see also Mulligan & Smith 1985.

⁸² Albertazzi 1993-1994; Brentano refers to Aristotle 1924, *Met.*, Book 5, 16.

⁸³ Smith 1989; particularly p. 43.

⁸⁴ Smith 1989, 44; on the ontology of the states of affairs see the paper by Smith in this volume and Smith 1988a. On figural qualities, Albertazzi 1993b.

⁸⁵ For the Brentanian theory of values see Chisholm 1986.

basis of these developments that one may contend that Brentano's *psychology is an ontology* based on the characteristics of inner evidence, on the intentionality of consciousness, and on the classification of psychic acts. One should not forget, moreover, that Brentano intended *Psychologie 3* to be an introduction to his metaphysics.⁸⁶

Brentano thus divided psychic phenomena into three classes, according to the different ways in which a psychic phenomenon is tied to its object. His criterion for this distinction was not a difference inherent in objects themselves, but the diverse features assumed by the intentionality relation. The origin of Brentano's division was the modes of in-existence in Aristotle, Descartes and Kant. It did not, however, derive from Aristotle's tripartition of the soul (vegetative, sensitive, intellective), but from his division of psychic phenomena into the two classes of *thought (nous)* and *desire (orexis)*. The former class includes both the highest activities of the intellect, such as abstraction and the elaboration of general judgments, and phenomena pertaining to the sensitive soul, such as sensible perception, imagination and memory. The class of desire comprises high sentiments as well as the basest instincts, both of which categories refer in the same way to their objects. According to Brentano, the criterion used by Aristotle to define these two classes was that of intentional reference, since they are not directed towards different objects, but to the same objects in different ways.⁸⁷

Another, less remote, source for Brentano was the tripartition set out by Descartes in his third *Meditation: ideae, judicia, valuntates sive affectus*.⁸⁸ His distinction can also be usefully compared with Kant's distinction among *knowledge, sentiment* and *desire*, which he based on a classification already proposed by other writers — Tetens and Mendelssohn for example — and also taken up by Lotze and Herbart.⁸⁹ The following diagram shows how these various classifications compare with Brentano's:

⁸⁶ Brentano 1982, 1 ff., 127 nr. 1., 135 nr. 1.

⁸⁷ For Aristotle see Aristotle 1979, Book 3, 10; Aristotle 1924, *Met.*, Book 12, 7: recalled in Brentano 1971, 7-9; while for Kant the reference is recalled in Brentano 1971, 10-18.

⁸⁸ Descartes, 3rd Meditation, see Brentano 1971, ch. 5, §§ 3-5.

⁸⁹ Brentano 1971, 10-23.

TABLE I

| ARISTOTLE | DESCARTES | KANT | BRENTANO |
|-----------|---------------------------------|-----------|--------------|
| Thought | <i>Ideae</i> | Knowledge | Presentation |
| | <i>Judicia</i> | | Judgment |
| Desire | <i>Voluntates sive affectus</i> | Sentiment | Feeling |
| | | Desire | |

The presentation is able to distinguish between judgments and feelings because they are bivalent. We can accept or reject them, in so far as we are pro or contra their objects.⁹⁰ Presentations and judgments have a great deal in common, since they jointly constitute the cognitive act. It was long believed that Brentano never abandoned this distinction, but recent evidence from the *Nachlaß* shows that he ultimately opted for a division of psychic phenomena into two classes, the first consisting of presentations and judgments (which he considered to be only presentations in a different form), the second consisting of feelings.⁹¹ In this case, Brentano pointed out, his classification resembled not only Aristotle's but also Kant's, since both connected the concepts of presentation and judgment.⁹²

Brentano's classification was criticised as being too generic: Meinong, for example, introduced also *assumptions* (*Annahmen*), which stood midway between presentations and judgments.⁹³ A second criticism was that his classification was not evident *a priori*, so that it was always possible to find another class which had not yet been identified.

Brentano discusses Meinong's proposal in "Von der Modifikation der Urteile und Gemütsbewegungen durch die Modi der Vorstellens"⁹⁴ where he relates assumptions to the differentiation between direct and oblique modes, and hence to presentations, with no need to introduce a new class. Brentano's tripartition of psychic phenomena lost part of its theoretical value in the reist revolution in Brentano's later thought, where the *modes* of presentation — *rectus*, *obliquus* and (among the oblique modes) *temporal* — are given priority.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Melandri 1960, 115-116.

⁹¹ Brentano 1987, 28.

⁹² Brentano Ps 37, nr. 512113; Albertazzi 1990-1991, Brandl 1987.

⁹³ Meinong 1910.

⁹⁴ Brentano 1971, 147-150.

⁹⁵ Brentano 1924, LI.

9. PRESENTATION

The first of Brentano's three classes of psychic phenomena was presentation, and this he assumed to be presupposed by the other two classes. Presentations include both intuitive presentations — i.e. those relative to perception — and conceptual ones. In the former case, we are aware of having an object in mind as a direct experience; in the latter case, the mental object is given, not in an intuitive presentation, but directly through the concepts based upon it.

Brentano's assertion that our thought takes only *things* as its object induced him to develop a more systematic conceptualization of presentation. In his theory set out in *Psychologie 1*, presentation admits only differences in the object. Subsequently, however, he introduced the concept of *mode of presentation*. He first announced this change to his theory, albeit in outline form, in a letter written to Anton Marty on 22 May 1905,⁹⁶ and then devoted an appendix to *Psychologie 2*, entitled *Von den Modis des Vorstellens*, to the modes of presentation.

In this new theory, the object can be thought in different ways. Of these, the most relevant are the modes of *time* and of *attribution*. The problem of time is given detailed treatment below, while here we may dwell for a moment on the *attributive synthesis*.⁹⁷ Since these changes do not modify the first theory of presentation, we may distinguish between two kinds of presentation — one *sensible* (relative to perception), the other *noetic* (relative to the attributive synthesis).

In the last phase of his thought, Brentano drew an explicit distinction between two types of presentation: direct presentations (*in modo recto*) and indirect presentations (*in modo obliquo*). The former are presentations in the usual sense, while the latter are presentations of something which necessarily refers to something else. When one thinks of someone who thinks something, then one thinks *in modo recto* of the thinker and *in modo obliquo* of what is thought. The *modus rectus* is unique, whereas the *modus obliquus* can assume an unlimited number of forms. For example, the presentation of an object in the past can assume a continuous series of oblique modes. In the appendix to *Psychologie 2*, the diversity of the temporal modes as well as of the *modus rectus*

⁹⁶ Brentano 1966, 122-124.

⁹⁷ Brentano gives a thorough account of his modified theory of intentionality in the appendixes to *Psychologie II*, particularly "Von der attributiven Vorstellungsverbindung in recto und obliquo", 145-147; "Anschauung und abstrakte Vorstellung" (dictated by Brentano the 9th March 1917), 204-212. On the differences between sensible and noetic presentation, see Albertazzi 1993-1994.

and *modus obliquus* is considered independently.⁹⁸ The various kinds of *modus obliquus* still do not include those of the past and of the future;⁹⁹ and even subsequently Brentano was reluctant to classify the temporal modes simply as oblique ones,¹⁰⁰ until he eventually did so in his dictation of 13 February 1915, “Das Zeitliche als Relativliches”, where he applied his theory of quasi-relations (§ 15) to the problem of time.¹⁰¹

10. JUDGMENT

Judgments are the second type of intentional reference to the object of consciousness envisaged by Brentano: when a judgment occurs, something is recognized (*anerkannt*) or rejected (*verworfen*); that is, believed or not believed.¹⁰² Brentano developed this account of the judgment in the 1874 *Psychologie* in opposition to traditional associationist theory, according to which the judgment consists in the association of two presentations.¹⁰³ For Brentano, the judgment expresses the way in which the object present to the consciousness is accepted or rejected, and it is therefore distinct from the presentation even though based upon it.¹⁰⁴

To prove the thesis that the judgment is not the synthesis of two presentations, Brentano draws on the analysis of subjectless propositions. In the case of statements like ‘it is raining’, ‘it is thundering’ or ‘it is hailing’, there is no subject and we therefore affirm the ‘raining’, and so on, without a synthesis between subject and predicate.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸ Brentano took the term ‘*obliquus*’ from the doctrine of declension. See Melandri 1989, 113-114.

⁹⁹ Brentano 1971, 145.

¹⁰⁰ Brentano 1966, 278-9, letter to Kraus of 8 February 1915.

¹⁰¹ Brentano 1976, 126-9.

¹⁰² On it Hillebrand 1891, 26-27.

¹⁰³ Brentano elaborated his ideas during the winter semester of 1870-1871, and these are the ideas we find in *Psychologie II*. He later returned to the question in his lectures on logic, delivered in Vienna from 1875 to 1895. The material has been published by F. Mayer-Hillebrand in Brentano 1956.

¹⁰⁴ Höfler 1890, 512. On Brentano’s theory of judgment see Hillebrand 1891 and Vailati 1987 (“Sulla portata logica della classificazione dei fatti mentali proposta dal prof. F. Brentano”), Calò 1908 and Rossi 1926.

¹⁰⁵ Brentano’s article was first published in the *Wiener Zeitung*, 13-14 November 1883, then as an appendix to Brentano 1969, see also pages 18 and 57; it was finally included in the second volume of *Psychologie* Brentano 1971, 183-196. The part in Brentano 1956 dedicated to the theme of impersonal verbs is examined partly in the preceding essay, partly in Hillebrand’s notes on Brentano’s lectures.

If we consider a judgment to be a synthesis of presentations, then the proposition 'God is' should be the synthesis of two presentations. In this case the verb 'to be' should express the second presentation, the presentation of 'existence'. The concept of existence is only the way in which the object is recognized in judgment: "We cannot render as our object of thought either a centaur, or the being or non-being of a centaur, but only a subject affirming or denying the centaur; in this case the centaur is in a certain oblique way the object of thought too".¹⁰⁶

An important distinction drawn within Brentano's theory of the judgment is that between autosemantic and synsemantic (*mitbedeutend*) expressions.¹⁰⁷ The former are signifying *per se*, while the latter are signifying only in connection with other expressions. However, the autosemantic character of an expression does not guarantee the existence of its referent. The distinction between autosemantic and synsemantic does not correspond to the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic: many grammatically autosemantic expressions are, from a semantic point of view, syncategorematic; that is, they do not possess reference. On the contrary "most of the terms of language... have a synsemantic nature"¹⁰⁸: universals, categories, genera and species are of a synsemantic nature. The only autosemantic category is that of name, while verb and adjective are synsemantic. Nevertheless, also names have a synsemantic value when they refer to the *entia rationis*, while they have an autosemantic meaning when they denote things.¹⁰⁹

For example, we can use the autosemantic/synsemantic distinction to give grammatical characterization to the difference between physical phenomena and psychic phenomena. Generally speaking, a phenomenon is everything that consists of a name and a transitive verb. If the name is autosemantic and the verb is synsemantic, the phenomenon is physical. If, instead, the verb is autosemantic and the name is synsemantic, then the phenomenon is psychic.¹¹⁰ In grammatical terms, the simplest expression of a judgment is one which contains a *name* — which corresponds to the presentation on which the judgment is based — and a *synsemantic* sign which expresses its relation to the object and which may be positive or negative.¹¹¹ This sign is the copula, but it cannot be identified with the predicate of existence. 'A is', does not constitute

¹⁰⁶ Brentano 1971, 162; Brentano 1974, 45.

¹⁰⁷ Brentano 1956, 36-37. Elsewhere he uses the expressions *Mitbezeichnenden*, *Synsemanticisch* and *Synkategorematisch*: see "Vom Denken und ens rationis" (1907/1908), 369; Brentano 1971, *Anhang* I, note 1; Brentano 1978, "Sprechen und Denken" (16/08/1905), 325; Brentano 1956, §§ 16 and 18. Albertazzi 1990.

¹⁰⁸ Albertazzi 1990.

¹⁰⁹ Brentano 1968a, 229, 234.

¹¹⁰ Melandri 1990, 112 ff.

¹¹¹ Brentano 1956, 97-98.

in the predication of the existence of the subject 'A'. More precisely, when someone affirms that 'a man is a philosopher', s/he affirms at the same time the existence of a man. In other words when someone affirms that 'A is', s/he is also affirming 'A', and therefore s/he takes A to be an existent thing. Likewise, when someone affirms that 'A is not', s/he is not denying the inherence of the predicate of existence in the otherwise affirmed A, s/he is denying A.¹¹²

In "Zur Lehre von den entia rationis", a dictation of 1917,¹¹³ Brentano distinguishes between the object of thought and the content consisting in the being or non being of the object, i.e. in its affirmation or denial. 'Being' or 'non being' are *entia rationis* and therefore the content does not exist in a proper (direct, autosemantic) sense; it is not a reality distinct from thought. 'Being' and 'non being' are resolved in acts of acceptance or rejection, analogously to the phenomena analysed in the third class.

This argument has two immediate consequences: (i) the confutation of the correspondentist theory of truth, which Brentano too had accepted at first;¹¹⁴ (ii) the formulation of the so-called existential theory of judgment, i.e. that any judgment, of any form, relates to a judgment of existential form which renders the ontological import evident.¹¹⁵

11. NOMINAL SEMANTICS

The categories of meaning (*Bedeutungskategorien*) have been traditionally analysed against the background of the so-called theory of *modi significandi*. The latter was developed between "the two extremes of nominal and propositional semantics, between which we can insert as subcontraries many other categories that are qualitatively distinguishable: for example adjective, participle, adverb, article".¹¹⁶ The importance of nominal semantics derives from the fact that a name is the simplest case of a linguistic expression linked to inner experience.

¹¹² Brentano 1971, 65-68; Brentano 1969, 18-19, Brentano 1968b, 24 and 30.

¹¹³ Brentano 1956, 58-62.

¹¹⁴ For the critique on the concept of *adaequatio* see Brentano 1971, 196-197; 181; Brentano 1984, 89, 159-161; see in particular the lecture of 1889 "Über den Begriff der Wahrheit", now in Brentano 1970; see also Szrednicki 1965 and Szrednicki 1966.

¹¹⁵ A crucial and much discussed aspect of Brentano's theory is the nature of *states of affairs* (*Sachverhalte*), the correlates of the act of judgment. See the contribution by Smith below.

¹¹⁶ Melandri 1989, 132.

Brentano based his nominal semantics on the three *functions* of the name: (i) notifying (*kundgeben*) to the hearer the presence of a mental act in the speaker; (ii) signifying (*bedeuten*) a content, and (iii) denoting (*nennen*) an object.¹¹⁷

The same object can have several names because the name denotes its object(s) through the signifying function.

12. THE BRENTANIAN REFORM OF LOGIC

The typical arguments of traditional logic comprise the analysis of propositions into subject and predicate, the classification into the four forms A, E, I, O, the theory of judgment and syllogistic inference. In keeping with this logical paradigm, Brentano presents his logic as an explication of the 'deep' structure of philosophical language and as a clarification of his ontological approach. He therefore starts with *Sprachkritik* in order to emphasise the ontological fallacies of language and pays little attention to the specification of deductive structures. In this regard, Husserl's opinion about the relationship between logic and grammar in Brentano is interesting. Husserl contends that if we limit ourselves to grammatical forms, we restrict the number of logical categories that can be used: "we excessively restrict the extension of forms and narrow an broad spectrum of grammatical differences, leaving just only enough of them to provide syllogistic tradition with a certain content". Husserl continues, "Brentano's attempt, although valuable, to reform formal logic suffered from this exaggeration."¹¹⁸ Brentano's revised theory of the judgment provided the basis for his reform of the syllogistic by denying the validity of certain traditional methods and making changes to the rules of conversion, subordination and opposition.¹¹⁹

Although Brentano's logic would be considerably clearer if it could be formalized, so far only tentative efforts have been made in this direction. There is one point, though, on which all the authors who have addressed the problem agree: namely, that algebraic logic is the system most suitable for its formalization, even though it is not one identifiable with Boolean logic.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ Brentano 1956, 47; Albertazzi 1989b, 145-159. The same position is present in Marty, Husserl and Bühler. See Marty 1884-1895; Husserl 1901, II/1; Bühler 1983, 81.

¹¹⁸ Husserl 1900-1901, vol. II, Introduction, § 4.

¹¹⁹ Brentano 1971; again in *Psychologie 2* Brentano states: "Ignorance of the nature of judgments has necessarily also produced other errors in logic. I have continued to think in this direction as far as its consequences, and I have found that it leads to nothing less than the complete destruction, but also the rebuilding, of elementary logic".

¹²⁰ Körner 1978; Simons 1984 and 1987a. The most thorough attempt at formal reconstruction is Poli 1992a.

In developing his theory, Brentano began with analysis of the four classical forms of categorical judgment. He divided judgments between *thetic* and *synthetic* (also called predicative or categorical), a distinction first drawn by Herbart. Synthetic judgments are the traditional categorical judgments. Thetic judgments “are obtained from the categorical judgments by evidencing their ontological behaviour by means of their transformation into judgments structurally isomorphic with the tenets of Brentano’s theory of substance and accident”.¹²¹

Brentano’s reinterpretation pivoted on the translatability of synthetic judgments into thetic judgments and vice versa, and this translatability depended in turn on the identification of universal judgments with positive ones. Thus ‘all A’s are B’s’ asserts that ‘there is no A that is not B’, and ‘some A’s are B’s’ becomes ‘there is an AB’. Leibniz had similarly reduced all judgments to affirmative existentials and negative universals, although Brentano was not aware of it.¹²² Thus, in the 1874 *Psychologie*, each of the four kinds of categorical proposition is related to an existential proposition:

TABLE 2

SYNTHETIC (or categorical) JUDGMENTS THETIC (or existential) JUDGMENTS

| | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|
| Any A is B | There is not (a non-B A) |
| No A is B | There is not (an AB) |
| Some A is B | There is (a AB) |
| Some A is not B | There is (an A non-B) |

Within thetic judgments a distinction can be drawn between their *function* and their *matter*. The function of a judgment may be affirmative (there exists) or negative (there does not exist) and it concerns *existence*. However, on the basis of the Brentanian theory which distinguishes *existence* from *reality* (or *actuality*), it is misleading to use the concept of existence for thetic judgments. One does not talk of existence in the real world, and it would be more appropriate to employ the expression *recognition*. In fact, ‘existence’ here means only ‘presence to consciousness’, as in *possible existence*, and not *real* or *actual existence*. The first part of the judgment affirms the subject, and the second part again affirms the subject but together with its determinations,

¹²¹ Poli 1992a.

¹²² Leibniz 1686. On the difference between Brentano’s and Leibniz’s philosophies of logic see Besoli & Franci 1983. This reduction also appears in Keynes’ *Formal Logic*, 1906.

thereby conflicting with the traditional account.¹²³ The matter of the judgment, by contrast, is the subject of the judgment, the universe of discourse.

This theory of the judgment rests on ontological considerations, according to the paradigm of traditional logic, and not on purely logical (in the sense of 'formal') ones. Logic and ontology, in fact, are correlated. Brentano's distinction between thetic and synthetic judgments, a distinction which was essential to his reform of logic, can be translated into the distinction between ontologically transparent judgments and ontologically opaque judgments. This depends on the fact that non-existents are also involved in synthetic judgments, whereas the *entia rationis* have been eliminated from thetic judgments and hence are called *existentials*.¹²⁴ The ontological anchoring of Brentano's logic is therefore provided by his reist theory.

Brentano's development of his existential theory of judgment, which was already present *in nuce* still in his early writings, exemplifies the problems that pushed Brentano into an increasingly emphatic nominalism. This reduction is coherent with Brentano's classification of psychic phenomena, according to which the judgment relates to the presentation. Thus a judgment is true if the object of the presentation to which it refers exists, and vice versa. If the judgment expresses the way in which the object is present to consciousness, there is no sense in the distinction between subject and predicate. The matter of judgment — that is, the *whole* '(an A not-B)' which has not yet been defined in terms of being or non-being — is the correlate of the act of judgment. It is then possible to interpret this whole in terms of both the predicative form 'each A is a B' and the form 'there does not exist (an A not-B)' which emphasises the ontological outcome.¹²⁵

Judgments, furthermore, may be *simple* (i.e. affirmative or negative) or *complex* (double). Complex judgments are made when we partly affirm something and partly, and simultaneously, ascribe or deny something with respect to the object considered.¹²⁶ Double judgments are judgments which can be broken down into propositions connected by an anaphoric link. For example, in the proposition 'that man is a wrongdoer', the demonstrative *that* already contains a primary reference to the object of the presentation, to which is added a second, that of the wrongdoer. The sentence is thus split into two correlated sentences: 'that is a man; *he* is a wrongdoer'. Similarly, the expression 'painted landscape' is broken down into 'this is a landscape; *it* is painted'.

¹²³ This theory was first developed by Miklosich, to whom Brentano refers in "Die Verba impersonalia im Slavischen", first published in *Wiener Zeitung*, 13-14 November 1883 and then as an appendix to Brentano 1889.

¹²⁴ Poli 1992a.

¹²⁵ For more details see Poli 1993c.

¹²⁶ Simons 1987a, § 3; Poli 1992b.

According to Marty, double judgments occur when (i) the subject is a personal or a possessive pronoun or a demonstrative expression (like ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here’, etc.); (ii) the subject is a proper name; (iii) modifying predicates are used; (iv) acceptance or rejection of the matter of the judgment also requires recognition of the existence of its corresponding subjects or classes.¹²⁷

Double judgments may accordingly be arranged into a typology of three cases, relative to their subjects, the relationship between their function and matter, and their existential implications.¹²⁸

13. FEELING ACTS

Brentano resumed and developed his analysis of the third class of phenomena in *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*, a lecture delivered in 1889 at the *Wiener Juristische Gesellschaft* and a text in which, for the first time, he defined the structure and confines of his ‘descriptive psychology’. The book, as Moore tells us, was for many years a standard reference work for students of moral philosophy.

The intentional character of *feeling acts* is constituted by the pleasure or displeasure, the love or hate felt towards an immanent object; that is, in general terms, by what can be called the phenomena of interest. Brentano thus allocates *emotions* and *will* to the same class of psychic phenomena because, according to his analysis, they stand in the same intentional relation to an object.¹²⁹ *Sentiments* and *values*, understood in the economic as well as the ethical sense, also belong to this class. Brentano’s followers thus developed a *psychology of sentiment* (which represents one of the most important but least known contributions of the school of Brentano) together with economic and ethical theories.¹³⁰

14. ETHICS

Brentano constructed his ethics in order to account for the axiological judgments endowed with apodictic evidence which derive from the immediate intuitive source of our capacities to love and hate. He equated the evidence of

¹²⁷ Marty 1884-1895.

¹²⁸ Poli 1992b.

¹²⁹ Brentano 1924, 203-205.

¹³⁰ Brentano 1971, 84. On this Albertazzi 1993c.

these kinds of judgment to that of inner perception, in that they are self-consistent and their truth does not depend on metaphysical questions and answers.

The acts of love and hate do not possess a cognitive valency, i.e. they are not able 'to perceive' objectively what is good or evil, and they do not detect a property ('good' and 'evil') contained in the object.¹³¹ Brentano clarifies his position by drawing an analogy with the meaning of expressions like 'true objects' (or 'false objects') belonging to the theory of judgment. In this case too, truth and falsity do not properly pertain to object, but to the judging act. Similarly good and evil pertain to the relationship between subject and object: we say that something is lovable because we discover we love it.¹³²

15. THEORY OF RELATIONS

Brentano's theory of relations is one of the least studied aspects of his philosophy.¹³³ This neglect, however, has been in spite of the importance of the theory, given that many developments in Brentano's thought stemmed from his analysis of the nature of relations — in particular, the changes he made to the concept of intentionality and to the concept itself of presentation. Generally speaking, in fact, the *modus obliquus* is connected with the possibility of thinking a relation, and it appears whenever something taking the form of a relation presents itself to the mind.¹³⁴

A relation is defined by an ordered pair of objects, the first of which is called the *foundation* and the second the *term*. The foundation is presented *in modo recto* and the term *in modo obliquo*.¹³⁵ The principal feature of a *relation* is the fact that both the foundation and the term are real. As examples of relations Brentano cites comparison relations (bigger than, smaller than, etc.), equality and identity relations, cause and effect relations.

Brentano maintains that a relation can subsist even if the term does not exist. This is for example the case of psychic relation, for when someone thinks of something, only the thinker necessarily exists, not the object of his or her

¹³¹ Brentano 1971, 87-89, such position is not equally explicit in Brentano 1969.

¹³² Brentano 1971, 89-90.

¹³³ Körner 1978. There follows only a brief outline (taken mostly from Kastil).

¹³⁴ Brentano 1971, "Die Psychische Beziehung im Unterschied von der Relation im eigentlichen Sinne".

¹³⁵ Brentano 1971, 145.

thought.¹³⁶ These particular relations Brentano calls *quasi-relations*, *something relative* (*etwas Relativliches*).

Kastil lists six kinds of relation:

- (i) The part-whole relation. This relation is established when one thinks of an element as part of a collective, or when one thinks of a collective which includes an element: in the former case the foundation is the collective, in the latter it is the element. The presentation *in modo recto* of the collective is accompanied by the presentation *in modo obliquo* of the elements, and vice versa. The relation is reversible because both terms of the relation exist. Brentano calls this kind of relation a *coexistence relation*.
- (ii) The part-whole relation in the sense of substance-accident. This relation differs from the previous one in that it is not a coexistence relation. It is therefore not reversible and the substance must necessarily be presented *in modo recto* as the foundation, and the cause *in modo obliquo* as the term.
- (iii) The cause-effect relation. Although this is a coexistence relation, given that the cause is determined by the effect, the effect is thought *in modo recto* as the foundation and the cause *in modo obliquo* as the term.
- (iv) The intentional relation, i.e. the thinker-thought relation. Although not a coexistence relation, this is the relation that underpins all the others, even though it does not exist except at the moment in which it is thought. Thus the thinker is the foundation of every relation. The intentional relation also includes the oblique modes connected with temporality.¹³⁷
- (v) The continuum relation, i.e. the limit-unlimited relation. The presentation *in modo recto* of a continuum entails those *in modo obliquo* of its possible partition, while the presentation *in modo recto* of a limit is accompanied by the presentation *in modo obliquo* of the limited. In the case of topical continua the continuum relation is a coexistence relation, in the case of chronic continua it is not.
- (vi) The comparative relation. Whether or not this is a coexistence relation depends on whether or not the term exists.¹³⁸

Let us now consider the intentional relation in detail.

¹³⁶ Brentano 1971, 1, 33. This was the position adopted by Brentano's closest disciples, like Kraus and Kastil, as well as by other philosophers associated with his school, like Katkov (See his 1930, 482); Findlay 1963, 39-41. For criticism, see Bergmann 1964; Grossmann 1965.

¹³⁷ "Das Zeitliche als Relative" (13/02/1915) in Brentano 1976, 126; "Über das Sein im uneigentlichen Sinne, abstrakte Namen und Verstandesdinge", in Brentano 1971, 232-233; Brentano 1976, XVIII.

¹³⁸ Kastil 1951, 133.

16. THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY

One of Brentano's most significant achievements was to reintroduce the theory of intentionality into philosophy, while its subsequent development into a more complex theory (several, in fact) of intentionality was the work of his pupils.¹³⁹

Those interpreting Brentano's theory must address at least two major problems. The first concerns its medieval origin and requires us to establish whether the origin reflects the conceptions of, say, Peter Aureolus or of Thomas Aquinas. The second problem is the nature of intentionality itself — that is, we must decide how Brentano's intentionality is to be understood. Brentano's doctrine of intentionality was not at first accorded the importance that it acquired later, in particular after Husserl. Significantly, the profile of Brentano written by Anton Marty does not even mention his concept of intentionality.¹⁴⁰

The fundamental thesis of Brentano's theory of intentionality asserts that consciousness is always consciousness of something, even if this 'something' (*Etwas*) need not necessarily always be a 'thing' (*Ding*).

In explaining Brentano's theory of intentionality, one may usefully begin with a remark by Landgrebe, who points out that Brentano never refers to the 'intentionality of consciousness', but only to the intentional reference of the acts of consciousness.¹⁴¹ In other words "the Brentanian intentional relation does not yet aspire... as it would instead in Husserl, to the status of the constitutive essence of consciousness, but it seems to restrict itself to being that qualified relation which unifies psychic phenomena with their contents".¹⁴² Intentionality in Brentano therefore has a static and relational character, and it is therefore a relation that can be described as unidirectional.

Intentionality does not involve a synthetic operation which brings about "the passage from the manifold psychic modes of the given to the logical unity of the content of thought".¹⁴³ Spiegelberg confirms this contention by observing that Brentano never uses the term 'intention' in isolation, but only in such expressions as 'intentional inexistence' or 'intentional relation'.¹⁴⁴

It was on this statically relational notion of intentionality that Brentano based his classification of psychic activities; and it was the merely descriptive aspect of his psychology that Husserl most severely criticised on the grounds

¹³⁹ See the article by J. Brandl in this volume.

¹⁴⁰ Marty 1916, 97-103.

¹⁴¹ Landgrebe 1968a, 11-12.

¹⁴² Valori 1956, 69.

¹⁴³ Modenato 1979, 119.

¹⁴⁴ Spiegelberg 1970, 40.

that it was no more than a mere classification of inner psychic experience, like the analyses of Hume or Locke.¹⁴⁵

The thesis of intentionality was a constant feature of Brentano's descriptive psychology, albeit with some changes,¹⁴⁶ until what is commonly called the *crisis of immanence* when the term 'intentional object' disappeared from his philosophical vocabulary. One of the consequences of Brentano's rejection of non-reals, in fact, was his concomitant rejection of the concept of *immanent object* and hence his revision of the theory of the psychic act as intentionally directed towards an object. This theory, formulated in *Psychologie 1*, required the existence of both the terms of the relation, both the act and the immanent object. The question, therefore, became that of explaining how one could pass to the realist requirement of the existence only of things (*Dinge*) from the previous claim of the existence of both the terms of the psychic relation. In the later Brentano, what exists is only that which represents, the individual-representing-something-to-himself.¹⁴⁷

Brentano therefore developed two different theories of intentionality, the difference between them being the different ontological statuses attributed to the intentional object. His first theory considered "intentionality as a direct relation tending to an immanent objectivity"; in his second one "the character of relationality disappears and intentionality becomes only the 'fiction' of a relation (*etwas Relativliches*), while the immanent object becomes a mere 'synsemantic' term".¹⁴⁸

An essential component of Brentano's theory of intentionality is its distinction between two different kinds of existence: existence in the proper sense or *effective* (*Dingliches, Wesenhaftes, Reales*) existence, which pertains to real things, and *mental, intentional or phenomenal* existence or in-existence. The concept of existence may in fact be also applied to *non-things* (*Undinge*), such as collectives, a part or a limit of a thing, a past or future thing, an impossibility, a lack, a capacity, an object of thought.¹⁴⁹ In particular, when *collectives* and *divisives* are recognized by means of a true affirmative judgment, they belong to the realm of the existent even though they are not *things*, i.e. not-*real*. In the extreme nominalist formulation of Brentano's last works, existence may be predicated only of someone 'thinking-now-something real'. These ramifications of his theory stemmed from Brentano's analysis of the nature of relations — in particular of the temporal relation — which led

¹⁴⁵ Husserl 1913.

¹⁴⁶ Brentano 1889 and Brentano 1928, 53.

¹⁴⁷ Brentano 1971, "Die psychischen Beziehung im Unterschied von der Relation im eigentlichen Sinne", particularly page 132.

¹⁴⁸ Melandri 1960, 28. See above all Albertazzi 1993-1994.

¹⁴⁹ Brentano 1924, Book II, ch. 7, § 5 *passim*.

him to define the psychic relation as a quasi-relation. He then went on to distinguish between *psychic reference* and *relation in the proper sense*. As we know, reference to something as object is the principal characteristic of psychic activity, and Brentano located it among the classes included in the Aristotelian category of *pros ti*. Now, the main feature of a relation is that both the foundation and the term are real: as we have seen, Brentano cited comparison relations, equality and identity relations, and the cause and effect relation, as examples. Conversely, in the psychic relation — that is, when someone thinks something — by necessity only the thinker exists, not the object of his or her thought. The essence of the intentional relation is the interplay of the modes of presentation — the key concept in the last stage of Brentano's thought and which entailed reducing the relation to simple relative determination and its exclusion from the table of categories. However, Brentano always maintained that the existence of the term is the criterion by which the various kinds of relation are distinguished.¹⁵⁰

Let us now consider another relation, the relation of continuum, which enables us to examine the Brentanian treatment of temporal relation.

17. THE CONTINUUM

Brentano analysed the problem of the continuum on several occasions, even though it should be pointed out that the majority of his manuscripts have not yet been published. An already elaborated theory of the continuum, one which probably dates back to his *Habilitationstheses* presented at Würzburg in 1866 (theses 9 and 10) is to be found in the notes for his lectures delivered at Vienna in 1890-91. Among Brentano's other writings on this topic, perhaps the most important is his dictation of 22 November 1914, "Das Kontinuierlich".¹⁵¹

The starting point of Brentano's analysis is once again Aristotle, specifically his theory of the continuum as set out in the *Physics*.¹⁵² On the basis of Aristotle's account, Brentano developed a phenomenological description of the continuum from the point of view of experience. For both Aristotle and Bren-

¹⁵⁰ "Das Zeitliche als Relative" (13/02/1915) in Brentano 1976, 126; "Über das Sein im uneigentlichen Sinne, abstrakte Namen und Verstandesdinge", in Brentano 1971.

¹⁵¹ Brentano 1968d, 133-141; Brentano 1982, 105-112; Brentano 1976, 3-49. Secondary bibliography: Chisholm 1977; Modenato 1979, 279-283; Smith 1988b, who repropounded the Brentanian theory in connection with topology.

¹⁵² Aristotle 1936, *Phys.*, 1, V, 3, 226 b 34-227 a 1.

tano, continuity was a perceptive phenomenon¹⁵³ and not a mathematical construct; indeed, Brentano maintained that the theories of mathematics and physics are themselves descriptions of experience and, in the particular case of Cantorian theory or the theory of relativity, *erroneous*.¹⁵⁴ The concept of continuum is a concept derivable by abstraction from any of our intuitions, he argued, because there is a continuum present in both internal and external perceptions; a fact which demonstrates the centrality of the concept to descriptive psychology.

Brentano's theory moved in two directions: on the one hand, it undertook to reform Aristotelian theory; on the other, it sought to confute mathematical theories of the continuum, which in those years were being given rigorous reformulation by Richard Dedekind and Georg Cantor. Mathematics used the notion of discrete to conceive the continuum as a sufficiently dense set of points; for Brentano, the continuum was a base concept and therefore one not constructable as a sum of points.

Brentano's theory originated from a problem in Aristotelian theory which the Stagirite laboured greatly to resolve — namely the question of the boundary between one continuum and another. The problem can be stated as follows: how is it possible for a continuum to have a beginning and an end? Whatever holds for a continuous thing seems also to hold for the relationship between two continuous things. Hence the infinite divisibility of continua also applies to the boundaries between continuous things. Every conceptualization thus becomes impossible, and every boundary and separate entity fuses into a magma.¹⁵⁵

In order to resolve this problem Brentano introduced the concepts of *plerosis* (fullness) and *teleiosis* (completeness).¹⁵⁶ These concepts are not expounded in detail here; I shall instead seek to convey a general idea of Brentano's solution to Aristotle's problem, which he based on the notion of limit as the point at which two parts of a continuum join.

Fundamental to the Aristotelian doctrine of the continuum was the correlation between potential and actual. According to Aristotle, a whole is not actual, but only potential, until its parts are actual; and the parts of a whole are

¹⁵³ In fact, for Brentano the origin of the concept of number lies in the concrete phenomena of multiplicity. Brentano 1970, II part, "Der logische Charakter der Mathematik". This markedly empiricist thesis Brentano took from John Stuart Mill. It reappears in Husserl's *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, dedicated to Brentano.

¹⁵⁴ Kraus 1925 and Kraus 1938.

¹⁵⁵ Aristotle 1936, *Phys.*, VI, 4. This problem concerns also both the Arabian thought, and that of the high Medieval times and appears again in a logical-categorical form in the Scholastic literature with the title of *De primo et ultimo instanti* or *Incipit/desinit*. Murdoch 1982; Kretzmann 1982; Brentano 1976, 39-40.

¹⁵⁶ Brentano 1977, 36-37.

not actual until the whole of which it is a part is actual. The whole must be potential in order for its parts to be real.¹⁵⁷ For Brentano, conversely, a whole can be real even if its parts are real. Thus Brentano believed, like Aristotle, that a continuum is constituted by an infinite series of continuous parts but, unlike Aristotle, that the parts of a whole are, in their turn, real: therefore the parts of a continuum and its boundaries themselves are real.

In the final phase of Brentano's thought, a substance, a set of substances and a part of a substance fall within the same concept of thing. There are no atoms, therefore, and every substance is always indefinitely divisible in such a way that its parts are still substances.¹⁵⁸ A continuum may thus be divided *ad infinitum* into continuous segments, since it is composed of an indefinite number of substances, and not, as in Aristotle for example, into non-extensive discrete points. The origin of this boundlessness lies in the boundlessness of the modalities of thought — this being the most significant point on which the Brentanian and Aristotelian theories diverge.

On these theoretical grounds, Brentano also criticised Aristotle's view that the continuum derives from becoming and from movement. In this case, Brentano argued, the parts of a continuum would only possess potential, not actual, existence. But then how would it be possible for the simple contiguity of two continua to give rise to a single continuum without altering the original continua? And how would it be possible for the division of a continuum to give rise to two independent and substantial continua?

Thus Brentano admitted the boundlessness of every continuum and rejected Cantor's thesis of the actual infinite. How was this theoretically possible? In attempting an answer, it is necessary to introduce Brentano's distinction between a multiple continuum (*kontinuierlich Vieles*), where removal of one of its parts leaves the rest unchanged, and a multiform continuum (*kontinuierlich Vielfaches*), whose parts do not possess such autonomy.¹⁵⁹ The former is therefore divisible and pertains to space, that is, to extension; the latter pertains to internal time, is non-divisible and is composed of non-independent parts. A paradigmatic example of a multiform continuum is the act of listening to a melody, which is not the perception of a multiple continuum — in that it is always only the present that is perceived — but the perception of a multiform continuum on the basis of proteraesthesia.

Now, every inner perception of a sensible object is a multiform continuum. This multiformity is increased by proteraesthesia — that is, by the temporal perception of every spatial quality. For Brentano, unlike Aristotle, the primary

¹⁵⁷ Aristotle 1924, *Met.*, Book 7, 1039a 3-10, the passage is commented in Brentano 1977, 45.

¹⁵⁸ Brentano 1985, 51-52.

¹⁵⁹ Brentano 1976, 41-43.

locus of the perception of the continuum is *space*. But since external perception is not the source of evident knowledge, the spatial continuum is only an extrinsic and occasional cause of the concept of continuum. The true origin of the continuum is therefore the inner perception of a primary object, spatial or temporal, which comes about as the perception of itself as a multiform continuum. The multiform continuity of the inner perception is not to be understood in either the spatial or the temporal sense, even though it is relative to both space and time. It is in this boundlessness of the modalities of thought that the boundlessness of the continuum has its origin.

Apart from distinguishing continua into multiple and multiform, Brentano also differentiated them by genus (temporal, spatial, etc.). The former of these types of continua only exist according to one of their limits, whereas the latter exist in their totality. Continua can be further distinguished according to their size and dimension — in the latter case, continua with one, two or more dimensions. A one-dimensional continuum is one whose limits are in themselves continua, like time or a line. A surface is instead a two-dimensional continuum because it has both points and lines between its limits; and so forth. Brentano also distinguished between primary and secondary continua. A primary continuum is one which varies independently of other continua, whereas a secondary continuum varies on the basis of another continuum. Thus, for example, space and time are primary continua, while a movement which occurs in space and in time is a secondary one. In a certain sense, time is an absolutely primary continuum insofar as the perception of a region of space may persist over time. Hence it follows that time is a continuous variation.¹⁶⁰

18. THEORY OF INTERNAL TIME

As we have seen, Brentano's theory of relations, and in particular his analysis of the continuum, formed the basis for his theory of the psychic act and of the various modes of reference, and thereafter for his theory of time and the final version of his theory of the continuum. In his dictation of 13 February 1915, "Das Zeitliche als Relatives", he reformulated his theory of relations to take account of the problem of time.¹⁶¹

Although Brentano's concept of time underwent several and major changes over the years, its point of departure always remained the same: we experience

¹⁶⁰ Brentano 1976, 28-31.

¹⁶¹ Brentano deals with the problem of time in Brentano 1924; Brentano 1971, 220-225; 262-269; 56; Brentano 1982, 98; Brentano 1976, second and third part; Brentano 1968a, 38-52; 107-123; the dictation is in Brentano 1976.

time within inner perception and therefore in relation to psychic phenomena. The problem of time in Brentano arises from his theory of the modes of presentation, and in all the versions of the theory time is a property not of objects but of our perception of them.¹⁶² The topic is analysed in an essay included in the appendix to *Klassifikation*, “Von den Modis des Vorstellens”, which gives first consideration to the temporal modes. There is therefore a close connection between Brentano’s theory of intentionality and the problem of the *inner consciousness of time*; a link already established in Augustine’s *Confessions*. Because of this connection, Brentano’s analysis of the perception of time enabled him in turn to clarify the structure of intentionality. The problem of time consequently later proved to be of profound interest to his followers.¹⁶³

It is possible to identify four different Brentanian theories of temporality:¹⁶⁴

1. In his *Würzburg lectures* (1868-1870), Brentano developed a theory similar to John Stuart Mill’s, although he arrived at his conclusions independently of the Scottish philosopher.¹⁶⁵ This conception of time considers temporal differences to be differences in the judgment and not in presentations. Analogously to the function of the verb in the sentence, temporal differences arise from our manner of setting and recognizing the object of presentation in the judgment.
2. In his later *Vienna lectures* (1889-1890), Brentano abandoned his previous theory because it entailed a discontinuity between the three modalities. In order to account for the continuity of our temporal experience, he ascribed temporal differences to the moment of presentation. This theory pivots on the concept of *original association*, which can be formulated as follows: proeraesthesia shows us the secondary object of a just elapsed sensation as the primary object. Brentano provided the example of a melody: when we perceive the second note of a melody it reminds us that we have just perceived the first.¹⁶⁶

The process regulating the phenomenon of original association may be described as follows: there exists a stimulus which produces a content of present sensation; when the stimulus ceases, the content becomes a representation of imagination. But the content of a presentation of imagination is the content produced by the stimulus, which has also acquired temporal character.

¹⁶² Albertazzi 1992, 1991, 1992-1993, 1993.

¹⁶³ Husserl 1900-1901, 6th Investigation; Husserl 1928; see in this volume the entry “Husserl” by Albertazzi.

¹⁶⁴ Albertazzi 1993-1994; Albertazzi 1990-1991.

¹⁶⁵ Stuart Mill 1843.

¹⁶⁶ Brentano 1982, 98. A first reference is in Brentano 1924, 190; Stumpf 1919.

This content arouses further presentations, which attach themselves to the previous ones. Thus the instantaneous memory encompasses the moment of the appearance of the content, while the phenomenon of expectation, which furnishes the content of the presentation of the future, pertains to the imagination.

By means of the imagination, for example, a melody can be transposed to a different tonality. Unlike the modifications of the past and the future, the moment-now neither alters nor defines the immanent datum, while the past and the future are modifying temporal predicates. The establishment of reciprocal relations among these modifications, moreover, takes place by means of infinitesimal changes, so that the moment-now always passes beyond reality into non-reality. The modification of elapsed sounds is accomplished by *proteraesthesia*, which modifies the content of the representation by adding temporality to it.

The flaw in this analysis is that Brentano does not justify the difference, within the temporal continuum, between the real object and the object modified by the original association. His failure to explain the relation between the reality of the moment-now and the non-reality of its modifications towards the future and the past later attracted the criticisms of Husserl.¹⁶⁷

3. Because of these difficulties Brentano produced a third version of his theory of inner time (1894-1895) in which the original association no longer directly concerns the contents of presentation, but rather the way in which we recognize them. Thus, at the beginning of 1900, Brentano formulated a more systematic theory of temporal differences as differences in the modalities of recognition of the content of the object of presentation. Inner temporality, therefore, consists in the constant modification of the modes of recognition.¹⁶⁸
4. Since the temporal modes also occur in the emotions it is impossible for them to refer to the judgment. The temporal modes are therefore modes of the presentation. The chronic continuum becomes a modal continuum which concerns the presentation.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Husserl 1900-1901, 6th Investigation; Husserl 1928.

¹⁶⁸ Kraus 1919, 18. On this change see the letter to Marty of the 22.V.1905, in Brentano 1966, 122-124. Temporal modification is a modification of the different ways of representing the internal object. See moreover *Psychologie* 2, 142-5 and *Psychologie* 3, 45-52; Brentano 1966, Briefe an Marty, March 1906, nr. 17, 154 ff. His final conception is exemplified in Brentano 1968a, "Anhang", 45-52.

¹⁶⁹ Brentano 1982, 165-66, note 6; Brentano 1976, 95-102 and the introduction by Chisholm and Körner; Kraus 1930.

As Albertazzi observes “the change of conception of the temporal continuum in Brentano is in line with his progressive adherence to nominalism and constitutes the ontological point of view for a deduction of the categories of judgment. The present becomes the foundation of the temporal relation... because what exists is only the thing; this justifies the exclusion of most of the entia of reason or of the abstract entia inside predication”.¹⁷⁰

Brentano’s theory of time was also of considerable importance for his analysis of physical phenomena. The objects of sensible experience, in fact, are given with spatial quality and extension, but even more so according to a temporal ordering. Brentano’s analysis stimulated numerous experimental studies of the perception of time, notably in Graz, Padua and Florence.¹⁷¹

19. REISM

The year 1905 marked the beginning of a radical change in Brentano’s philosophy brought about by the influence of Marty’s analyses of language. This influence, which is documented in the voluminous correspondence between the two philosophers, centred on Marty’s thesis that ontological assumptions are modelled on linguistic ones, so that language is the source of fallacies.¹⁷² Language, in fact, ‘operates according to fictions’¹⁷³ and treats pseudo-objects as if they were things, i.e. linguistic terms endowed with content. “In reality abstract names are synsemantic terms conveying a non-autonomous meaning, even if they refer to a linguistic set endowed with meaning”.¹⁷⁴ The most evident example of a language which uses fictions is mathematics. Here Brentano seemingly anticipates the theories on the language of mathematics later developed within a phenomenological framework, for example by Kaufmann.¹⁷⁵ Brentano thus broke with the medieval tradition where, by contrast, logic and ontology were modelled on language.¹⁷⁶

On the basis of his critique of unwarranted assumptions, Brentano developed a philosophy of a markedly ontological bent which is known as

¹⁷⁰ Albertazzi 1990.

¹⁷¹ Albertazzi 1993d.

¹⁷² Brentano 1985; Marty 1908. On the relationship between reism and the *Sprachkritik* Terrell 1966, Haller 1978 and Albertazzi 1990. On the relationship Brentano-Marty see Smith 1988a.

¹⁷³ Brentano 1971, XIV, “Anschauung und abstrakte Vorstellung”. See Albertazzi 1990.

¹⁷⁴ Albertazzi 1990; Brentano 1956, 44.

¹⁷⁵ Brentano 1971, IX, “Von den wahren und fiktiven Objekten”. See Kaufmann 1930. On Kaufmann see Albertazzi 1989c.

¹⁷⁶ Albertazzi 1990.

reism. To this period belong his essays published posthumously in *Wahrheit und Evidenz*, edited by Oscar Kraus in 1930, those edited in 1933 by Alfred Kastil and published as *Kategorienlehre*, and those edited by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand and published as *Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen* in 1966.

The term *reism* was coined by Kotarbiński, a pupil of Twardowski, although in doing so his intention was not to make direct reference to Brentano's philosophy.¹⁷⁷ There may however exist an indirect link, since Twardowski himself pointed out to Kotarbiński the similarity between his point of view and Brentano's.¹⁷⁸ Nevertheless, there is a basic difference between the two thinkers which Kastil has highlighted: for Brentano also thoughts are things, whereas for Kotarbiński only bodies are things. Therefore the most appropriate term for Kotarbiński's philosophical position is *pan-somatism* or the Leibnizian expression *concretism*.¹⁷⁹

From a metaphysical point of view, Brentano's conversion to reism entailed a fundamental change in his philosophical position: the concept of real became the fundamental category of thought. In the Appendix to *Psychologie 2* of 1911 Brentano, after reaffirming his contention that "characteristic of any psychical act or event is that it stands in relation to something as object (*Objekt*)", observes that this object possesses a merely synsemantic value. Therefore, the intentional object does not exist, it is a mere synsemantic correlate of the psychic act.

The theses of reism can be expressed in various ways, for example by affirming that only things exist. Negative assumptions deny the existence of all non-reals (i.e. *entia rationis*, like universals, categories, and so on; immanent object, relations, and so on). As regards positive assumptions, Brentano's position is that there are only *substances*, *aggregates* of substances and *parts* of substances. From this derives the great importance of mereological considerations in Brentano's later work.

Brentano, moreover, was never a convinced proponent of the existence of *entia rationis*. Indeed, with only slight exaggeration, we can affirm that a rejection of *entia rationis* is implicit in all Brentano's work. If, in fact, he at first admitted the existence of *entia rationis* he did so with no particular conviction and without further examination. The same applies to his dissertation of 1862 where he expounds Aristotelian theory on ideal *entia* without taking up any clear position on the matter.¹⁸⁰ In the *Psychologie* of 1874 the question is consigned to the footnotes, while he gives brief treatment to the topic in "Über den Begriff der Wahrheit". His rejection of *entia rationis*

¹⁷⁷ Kotarbiński 1966a, ch. I, § 12; Terrell 1966.

¹⁷⁸ Kotarbiński 1966b, 461.

¹⁷⁹ Kastil 1951, 24; Leibniz 1890, ch. 23; § 1.

¹⁸⁰ Brentano 1984, 21-39.

is given explicit formulation in his texts written after 1900, notably: "Sprechen und Denken" (1905),¹⁸¹ "Von den wahren und fiktiven Objekten",¹⁸² "Universell Denkendes und individuell Seiendes (1917),¹⁸³ and "Vom *ens rationis*" (1917).¹⁸⁴

The doctrine of reism asserts the univocity of existence (that is, the univocity of being);¹⁸⁵ an assertion for which Brentano propounds various supporting arguments, principal among which is the following: "The expression 'to think' (*vorstellen*) is univocal. To think is always to think of *something*. Since 'to think' is univocal, the term 'something' must also be univocal. But there is no generic concept that can be common both to things and to non-things. Hence if 'something' denotes a thing at one time, it cannot denote a non-thing — an impossibility, say — at another".¹⁸⁶

In the late Brentano, being in its 'proper sense' is inextricably bound up with time. The concept of 'being' can be assumed in an univocal sense providing we distinguish the proper uses of the term from its improper ones. Improper uses are those represented by the locutions 'ens in general', 'something', 'ens rationis', 'X'. In its proper sense being is only what is actually present. In *Versuch über die Erkenntnis* Brentano explicitly states that 'being' means 'present' (*gegenwärtig*).¹⁸⁷

The two main components of Brentano's reism are the *thesis of the primacy of inner perception* and the *theory of concrete predication*. In a reist context, the use of predicates is governed by the theses of concrete predication according to which the predicates of the language must be transformed into concrete terms. Thus we cannot say, for example, 'roses are red'. We are instead obliged to say that 'roses are red-things'. Consequently, a judgment does not attribute properties to things, but connects things with things. This argument derives, as Chisholm observes, from Aristotle's conception of simple judgments according to which in affirmative judgments we combine things and in negative ones we separate them.¹⁸⁸ Moreover this thesis is founded on the

¹⁸¹ Partially reprinted in Brentano 1956, 37 and 46.

¹⁸² Brentano 1971, 158-171; some passages are reprinted in Brentano 1956

¹⁸³ Brentano 1971, 199-203.

¹⁸⁴ Partially reprinted in Brentano 1971, 238-277.

¹⁸⁵ For the Brentanian theory of the univocity of being see Brentano 1971 in particular chs. I. "Die psychische Beziehung im Unterschied von der Relation im eigentlichen Sinne"; II. "Von der psychischen Beziehung auf etwas als sekundäres Objekt"; III. "Von den Modis des Vorstellens"; XIV. "Von den Gegenständen des Denkens"; XVI. "Über das Sein im eigentlichen Sinne, abstrakte Namen u. Verstandesdinge"; XVII. "Vom *ens rationis*" and Brentano 1968a, in particular sect. I, ch. V. ("Über Wahrnehmung modo recto, modo obliquo u. die Zeitwahrnehmung") and sect. II; finally Brentano 1970, 29-30.

¹⁸⁶ Brentano 1966a, 108. For criticisms see Terrell 1966 and Morscher 1978.

¹⁸⁷ Brentano 1970, 29-30.

¹⁸⁸ Chisholm 1982; Aristotle 1928, *De Int.*, 16 a 11; Poli 1993a, 70.

ontological theory that substances exist within the accidents of which they are substances; a thesis, therefore, which connects with the existential theory of judgment: "all predicative judgments can be transformed intothetic judgments, and these latter are clearly the linguistic correlates of the ontological judgments that we obtain by using the thesis of concrete predication and the Brentanian theory of substance and accident. Existential judgments are the explicit attribution of being or non-being to non-qualified wholes".¹⁸⁹

Brentano's reism was neither a rejection of Aristotelianism (as is evident from his analysis of space, time and continuum), nor was it an abandonment of metaphysics. Quite the contrary: Brentano attributed his conversion to reism specifically to his reading of Aristotle,¹⁹⁰ and, as Kraus notes, he spent his last years involved in examination of "the deepest metaphysical problems".¹⁹¹

Both Brentano and Kotarbiński displayed profound knowledge of Aristotle. It may be possible that their direct knowledge of his texts played a decisive role in their adoption of a reist standpoint. If so, we may presume that there are elements in Aristotelian philosophy which induced the two thinkers to embrace a 'strong' version of nominalism.¹⁹²

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¹⁸⁹ Poli 1993a, 72.

¹⁹⁰ Cruz Hernandez 1958, 13 stresses the similarity between the evolution of Brentano and Aristotle's thought (as has also been suggested by Jaeger), i.e. from Platonism to concreteness.

¹⁹¹ Kraus 1919, 84.

¹⁹² For argument in support of this interpretation, based on the superposition of 'stoic' categories on Aristotle's thought, see Poli 1992, Smith 1987, Smith 1990, Terrell 1966, Körner 1978, Chisholm 1982.

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

| on: | see also: |
|------------------------------|---|
| continuum | 6.4 |
| descriptive psychology | 2.2, 3.3, 6.3, 6.10 |
| intentionality | 4.3, 6.5, 9, 16.11 |
| logic and theory of judgment | 2.6-7, 3.4, 4.4, 4.6, 7.13, 11 , 12 , 16.6, 16.12-13 |
| presentation /representation | 7.6, 7.10, 7.12, 9.2, 9.4 |
| reism | 2.5, 14 |
| time | 6.4, 8.4, 10.6-7 |
| value /ethics | 4.7, 5.3-4, 15 |

PART I: THE PUPILS

ANTON MARTY (1847-1914)

1. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Anton Marty, like Brentano, was a pupil of Trendelenburg, and then subsequently studied under Brentano himself — one of the small circle of disciples which included Stumpf, Kastil, Eisenmeyer and Kraus.¹ The friendship and the intellectual collaboration between Marty and Brentano persisted throughout their lifetimes: in fact they often spent their holidays together in Schönbühl and would go on short journeys together. Like Brentano, moreover, Marty joined holy orders, and like him, although independently, renounced his calling after the First Vatican Council.

His academic career began in Göttingen with Lotze, under whom he studied together with Stumpf and Frege, and with whom he took his degree by submitting a thesis on the origin of language entitled *Kritik der Theorien über den Sprachursprung*.² On recommendation from Brentano he was appointed to a chair in philosophy at Czernowitz, where, in 1879, he published *Die Frage nach der geschichtlichen Entwicklung des Farbensinnes*. After an unsuccessful attempt to move to the university of Vienna, a move opposed by the authorities because he had abandoned his religious vows,³ from 1880 onwards Marty pursued his academic career at the university of Prague. Apart from a series of articles, he devoted his energies to his principal work, *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, of which he only managed to complete the first volume, in 1908.⁴

¹ Kraus later edited of many of Brentano's and Marty's works. Kraus 1916a, 1916b, 1920, 1929; Funke 1945; Holenstein 1981, 17-19.

² Later in Marty 1875.

³ Marty's place in Vienna was taken by Jodl.

⁴ Marty 1908, then Marty 1916.

The period that Marty spent in Prague was one of the happiest of his life, amongst other things because of the city's invigorating cultural climate: in fact, prior to the imported Brentanianism of Marty, Stumpf and Masaryk, Prague was influenced by the neo-Kantian doctrines of Krause and his pupil von Leonardi, and later by Herbart's psychology and Mach's phenomenalism.⁵ The city's intellectual life comprised a mixture of methodological rigour and scientific psychology which combined with intense debate between nominalists like Löwe and realists like Volkmann.⁶ Brentanism, therefore, with its twofold character as both an empirical and a scientific psychology, and with its insistence on methodological rigour, found Prague fertile terrain on which to develop.

Throughout Bohemia, moreover, and in Prague in particular, there was a vigorous tradition of linguistic studies which had begun with Jan Hus, had then been developed by Zahradnik and Hanus, a pupil of Schleicher, and was now being carried forward by Sercl and Klácel. Marty felt perfectly at home in this environment, and set about developing an original theory of language, on the basis of Brentano's psychognosy, which made a major contribution to the development of subsequent linguistic research.⁷ In spite of the scant recognition afforded his work, we should remember that Mathesius, who founded the Prague School of Linguistics in 1926, was one of Marty's disciples.⁸

In 1889 he became dean, in 1896 rector of the university. He retired in 1913 and died the following year. In spite of the originality of his research, Marty endeavoured to be as faithful as possible to Brentano's ideas. He would only distance himself from them at the beginning of this century when Brentano developed his radically new reist doctrine.⁹ On the nature of their relationship, Marty himself wrote in 1911: "I give history the task of judging if in the works I published and in the epistolary correspondence about scientific questions, which has been already going on for years between Prof. Brentano and myself, I was just ready to accept and verify as well and to what extent I myself have carried the inquiry forward".¹⁰

Generally speaking, both Brentano and Marty based their theories on an Aristotelianism which they had inherited from Trendelenburg. In addition,

⁵ On Marty's relationships with eminent contemporaries see Thiele 1971.

⁶ Kraus 1936.

⁷ On Marty's influence on the development of the theories of the Prague Linguistics School, see Jakobson 1933, 637; Masaryk 1887.

⁸ Although the members of the Prague school did not explicitly refer to Marty, their theories show substantial theoretical similarities with his thought. See Holenstein 1976, 775; Raynaud 1982, 39-47. Marty's theories were also well known in Moscow through the work of the phenomenologist Sphet: see Holenstein 1976, 770ff.

⁹ Mayer-Hillebrand 1968.

¹⁰ Kraus 1916b, 8.

Marty, like Brentano, was influenced by English empiricism, especially that of Hume and Mill.¹¹

From his teacher Marty accepted — and never rejected — his thesis of descriptive psychology and his classification of psychic activities. From the beginning of this century, however, although Marty agreed with many of Brentano's linguistic ideas and his reism's rejection of the majority of unreal entities, he could not accept its extreme consequences.

As regards method, Marty's approach was the same as Brentano's, for which Marty found antecedents in Newton, Fechner and Mach himself; it was an analytical method that came very close to the procedures of exact science.¹² As we shall see, Marty paid particularly close attention to the distinction between genetic and descriptive method. In general, we may state that Marty developed Brentano's psychology from the point of view of a philosophy of language.¹³

2. DESCRIPTIVE AND GENETIC METHOD

Ever since his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte*, Brentano had maintained that his empirical psychology founded on the evidence of inner perception was descriptive in purpose; and that he was opposed to genetic investigations of a positivist kind. In fact, the empirical psychology centred on the *Völkerpsychologie* developed by Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt sought to explain the psychological mechanism which, from the lower-order functions to apperception, generates linguistic expression.

Most European psychology of the nineteenth century concerned itself, on the one hand, with the questions of the psychological origin of mental events, and, on the other, with the linguistic forms that express them. However, the theoretical problem that separated these various theories was the connection between experience, the mind and language. For the positivists, this connection was random and associative; for the Brentanians it was morphological and mereological; for Brentano in particular, the interconnections among mental events reflected the psychic components of consciousness which, he maintained, must be classified.¹⁴

Marty accepted the principle of descriptive psychology that consciousness was not given by the sum of its mental events but was instead a whole whose

¹¹ Marty (1897) 1916 I, 1, 76; Haller 1968, 85-6. On Marty's and Brentano's shared admiration for English empiricism see Marty 1916 I, 1, 97-105.

¹² Marty (1896c) 1916 I, 1, 69-93.

¹³ Landgrebe 1934, 2.

¹⁴ Landgrebe 1934, 10.

parts were distinguishable and regulated by analytic laws. These laws, which connected the components of consciousness, were necessary a priori.

Marty also addressed the genetic question in a series of articles published between 1875 and 1896. He returned to the topic in his book of 1879 on the origin and evolution of the language of colours, and again in his *Untersuchungen* of 1908.¹⁵

From a systematic point of view, Marty called his field of inquiry a *general semasiology*: that is, he conducted the kind of analysis that deals with the properties and genesis of language¹⁶ and which, by emphasising the semiotic nature of language, stands on the border between psychology, physiology and phonetics.¹⁷

General semasiology set itself the task of defining the fundamental *functions* of language.¹⁸ It divided between descriptive (*beschreibende*) semasiology, which classified the elements of language, and genetic semasiology, which studied the genesis of language.¹⁹

This is an important point, for although Marty drew from Brentano's classical psychognosy his distinction between the *elements* of consciousness and the *laws of connection* among them, his emphasis on the expression and communication of these elements, mental events, in language was totally original. This latter aspect is bound up with the *functions* of language and constitutes the pragmatic basis of Marty's philosophy of language.²⁰

3. MARTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. AN INTRODUCTION

In the nineteenth century, Humboldt laid the foundations of linguistic science, which subsequently developed into comparative linguistics and the neo-grammarian movement. All linguistic inquiry at the time endeavoured to elaborate theories of the origin and nature of language, and many of its con-

¹⁵ Marty 1875; 1884; 1884-92; 1896a; 1896b; 1896c; 1908; 1910. On the affinity between Marty and De Saussure see De Mauro 1974, 350 ff., Mounin 1967 and von Wartburg 1962, 9.

¹⁶ Marty 1908, 51. Synonyms for semasiology are semantics, doctrine of meaning (*Bedeutungslehre*) or doctrine of function (*Funktionslehre*).

¹⁷ Vailati (1911) 1987, 416 emphasises the analogies between Marty's and Breal's theories (*Essai de Sémantique*, 1897).

¹⁸ Marty 1908, 53 ff.

¹⁹ Marty 1908, 424; Brentano 1982, 10. On affinities with De Saussure's distinction between language synchrony and diachrony see again De Mauro 1974, 350-51 and von Wartburg & Ullman 1971, 25.

²⁰ Spinicci 1991, 101-3.

cepts and categories, notably borrowing and linguistic change, were discussed in Marty's writings.²¹

Marty made frequent reference to Humboldt and Steinthal. From Humboldt he took the concept of language as the *formative organ of thought*²² or as an *activity* connected with the different world views of the individual cultures in which a language develops. Language was a view of the world, according to Humboldt,²³ because it was language that made the world itself possible — in the sense that an individual, or the group to which he or she belongs, uses speech to mould the chaotic material of the phenomenal experience which is presented in perception.²⁴ In this formative activity, language identifies with the action of the mind and is a dynamic process (*enérgeia*).²⁵

A key component in Humboldt's theory was *internal form*.²⁶ Humboldt distinguished between *internal form* (thought activity) and *external form* (sounds)²⁷ — these, when combined, constitute language. External and internal forms differ in every language; hence just as different phonological systems exist, so words take different varieties of meaning in distinct languages.²⁸ In fact, there are languages which draw more distinctions among grammatical forms, and others which have more ramified semantic distinctions. For example, if we take the Sanskrit expression for an elephant, which denotes it as either 'that which drinks twice' or 'that with two tusks', or 'that with a single hand', Humboldt declared that the same object can assume different meanings which correspond to the different subjective ways in which the object is linguistically formed.²⁹ It was this argument of Humboldt, which identified form with meaning, that attracted Marty's particular criticism.

Marty's first book, *Über den Ursprung der Sprache*, integrated perfectly with nineteenth-century debate on the origin of language. Marty's prime pur-

²¹ Marty (1884-1895) 1916 II, 2, 90.

²² Humboldt (1820) 1907 IV, 42.

²³ By world view (*Weltansicht*) Humboldt did not mean a conceptual theory (*Weltbild*) or a set of beliefs and traditions (*Weltanschauung*) which define an individual's conception of the world.

²⁴ As Humboldt wrote: the essence of language consists in pouring the material of the phenomenal world into the mould of thoughts: its entire thrust is formal. Humboldt (1820) 1907 IV, 17.

²⁵ For Humboldt, moreover, the various parts of a language taken as an organic whole are connected by analogy, which is a product of imagination and acts on the basis of similarities: Humboldt (1798) 1907 II, 138.

²⁶ This concept is rather obscure in Humboldt.

²⁷ The idea of internal form is closely connected to that of world view. See Weisberger 1954, 571.

²⁸ Humboldt (1824-26) 1907 V, 402.

²⁹ Humboldt (1824-26) 1907 V, 72.

pose in this essay was to investigate the origin of language within the framework of Brentano's descriptive psychology.³⁰

In his classification of linguistic theories, Marty used Helmholtz's celebrated distinction between nativist theory and empiricist theory.³¹ The former explains the mental activity involved in language on the basis of physiological mechanisms; the latter deduces it from the processes and laws involved in learning language itself.³²

In nineteenth-century linguistics, a classic example of the first theory was the doctrine of linguistic reflexes developed by Steinthal from Humboldt's ideas and from the theories of *Völkerpsychologie*.³³ Steinthal posited a physiological or psychophysical mechanism which linked psychic conditions to utterances. He maintained that language acquired intentionality at a late stage in its evolution, given that originally the mechanism would have been entirely instinctive. With his hypothesis of psychophysical mechanisms, Steinthal also joined the debate on the role of *onomatopoeia*, which, he argued, was the result of the resemblance between a sound and the mental presentation instinctively associated with it.

Marty's criticism of Steinthal may be briefly summarized as follows: the hypothesis of linguistic reflexes is not borne out by the facts,³⁴ and the thesis of the resemblance between sensation and linguistic reflex in particular, as well as being reductionist, generates contradictions when we seek to explain complex sensations.³⁵

Marty's criticism of Steinthal, and in general of nativist theory, enabled him to propound the contrary idea that linguistic phenomena are voluntary in nature and therefore based upon intentional (*absichtliche*) linguistic constructs.³⁶

Marty made specific reference to Humboldt by introducing the concept of *internal form* in an essay on the relations between grammar and logic; an essay which was of fundamental theoretical importance³⁷ and in which he

³⁰ Marty 1875, III-3.

³¹ Helmholtz 1867.

³² Marty subsequently returned to these topics in a series of articles published in *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* between 1884 and 1892.

³³ See Wundt 1910, 2 ed.

³⁴ Marty 1875, 135.

³⁵ On the nature of the hypothesis of resemblance, which posits the linguistic reflex as the effect of a cause, i.e. a sensation, see Marty 1875, 33. On the question in general see Kelsen 1939, 69-130.

³⁶ Marty 1884-92, 304 ff.

³⁷ Marty (1893) 1916 II, 2, 57-99. On the importance of this concept for the whole of Marty's philosophy of language see Funke (1924) 1974.

distinguished between figurative internal form and constructive internal form.³⁸ The first of these concepts I now examine.

Marty's figurative internal form is a somewhat complex notion.³⁹ To the internal form, he wrote, belong those presentations (images, collateral or auxiliary presentations)⁴⁰ which accompany the act of signifying and which facilitate the association between sound and meaning. Because these presentations are figurative, they are often constituted by images or imaginative contents drawn from the field of visual perception, and they enable the interlocutor to make associations. As a first approximation, we may say that internal form comprises those expressions to which the presentation of a nameable object corresponds.

Marty wrote, in fact, that names can be called signs of things in many ways, but in two ways in particular: insofar as they signify and insofar as they denominate. The second function is mediated by the first. Names are signs of our concepts and of our presentations because they 'awaken' them. "By pronouncing a name, we awaken in the listener a certain concept which we consequently call the meaning or the sense of a name. If we ask ourselves, instead, what denominates a name, then we are not referring to the concept or presentation, but to the object that corresponds to it in reality".⁴¹

Hence Marty's position was that the names used by language have the two semantic functions of signifying and of denominating. We should bear in mind, therefore, that first of all names *signify* — that is, they are part of the act of signifying — and secondly that they *denominate* objects; moreover, they evoke mental contents in the listener.⁴²

Marty extended the Brentanian class of presentations to include both intuitive presentations and conceptual ones: the former are based on the intuition of something concrete; the latter on an abstraction of certain of the object's 'universal notes'.⁴³

A conceptual presentation is, in other words, a product of the function of abstraction: that function of thought which involves the non-intuitive components of a presentation.

Marty meant by 'intuitive presentations' or intuitions every concrete presentation, such as a tactile or luminous impression, which is determined by

³⁸ See also Marty 1908 and Husserl's review 1910, 1106-1110.

³⁹ Gipper & Eschmitter 1975, 540.

⁴⁰ Marty (1884-1895) 1916 II, 2, 68.

⁴¹ Marty 1893, 84, no.1.

⁴² Landgrebe 1934, 63-5.

⁴³ Marty had been studying abstraction since 1867, when he examined Thomas' theory, and it later became the subject of his essay, *Sprache und Abstraktion*, published in 1896. Marty (1867 and 1896) 1916 II, 2, 101-6.

quality, quantity, place and time, or any olfactory phenomenon which has been determined in the same way, “a presentation of an actual judgment which I have now or have had in the past, an emotion that I am experiencing now or have experienced before”.⁴⁴ However, Marty refused to accept as intuitions the signification or the comprehension of a complex presentation like a ‘piece of gold’ or a ‘psychic individual’, or the classification of the content of each elementary intuition as colour, tone, judgment, feeling. These latter phenomena, in fact, involve judgments, conceptual syntheses and processes of abstraction: in short, the non-intuitive parts of an intuition. ‘Coloured’, ‘extended’, and so forth, are examples of abstract presentations, according to Marty, because they represent a different ‘how’ of the comprehension of the same concrete, grasping from it or within it a different ‘what’.⁴⁵

In his criticism of Humboldt, Marty argued that when we use (common) nouns to designate some object, we distinguish between the denominated object (‘elephant’) and its possible descriptions (‘the animal with two tusks’, ‘the animal which drinks twice’ and so on). Thus we use different descriptions to refer to the same object. But there are also cases in which we designate the same object via different concepts — *voces significant res mediantibus conceptis*, as Marty put it — for example, when we assert that ‘this dog is a poodle’.⁴⁶ Marty further pointed out in criticism of Humboldt that when we use the words ‘dog’ and ‘poodle’, although these denominations refer to one particular object they convey different meanings.

What Marty meant here was that the difference between two propositions like ‘the apple is red’ and ‘this tree is a fir’ is the following: in the first case we are referring to an object and its quality; in the second, we use both terms to refer to objects (genus and species).

Internal form, therefore, is not merely a matter of names. It also involves propositions (as Marty’s analysis of subjectless constructions would demonstrate) or adjectives (as the theory of modification would show), and it therefore more generally involves the phenomena of syntax.⁴⁷

Internal form is the link between sound and meaning, and it therefore enables the creator of language to encompass a much wider range of contents within a relatively limited number of signs, which are comprehensible in themselves or have become comprehensible out of habit.⁴⁸ Internal form thus has an essentially *syntactic* nature and an essentially *pragmatic* function.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Marty (1884-1892) GS I, 2. X, 164 note.

⁴⁵ Marty 1908, 440 ff.

⁴⁶ Marty 1908, 456.

⁴⁷ Marty 1916 II, 2, 91; Marty 1908, 137. On this subject see Porzig 1928, 16.

⁴⁸ Marty 1916 II, 2, 71-2.

⁴⁹ Marty 1893, 70.

This double semantic function of nouns — signifying and denominating — has two features which should be borne in mind: one concerns meaning, the other concerns proper names.

In *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, as well as distinguishing between intuitive and conceptual parts, Marty also differentiated between the essential and the improper parts of meaning.⁵⁰ The *improper parts* of meaning relate to cases in which there are (i) presentations without intuitions (mathematical infinity), (ii) presentations which contain only a specific aspect of an intuition, or the relations of the object with other objects (a broken heart), (iii) or fantastic meanings (unicorn) or metaphorical ones.⁵¹

The second aspect to be borne in mind is *proper names*. These, according to Marty, have a purely denominative function and do not possess a conceptual dimension.⁵² Proper names have meaning only in their specific context, although different descriptions, like 'the emperor of France' or 'the general at Waterloo', may attach to them. The principal features, therefore, of proper names are that they are unable to render the complete meaning of the individuals they denominate, and that they depend on the context of their specification.⁵³

Marty drew a further general linguistic distinction between *autosemantic* and *synsemantic* terms in discourse. The adjectives 'autosemantic' and 'synsemantic' are translations of the Aristotelian 'categorematic' and 'syncategorematic'. They thus refer, in the first case, to terms which act as the subject and predicate in judgments, in the second to parts of speech, including syllables.⁵⁴ In adopting this classical Aristotelian position, Brentano had reduced almost all the terms of language to synsemantics, apart from the names of things. Husserl had argued that to each synsemantic element of language there also corresponded a 'trait of meaning'.⁵⁵ However, according to Marty, the difference between a simple expression on the one hand and a compound or connection of words on the other lay only in the expressive method.⁵⁶ Once more, therefore, the signifying 'function' played the dominant role in Marty's theory of language. Accordingly, he distinguished between *names* as theoretical autosemantics (subject and predicate) and *utterances* as practical autosemantics. Among the latter Marty included all 'sentences' in a wider sense, as well as expressions of

⁵⁰ Raynaud 1982, 227 ff.

⁵¹ Marty 1908, 465 ff.

⁵² Marty 1908, 438 ff.

⁵³ Landgrebe 1934, 88 ff.

⁵⁴ Chisholm 1967, 170-1.

⁵⁵ Husserl 1900-1, II, 4th Investigation.

⁵⁶ Marty 1940, 46.

emotion and fictitious discourse. A sentence is essentially the linguistic unit by means of which we usually admit that we speak to each other.⁵⁷

Marty's *Untersuchungen* gave original and systematic treatment to many of the theoretical issues that preoccupied the philosophers of language of nineteenth century. If we go back further in time to some of the questions addressed by the theorists that preceded him — such as the importance of imagination in the creation of linguistic thought, the metaphorical nature of language (which was however analysed in predominantly syntactic terms), the importance of the etymon, which relates to the different ways (imaginative contents) in which a certain community establishes a pragmatic norm in linguistic exchange, change of meaning (understood as a function), and so on — Marty elaborated an original theory of sign, form and meaning on the basis of a pragmatic conception of language as communicative behaviour.⁵⁸

Starting from the assumption of the semiotic nature of language — the assumption, that is, that words signal the mental events that the speaker wishes to communicate — Marty explored the functions of language from a more general point of view.

The linguistic theories of the nineteenth century had examined a wide range of phenomena and gave varying emphasis to each of them: the notifying function, then the expressive function, the signifying function (or the function of arousing in the listener, by means of words, presentations similar to those of the speaker).

On the basis of the duality of the linguistic sign — which manifests the speaker's mental experience and simultaneously triggers a similar experience in the listener — Marty reorganized the classic functions of linguistic science into a theory of language.⁵⁹

For Marty, notification relates to the mental experience to be notified;⁶⁰ expression to what is conveyed in an immediate way;⁶¹ signifying to what is conveyed in a mediated way. Implicit in signifying is the triggering function, which evokes similar presentations in the listener. Marty wrote: "if a linguistic device has meaning or the function of meaning, for example an assertion, it is usually intended to suggest to the listener a judgment of a certain kind".⁶² Further: "notifying our own mental experiences is not the first or the only

⁵⁷ Marty 1940, 18.

⁵⁸ Landgrebe 1934, 73.

⁵⁹ Bühler has given systematic theoretical exegesis to these functions. See his (1930) 1965, 28 ff.

⁶⁰ According to Marty rendering this function absolute is a typical feature of psychologism: Marty 1908, 495 ff.

⁶¹ The absolutization of this function, on the contrary, is characteristic of nativistic theories.

⁶² Marty 1908, 286.

purpose of intentional speech. What it seeks to achieve is rather a specific form of behaviour, whose ultimate goal is to awaken certain psychic phenomena".⁶³

In order to exert this influence, speakers uses rhetorical and syntactic devices: they suggest and anticipate in their speech a series of imaginative contents which only make complete sense at the end of the utterance. Accordingly, we cannot speak of meaning as a logical form, but rather as a whole comprising a series of meaningful anticipations which in dialogue evoke a sequence of expectations which are resolved only on its completion. This aspect of the internal form of language, which is necessarily characterized by structural imprecision and indeterminacy, Marty called *constructive internal form*.⁶⁴

By stressing the importance of the functional character of dialogue and of the instrumental nature of language, Marty distanced himself from *Völkerpsychologie* to come closer to the theories of the neo-grammarians and of Paul in particular.⁶⁵

4. MARTY'S DOCTRINE OF MEANING

Inasmuch as language expresses psychic relations and their objects, if we know the former and if we know the latter, we also know all the semantic possibilities that in principle a language can generate.⁶⁶ From this point of view, even though Marty's analysis was closely concerned with the pragmatics of communication — a *practical* theory of language, as he called it — it was not merely linguistic analysis: on the basis of the forms of meaning, Marty maintained, a *general grammar* of language could be constructed.

This thesis came very close to that advanced by Husserl in the Fourth of his *Logical investigations* — the difference being that for Husserl meaning was a concept of pure logic, correlative to formal ontology,⁶⁷ whereas for Marty meaning was an element of psychic life which descriptive psychology was able to classify and which words had the task of evoking in discourse.⁶⁸ Not surprisingly, Husserl detected psychologistic tendencies in Marty's theory, and

⁶³ Marty 1908, 284.

⁶⁴ Husserl 1910, 1106-1110.

⁶⁵ Paul 1920, 20 ff.; Gabelentz 1901, 3; Wegener 1885. On this see Spinicci 1991, 195-6. The importance of Marty's theory was recognized by Bühler 1920, 947-979.

⁶⁶ Marty 1926, 41.

⁶⁷ Husserl 1900-1, 248.

⁶⁸ Parret 1976b, 732-771.

accused him of failing to understand his notion of pure grammar as an a priori and autonomous discipline of forms of signifying meant as ideal units.⁶⁹

However, the question of meaning in Marty is a very complex matter. Funk, who has provided one of the classic interpretations of his theory, claimed that for Marty meaning is given by the *psychic phenomenon* that the speaker seeks to awaken in the listener.⁷⁰ A second interpretation, advanced by Landgrebe, and more recently by Parret, identifies the meaning of expression in the function of a linguistic sign able to evoke a mental occurrence which is similar to the one that we wish to communicate.⁷¹ We must therefore conclude, it seems, that Marty failed to develop a coherent doctrine of meaning, since he constantly oscillated between a static conception of meaning (as a psychic mental occurrence) and a dynamic one (meaning as a function designating an object and evoking a mental content).⁷² However, a third possibility exists, one based on the complexity of the various ramifications of Brentano's descriptive psychology. This interpretation considers the different connotations of meaning in Marty's writings according to the levels of sense to which he refers, and it draws a distinction between *objective meaning* and *signifying function*.⁷³

The basis of Marty's theory of meaning is Brentanian. Meanings therefore have, not a logical origin, but a psychological one:⁷⁴ the act of consciousness is intentionally directed towards an object, towards something we know through one of its presentations. The objects of our consciousness are thus only correlates of intentional acts, or contents of presentation. We have objective meaning if the intentional relation refers to something which exists, and which is neither fictitious nor absurd and therefore involves an actual presentation. Hence Husserl's criticism of Marty that he never developed a theory of meaning should be reconsidered in at least one of its aspects: that of the logical form and the ontological structure of consciousness.⁷⁵ At this level of language, the notifying function predominates.

However, when we move to the realm of communication, it is the signifying function that becomes paramount. The meaning of a statement is closely connected with the mental content that it is intended to evoke in the listener,

⁶⁹ Husserl 1910.

⁷⁰ Funk 1924, 20 ff.

⁷¹ Landgrebe 1934, 27; Parret 1976b, 756. Also based on this interpretation is Bühler's theory: Bühler 1909, 263.

⁷² Raynaud 1982, 211-2. The same oscillation between functional-genetic investigation and descriptive-morphological inquiry is evident in Husserl. On this see Albertazzi 1989a.

⁷³ Spinicci 1992, 199 ff.

⁷⁴ Marty (1911) 1916 II, 2, 173 ff.

⁷⁵ Husserl 1910, 263.

and in this sense it depends on the context and the linguistic competence of the speakers.⁷⁶ Here the expressive and triggering functions predominate.

Marty enunciates a norm or rule which governs the use of meanings in linguistic behaviour: "language is by its nature a collective resource, and only the social and collective consciousness of those who participate can value as an authentic foundation of its possession and of its meaning".⁷⁷ The importance thus attributed to the context of linguistic communication is, in the last analysis, the essential difference between Marty's theory of meaning and Husserl's conception of a pure grammar of signifying acts.⁷⁸

5. REISM AND THE ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

From the 1880s onwards, the published correspondence between Marty and Brentano reveals that their relationship became a particularly fruitful, and that it gave rise to developments and modifications in both their theories.

One notes two things in particular. First, that Brentano's later theory, after a series of disagreements, assumed a point of view that was very close to Marty's. Second, that Marty's theory was influenced by Brentano's conversion to reism: a radical shift of position with which Marty could not agree completely, but which nevertheless induced him to revise of many of the ideas that he was about to set out in the second volume of *Untersuchungen*.

Marty and Brentano continued to discuss the classification of the components of consciousness, the spatial and temporal continuum, the differences between direct and indirect modes, and the question of nominalism (which also included the distinction between autosemantic and synsemantic expressions).⁷⁹

The reist revolution in Brentano's ontology, with its new approach to the problem of substance and accident, induced Marty to revise his mereological theory of consciousness.⁸⁰

Since his lectures on metaphysics, Brentano had distinguished between the physical parts, logical parts and metaphysical parts of consciousness.⁸¹ In his

⁷⁶ Spinicci 1991, 205 ff.

⁷⁷ Marty (1884-95) 1916 II, 1, 133.

⁷⁸ Husserl 1901-2, 319 ff., 440.

⁷⁹ As Chisholm notes, this distinction is drawn in different ways: when Brentano describes thoughts which are addressed to another person; when he describes judgments about the past and the future (Brentano 1966, 278); and when he describes sensation (Brentano 1968, 37-52). See Chisholm 1990, 1-9.

⁸⁰ Marty 1940, 220 ff.

lectures of the 1880s,⁸² however, Brentano introduced a further distinction between logical parts, distinctional parts, parts of the intentional relation (double psychic energy) of the act, and parts of the intentional correlation.⁸³

Later, in the first years of this century, Brentano attributed reality only to metaphysical and physical parts, so that all the parts relating to the *properties* of objects become essences of reason, abstractions or linguistic fictions.⁸⁴ In consequence, the intentional object, too, became a fictional, synsemantic entity, based only upon the individual substance of whoever has some kind of intentional presentation.

Marty accepted Brentano's new doctrine that the properties of objects are fictional essences (*ficta cum fundamento in re*), and also accepted the consequent modification of the concepts of part and whole.

By drawing on Hume's doctrine set out in the *Treatise*, Marty distinguished between proper and improper parts.⁸⁵ Since Brentano's reism maintained that accidents have reality only in substance, parts which are proper to an object (its substantial parts constitutive of the whole) should be differentiated from the modes in which substance is conceptually apprehended: that is, the various ways in which the same object can be presented to the consciousness. These latter are the improper parts of consciousness, for they have no existence independently of the subject and of the intentional act: they are universals or the logical parts which correspond to our partial modes of apprehending substance and which have neither autonomous nor independent existence.⁸⁶ Therefore, "if we attribute logical parts to objects, we do so only improperly

⁸¹ (i) Physical parts are entities whose concepts of the whole (collectives, continua, sets, and divisives, i.e. their parts), take grammatical form; (ii) logical parts are those which constitute *the logos* of something, i.e. its definition, and they divide between genera and species; (iii) metaphysical parts are substance, place, time and thought. The latter, unlike physical parts, refer not only to bodies, but also to accidents and spiritual substances. The collected edition of the lectures on metaphysics is forthcoming in R.M. Chisholm and W. Baumgartner. See Brentano MS 31451 and Brentano 1982, 20 ff.

⁸² Brentano 1982.

⁸³ The parts of which consciousness is constituted, Brentano now declared, are not solely individual elements: there are also parts which can be divided — that is to say, they are separable, even if only conceptually, from the substratum to which they belong. These parts are called distinctive, a category which includes logical parts, concurrent parts, those involved in the direction of the intentional act both towards the object and towards itself (parts of the dyenergy of the act), and parts of intentional correlation (for example seeing and seen, presenting and presented, wanting and wanted, loving and loved, and so on). See Brentano 1982, 10-25.

⁸⁴ Brentano 1906.

⁸⁵ Marty 1910, 93 ff.; Hume 1739-40, I, 37.

⁸⁶ Twardowski 1894.

and in relation to the possible and legitimate partial thoughts by means of which objects can be learnt".⁸⁷

A crucial theoretical issue for Marty and Brentano was temporality and the modes of consciousness. They constantly returned to the question and, as their correspondence shows,⁸⁸ devoted intense energy to finding an answer to it.⁸⁹

As we know, Brentano denied the possibility of a proteresthesis: that is, of a direct internal self-perception of the subject. Consequently, in 1874, the primary object of perception was, for Brentano, sensible quality, while the secondary object of perception became the subject, which is perceived only indirectly.

Towards the end of his Italian period,⁹⁰ Brentano apparently reversed his argument: the subject was the direct object of sensation, while sensation or sensible quality became the indirect object. More generally, Brentano now declared that the subject was implicit in any thought as one of its parts. This reversal belongs to the complex branch of descriptive psychology known as reism.⁹¹

For his part, Marty's ideas on the temporal continuum were, in fact, very similar to those of the late Brentano and linked closely with his linguistic research.⁹²

In this period, both Marty and Brentano assumed the hypothesis of an enlarged present (*Zeitlänge*) as a complex structure characterized by a specific temporal 'position'. Internal perception presents itself with certainty and evidence founded upon an existing real, the thinking individual. Secondly, it manifests or refers to the continuum, for which it acts as the limit and which as such can only precede it or follow it.⁹³ Although the present is restricted to the moment-now, the act of presentation both directly incorporates this temporal limit and *indirectly* incorporates a temporal trait, of which the moment-now is the limit, completion and anticipation of its precedents. These temporal differences, for Marty, were relative (not absolute) differences of distance and position based upon individual internal perception.

⁸⁷ Marty 1910, 93 ff.

⁸⁸ Marty 1916.

⁸⁹ Kraus 1916, 8.

⁹⁰ That is to say, in 1911 and even more so in 1914, as we read in the dictated work "Zur Lehre von der Empfindung".

⁹¹ Albertazzi 1992 and 1993.

⁹² Brentano's writings in the *Nachlaß* — both his dictated works on space, time and continuum and his essays on logic and the theory of language — are contemporaneous with the writings which were to have constituted the second volume of Marty's *Untersuchungen*: Marty 1940. On internal time in Marty see Simons 1990, 157-170.

⁹³ Brentano 1976, "Objectual and temporal differences", T 22, VII, 121-4 and "Temporal as relative", T 24, 124-138.

In sum, the intentional act becomes a *relative determination*, in the sense that it is simply directed towards the comprehension of something that is learned through one of its determinations and which may or may not exist. The final version of Brentano's theory considers the subject of intentional modification to be the accident which identifies substance: in consequence, the multiple secondary relations of the act of presentation constitute the various partial ways in which subjectivity can apprehend itself.⁹⁴

6. SUBJECTLESS AND THETIC JUDGMENTS

The outcome of Brentano's and Marty's analyses of the psychic continuum induced them to develop the thesis that accidents identify substance and not vice versa.⁹⁵

Since both Brentano and Marty saw logic and ontology as intimately connected, they developed a form of logical nominalism — more accentuated in Brentano than in Marty — on the basis of the theory of concrete predication which held that all the predicates of language, and especially abstract terms, must be reduced to concrete terms indicating things.⁹⁶

In the first years of this century⁹⁷ Brentano asserted that judgments are thetic and ontologically transparent, and that they concern the *connections* among things and not the attribution of properties to things.⁹⁸ Thetic judgments are the basis for categorical judgments: the latter pertain to logic and therefore to language. Apart from thetic and categorical judgments, Brentano also distinguished between simple judgments and double ones: as we shall see, the latter occur in particular circumstances, for example in the case of anaphora and modification.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Albertazzi 1992 and 1993. Later Brentano admitted also *absolute* temporal determinations.

⁹⁵ Brentano 1976.

⁹⁶ These observations, which were already set out in the logical theory developed by Brentano in the years 1870-71, and in that of Miklosich 1883, seem thus confirmed by the reism of his Italian period. Miklosich's commentary on Brentano's theory had emphasized that there are also propositions of a non-predicative kind, subjectless propositions: for example, 'it rains'.

⁹⁷ Brentano reviewed *Die verba impersonalia im Slavischen* in *Wiener Zeitung* (13-14 November, 1883); the review was later published in the appendix to *Psychologie II*. See Brentano 1971b, 183-96.

⁹⁸ Chisholm 1982b, 3-16.

⁹⁹ Poli 1992.

Between 1884 and 1895, Marty published seven articles on this subject in *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, under the general title of “Über subjektlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zur Logik und Psychologie”.¹⁰⁰ These articles on subjectless propositions¹⁰¹ faithfully reflect the reist change in Brentano’s theory. Because they have never been critically edited, attribution of individual arguments in them to either Marty or Brentano is difficult.¹⁰² The earlier articles frame the problem in general terms and conduct analysis of the inner form or etymon; the later ones conduct critical examination of the ideas of Sigwart, Paul, Schuppe, Erdmann and Wundt on this subject, dealing specifically with the doctrine of thetic and categorical judgments and of double judgment.

Analysis of Brentano’s and Marty’s thetic judgments must be placed in relation to the change that Brentano made to his classification of psychic activities in the early 1900s: a presentation now involved a recognition of existence — in the sense of the recognition of something which is ‘already known’.¹⁰³ Thus in the perceptive present we attribute an judgment of existence to certain wholes which are not yet qualified and which are correlated to the act of presentation.

Thetic judgments, both for Marty and for Brentano,¹⁰⁴ are existential judgments,¹⁰⁵ and existence — ‘there is’ or ‘there is not’ — is the *function* of the judgment we apply to a *matter*, which is always different but always present to consciousness in the psychic present.¹⁰⁶ Marty maintained that ‘being’ does not mean only ‘being real’. Being in the sense of reality and being in the sense of existence are two totally different concepts.¹⁰⁷ Being in the sense of existence, therefore, means nothing more than being able to be the object of a true judgment.¹⁰⁸ The problem of form and matter was fundamental to Marty’s inquiry because it was the foundation of the problem of meaning as well.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁰ Marty (1884-1895) 1916 II, 1, 3-67. On this see Husserl’s review in Husserl 1975, 182-3.

¹⁰¹ In particular Marty 1893.

¹⁰² Brentano’s linguistic theory was published by F. Mayer-Hillebrand under the title *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*. See Brentano 1956. See also Brentano 1982, 1-2 and Marty 1987, 8-12.

¹⁰³ Brentano 1989. On this see Brandl 1989 and Albertazzi 1992.

¹⁰⁴ Marty 1916 II, 1, V, 227-307.

¹⁰⁵ Marty 1916 II, 1, V, 283.

¹⁰⁶ Marty 1916 II, 1, V, 282-3. Marty and Hillebrand maintained that for Brentano ‘to exist’ was not ‘to be real’ but ‘to be recognized’ or ‘recognizable’: see also Calò 1908, 337-68.

¹⁰⁷ Marty 1895, 278 ff.

¹⁰⁸ Marty 1895, 441.

¹⁰⁹ Marty 1916 II, 2, 123-128.

7. FROM EXISTENTIAL JUDGMENTS TO DOUBLE JUDGMENTS

Marty continued to work on the Brentanian theory of judgment and his analyses of the spatial and temporal continuum until his death.¹¹⁰ His investigations centred on the distinction between form and matter, on which basis he sought to classify the differences among thought, linguistic expression and meaning.¹¹¹ As said, thetic judgments distinguish between a form or function ('there is') and a matter (the frame of reference). The thetic judgment affirms the existence of a subject together with its determination, and in this sense Brentano and Marty asserted that the predicate is *synsemantic* relative to the object, because predicate and object are presented by being identified in the present mode. The thetic judgment is therefore also a double judgment, because its first part affirms the subject while its second part re-affirms the subject as well as its determination.

In particular, Marty distinguished among five cases of double judgment: 1. when the subject is a personal pronoun or when it contains a possessive pronoun; 2. when the subject is a demonstrative expression (this, that, here, there, etc.); 3. when the subject is a proper noun; 4. when modifying predicates are employed; 5. when acceptance or rejection of the matter of judgment also involves recognition of the existence of subjects or of their correspondent classes.¹¹²

Double judgments can be divided into two propositions connected by an anaphoric expression: for instance, in the case of 'this keyboard is grey', 'this' already denotes a primary recognition, to which is added that of 'grey colour'. In other words, the sentence can be translated into '*this* is a keyboard; *it* is grey'.¹¹³

These distinctions have a close bearing on the theory of modification, since the first three cases deal with the subject, the fourth with actual modification (that is, the cases of modifying predicates), and the fifth with the existential commitment of judgments relative to the relationship between form and matter.

8. MODIFICATION

In this interweaving of ontology and language, a major role is played by the phenomenon of linguistic modification, which Marty applied to the syntax of

¹¹⁰ Rossi 1926, 214 and Kuroda 1990, 77-87.

¹¹¹ Marty 1908, 120 ff.

¹¹² Marty 1895.

¹¹³ Poli 1992.

cases, in particular when the conceptual meaning of the main term is modified by the term that follow, for example: 'death's son' or 'painted landscape'.¹¹⁴

The importance of modification had also been emphasized by Brentano.¹¹⁵ Adjectives, in fact, sometimes determine and modify the subject to which they refer. Consider the case of 'learned man' and 'dead man': although a learned man is a man, we cannot say that a dead man is a man.¹¹⁶ Certain terms may be both determining and modifying, as, for example, in the expressions 'painted picture' and 'painted landscape': the adjective 'painted' in the former case is determining, in the latter case it is modifying: the painted landscape, in fact, is not a landscape but a picture.¹¹⁷

Generally speaking, we can identify two distinct kinds of modification in the Brentanian theory of modification: the modification of form but not of matter, and the modification of matter but not of form: 'dead man' is an example of the former; 'painted landscape' is an example of the latter. The difference between them is that a painted landscape is not a landscape, just as a dead man is not a man, yet a painted landscape *resembles* a landscape because it preserves its form.¹¹⁸

To understand these differences we must resort to the theory of double judgment, which, when applied to modification, transforms an expression like 'painted landscape' into 'this is a landscape; it is painted'. Here the natural matter — that is, the *ontologically* natural or primary matter — of the form 'landscape' is replaced by derived matter.¹¹⁹ The analysis of possible forms therefore constitutes a sort of general philosophical grammar of possible meanings based on ontology.

¹¹⁴ Marty 1940 I, 197, 209 ff.; 1910, 86 ff.

¹¹⁵ Brentano 1971a. Brentano's theory of modification was analysed by most of his followers: Meinong 1910, 1-8, 377-85. Husserl 1913, 243-5. For thorough examination of this theory, which is also to be found in Reinach, Wittgenstein, Chomsky, Evans and Austin, see Mulligan 1987a. See also Poli 1992, ch. 7 e Poli 1993, and Poli & Dappiano 1994.

¹¹⁶ Within Brentano's school, however, a systematic theory of modification was developed by Twardowski. According to Twardowski, who began distinguishing among act, content and object of presentation, an adjective is determining if it broadens, narrows or completes the meaning of a term; it is modifying if it transforms the term's meaning. Twardowski 1894, ch. IV.

¹¹⁷ Quine 1961; Poli 1993c, 112-116.

¹¹⁸ Poli 1993b. This raises the important question of similarity: see above for the problem of relative determination as the capacity of the act to adapt ideally to a multiplicity of possible objects.

¹¹⁹ Poli 1993b.

9. THEORY OF LANGUAGE

In conclusion, in order to obtain a clear idea of Marty's doctrine of meaning and its connections with his theory of language, it is advisable to keep the different levels to which he referred — psychological, linguistic and ontological — distinct.

At the first level, according to the classification used by descriptive psychology, we have the presentation of an object to which a name corresponds. Here, since the name denominates the object and has autosemantic value, we can speak of objective meaning in a logical sense.

At the linguistic level, ongoing communicative discourse constantly modifies meaning according to mental contents notified by the speaker and evoked in the listener with features of internal figurative form: at this level, rather than objective meaning, it is the signifying function and the conceptual mark of the terms used in discourse that predominate.

All notified contents, both expressed and evoked, also depend upon the context in which they are used, upon the linguistic competence of the speakers, upon the rhetorical force of terms, and upon the norms of usage of the language in question — according to the constructive inner form.

Finally, at the ontological level, this theoretical construct validates the existence of states of affairs as the objective contents of utterances and of the correlates of signifying acts, relative tothetic judgments, in the enlarged present in which communication takes place. Marty called states of affairs 'judgment-contents' (*Urteilsinhalte*) which have the function of ascribing truth: a judgment is true, according to Marty, if its corresponding content exists — that is to say, if the judgment and the content of the judgment correspond.¹²⁰ It is this aspect of Marty's theory that diverges from the extreme nominalism of the late Brentano. Moreover, the content of judgment stands in relation to the object and not to thought, because its objectivity entails an existence which is independent of thought.¹²¹ In consequence, we have contents of judgment only in the case of true judgments.¹²²

In Marty's general grammar, at the ontological level, propositions in the sense of ideal units of meaning do not exist because his general grammar excludes directly intuitable essences like those of Husserl's pure grammar. The pragmatic dimension of his theory of language, in fact, only acknowledges the existence of utterances and the states of affairs to which they are connected within the flow of communicative discourse.

¹²⁰ Marty 1908, 295; Morscher 1986, 78. See also the entry by Smith in this volume.

¹²¹ Marty 1908, 404.

¹²² On the other hand, Bolzano also admitted false contents of judgments. For a criticism of Bolzano see Bergmann 1909, 15.

10. CRITICISM OF LANGUAGE

It is evident from these observations that Marty's philosophy of language has a great deal in common with Wittgenstein's theses set out in *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, and also with the thought of one of Wittgenstein's inspirers: Fritz Mauthner.

Certainly, as regards linguistic behaviour, Mauthner's doctrine of the three visions of the world finds some support in Marty's theory. Mauthner distinguished between substantival, adjectival and verbal visions of the world, to which, at the ontological level, the classes of objects, events and qualities correspond.¹²³ These embryonic semantic categories in language predominate to varying extents over the others — both in the use of single terms, and at the general level of internal form or world vision.¹²⁴ Mauthner's doctrine, therefore, certainly has some points of contact with the second aspect of meaning in Marty, where the *function* of a term predominates over the logical and descriptive structures of its meaning.

However, in spite of several close analogies, we cannot speak of Marty's theory as a thoroughgoing critique of language, like that conducted by Mauthner or by the later Wittgenstein. This is essentially because of one factor: the influence of Brentano's descriptive psychology. What Mauthner needed to eliminate the psychologism of his three world views (which gave priority to the denoting function of subjective, emotional and poetical contents) was a theory of meaning which did not reduce language to mere pragmatic function or rules of usage, despite its instrumental purpose of satisfying communicative needs. In other words, he required the guarantee of the evidence, clarity and reliability of inner perception which, at the descriptive level, gives to names the autosemantic value of denoting the intentional existence of presentation.¹²⁵ Which is tantamount to guaranteeing the validity of meaning as the identity of signifying intention.

¹²³ Mauthner quoted Marty in the second volume of his 1923; in particular, Marty 1875 when he analysed the development of linguistic sounds (367) and Marty 1879, when he analysed the linguistic terms for colours (686). On Mauthner cf. Albertazzi 1986.

¹²⁴ Mauthner 1925. On the critique of language in Brentano and Mauthner see Albertazzi 1989b, 145-157.

¹²⁵ Albertazzi 1986.

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on:

see also:

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| content /meaning | 6.6, 6.9, 7.4, 7.9, 8.3, 12.5 |
| descriptive psychology | 1.4, 1.7, 3.3, 6.3, 6.10 |
| language | 6.6-7 |
| logic and theory of judgment | 1.10-13, 3.4, 4.4, 4.6, 7.13, 11, 12, 16.6, 16.12-13 |
| modification | 7.5 |
| reism | 1.20, 14 |

CARL STUMPF (1848-1936)

1. STUMPF AS A DISCIPLE OF BRENTANO

Among Brentano's more important students Carl Stumpf was not only one of the longest-living, to be outlived for a year only by Masaryk and for two by Husserl. He could pride himself also on having been Brentano's "most ancient disciple".¹ Brentano's teaching at the University of Würzburg almost coincided, in fact, with the beginning of Stumpf's study there. Carl Stumpf was in his second term when Brentano on 14 July 1866 defended a series of theses for the purpose of his habilitation and subsequently became a *Privatdozent*. From Winter 1866/67 onward Stumpf attended Brentano's lecture courses on the history of philosophy, metaphysics and logic,² and it was "the rigorous exactness of their train of thought" that made him quickly turn to philosophy.³ Already around Christmas 1866 he was on close terms with Brentano. Since a *Privatdozent* could not supervise a doctoral dissertation, Brentano sent Stumpf for three semesters (Summer 1867 to Summer 1868) to Göttingen where he took his degree under Hermann Rudolph Lotze. In Winter 1868/69 he went back to Würzburg where he again attended Brentano's lectures up to Summer 1870.

It was in all probability Brentano's courses on the history of philosophy what awakened Stumpf's own interest in the subject. Brentano had taken his doctorate in 1862 with a work on the meaning of the concept of being in Aristotle, and in 1867 published an equally scholarly work on Aristotle's psychology. Stumpf for his part wrote his PhD on the relationship of Plato's

¹ Stumpf 1940, 428.

² See Stumpf 1919b, 89 and 97.

³ Stumpf 1883, V (Preface).

God to his idea of the Good.⁴ Later in life, too, Stumpf showed a marked interest in the history of philosophy⁵ and contributed especially an important treatise on the relation between the substance and the attributes in Spinoza.⁶

Brentano's Würzburg lecture courses on metaphysics, especially the third expanded version of this course he gave in Winter 1868/69, were of particular interest to young Stumpf as can be gathered from the sheer fact that his notes of this lecture course comprised a quarto volume of not less than 833 shorthand pages.⁷ Brentano divided metaphysics into transcendental philosophy and ontology on the one hand and theology and cosmology on the other.⁸ In transcendental philosophy, i.e. the theory of knowledge, he seems above all to have defended the validity of certain types of knowledge against the arguments of scepticism.⁹ More especially Brentano considered logical axioms and inner perception to be immediately evident.¹⁰ Against Zeno's view that it is impossible to conceive the notion of a continuum without lapsing into contradictions, Brentano argued that such contradictions rested on misconceptions of points as substance-like entities. Zeno, in other words, had confused boundaries of things with their parts. A point is not, however, a part of a line, be it even infinitesimally small: rather it is the line's boundary. It is therefore a misconception to suppose that continua are composed of (an infinite number of) points.¹¹ Another topic related to transcendental philosophy seems to have been Brentano's doctrine of induction. This, he argued, was a legitimate way of acquiring knowledge insofar as it was based on the calculus of probability.¹² Repeated experience makes the degree of certainty of our knowledge increase according to the rules of statistics.

In his ontology Brentano distinguished between physical, metaphysical and logical parts of a thing and gave an a priori proof of the law of causality by way of 'immanent induction'. By this he meant that temporally determined change does exist; we are aware of it in the inner perception of our own continually changing acts. Now the concept of change implies that something is brought about that previously did not exist. If there were no cause that would make it begin at a given moment of time, it would be equally likely that it would have come to exist at any other moment of time. In view of the infinite number of

⁴ Stumpf 1869.

⁵ See Stumpf 1896, the 4th edition of which (co-authored by Paul Menzer) appeared in 1928.

⁶ Stumpf 1919a, 1-57.

⁷ Stumpf 1919b, 104.

⁸ Stumpf 1919b, 97.

⁹ Cf. Stumpf 1939, 1, and Stumpf 1919b, 99.

¹⁰ Stumpf 1919b, 100.

¹¹ Stumpf 1940, 696f.

¹² Cf. Stumpf 1940, 539.

time moments the probability that it should begin to exist at this very moment would hence be infinitesimally small. Therefore there is an infinitely great probability that its existence at a given moment has a cause. Brentano moreover defended teleology on the base of arguments of probability: it is, he argued, infinitesimally improbable that the world as a well-structured totality should have come into existence by chance.¹³

In the lecture course on ‘deductive and inductive logic’ (a title clearly reminiscent of J. S. Mill) Brentano introduced his famous tripartite division of all psychic acts into presentations, judgments and ‘appetitions’, as he called them at the time — a classification that was to prevail with him throughout his life. Names Brentano considered to express presentations, and in names he distinguished between the meaning of the name and the psychic functions expressed or manifested by it. Concerning judgments he already at this stage defended the view that they all are reducible to positive or negative existential judgments. The whole complex of presentations underlying the judgment he called the judgment’s matter and the act of affirmation or negation he termed the judgment’s form or quality. Further he posited the judgment’s content which he defined as that which is accepted or rejected in the judgment (the immediate target of affirmation or negation, as it were). Such judgmental contents are linguistically expressible in infinitival clauses or in that-clauses. This notion of a content allowed Brentano also to explain so-called indirect judgments of the type ‘it is possible, necessary, true, wrong that ---’ by referring to their content. Thus the judgment ‘it is possible that A exists’ has as its presentational matter A and as its content the possibility of A’s existence.¹⁴

This then is a rough outline of the Brentanism Stumpf imbibed during his years of study in Würzburg. In 1870 he moved once more to Göttingen to become *Privatdozent*. He planned to pursue the historical line of research adopted already in his dissertation and so developed the project of writing a critical history of the notion of substance. In this he failed. A major example of the inseparable relation supposedly holding between a substance’s properties suggested to him by Brentano concerned the connection in visual perception between a given extension and its color. This attracted Stumpf’s special interest. Out of it there grew his book on the presentation of space,¹⁵ the second

¹³ Stumpf 1919b, 104; Stumpf 1940, 741ff.

¹⁴ Stumpf 1919b, 97 and 106f; Stumpf 1940, 392 (see also 577 note). See also Stumpf 1907b, 29: “Already three decades ago Brentano in his lectures has sharply underlined the fact that to the judgment there corresponds a specific judgmental content distinct from its presentational content (from its matter) and expressible in linguistic that-clauses or by substantivized infinitives”.

¹⁵ Stumpf 1873. The connection between Stumpf’s projected history of the concept of substance and the work on space is hinted at on p. 113 of the book where Stumpf says that to predicate a property of a substance is analogous to predicating extension of a color.

chapter of which (on the visual presentation of depth) he discussed with Brentano in September 1872, i.e. one month before the manuscript of the work was completed.¹⁶ In retrospect Stumpf wrote about this book that it was “stimulated by Brentano and had been written under his decisive influence”. The intention of the work had been to show “that color and extension not only habitually accompany each other, as the empiricist psychology of association had taught, but are by their very nature indivisibly and intrinsically connected”.¹⁷

The next important step in Stumpf’s relation to Brentano occurred in September 1873 (or 1874?) when both men met in Heyst at the Belgian seaside. In 1873 Stumpf had returned to Würzburg as a full professor; Brentano for his part had left for Vienna. Thus both men were eager to renew their earlier contacts. Brentano took to Heyst the manuscripts of the lecture courses on logic and psychology that he had given in Vienna from 1870 onward, all of which were copied out by Stumpf.¹⁸ It is probably from these texts that Stumpf learned how Brentano now opposed his analysis of structural laws of psychic occurrences both to Herbart’s causal-explanatory psychology and to Wundt’s physiological psychology by developing a descriptive or phenomenal psychology (‘psychognosy’) of his own. Also Stumpf discovered that Brentano in his doctrine of association had reduced all laws of association to a single one according to which each presentation leaves behind a disposition for the reawakening of a similar presentation under similar psychic circumstances. “Even today”, Stumpf says in 1919, “I consider this to be the most correct and comprehensive” formulation of the law of association.¹⁹

In 1874, Brentano’s *Psychology from an empirical standpoint* was published, and one year later Stumpf began to work out his psychology of sound perception.²⁰ The first volume of this pioneering *Tonpsychologie* appeared however only in 1883, and the second volume dedicated to “the teacher and friend Franz Brentano” was delayed until as late as 1890. Then, as later, however, Stumpf and Brentano continued to exchange letters,²¹ and Stumpf from time to time paid visits to his erstwhile teacher.²² Brentano’s

¹⁶ Stumpf 1924, 212; Stumpf 1919b, 143; Stumpf 1939, 24, note 1. The preface of Stumpf 1873 is signed October 1872.

¹⁷ Stumpf 1939, 183.

¹⁸ Stumpf 1919b, 131. On this page Stumpf gives 1873 as the date of their meeting. On p. 137 he mentions however 1874 instead.

¹⁹ Stumpf 1919b, 135 and Stumpf 1939, 183. See also Stumpf 1907a, 63n.

²⁰ Stumpf 1924, 213.

²¹ Such letters are referred to in Stumpf 1940, 431 and 519 note.

²² Stumpf mentions such visits taking place in 1876, 1879 (at the occasion of Stumpf’s appointment to a chair of philosophy in Prague), 1881, 1885, 1891 (Brentano visiting Stumpf in Munich), 1905, 1911 and 1913 (Stumpf 1919b, 138-140).

influence on Stumpf seems however to have diminished in the course of the years. As Stumpf himself reports: "On some issues I found it more difficult to follow his development, for our ideas, and in part even our habits of thought, had developed in different directions over the years".²³ In 1879 Stumpf had moved to Prague and in 1884 to Halle. In 1889 he went on to Munich, only to leave this town again in 1894 for Berlin because he had been denied the means for establishing a full-fledged laboratory for experimental work in psychology. This leaning toward experimental psychology²⁴ meant of course a certain loosening of the ties linking Stumpf to his erstwhile teacher who remained predominantly interested in issues of a more general nature. Yet even more important is the fact that Brentano's philosophy in the meantime had developed far beyond its original scope. Stumpf's views however had reached a rather high degree of stability at a quite early stage, and it was above all the early Brentano to whom he remained addicted. His interest in Brentano's innovations therefore was but limited. Yet this did not prevent him from considering Brentano the true and only model of philosophizing throughout.

2. SOME MATERIAL DIFFICULTIES

Stumpf remains famous today mainly for having been an eminent psychologist of sound and music. Empirical research in this field spanning a period of almost fifty years makes up the main body of his published work. Second, he was the father of Gestalt psychology as it developed among his students during the decennia he taught at the University of Berlin. Neither of these activities is however decisive for a portrait of Stumpf as a member of the Brentano school. Stumpf's more explicit philosophical interests, although remaining vivid throughout his whole life and manifesting themselves in his last years especially in the preparation for print of his voluminous *Erkenntnislehre*, did not issue in a stream of publications comparable to what he produced in the field of experimental research. Most of Stumpf's published philosophical work had first been read at the gatherings of the Bavarian and Prussian Academies of Sciences of which Stumpf was a long-term member, and was consequently published between 1892 and 1921 in the series of publications of these Academies. This lack of unified presentation not only stands in the way of

²³ Stumpf 1919b, 141.

²⁴ It should however be noted that Stumpf was more interested in empirical psychology as a foundation of philosophy than in experimental work for its own sake (I take over this distinction from the pertinent discussion of Stumpf's conception of psychology in Ash 1982, 30-62).

developing a coherent picture of his views, it also hampered the impact of his philosophy. Literature on Stumpf's philosophy therefore is rather limited.²⁵ Another difficulty barring the access to the philosopher Carl Stumpf is the complete destruction of his literary remains in the bombardments of World War II. This is all the more deplorable as among his posthumous papers there must have been many philosophical pieces more or less ready for publication, as becomes clear from the fact that between 1899 and 1912 he had read at the Prussian Academy not less than eleven substantial papers on philosophical topics. Among these were treatises on the concept of willing and the peculiarity of acts of willing, on the law of causality, the theory of inductive reasoning, and on structural differences between various contents of perception.²⁶ All this makes it extremely difficult to present a unified and sufficiently complete picture of Stumpf's peculiar philosophy.

Another problem concerns the determination of Stumpf's place in the development of Brentanism. Where his relations to Brentano's other pupils especially of the Vienna period, such as Meinong, Twardowski and Husserl, were for the most part channelled through their publications, he had already definitively fixed his relations to Brentano years before Brentano's first major publication, the *Psychology* of 1874. True, Stumpf remained interested in Brentano's development and continued to study even his posthumously published works attentively. But his view of Brentano and of what he considered to be Brentanian doctrine remained largely determined by the early Würzburg lectures he had attended, and to a lesser degree by the Vienna lectures the manuscripts of which his teacher had shown him in Heyst. Now it is known that there was a lively trade among Brentano's disciples in student notes taken at Brentano's lectures, and Stumpf, too, owned a body of such notes. These he donated to the Brentano Archives at Prague.²⁷ It is against the background of these lecture notes that Stumpf could best be understood as a philosopher in the Brentanist tradition. Yet here, too, we are at a loss. It can no longer be established what these notes contained, since they were completely lost in 1939 during the German invasion of Prague. Moreover Brentano's notes of his Würzburg courses are still unpublished, and we can only draw upon the information scattered through Stumpf's own works (as has been done above in the description of these courses).

²⁵ Most work on Stumpf consists of entries in works on the history of psychology or of articles prompted by occasions such as his 70th and 85th birthdays and his death. A more substantial discussions of his work is contained in Spiegelberg 1982, 51-65. Yet there exists no comprehensive study of his philosophy.

²⁶ Short notices on these papers are contained in the corresponding *Sitzungsberichte* of the Prussian Academy which it would be too tedious to list here in detail.

²⁷ *Philosophia* II (1937), 404.

In this situation the best thing one can do is to fall back upon the few presentations left to us by Stumpf of the main disciplines of his philosophizing. What I have in mind are more specifically three sets of lecture notes preserved among Husserl's papers at the Husserl Archives in Louvain.²⁸ These are an incomplete set of Stumpf's 'Metaphysics' of unknown date (probably from around 1890), a complete set of his psychology lectures as delivered in Winter 1886/87, and a lithographed copy of the logic lectures of Summer 1889. Where the notes on metaphysics were transcribed by Husserl from notes taken down (in a none too intelligent way) by another student of Stumpf during the lectures themselves, we have in the case of Stumpf's psychology course Husserl's own well-prepared notebooks, and Stumpf's logic exists even in a semi-official version destined for circulation among his students. The notes on metaphysics are incomplete insofar as certain main questions Stumpf describes as pertaining to the various branches of metaphysics are not treated at all, apparently due to lack of time. As regards the psychology lectures I will rely exclusively on the *Diktate* contained in Husserl's notebooks. Dictata of that kind used to make up the backbone of a professor's lectures, and they remained unchanged almost throughout his career.²⁹ Every time he repeated his lecture course, he dictated the same main theses to his students, adding explanations and proofs that could vary according to the situation. The psychology dictata preserved in Husserl's notes reflect at all events Stumpf's views during the '80s and '90s of the last century. And finally Stumpf's logic guide may be considered as an official statement of the author's views on the matter. The copy in Husserl's possession was, by the way, donated and dedicated to him by Stumpf.

3. STUMPF'S EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Stumpf was a true Brentanist in the sense that according to his own testimony his "views were in their broadest range based on the impulses received by Brentano".³⁰ More specifically Stumpf's "whole conception of philosophy, of the true and false methods of philosophizing, and the most essentials doctrines

²⁸ I want to thank Professor S. Ijsseling, the Director of the Husserl-Archives, for his kind permission to utilize all Louvain materials relevant to the present discussion.

²⁹ In Stumpf's case there is evidence that in his Berlin years he worked out new *Diktate* (containing the two parts "Individual Psychology and Psychophysics" and "General Psychology and Psychophysics") for the purpose of his teaching needs in the Psychological Seminar. Summaries of these later version which in the present account is left out of consideration, have been published in Langfeld 1937.

³⁰ Stumpf 1924, 231.

of logic and theory of knowledge, psychology, ethics and metaphysics — are his [=Brentano's] doctrines".³¹ As regards the general conception of philosophy, this is to say that according to Stumpf as well as to Brentano all philosophical disciplines were to be based upon psychology. The true method of philosophy as conceived by Stumpf derived from Brentano's famous 1866 fourth habilitation thesis according to which philosophy's true method does not differ from that of the natural sciences. This thesis, Stumpf later confessed, "was and remained my lode-star".³² It implied, first, that theory always presupposed a level of descriptive work with regard to the facts to be explained by that theory. And second, the method of deriving explanation from description was induction underpinned by the calculus of probabilities.³³ In this sense Stumpf's considerable work in experimental psychology only carried on Brentano's own impulse by painstakingly observing what was in fact going on in mental life, such as to allow the establishment of certain generalizing laws.

Especially as regards ethics, we do not exactly know how this program was worked out by Stumpf. Yet it is certain that at least the fundamentals of Stumpf's ethics remained close to Brentano. The principle of ethics, Stumpf contends, lies "in an evident feeling in which certain contents present themselves as good or valuable, just as evident judgments furnish the foundation of theoretical knowledge": a fact that had been pointed out already by Brentano.³⁴ In his psychology Stumpf adds that "positive feelings with regard to what is lovable (good) and negative feelings with regard to what is odious (bad) are called value feelings" (§ 34).³⁵ Because such feelings adequately echo the intrinsic qualities of their objects, they are right and evident, as opposed to blind judgments based on instinctive pleasure or habit, i.e. more generally on heterogeneous motives irrelevant for ethical thought.

The discipline worked out most carefully by Stumpf is however psychology. This was not only the field of research most dear to him, but was according to Brentanian doctrine also the fundamental branch of philosophy und therefore deserved some special attention. Stumpf's psychology is in all essentials close

³¹ Stumpf 1919b, 144.

³² Stumpf 1924, 208.

³³ Under both aspects the Brentano-Stumpfsian model ultimately derives from Bacon's view (as revived by the 18th century French encyclopedists and 19th century thinkers such as William Whewell) according to which science is to be preceded by (natural) history registering the relevant facts, such as to allow for 'true induction'. The combination of induction with the calculus of probabilities is however peculiar to nineteenth century developments in the wake of Laplace's research, such as were worked out especially by Brentano and, independently, by Stanley Jevons (see his 1874).

³⁴ Stumpf 1924, 253. Cf. Brentano 1889.

³⁵ The *Diktate* in Stumpf's lecture course in psychology are divided into running paragraphs and henceforth are quoted by indicating the paragraph number as it occurs in Husserl's notes.

to that of Brentano as laid down in his *Psychology*. They both consider inner perception as the source of psychological experience and are convinced that psychological laws are attained by induction in combination with deduction, a doctrine deriving from John Stuart Mill. Psychic phenomena (Brentano) or psychic states (Stumpf's preferred term) differ from what is physical in that they lack spatial extension, although they do possess temporal duration in every case. What is most characteristic of psychic states is that they are an awareness of a given content. Notwithstanding the fact that every awareness includes a content, the two elements are fundamentally irreducible to each other. "The content is not identical with the psychic act itself. The sensation of green, e.g., is itself not green" (§ 7). Stumpf, it should be noted, neither uses the term 'intentional' in his determination of what is psychic, nor does he equate the immanent content with the immanent object as is the case in Brentano. Still he accepts Brentano's threefold division of psychic states into presentations, judgments and 'acts of love and hatred' (Brentano) or, as he prefers to call them, feelings. Moreover he agrees with Brentano's doctrine that all psychic phenomena are conscious, in the sense that they are the objects of an inner awareness which, however, is not a superadded act of its own but a peculiarity of all acts as such.

About presentations Stumpf is much more explicit than Brentano in his *Psychology*. He gives a separate treatment of sensation, imagination, the presentations of space and time, and abstract presentations. Among sensations he deals specifically with sensations of color because they allow a qualitative ordering with regard to the so-called primary colors, and with sounds which, too, show an invariable order according to their qualities. In all such cases it is however not the act of sensation that would possess a certain force or intensity, but its content. "Hearing is not loud or low, but sounds are" (§ 17). States of imagination, Stumpf goes on to explain, are presentations the cause of which lies in sensations. They differ from sensations in that they are usually less intense and less detailed than are these. They also are rather volatile and easily modifiable. Moreover we usually do not believe them to be real. Stumpf's 'law of habit' taken over from Brentano (already from a terminological point of view however it is clear that there is here much that goes back to Hume) states that states of imagination (including memory states) are reproduced every time the circumstances or the disposition are similar to an earlier one which first had given rise to the state in question. This reproduction is not a merely passive process. By actively paying attention to the relevant conditions we can reawaken a state of imagination that is of interest to us: when trying to remember a person's name, we may reproduce the circumstances under which we first met the person. In a comparable way one is also to understand cases of loss of memory or of productive (poetic) imagination. These flow from a

special incapacity (or capacity for that) to resuscitate the relevant dispositions or circumstances.

The idea of time results from an original type of association that occurs in primary memory. "Although each sensation lasts a certain time, one cannot sense duration itself" (§ 25). Rather all presentations have the property of producing other presentations similar to the first one and differing from it only in respect to the moment of time. Stumpf, this is to say, sticks to Brentano's early doctrine according to which the presentation of time consists in the duration of contents of presentation, connected with a subjective shift in the presentation's position.³⁶ And correspondingly he rejects his teacher's later views that time-awareness is a mode of judging or, still worse, of the act of presenting. This Stumpf understood as a relapse into Kantian doctrine, according to which time is a *form* of intuition.³⁷ To Stumpf time was to remain "a characteristic of the *content* of both sense phenomena and psychic acts".³⁸

With regard to space, Stumpf defends a mitigated version of the 'nativist' view, according to which the optical nerve not only gives certain sensations of color but of extension, too. "This is why it is absolutely impossible to present a color without any extension at all" (§ 26). Yet most other spatial relations, such as the seeing of figures and distances, result from experience and association. In this sense the 'empiricist' view, which considers the idea of space to be the result of certain combinations of sensations, is justified by Stumpf. To summarize his doctrine: "It seems that all sensations possess a moment of spatiality" (§ 27), and this is to say that "extensity is an integral part of sense-impression just as is intensity" (§ 26). Nevertheless our spatial presentations as well as judgments result from associations acquired in the course of our life.³⁹

The last statement applies also to abstract presentations. "In our consciousness we have exclusively concrete presentations of individual things" (§ 28). Yet we are capable of noticing certain parts of these separately and may grasp similarities between such parts. We can, this is to say, abstract certain concepts from experience, be it from the perception of outer things or from that of our own psychic acts, especially from the act of judging. From judging we abstract concepts such as causality, existence or necessity — in short, a good deal of what Kant considered to be categories of our understanding. This is of course orthodox Brentanian doctrine as developed not so much in Brentano's *Psychology* as in his lecture courses on the subject. At least with regard to the

³⁶ Cf. Stumpf 1924, 249; Stumpf 1939, 283.

³⁷ Stumpf 1939, 285.

³⁸ Stumpf 1940, 687 (my italics).

³⁹ This is broadly speaking the position defended by Stumpf already in his book on *Raumvorstellung*: "space is sensed in the same way sense qualities are, but it needs to be worked out" (307). On the correct understanding of Stumpf's view see Smith 1986, 116.

concept of existence however Stumpf later in life gave up the Brentanist explanation and “stood closer to good old Aristotle”, as he himself said.⁴⁰ Existence, he now taught, was abstracted not from judgments but from (outer and inner) perception.

On another Brentanian doctrine Stumpf however remained firm all his life. “I always kept Brentano’s sharp distinction between judgment and mere presenting”, he states.⁴¹ Judgments as such Stumpf of course was to treat extensively in his logic. In the framework of psychology we are discussing here he is however mainly interested in the origin of judgments. He distinguishes evident judgments from blind ones. The former are either immediately evident or evident only by way of some mediation. In the first case our evidence is grounded in the nature of the presentations the judgment involves. This applies firstly to axioms the evidence of which derives from that of the abstract presentations they imply, and secondly to judgments of inner perception. These are true in virtue of the concrete presentations affirmed in them. Evident in a mediate way are all judgments *derived* either from inner perception or from axioms. Axioms together with their derivatives constitute the realm of a priori truths. The notions of necessity and of law result from an abstraction from such a priori judgments. All of this is of course taken over more or less verbatim from Brentano’s early lecture courses.

Blind judgments spring from three main causes. First, from feelings. We are prone to believe whatever is in line with a dominant feeling. Moreover we tend to believe whatever is in harmony with our habits. Judgments stemming from these two sources are mere prejudices. Yet there exists in us also an original bent inclining us to acknowledge everything given to us in presentation, as long as this presentation is not subject to critical reflection. Perception, i.e. the naive belief in an external world, springs from such instinctive judgments. Only reflection upon sense deceptions enables us to sift out what is erroneous in perception from what is real.

Where Stumpf’s doctrine of evident judgments seems to be somewhat more elaborate than Brentano’s corresponding view, he remains at all events close to him in his doctrine of perception. *Wahrnehmung*, Brentano used to say — and Stumpf was to repeat — is in fact *Falschnehmung*. Only in the course of his later development Stumpf came to acknowledge the reliability not only of internal perception, but of external perception, too, if only to a certain degree. In his *Erkenntnislehre* he finally posited three conditions for external perception to be evident: (a) it must be the case that one has separated this perception from any interpretation according to which it would present to us things

⁴⁰ Stumpf 1939, 79.

⁴¹ Stumpf 1924, 240; cf. Stumpf 1939, 6.

existing independently of consciousness, (b) the perception must be clear and distinct, and (c) the judgment about it may not transgress what is really given in perception.⁴² By separating in this way perception from our judgments about it Stumpf more or less returns to traditional non-Brentanian doctrine of perception which in fact seems to be more consonant with common sense.⁴³

Stumpf's treatment of the third class of psychic phenomena, too, differs in certain ways from the doctrine as developed in Brentano's *Psychology*. First, Stumpf calls it the class of feelings, where Brentano had spoken of acts of love and hatred. Second, he distinguishes among feelings between active and passive ones. The first are accompanied by the presentation of a causal link connecting the content felt with its realisation by means of that very feeling, where in passive feelings such a link is absent. Active feelings are wishes, hopes, courage, and willing; all the rest are passive. Among feelings we also encounter feelings of values in which we love what is good and hate what is bad. Blind feelings, however, love and hate something not in function of its own value or disvalue, but for heterogeneous motives such as instinctive pleasure or habit.

The two feelings receiving separate treatment in Stumpf are attention and willing. Attention or interest may be caused by changes in the content of our consciousness. Among simultaneous contents it is usually the strongest or most pleasant one that attracts attention. Yet we can direct our attention also voluntarily to certain things. In such cases attention is nothing but a willing directed at the perception of something. Willing thus is closely linked to attending. Indeed, attention brings about the continued presence of a presentation given in consciousness, and habitual repetition of this will make us expect a comparable success under similar circumstances. Thus attention first becomes the will to keep a presentation present in the field of consciousness. In later stages the will may extend to the consequences flowing from such a presentation and may be directed at them at once. Thus the domain of willing will gradually extend and even result in the production of arbitrary movements of our body. This whole view, to repeat again, seems to go beyond Brentano's original doctrine which did not so narrowly run together feeling and willing but tended to keep them separate as distinct elements of the class of love and hatred.

⁴² Stumpf 1939, 219.

⁴³ In his 1907b, 16n. Stumpf states that not unlike Brentano he had in earlier times considered all perceiving to be judgment. "But now I understand it as a function preceding and underlying the judgment by which parts or relations are set off from the indistinct chaos of appearances".

4. A LOGIC IN BRENTANIAN STYLE

It is no great surprise that Stumpf's psychology is more than just a simple remake of that of Brentano, since psychology was the field in which Stumpf was most active. In logic, however, he was less of an innovator. Logic is according to him the practical doctrine of cognition. It is a part of philosophy since it is based on a philosophical science, i.e. on psychology. More specifically it deals with judgments and by consequence also with the presentations included in them, i.e. with two of the three main groups of psychic phenomena. Now as regards judgments Stumpf explicitly states in a note appended to § 4 of his *Logic* of 1888, that the basic features of his doctrine of judgment and some of its main consequences "are to be found in Brentano's *Psychology*, vol. I. This scholar has developed them into a system of logic in oral lecture courses which have been used frequently in the present compendium". This last phrase clearly refers to Brentano's Würzburg lectures. Some important traits of Stumpf's compendium indeed point back to these lectures. This is true already of an important distinction introduced in this very § 4 between the judgment's matter, which consists in one or more representations underlying the judgment, and the act of affirming or denying which constitutes the judgment's essence. "From the judgment's matter", Stumpf goes on, "we distinguish its *content* or the state of affairs expressed in the judgment. E.g., the matter of 'God exists' is God, its content is God's existence. 'God does not exist' has the same matter, but its content is 'God's non-existence'". Thus Stumpf accepts Brentano's early distinction between judgmental matter and judgmental content. Moreover this statement is historically important in the sense that it introduced into logic the notion of *Sachverhalt* or state of affairs so pervasive in 20th century philosophy.⁴⁴ Indeed, in later years after this notion had been popularized through Husserl's *Logical investigations*, Stumpf repeatedly insisted that he had introduced the term *Sachverhalt* as another name for Brentano's judgmental content "for the first time in my Halle logic lectures of 1888".⁴⁵

With regard to presentations underlying all judgments Stumpf makes use of several distinctions introduced by Brentano. Most noteworthy is his repetition of Brentano's distinction between the several kinds of 'parts' composite pre-

⁴⁴ See the comprehensive study by Smith 1992 and his contribution below.

⁴⁵ Stumpf 1924, 240. Also in his 1907b, 30n. Stumpf says that "already in a textbook on logic lithographed for the students" he had used the expression 'state of affair' for the judgment's content. This claim is also confirmed by Husserl in his copy of this lithographed compendium. Husserl, who had attended, and taken notes in, Stumpf's lecture course on logic in 1887, commented in the margin of his copy of the 1888 compendium upon the paragraph quoted above from § 4 that this paragraph was "not contained in the *Diktate* of 1887".

sentations may contain.⁴⁶ There are, Stumpf says, collective parts (such as the items in a collection), physical parts (spatial or temporal parts bordering on each other), metaphysical parts (i.e. a presentation's moments such as a movement's direction or velocity or a sound's intensity),⁴⁷ and logical parts (general and specific differences, such as hold between color and red). With the exception of collective parts this is in fact a repetition of early Brentanian doctrine. Stumpf goes on to state that all such parts refer to a presentation's true or internal characteristics. Such characteristics must be distinguished from what he calls with Brentano 'modifying' characteristics — characteristics which do not at all add to the concept they are used to determine, but rather change its meaning completely. "A supposed, painted or future horse is not a horse at all, but the idea, the picture, the wish or possibility of a horse" (§ 6). It is also in agreement with Brentanian doctrine that Stumpf rejects the idea that there are so-called contradictory oppositions between presentations as distinguished from contrary oppositions. Contradictory opposites, Stumpf says, are defined by the mere negation of a given concept. Thus 'a man' is said to be the opposite of 'not a man'. But, he argues, everything not falling under man would fall under that negation, be it a triangle, a fork, a dog, God, or a possibility, i.e. things having nothing in common. "Such negative expressions make sense only when a positive concept underlies them, within the framework of which a negative judgment denying the applicability of a characteristic is made. 'No smoking', e.g., refers only to *passengers* who do not smoke" (§ 7).⁴⁸

The scheme of judgment is, for Stumpf as for Brentano, +A or -A, a scheme best exemplified in existential and impersonal sentences of the type 'S is' and 'S is not'. Categorical sentences of the type 'S is P' therefore fall far from the judgment's essence (§ 8, 2). In this context Stumpf also mentions Brentano's doctrine of the logical reducibility of affirmative general statements ('All S are P') to negative judgments about existence ('There is no S that would not be P'). Yet he surely does not insist upon it to the degree Brentano himself was wont to do. This is in line with Stumpf's declaration of 1919 to the effect that "since long ago the interpretation of general affirmative utterances as negative judgments or judgments containing negations seems to me to be incorrect".⁴⁹ For, he goes on, he can no longer accept Brentano's "transformation of all judg-

⁴⁶ For a perceptive study of this topic in both Brentano and Stumpf see Smith & Mulligan 1982.

⁴⁷ In his 1873, 8f. Stumpf had called this type of parts 'psychological parts'; in later years he was to prefer the expression 'attributive parts' (Stumpf 1907b, 21).

⁴⁸ Later on this view was propagated especially by Brentano's disciple Kazimierz Twardowski in his 1894, 21f.

⁴⁹ Stumpf 1919b, 133.

ments or utterances into existential ones”.⁵⁰ On the contrary, Stumpf in his later period rather advocated ‘the reverse procedure’: all sentences expressing existence should be translated into categorical judgments.⁵¹ Stumpf’s logic compendium of 1888, this is to say, represents a transition between his first period under the influence of Brentano and his return to more traditional views on the nature of (general affirmative) judgments.

In the context of Stumpf’s psychology we have already mentioned his distinction between blind and evident judgments. Now we may add that he also distinguishes between true and false ones. These do not differ in the sense that true judgments would correspond to reality, whereas false ones would not. For there are also true hypothetical and mathematical judgments that do not correspond to any reality at all. Rather, what makes a judgment true or false is the nature of its content. Whenever it is such that it must be affirmed, the corresponding judgment is true. Also in this respect Stumpf manifestly sticks close to Brentanian doctrine.

As in his psychology, so in his logic, too, Stumpf distinguishes between judgments that are immediately evident and judgments that are not. The first he divides further into a posteriori judgments, i.e. judgments concerning immediately evident fact (judgments based on inner perception) and a priori judgments (judgments based on axioms). The axioms he now reduces to the principles of non-contradiction and of the excluded middle. To these he adds what he calls axioms concerning consequences (*Folgerungsaxiome*) of the type ‘if a neither is b nor is not b , it is not at all’ (§ 16, 1c) or ‘if all a are b and all b are c , then also all a are c ’.⁵² Such axioms are implied in all syllogisms. Yet they are not premises of syllogisms (for in that case a syllogism would have three premises: the axiom ‘if all a are b and all b are c , then also all a are c ’ and the premises ‘all a are b ’ and ‘all b are c ’). Rather, they can be abstracted from syllogisms if one states the special relationship obtaining between the premises and their consequence. In that case they show themselves to be necessary judgments, i.e. a priori axioms of reasoning.

The kind of reasoning most dear to Stumpf is however not the syllogism, but reasoning by means of probabilities. For it is thereby that inductive reasoning starting from an empirical basis becomes possible. Induction, Stumpf says, sets out from the observation of convergent facts, then establishes the chance p that this convergence might be just a matter of mere coincidence, and finally concludes to the probability $1-p$ that there exists a general law of which the given

⁵⁰ Stumpf 1924, 240.

⁵¹ Stumpf 1939, 81f.

⁵² This latter example derives from Stumpf 1907a, 49. In a note to this page Stumpf says that he had developed the notion of *Folgerungsaxiome* for the first time in a lecture course on logic given in 1883.

facts are valid instances. It goes without saying that the formulation of hypotheses is according to Stumpf in large measure governed by the principles of the calculus of probabilities. On all these matters Stumpf stays close to Brentanian doctrine. Here I will however not enter into the details of what Stumpf has to say about probability,⁵³ since his views are clearly flawed by a lack of mastery of the problems surrounding the calculus of probability. According to Stumpf “the probability that several mutually independent assumptions (facts, laws) are true together, is the outcome of the probability of all assumptions taken individually” (§ 23). This is however to overlook the fact that probabilities can be summed only in case they together constitute one common field of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities.⁵⁴

5. METAPHYSICS AS THE GENERAL SCIENCE OF REALITY

According to a well-known Brentanian distinction, everything given to us is either a physical or a psychic phenomenon. Or to put it in Stumpf's own terminology: everything either is an appearance or a function. Correspondingly the main division of science is into physics and psychology, and these two exhaust the field of what can be known with regard to reality. However there is more to be investigated than each of these domains separately. First, there are certain determinations or laws common to both. Complexes consisting of elements for example occur in the world of physics as well as in that of the mind or soul. Moreover the two fields are in some way connected, and the way they are linked is no doubt a legitimate field of inquiry of its own. Now the science investigating the most general laws valid in both domains, i.e. the science of the determinations common to internal and external experience, is metaphysics.⁵⁵ The

⁵³ Stumpf's major publication on the subject is his Stumpf 1892. This resulted in a controversy between Stumpf and L. von Bortkiewicz in 1899 in the journal *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*.

⁵⁴ This was pointed out by Husserl in a letter to Stumpf of June 21, 1899 in the wake of the aforementioned controversy. Yet the point was apparently lost on Stumpf who had taken his habilitation in Göttingen with an (apparently lost) work on the axioms of mathematics. Yet it is significant that in retrospect he was to confess: “I did not publish this work, because the non-Euclidean ways of considering things to which Felix Klein introduced me, finally went beyond me” (Stumpf 1924, 211).

⁵⁵ As this science concerns psychology in the same way as it concerns physics, Stumpf says that, instead of metaphysics, it could with equal reason be called metapsychics (Stumpf 1907a, 42).

object of metaphysics may accordingly be described as the nature of reality in general.⁵⁶

Metaphysics Stumpf divides into the same four branches the early Brentano had advocated: *theory of knowledge* or *transcendental philosophy*, dealing with sceptical problems such as the subjectivity and relativity of our cognition and the contradictions conceptual knowledge seems to involve, *ontology*, treating the concept of reality and general problems such as the parts, causes and laws of things, *theology*, considering the first ground of reality and the question of teleology, and *cosmology*, reflecting on the infinity or finiteness of the world and of its development.⁵⁷ All this is once more in line with the early Brentano's lecture courses on metaphysics. A special Stumpfian accent may be seen to lie in his insistence that metaphysics, since it is about reality, cannot be an a priori science, but has to use the empirical method.

Stumpf's theory of cognition deals mainly with the supposed subjectivity of our presentations, be they sensations or what Kant had called categories of the understanding. Stumpf then goes on to treat the Eleatic arguments against the possibility of a contradiction-free understanding of continua (of spatial extension and movement). These arguments, together with the general skeptical one that we can neither blindly trust our cognitive faculties nor dispose of any other means to control them except these very faculties themselves, Stumpf answers by a general appeal to the notion of evidence. There are, he maintains, certain types of cognition which are as a matter of fact evident, such as inner perception and the axioms. As to the other great problem of how to cognize or to guarantee the validity of our beliefs about the external world, Stumpf confronts two extremist positions, viz. intuitive realism affirming the reality of things as perceived, and phenomenalism reducing things perceived to regular possibilities of sensation. Stumpf opts for a qualified version of realism based on the principle of causality. According to this principle, the notion of things existing independent of my sensations involves no contradiction, since they are to be understood as the *causes* of sensations. And it is necessary to accept such causes, because sensation is neither completely chaotic (thus not allowing the suggestion of a cause inducing it) nor completely regular (so that its cause could be looked for in the subjective rules according to which sensations deve-

⁵⁶ This Brentanist definition of metaphysics is present, e.g., in Meinong, too, according to whom metaphysics is "the general science of what is real" (Meinong 1904, 38).

⁵⁷ This is a typical 19th century view which in the last instance goes back to Christian Wolff's division of metaphysics into general metaphysics or ontology, and the three branches of special metaphysics: psychology, cosmology and theology. Yet in the course of the 19th century this scheme was remodelled in a Kantian fashion by substituting transcendental philosophy for rational psychology and by assigning to this psychology the first place in the scheme, since it was conceived to function as a general critique of cognition.

lop out of each other). Sensations, this is to say, display a certain regularity, and real things must be posited to account for it. "The explanatory value", Stumpf says, "of the realist hypothesis possesses a probability that surpasses all others". The existence of an external world is thereby demonstrated in the highest degree possible.

This argument hinges, of course, on the validity of the concept of causality. As Stumpf puts it: "If we were not even allowed to use the concepts of cause and effect in order to get across from appearances to what is objective, everything would be at an end". In fact we are entitled to use these concepts, since they are absolutely necessary for explaining the regular succession of our sensations. And everything indispensable for that purpose is as such a legitimate instrument of understanding what is given. Further discussion of this question is, Stumpf believes, to no avail. As he was to write in later years: "Everything we must think as independent from consciousness and as conditioning consciousness itself, if we are not to contradict all rules of probability, we like to call objectively real. Whoever prefers the more pedantic pleonastic expression or thinks it especially profound to add to all objects of our thinking and speaking the index 'thing thought of' may do so. However he will thereby solve no problem at all".⁵⁸

There is one problem the solution of which by Stumpf deserves some special attention in the present context. It concerns the concept of space on which Stumpf had written his first major work. In a way clearly reminiscent of Kant's inaugural dissertation,⁵⁹ Stumpf says that space, if it is to exist, must be either a substance, a property or a relation. Since the first and the third alternatives can be ruled out — for otherwise space would be in another space, and there were to be spatial fundamentals of the relation — only the second possibility is left. To this it can be objected that whenever a body is moved, its properties move along with it, whereas space is left behind. Yet Stumpf says that space, i.e. the body's place, is neither left behind nor such as to move with the body whose place it is. In order to understand this thesis one has to distinguish between the body's place taken individually and the same place taken specifically. "Just as two bodies cannot have individually, but indeed specifically the same color", two bodies cannot occupy individually, but only specifically one and the same place. "A body when moved does not take along its place with it, but loses it and occupies a new one, just as a body loses a color and acquires another one, without some other body taking over the color that has been lost". The same relation is exemplified by Stumpf by the law of pushing bodies. In the case of pushing the first body's movement goes over to the second one, but the two

⁵⁸ Stumpf 1907a, 18f.

⁵⁹ Kant 1770, § 15 D.

movements are not individually, but only specifically the same. This doctrine is particularly remarkable in view of similar ideas about space entertained by the later Brentano.⁶⁰

Stumpf's sketchy ontology follows in all essentials the Brentanian model. Its two main questions concern the parts of things and the causal laws governing their behavior. Also the division of parts into physical, metaphysical and logical ones is directly taken over from Brentano. A special Stumpfian conception can be found only in his view that the substance is not an entity behind a thing's properties, but only the compound of these properties themselves.

In theology however Stumpf deviates in some interesting ways from Brentano's theistic position. The only stringent argument demonstrating God's existence according to Stumpf is the teleological one. He agrees with Brentano that Darwinist and mechanical explanations of teleology, be it in the world of organisms or in nature at large, cannot do away with teleology as such. If experience displays to us a well-ordered universe, we must impute design already to the universe's original state, for it must have been such as to lead up to the present state of order. The exceptional present phase therefore implies the exceptionality of the world's original phase. And that this exceptional original phase should have come into existence, rather than any other one, is infinitely unlikely. "The question of teleology thus is reduced to a question of probability". There must therefore exist an intelligent ground of the universe to which we are to ascribe in the last instance the design of producing the well-ordered present state we perceive.⁶¹ Stumpf conceives this principle as continually creating, so that the world becomes "an eternal creation out of nothing", as he puts it in the framework of his cosmology.

Another topic worthy of note is the view that God must be absolutely simple. Therefore there can be no distinction between what God conceives by means of his intellect and chooses by means of his will. Against Leibniz Stumpf therefore holds that our world is not one (maybe the best one) chosen by God among an infinite number of possibilities, but must be the only possible one. For the same reason Stumpf also denies that one could ascribe to God designs in the proper sense of the term. This implies that all attempts at formulating a theodicy are futile. Stumpf therefore concludes: "Whether one

⁶⁰ See Brentano 1988, 169: "It has been said that if a body is to move then there must exist an empty space into which it moves. This is just as compelling as if someone were to say that, if something is to change color, there must already exist a color which it then takes on. Like the body changing color, so also the body that moves suffers an alteration, though in a different genus of determinations".

⁶¹ It is curious that both Stumpf and Brentano even after Kant continue to operate uncritically with the concept of order, ignoring the suspicion cast upon it by thinkers such as Bacon or Voltaire, that it might be vitiated by anthropomorphic connotations.

calls this conception theistic or pantheistic, and correspondingly wants to call God personal or impersonal, immanent or transcendent, depends on the way one defines these expressions". It may however be anticipated that in view of God's absolute simplicity and the world's uniqueness it will be impossible to enumerate some set of determinations that would allow us to distinguish between God and the world. Hence the problem of evil, to repeat once more, cannot be solved by appealing to higher purposes God would pursue with regard to the world as a whole. As the later Stumpf was to say: "The only decisive explanation for the existence of evil in the world is that the absolute itself is bound by the laws of nature, and that the latter are not opposed to the former in any extrinsic way, but rather pertain to its essence. This is however to proceed from theism to pantheism".⁶² Stumpf reports himself to have moved away from Brentanian theism in the direction of (what he conceived to be) a Spinozistic pantheism as early as 1876, and to have done so precisely because of the problem of theodicy.⁶³ 1876 was, by the way, also the year of Stumpf's "first lecture course on metaphysics",⁶⁴ and it is more than likely that the opposition to Brentano and his personal coming to grips with metaphysics were two sides of the same coin. Where Stumpf, this is to say, in his philosophical views about psychology, logic, the theory of cognition, and ontology always remained a close follower of Brentano, he was on the contrary from the very outset a Spinozist in matters concerning God and his relation to the world.

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⁶² Stumpf 1940, 796.

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

on:

see also:

descriptive psychology
 logic and theory of judgement
 metaphysics

1.4, 1.7, 2.2, 6.3, 6.10
 1.10-13, 2.6-7, 4.4, 4.6, 7.13,
11, **12**, 16.6, 16.12-13
 7.3, 16.15

ALEXIUS MEINONG (1853-1920)

In the constellation of Brentano's students who became renowned scholars and philosophers, Alexius Meinong shines as one of the brightest stars. The founder of *Gegenstandstheorie*, the theory of intended objects, Meinong understood his contributions to metaphysics, philosophical psychology, logic, semantics, epistemology, and value theory, as a systematic continuation of Brentano's realist empiricist intentionalism.

Yet Meinong's philosophy, beginning with Brentano's thesis of the intentionality of thought, followed a path quite different than Brentano's; different, indeed, than that of many others who drew inspiration from Brentano's lectures and writings. To situate Meinong's thought in the context of Brentano's school, it is necessary first to sketch his biography, and then to see how he came to philosophy from a nonphilosophical background under Brentano's influence, and quickly emerged as an independent thinker. Despite their later differences, Meinong in his own way elaborated a revisionary Brentanian conception of mind, world, knowledge, and value, which he acquired during his years of study with Brentano, and which remained throughout his career at the heart of his philosophy.

1. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Meinong was born on 17 July 1853 in Lemberg (Lvov), Poland. His ancestors were German, but his grandfather had immigrated to Austria. At the time of his birth, Meinong's father was serving the Austrian emperor Franz Josef as a senior military officer stationed at the Lemberg garrison. Meinong was related to the royal House of Handschuchsheim, and legally held title as Ritter von

(Knight of) Handschuchsheim. But, in keeping with his republican convictions, Meinong never used this aristocratic form of address.¹

In 1862, Meinong began six years of private tutoring in Vienna, followed by another two years at the Vienna Academic Gymnasium. Recalling his early schooling, Meinong pays special tribute to his German professor Karl Greistorfer, and his philosophy professor Leopold Konvalina, whom he credits with directing him toward historical and philosophical pursuits, and away from his family's plan that he become a lawyer, and his own desire to study music. In 1870, Meinong enrolled in the University of Vienna, where his first major subjects were German philology and history. Later, he concentrated exclusively on history, completing his dissertation in 1874 on Arnold von Brescia, the medieval religious and social reformer. Meinong reports that during this time his interest in philosophy was overshadowed by historical studies. His philosophical appetite was whetted and reawakened only when, in preparation for the philosophical component of a mandatory examination on topics related to his dissertation research (the *Nebenrigorosum*), he undertook a self-directed study of Kant's *Critique of pure reason* and *Critique of practical reason*.

To broaden his historical background, and possibly to appease his parents, Meinong entered the University of Vienna law school in the autumn of 1874. There he devoted his time to Carl Menger's lectures on economics, which influenced his later work on value theory. It was just before the 1874-75 winter term that Meinong decided to turn his attention to philosophy. Brentano had recently joined the philosophical faculty of the University of Vienna, and he and Meinong had met in connection with Meinong's *Nebenrigorosum*. Significantly, Meinong denies that Brentano directly influenced his decision to study philosophy, but acknowledges that as a result of their encounter he was persuaded that his progress in philosophy would improve under Brentano's direction.

Brentano recommended that Meinong undertake his first systematic investigations in philosophy on Hume's empiricist metaphysics. Meinong completed his *Habilitationsschrift* on Hume's nominalism in 1877. This was Meinong's first philosophical publication, appearing as *Hume-Studien I* in 1878 in the *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akademie der Wissenschaften*. It was followed by a sequel on Hume's theory of relations, the *Hume-Studien II*, in 1882. During this four-year interval, while studying with Brentano and working out his interpretation of Hume, Meinong held the position of *Privatdozent* in philosophy at the University of Vienna. In this capacity, he tutored some of Brentano's most talented students, including Christian von Ehrenfels, A. Oelzelt-

¹ The principal source of information on Meinong's life is his *Selbstdarstellung*. See Meinong 1921.

Newin, and Alois Höfler, with whom Meinong collaborated thereafter in his first explorations of the logical and conceptual foundations of object theory.

In 1882, Meinong was appointed Professor Extraordinarius at the University of Graz, receiving promotion to Ordinarius in 1889, where he remained until his death. At Graz, Meinong established the first laboratory for experimental psychology in Austria, which flourished under his directorship until 1914. Then, for reasons of failing eyesight, he turned it over to Stephan Witasek, who, because of failing health, was succeeded almost immediately by Vittorio Benussi. Throughout his long tenure at Graz, Meinong was engaged in difficult philosophical problems, and simultaneously occupied with psychological investigations, especially those Brentano designated as belonging to descriptive psychology. Here, for the philosophically most active forty-three years of his life, Meinong wrote his major philosophical treatises and edited collections of essays on object theory, philosophical psychology, metaphysics, semantics and philosophy of language, theory of evidence, possibility and probability, value theory, and the analysis of emotion, imagination, and abstraction.

By 1904, Meinong, like his teacher Brentano before him, was almost totally blind. The affliction did not strike suddenly, but was preceded by degenerating vision that began to plague Meinong from the age of thirty, when he could no longer read well enough to lecture from written text. The hostilities of World War I brought the wounding of his son Ernst, who lost an eye in combat. This tragedy, and the breakdown of human decency in international relations that affected so many persons of good will at the time, left him deeply dispirited. Meinong died on 27 November 1920, survived by his wife Doris and son.

The Graz school of phenomenological psychology and philosophical semantics which centered around Meinong and his students made important advances in all major areas of philosophy and psychological science. Meinong's most notable *protégés*, who entered the field as Brentano's *Enkelschülern*, prominently include Ernst Mally, Rudolf Ameseder, Stephan Witasek, Karl Zindler, Ernst Schwarz, France Veber, Johann Clemens Kreibitz, Wilhelm Frankl, Hans Pichler, Eduard Martinak, Hans Benndorf, Fritz Heider, and Vittorio Benussi.²

2. MEINONG'S APPRENTICESHIP TO BRENTANO

When Meinong applied to Brentano for advice about his first systematic philosophical studies, Brentano, as we have seen, recommended that Meinong

² Meinong offers a partial list of distinguished students in his *Selbstdarstellung*. See Meinong 1921 (Meinong 1969-78, VII, 11). See also Smith 1991, 520-21.

examine Hume's nominalism. The suggestion was significant for several reasons, from Brentano's as well as Meinong's perspective.

Brentano in 1874 had just begun his appointment at the University of Vienna, and was already enjoying the prestige of his famous lectures and the appearance of his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. His proposal that Meinong begin his formal philosophical studies with an analysis of Hume reflects the wisdom of Brentano's well-meaning counsel. Meinong's background in historical scholarship made the choice of an historical topic in philosophy naturally suited to his demonstrated abilities, and one that by virtue of its subject matter would eventually serve as a bridge to more demanding original philosophical inquiry. The empiricism in Hume's attempt to apply the 'experimental method of reasoning' to philosophical problems was particularly relevant to Brentano's own interests and inclinations.

Brentano's stand against idealism in the academic mainstream of neo-Kantianism dominated by the followers primarily of Fichte and Hegel has been frequently remarked.³ Brentano's sympathetic commentary on Aristotle's metaphysics and psychology, his efforts to visit John Stuart Mill at Avignon in 1873 (prevented only by the latter's unexpected death), the subject matter of his Würzburg and Vienna lectures, and the elaboration of his own empiricist philosophy of psychology, testify to his affinity with the British empiricist philosophers, and with the traditions of realism and empiricism, as opposed to those of Platonism and German idealism.⁴ The proposal that Meinong devote his first professional philosophical efforts to Hume's nominalism and theory of relations again reflects Brentano's intellectual affinity with classical empiricism.

In his *Selbstdarstellung*, Meinong indicates sincere gratitude to Brentano for his early guidance: "Brentano, by fulfilling my request, gave lavishly from his riches; as an example, as a conscientious teacher and kind adviser, for what may stand the proof of my own academic career".⁵ But, writing after Brentano's death in 1917, in the last few months of his own life in 1920, Meinong's memory of his apprenticeship and later relationship with Brentano is tinged

³ Husserl 1976, 50: "[Brentano] had little regard for thinkers such as Kant and the post-Kantian German Idealists, who place a far higher value on original intuition and premonition as to the future than they do on logical method and scientific theory... He, who was so devoted to the austere ideal of rigorous philosophical science (which was exemplified in his mind by the exact natural sciences), could only see in the systems of German Idealism a kind of degeneration".

⁴ Kraus 1976, 6. Stumpf 1976, 20: "I do not know what induced Brentano to give an additional public lecture on Comte and positivism in the spring of 1869. Perhaps English empiricism (his metaphysics lectures showed that he had studied Mill's *Logic* thoroughly) and Mill's piece on Comte are what spurred him on. This could be seen as an initial step in his interest in foreign endeavours which soon was to assume even greater dimensions".

⁵ Meinong 1921 (Meinong 1969-78, VII, 5); trans. in Grossmann 1974, Appendix II, 231.

with the bittersweet acknowledgement of an unresolved estrangement. Immediately following the sentence above, Meinong offers this poignant portrait:

If I, nevertheless, at no time had so close a relationship with Brentano as, according to [Carl] Stumpf's respectful memorial notes, others were fortunate to have, the still living younger man must undoubtedly shoulder the blame for this, although his own memory does not help him here. I have often experienced in the meantime how students, who have just become independent of their teacher, jealously guard their independence, especially from their teacher, even though it was this very independence which he had unceasingly tried to instill. Such worries may have been caused with special ease by a forceful personality like Brentano; and they may then have become the origin of misunderstandings whose consequences have been with me deep into my later work. But what in life could not be laid to rest, in death has been reconciled; and before the inner eye of memory, there stands, once again, as a treasure I shall never lose, my admired teacher, a figure of spiritual beauty, bathed in the golden sunshine of the summer of his own and my youth.⁶

Brentano generously shared his philosophical knowledge. He also encouraged his students' independence of thought, seeking no disciples.⁷ But Brentano could not conceal his disappointment when certain of his students developed his ideas in a direction of which he did not approve.

The exact nature of the breakdown in relations between the two thinkers may never be known. Meinong claims that he does not understand how the loss of empathy and communication with his teacher came about, but apologizes for it after the fact, and consoles himself with an idealized reminiscence of a time when they enjoyed friendlier relations. He has no clear memory of having committed a specific *faux pas*. But he admits that in his youthful desire for independence, he may have been too eager to surpass and carry forward Brentano's philosophy in a way that may have implied insufficient recognition or disapproval of his mentor's achievements.

To speak of Brentano's sense of betrayal in these circumstances is an exaggeration that nevertheless conveys a grain of truth. What Brentano regarded as a former student's drastic doctrinal and methodological shifts away from the positions he had labored so hard and in the face of such opposition to carve out was something he could not help receiving as an affront. The pride and punishing aloofness of the man are evident in his later correspondence, in his favoritism toward the more loyal (and less heretically imaginative) followers

⁶ Meinong 1921 (Meinong 1969-78, VII, 5-6); Grossman 1974, 231.

⁷ Stumpf 1976, 44: "[Brentano] was, on principle and with every right, against the development of a 'school' that swears by his every word; he had in mind here the sort of thing that so many philosophers perceive as the main goal of their ambition and their major claim to fame. He once told me when he was in Vienna that people there had already begun to talk about 'Brentanians' and that this was most disagreeable to him".

Stumpf, Anton Marty, and Oskar Kraus, and more especially in his deafening silence toward Edmund Husserl, Kazimierz Twardowski, Höfler, and Meinong.

Nor is Meinong alone in perceiving Brentano's coldness. Stumpf, in discussing 'Brentano's relations toward his students' in *Franz Brentano, zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre*, speaks of: "... a certain touchiness on Brentano's part toward dissension that he thought to be unfounded... And yet, if he encountered basic intuitions in his students' publications which were considerably different from his own, and which were not thoroughly justified and defended on the spot, he was inclined to consider them at first as unmotivated, arbitrary statements... Occasional ill-feelings were unavoidable in the face of this..."⁸ Husserl, too, in his memoir, notes that Brentano never acknowledged receipt of his first (1891) book, *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, and did not discover until fourteen years later that the book was dedicated to him. "Of course I had too high a regard for him", Husserl diplomatically recalls, "and I understood him too well to be really hurt by this." Then he adds: "I knew, however, how much it agitated [Brentano] when people went their own way, even if they used his ideas as a starting point. He could often be unjust in such situations; this is what happened to me, and it was painful".⁹

The point is not to portray Brentano as a sour pedagogical despot. But the personal distance Brentano kept from Meinong is an interesting symptom of their ideological separation. It is in this sense and in this historical context that we must try to understand Meinong's philosophy in its relation to Brentano's. Meinong was inspired by Brentano's teachings and by his personality and philosophical presence. He came away from his four-year apprenticeship under Brentano at the University of Vienna with something of enormous philosophical value, and, like Husserl and others who drank deeply from Brentano's *Ursprung*, proceeded to follow out the implications of certain of Brentano's ideas in ways Brentano himself found unacceptable.

To appreciate Meinong's thought as a branch of Brentano's school we must therefore identify the starting-place Brentano provided, the special meaning it had for Meinong, and finally the heterodox conclusions he reached from some of Brentano's assumptions in articulating his own philosophy. What did Meinong learn from Brentano, and how did he transform and apply what he had learned?

⁸ Stumpf 1976.

⁹ Husserl 1976, 53.

3. THE INTENTIONALITY THESIS IN DESCRIPTIVE PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

In the most famous passage of his 1874 *Psychologie*, Brentano maintains that every mental phenomenon exhibits what he alternatively designates as a thought's reference to a content, its direction upon an object that is not an external thing, and the object's intentional in-existence or immanent objectivity.

Brentano's position is not merely that every thought is about or directed toward an object, but that the objects of psychological states are immanent, literally contained within the mental acts by which they are intended. Brentano writes:

Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called intentional (also indeed mental) in-existence of an object, and which we, although not with an entirely unambiguous expression, will call the relation to a content, the direction toward an object (by which here a reality is not understood), or an immanent objectivity. Every [psychic phenomenon] contains something as an object *within itself*, though not every one in the same way. *In* presentation something is presented, *in* judgment something acknowledged or rejected, *in* love loved, *in* hate hated, *in* desire desired, and so on.¹⁰

The immanent intentionality thesis in Brentano's early psychology rightly or wrongly prompted accusations of psychologism. Brentano afterwards rejected the immanence thesis, and vehemently denied commitment to psychologism in any philosophically objectionable sense. He reformulated the intentionality of mental phenomena in ontically neutral terminology, and offered a reductive reist metaphysics that countenanced only existent particulars.¹¹

The consequences of Brentano's early immanent intentionality thesis were far-reaching. They were felt and responded to in different ways by virtually all of his students. For Meinong, the influence of Brentano's concept of immanent intentionality was three-fold. In the first place, Meinong acquired from Brentano a respect for empiricism as the only sound basis for a scientific philosophy. Brentano's account of the intentionality of thought assumes that phenomenological introspection of psychological content is as legitimate an empirical source of data for theoretization as external sense perception. Meinong's writings bear the unmistakable stamp of this systematic scientific approach to philosophical inquiry. Secondly, Meinong accepted that part of Brentano's intentionality thesis by which intentionality is regarded as the mark of the mental, distinguishing psychological from purely physical states by the criterion of the intentionality or object-directedness of the psychological. Thirdly, Meinong inherited from Brentano the rough outline of a research program, which

¹⁰ Brentano 1874, 115 (my translation; emphases added).

¹¹ Kraus 1925, *liv-lv*, *lxii*; Brentano 1925, II, 179-82. See Aquila 1977, 1-25.

Meinong subsequently extended and embellished, establishing the intentionality of thought as the basis for a unified scientific descriptive and normative philosophy. The project as Meinong conceived it was first to elaborate a general ontically neutral theory of intended objects, in terms of which it would then be possible to provide a detailed intentionalist taxonomy of particular types of mental states, including sensations, perceptions, emotions, belief and other intentional or propositional attitudes, love, hate, fear, and so on, as a framework for the philosophical analysis of mind, world, knowledge, and value.

Where Meinong in company with others departed from Brentano's teachings was in rejecting the notion of the immanence of intended objects prescribed by the early intentionality thesis. Brentano's revival of the medieval Aristotelian doctrine of the intentionality of thought was a brilliant rediscovery. Meinong agreed that thought is intentional, and that psychological states cannot adequately be explained except in terms of the intended objects toward which thoughts are directed. But that thoughts should have as their intended objects something immanently contained within them smacked of the same sort of self-enclosed idealism implied by Berkeley's empiricism. To his chagrin, immanent intentionality led to an introspective idealism similar to that which Brentano had struggled against in the German academy.¹²

Meinong sought to rechannel Brentano's ideas. He would preserve the three elements previously described, accepting an empiricist (including introspectivist) methodology for scientific philosophy, the intentionality thesis shorn of its immanence doctrine, and the program to develop an intentionalist philosophy of fact and value. Intended objects, if they are not necessarily immanently contained within the thoughts directed toward them, must be something else, and must belong to some domain outside the mind. But some ostensibly intended objects do not, and others cannot, exist. What kinds of things could nonexistent objects be, if not mental or conceptual? What would a theory of thought-transcendent intended objects be like?

To answer these questions, Meinong expounded the principles of object theory. In retrospect, it may have been to Meinong's advantage that he came to philosophy relatively late in his course of studies. As a result, he did not have the prejudices and impediments that often attend a more doctrinaire grounding in a discipline. Rather, the impetus Meinong received from his four-year apprenticeship with Brentano gave him the sense of a space to be filled in building up a new kind of intentionalist philosophy. Meinong had to fashion his tools and shape his raw materials almost entirely on his own, in a new frontier where there were few guideposts to show the way. This is partly why his first

¹² A more complete discussion of the idealism implied by Brentano's immanence thesis is given by Jacquette 1990-91, esp. 179-82.

writings have the energy and enthusiasm of a pioneer in uncharted territory, a spirit with which Meinong also infused his students. It was the kind of undertaking that by its very nature required a disciplined systematic investigation of naively conceived hypotheses.

4. LOGIC AND PHENOMENOLOGY: HÖFLER, MEINONG, AND TWARDOWSKI ON THE ACT-CONTENT-OBJECT STRUCTURE OF THOUGHT

There is an irony in the way history of philosophy retells the development of *Gegenstandstheorie* in the work of Graz school thinkers on the one hand, and transcendental phenomenology as it was to unfold in the thought of Husserl and his followers.¹³

The usual account is that Twardowski, Meinong, and the Graz school adhered more closely to Brentano's conception of intentionality, and that Husserl, in what has come to be known as his transcendental phase after 1913, marked by the publication of *Ideen I* and the second edition of volume I of the *Logische Untersuchungen*, strayed farthest from the Brentanian party line. The irony is that Husserl in *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, assimilated Brentano's immanent intentionality thesis almost uncritically, and used it as a philosophical springboard for explaining the conceptual grounds of arithmetic in terms of the intentional in-existence of elementary mathematical objects.¹⁴ It was not until Frege's 1894 criticism of Husserl's *Arithmetik*, in which some of the limitations of the immanence thesis were highlighted, that Husserl began to distrust the psychologism latent in Brentano's theory. This marked the first step in Husserl's dramatic turn from Brentano's Aristotelian realism toward a Kantian transcendentalism.¹⁵

Höfler in the meantime in collaboration with Meinong had in 1890 published his *Logik*. Here Brentano's immanent intentionality thesis is superseded by a conception of intentionality in which the transcendent (not to say Kantian transcendental) intended object (*Gegenstand*) at which thought aims or is intentionally directed is distinguished from the immanent component of thought regarded only as its content (*Inhalt*).¹⁶ Twardowski, in his 1894 *Zur*

¹³ For example, Grossmann 1974, 48-56.

¹⁴ Husserl 1970. See Harney 1984, 24-5, 122-25. Woodruff Smith & McIntyre 1982, 171-74.

¹⁵ Frege 1972.

¹⁶ Höfler 1890, 6-7.

Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen, credits Höfler and Meinong as having first distinguished psychological content and intended object.¹⁷

In a characteristic paragraph from which Twardowski quotes with approval, Höfler maintains:

(1) What we above called the 'content of the presentation and of the judgment' lies entirely within the subject, like the presenting- and the judging-act itself. (2) The word(s) 'object' ('*Gegenstand*') (and 'object' ('*Objekt*')) is used in two senses: on the one hand it is used for the thing existing in itself (*an sich Bestehende*), the thing-in-itself, the actual, the real... to which our presentation or judgment so to speak is directed, and on the other hand it is used for that which exists 'in' us psychically (*für das 'in' uns bestehende psychische*), the more or less accurate 'image' ('*Bild*') of this reality, which quasi-image (more correctly: sign), is identical with the 'content' mentioned under 1. In order to distinguish it from the object taken to be independent of thinking one also calls the content of a presentation and judgment (the same for feeling and will) the '*immanent or intentional object*' ('*immanente oder intentionale Objekt*') of these psychical phenomena...¹⁸

There is already in Höfler and Meinong's treatment a significant abandonment of Brentano's immanence or intentional in-existence thesis. The content of the presentation, like the intentional act, is distinguished from the object. But only the content is said to be immanent, as something belonging to or literally contained within the presentation as a 'quasi-image' of the object. The object itself toward which the thought is intentionally directed is expressly described as mind-independent.

Höfler, Meinong, and Twardowski, less than twenty years after the publication of Brentano's *Psychologie*, by these principles laid the groundwork for Meinong's later refinements of non-Brentanian object theory. The amendment was to discern in every psychological state an act-content-object structure — mental acts intend or are directed toward intended objects by means of their lived-through contents. Much of the terminology of the renegade theory had its roots in Brentano's early immanent intentionality thesis, adapted for different use. Where Brentano had spoken of the content of thought as its object, Meinong and company referred to content as the immanent component of descriptive psychology, but refused to identify it with the intended object. Their desire to distance themselves from the immanence thesis was so pronounced, that in their expositions of the theory they separated act, content, and object into mutually exclusive categories, deliberately or by oversight forbidding thoughts from reflectively intending their own contents as intended objects.¹⁹

¹⁷ Twardowski 1894, 4. See Findlay 1963, 7-8.

¹⁸ Höfler 1890, 7 (my translation). Twardowski 1894, 4.

¹⁹ See Jacquette 1987, esp. 194-95.

A semantic domain of transcendent intended objects is suggested by Höfler and Twardowski. But a full-fledged theory of mind-independent existent and nonexistent intended objects first appears in 1902 in Meinong's *Über Annahmen*, and subsequent writings. It is useful to compare Meinong's terminology with Brentano's and Twardowski's, since Twardowski sees part of the difficulty in Brentano's immanence or intentional in-existence thesis as stemming from the ambiguity noted by Höfler in such philosophically-loaded expressions as 'object', 'thing', and 'presentation'. Meinong in many respects follows when he does not actually lead the way for Höfler and Twardowski. Having broken with Brentano's content-object confusion, Twardowski discards the Scholastic term 'immanence' in discussing intentionality, and never uses the word again after mentioning it on the first few pages of his treatise to identify Brentano's thesis as the one he proposes to replace. Meinong, by contrast, nominally retains a version of the Brentanian distinction between immanent and transcendent intentional objects, though he gives these terms a decidedly Twardowskian interpretation. Meinong's efforts to clarify his exact use of these expressions are difficult to follow, and his repeated attempts to achieve precision only confuse things. By comparison, one cannot but admire Twardowski's decision to set aside Brentano's immanent object terminology and proceed only with the newly clarified terms 'content' and 'object'.

Meinong nevertheless appears to mean by 'immanent' object roughly what Twardowski refers to as a presentation's content. It is that which is part of or contained within the experience. By 'transcendent' object, Meinong intends the mind-independent object which a thought is about, toward which it is directed. In *Über Annahmen*, Meinong maintains:

There exists no doubt at all as to what is meant by the contrast of 'immanent' and 'transcendent' object, and one is so accustomed to the use of the expressions, that one does not as a rule have occasion to worry about the participial form of the word 'transcendent'. But once one does, it proves difficult enough to justify this form as long as one thinks by 'object' only of what is apprehended or apprehensible by means of an affirmative judgment. It is not the table or armchair that 'transcends', but rather the judgment, that which in its way apprehends an actuality, in a certain manner reaching beyond itself and 'exceeding' the limits of subjectivity.²⁰

The point is that although Meinong preserves vestiges of Brentano's Scholastic terms 'immanence' and 'immanent object', he so alters their meaning that in his object theory they have no more import than Twardowski's 'content'. Meinong holds with Twardowski that there is an immanent object contained within every psychological state, but that it is the content of the mental act, not the in-

²⁰ Meinong 1910; see Meinong 1969-78, IV, 229 (my translation); see also 237. Meinong 1899 (Meinong 1969-78, II, 382-83); Meinong 1978, 61-3.

tended object toward which the state is directed. The transition to Höfler's and Twardowski's way of thinking about immanent objects is so complete in Meinong's work by 1902 (perhaps even by 1890, depending on the unspecified nature of his collaboration with Höfler), that Meinong complains in an aside that Marty's attacks against the concept of immanence in the latter's *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie* cannot apply to him, but only to those who accept the traditional Scholastic immanence doctrine.²¹

5. GEGENSTANDSTHEORIE: EXISTENT AND NONEXISTENT OBJECTS

The object theory is the centerpiece of Meinong's intentionalist philosophy. By distinguishing the kinds of mind-independent intended objects available to thought, Meinong provides a new subject matter for philosophical psychology, epistemology, and value theory, in a combined ontology and extraontology consisting of existent and nonexistent objects.

Meinong begins with the principle that thought is unlimited in its free assumption of objects. This is Meinong's thesis of the unrestricted freedom of assumption or *unbeschränkten Annahmefreiheit*. The transcendent intentionality thesis complements the unrestricted freedom of assumption by implying that thoughts intend whatever mind-independent objects they freely assume.²² The direction of thought toward freely assumed intended objects entails that some thoughts intend contingently nonexistent and ontically impossible objects like Berkeley's golden mountain and the round square. If the domain of intended objects includes whatever freely assumed objects thought ostensibly intends, then, since thought is often ostensibly about objects that do not and cannot exist, nonexistent as well as existent objects must be included for reference and predication by any adequate intentionalist semantic comprehension principle. If intended objects transcend rather than being immanently contained within the thoughts by which they are intended, then existent and nonexistent objects cannot owe their objecthood or membership in the domain of objects to the contingent occurrence or nonoccurrence of thoughts by which they may but need not be actually intended. Nonexistent objects are neither spatiotemporal nor abstract; they neither exist nor subsist, because they are incomplete or impossible.

The domain of intended objects is accordingly said by Meinong to be beyond being and nonbeing, *jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein*. Instead of an

²¹ Meinong 1910, 85-6, n. 3. Marty 1908, 761.

²² Meinong 1904 (Meinong 1969-78, II, 483-85).

extensionalist domain of actual existents or Platonic heaven of abstract entities, Meinong speaks of the realm of *Außersein* as the domain of intended objects, and of the *Außersein* of the pure object or *reiner Gegenstand*. The pure object is outside of being, considered independently of its ontic status. Thought is free to intend existent spatiotemporal entities, subsistent abstract entities, and non-existent nonsubsistent incomplete and impossible objects. Intended objects, considered only as such, therefore, cannot be restrictedly spatiotemporal, abstract, nor immanently conceptual, but are described by Meinong as homeless (*heimatlos*), belonging to no traditional ontic category.²³ Positing an intended pure object as *außerseiende* in the object theory domain is comparable to Husserl's exercise of bracketing the ontic status of the *noemata* of thought in the phenomenological *epoché*, as the first stage of transcendental subjectivity.²⁴

Meinong distinguishes between judgments of an intended object's being or *Sein*, and judgments of its so-being or *Sosein*, which is to say its nature, character, or set of constitutive properties. He maintains that an intended object's *Sosein* is independent of its *Sein* or ontic status. Objects truly have whatever constitutive properties attributed to them regardless of whether or not they exist, and regardless of whether or not they are actually intended. This allows nonexistent objects to be referred to or designated in thought and language, truly possessing the constitutive properties predicated of them. When we accept the possibility of intending distinct objects independently of their ontic status, we in effect admit the possibility of individuating nonexistent and existent objects alike by their constitutive properties.²⁵

Meinong's object theory evolved over a period of years, and underwent various additions and revisions. In its mature form, the theory includes the following principles:

- (1) Any thought or corresponding expression can be assumed. (Principle of unrestricted freedom of assumption, or *unbeschränkten Annahmefreiheit* thesis.)
- (2) Every assumption is directed toward an intended object. (Intentionality thesis.)
- (3) Every intended object has a nature, character, *Sosein*, 'how-it-is', 'so-being', or 'being thus-and-so', regardless of its ontological status. (Independence of *Sosein* from *Sein* thesis.)

²³ Meinong 1904 (Meinong 1969-78, II, 490-93). See Chisholm 1972, Grossmann 1974b.

²⁴ Husserl 1973, 20-6.

²⁵ The independence of *Sosein* from *Sein* thesis was formulated by Mally 1904, 127. See Findlay 1963, 44.

- (4) Being or nonbeing is not part of the *Sosein* of any intended object, nor of the object considered in itself. (Indifference thesis or doctrine of the *Außersein* of the homeless pure object.)
- (5) There are two modes of being or *Sein* for intended objects: spatiotemporal existence and platonic abstract subsistence. (*Existenz/Bestand* thesis.)
- (6) Some intended objects do not have being or *Sein* at all, but neither exist nor subsist. (There are objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects — *es gibt Gegenstände, von denen gilt, daß es dergleichen Gegenstände nicht gibt.*)

Meinong proposed a science of intended objects. He thought of object theory as a wrongfully neglected branch of philosophy, and he sought to restore it to its proper place among other technical philosophical disciplines. Of these, object theory would be the most fundamental, since it deals with objects of thought in the most general sense, including but not limited to those of metaphysics and mathematics.²⁶

If all thought in unrestricted freedom of assumption is directed toward existent or nonexistent intended objects, then Meinong's semantic domain of existent, subsistent, and beingless intended objects may offer the most flexible, comprehensive, and ontically neutral semantic foundation for a satisfactory philosophical explanation of the intentionality of thought, language, and art. Meinong is impressed by the fact that when we consider the objects of our mental states without inquiring into their ontic status, it is plain to the empirically most naive introspection that the nature of thought is qualitatively the same whether we are thinking about the existent Mount Everest or Berkeley's nonexistent golden mountain. From within the confines of what thought knows about its objects, there is no discernible difference in the mind's being directed toward existent, subsistent, or beingless intended objects. The ontic status of intended objects is accidental to the mind's intentionality, so that the most general theory of mind and meaning must be indifferent to the being or nonbeing of intended objects. To assume that thought can only be about or truly predicate properties of existent objects Meinong epitomized as the 'prejudice in favor of the actual'.²⁷

We have seen that for Meinong, even beingless objects, though nonexistent and nonsubsistent, have *Sosein*. An object's *Sosein* is the set of properties that constitute it as the unique object it is, by virtue of which, even if it is beingless, it can be thought about and referred to in language. These are the properties that determine and individuate intended objects. The round square is the object

²⁶ Meinong 1904, 485-88.

²⁷ Meinong 1904, 485. Meinong speaks of "Das Vorurteil zugunsten des Wirklichen".

that has the constitutive properties of being round and square; the golden mountain is the object that has the constitutive properties of being golden and a mountain. The round square is truly round and square, or has the constitutive properties of being round and square in its *Sosein*, even though it does not, and, indeed, cannot, exist. It is precisely because no existent or subsistent object can be both round and square that the round square necessarily lacks being.

Objects are categorized as complete or incomplete according to the completeness or incompleteness and exact content of their *Soseine*. Complete objects have complete *Soseine*. They are such that for any property and property complement pair, say, being red or nonred, the object has either the property or its complement in its *Sosein*. Objects with being are not only complete, but consistent, in the sense that, for any property, their *Soseine* do not contain both the property and its complement. Incomplete objects are those whose *Soseine* are lacking at least both one property and its complement. This is seen in the instance of a fictional or mythological object, in which certain properties are left open or undetermined. A mythical flying horse is an incomplete object with respect to color (among other properties), if in a story it is not stipulated as being either white or nonwhite. Impossible objects are also typically incomplete, but they have ontically incompatible properties. If being square implies being nonround, then the round square has in its *Sosein* both the property of being round and the complementary property of being nonround. Despite its ontic or metaphysical impossibility, there need be no logical inconsistency in the inventory of the round square's incomplete *Sosein*, provided that the complementary predication being nonround does not imply the negation of the predication being round. The object theory tolerates impossible objects, but it is not embroiled in the outright logical inconsistency presented by an object which is such that it is both round and it is not the case that it is round, or for which it is both true and false that it is round. *Seiende* objects are those with being, including existent or spatiotemporal and subsistent or abstract entities. They are definable as objects whose *Soseine* are both consistent and complete. Existent objects are consistent and complete and exemplify at least some spatiotemporal properties. Subsistent objects are Platonic entities that, although consistent and complete in their *Soseine*, do not exemplify any spatiotemporal properties.²⁸

Meinong further distinguishes between what he calls objects of lower and higher order, *inferiora* and *superiora*. There are several different kinds of higher-order objects, each based on objects of lower order. As an illustration of Meinong's distinction, consider its application to the category of relations.

²⁸ Meinong 1904, 488-90. An excellent exposition of object theory principles is found in Lambert 1983.

Relations are intended objects, in that thoughts can be directed toward them, as when we think or speak about the relation between a circle and its radius. For Meinong, relations are not ordinary objects, but rather comprise a special kind of intended object, in that they would not obtain even as beingless intended objects, were it not for the objects they relate. It is this connection to which Meinong calls attention by means of his distinction between *inferiora* and *superiora*. The relation between a circle and its radius is a *superior* or higher-order intended object, in that the relation supervenes or depends logically on *inferiora* or lower order objects, here the circle and its radius. If the circle and its radius were not available as lower order intended objects, then, Meinong holds, there could be no higher-order intended object consisting of the relation between the circle and its radius. Among higher-order objects, Meinong identifies families of several kinds of relations, complexes, and ideal objects.²⁹

Finally, Meinong distinguishes between *objecta* or things in the ordinary sense, like tables and chairs, golden mountains and round squares, with or without being, and *objectives*, or states of affairs, including propositions, which may be subsistent or nonsubsistent. Objectives are further divided into *Seinsobjektive*, *Nichtseinsobjektive*, and *Soseinsobjektive*. As the labels indicate, these are states of affairs involving an object's being, nonbeing, and so-being. Meinong disambiguates *Soseinsobjektive* into *Wasseinsobjektive* and *Wieseinsobjektive*, to distinguish the states of affairs of *what* an object is from precisely *how* it is. In a third main category, Meinong distinguishes between *dignitatives* and *desideratives*, as the special normative objects of his value theory. The structure of so many types of objects in *Gegenstandstheorie* signifies the range of conceptual labyrinths Meinong found it necessary to explore in offering a nonimmanent mind-independent adaptation of Brentano's insight that every thought intends an object.³⁰

6. ONTIC NEUTRALITY IN LOGIC AND SEMANTICS: PROBLEMS FOR MEINONG'S OBJECT THEORY

Criticisms of several kinds have been raised against Meinong's object theory. These cannot be fully examined here. But it may be worthwhile to mention a few notable objections, which have led critics after Bertrand Russell to conclude that Meinong's project to develop an object theory is hopelessly confused.

²⁹ Meinong 1899 (Meinong 1969-78, II).

³⁰ Meinong 1904, 489-91. See Findlay 1963, 42-101.

The most frequent objection to Meinong's object theory is also the easiest to answer. Meinong is often said to have planted a jungle of possible and impossible nonexistent entities.³¹ This is supposed to have inflated ontology to unacceptable proportions, particularly for those with desert landscape preferences in semantics and metaphysics. The reply to this unwarranted charge is that Meinong could not possibly have inflated ontology with nonexistent objects, since ontology is the domain exclusively of existent entities. Meinong's semantics permits reference and true predication of properties to existent and nonexistent objects alike, regardless of their ontic status. But it does not imply that nonexistent objects exist. Meinong takes at face value the introspective data that we can think and talk about the round square, even though it does not exist, and respects the judgment that the round square cannot exist precisely because it truly is both round and square. Meinong's object theory does not postulate a superabundance of entities. In some applications, on the contrary, it permits a reduction in the ontology especially of abstract subsistent objects to which a theory is otherwise committed. Object theory does not overpopulate ontology, but in the realm of *Außersein* offers an extraontological semantic domain of all mind-independent intendable objects of thought and language, existent, subsistent, and beingless.³²

Russell extends a more provocative challenge, when he observes that if for Meinong thought is free to assume any object, including incomplete and impossible nonexistent objects, and if intended incomplete and impossible nonexistent objects truly have the properties attributed to them in thought, then it should be possible to intend as an object of thought the existent round square, just as it is possible to intend the (plain, unadorned) round square. If the round square is truly round and square, then the existent round square presumably is existent, round, and square. But the round square as an impossible object cannot possibly exist, as Meinong rightly insists, because its *Sosein* contains a metaphysically incompatible combination of properties. It seems to follow that Meinong's object theory, with its inflated domain of existent, subsistent, and beingless intended objects, and its liberal interpretation of true predication for the properties even of nonexistent impossible intended objects, is caught in an inescapable contradiction.³³

Unfortunately, Meinong responded to Russell's objection by introducing a confusing distinction. He maintained that the existent round square is existent, even though it does not exist. Russell claimed he was unable to make sense of this reply, and as a result lost interest in Meinong's theory.³⁴ Russell's theory of

³¹ See below note 38.

³² Routley 1969.

³³ Russell 1905a, 484-85; 1905b, 533.

³⁴ See Griffin 1986, Smith 1985.

definite descriptions, published in the same year as his objection about the existent round square, disallows reference and true predication of properties to nonexistent objects. The position marks a radically extensionalist ontology. Russell treats names as incomplete symbols to be replaced by definite descriptions, and analyzes definite descriptions in terms of a triad of conditions, including existence, uniqueness, and predication. Nonexistent objects in Russell's austere extensionalism cannot even intelligibly be denoted by names or descriptions, since they fail to satisfy the existence condition.³⁵ Meinong's official solution to Russell's problem of the existent round square involves yet another complicated distinction between properties that have and those that lack the 'modal moment'. The modal moment is supposed to lend an object real being or full-strength as opposed to watered-down factuality. When Meinong claims that the existent round square is existent, he means that the existent round square has a watered-down version of the property of being existent in its *Sosein*. This individuates the existent round square from the intended object of thoughts about the (plain, unadorned) round square. But Meinong also insists that the existent round square lacks the modal moment that would entail its actual existence, and so does not exist.³⁶

Meinong's defenders have since lamented the fact that he did not answer Russell's objection by appealing to a much simpler and more fundamental distinction already available in the theory. This is the distinction, which Meinong derives from a suggestion of Mally's, between *nuclear* or constitutive (*konstitutorische*) and *extranuclear* or nonconstitutive properties (*außerkonstitutorische Bestimmungen*).³⁷ Nuclear properties are ordinary garden variety properties, like being red or round. Extranuclear properties are properties that determine an object as belonging specifically to one or another particular ontic category, such as the properties of being existent, nonexistent, possible, impossible, complete, incomplete. The distinction is entailed by the indifference thesis in object theory, restricting nuclear properties only to membership in an object's *Sosein*. If an object's *Sosein* provides the identity conditions by which an object is determined as the particular existent or nonexistent object it is, and if an object's *Sosein* can contain the (non-watered-down modal-momentous) property of existence, completeness, or any other extranuclear property, then the

³⁵ Russell 1905a.

³⁶ Meinong 1906-07 (Meinong 1969-78, V, 16-7); Meinong 1915 (Meinong 1969-78, VI, 272-82).

³⁷ Meinong 1915 (Meinong 1969-78, VI, 176-77). Meinong credits Mally with the distinction. See Findlay 1963, 176 (the standard English translation of Mally's and Meinong's terminology as 'nuclear' and 'extranuclear' is owing to Findlay). Parsons 1980, 23-4; see also his 1978.

object's so-being is clearly not indifferent to its being or nonbeing, as the indifference principle requires.

A judicious application of Meinong's nuclear-extranuclear property distinction via the indifference principle enables object theory to avoid Russell's problem of the existent round square. If nuclear constitutive properties alone belong to an object's *Sosein*, to the absolute exclusion of extranuclear properties, then, since to exist is an extranuclear rather than nuclear property, Meinong can simply reject out of hand Russell's counterexample as violating the nuclear-extranuclear property distinction. The existent round square in that case is not existent, even in the watered-down sense of a property lacking the modal moment, because the distinction implies that the only properties truly predicable of an object are the nuclear properties in its *Sosein*.³⁸

Largely as a result of Russell's influential criticisms, Meinong's object theory fell into disregard in much of 20th century analytic philosophy. It is not difficult to find discussions, often by writers who have not troubled to read Meinong, rejecting a logical, semantic, or metaphysical theory merely on the grounds that it condones nonexistent objects. These criticisms, it is both amusing and disheartening to see, typically dismiss a philosophical position with a wave of the hand, and the disdainful perjorative that the theory is 'Meinongian'.³⁹ Gilbert Ryle, though familiar with Meinong's texts, and in some ways sympathetic to Meinong's ideas, must have believed he was sounding Meinong's final epitaph, when, in his essay 'Intentionality-theory and the nature of thinking', he offered these famous last words, declaring that Meinong's object theory is 'dead, buried and not going to be resurrected'.⁴⁰

Yet, despite its detractors, a resurrection of Meinongian object theory is underway. Following Meinong's death, and Mally's some twenty-five years later, the contributions of object theory philosophers to metaphysics, psychology, philosophical semantics, and value theory, were associated mainly with Russell's 'devastating' refutations. As such, they were thought to be not worth serious consideration. There were nevertheless a few philosophers who defied analytic fashion and pursued what they found valuable in Meinong's thought, keeping the Graz school wing of the intentionalist tradition alive. Meinong's object theory, and to a lesser extent his value theory, is now enjoying an unprecedented renaissance of interest and activity, and there is a vital continuation

³⁸ Jacquette 1986, 430-38.

³⁹ For example, see Hacker 1986, 8: "The Theory of Descriptions... enabled Russell to thin out the luxuriant Meinongian jungle of entities (such as the round square) which, it had appeared, must *in some sense* subsist in order to be talked about..."

⁴⁰ Ryle 1972, 7.

and development of the research program in logic and philosophy of language that Meinong and his followers initiated more than a century ago.⁴¹

7. WERTTHEORIE: VALUES IN EMOTIONAL PRESENTATION

Object theory also provides the basis for an intentionalist theory of value. Value for Meinong is explained from the dual standpoint of the subject who confers value on objects by psychological attitude and emotional response, and of the objects that are valued. To regard something as valuable is to intend it in a special way. What is valued is always an object or an objective or state of affairs, including the higher-order subsistence or nonsubsistence of a lower-order objective or state of affairs.

Meinong's theory can accordingly be divided into two parts: his analysis of the psychological aspects of valuation and the mind's conferring of values on objects, and his treatment of the distinguished valuational objectives he calls dignitatives and desideratives. Meinong's value theory investigations, like his work in philosophical psychology, metaphysics, and semantics, are continuations in new directions of areas of inquiry that had preoccupied Brentano. Meinong's theory of emotional presentation, presupposed by his later value theory, takes up themes that can be traced to Brentano's analysis of value in terms of correct and incorrect emotion.⁴²

Like Brentano, Meinong is empiricist not only in his philosophical methodology as it pertains to the development of logic, metaphysics, and psychology, but also by extension to the consideration of value. Brentano's recommendation that Meinong study Hume's empiricist theory of universals and particulars laid the groundwork not only for Meinong's object theory, but also for his later treatment of value. Meinong's value theory follows Hume and Hutcheson in its reliance on emotion and the passions in providing a psychological account of value attributions. Unlike Hutcheson's account, however, Meinong's theory does not postulate a special moral or aesthetic sixth sense; nor, like Hume's and Hutcheson's discussions, does Meinong's analysis depend on a narrowly construed associationist psychology. Yet Meinong interprets value as arising from the emotional presentations subjects experience, and the emotional attitudes they assume toward objects and states of affairs, and he agrees with his empiricist predecessors that value, though in some sense impersonal and amenable to scientific explanation, has no higher or absolute objective source.

⁴¹ A brief account of the Meinongian dark ages and renaissance appears in Jacquette 1994e.

⁴² See Chisholm's essays on Brentano's value theory in his 1982 and his 1986.

The fundamental concept in Meinong's value theory is that of 'value-feelings'. These occur in several types and degrees, and, like feelings generally in Meinong's intentionalist psychology, they are about or directed toward intended objects. The objectives toward which emotions are directed in valuation include four types of dignitatives, which Meinong distinguishes as the Pleasant, the Beautiful, the True, and the Good. The capital letters by which Meinong's terms for the dignitatives are naturally translated indicate that these objectives are not merely the properties of objects, but are also objects in their own right, about which psychological subjects can experience feelings and emotional attitudes. At the same time, dignitatives are also valuational feelings and values conferred on objects and objectives. The dignitatives can thus be used to describe the subject's experience as well as the intended object of the experience. This application of technical terminology in Meinong's theory accords in part with ordinary usage, in which it is common to speak of a good or pleasant or beautiful feeling, and of that toward which the feeling is directed as good or pleasant or beautiful. The remaining dignitative, the True, may belong to a somewhat different category. But it is not so unusual to speak even of feelings as true in the sense of corresponding to facts or as authentic emotional responses. Meinong's selection of these four dignitatives indicates the generality to which his value theory aspires, encompassing sensory, aesthetic, semantic, and moral values.⁴³

As a platform for ethical philosophy, Meinong's theory supports a subdivision of emotional presentations into such categories as the meritorious, correct, allowable, and censurable. Actions in Meinong's system are the primary vehicles of moral value, and these in turn are motivated by desire. Desire is a distinctively intentional concept, since desire is always desire for something or to do something, and is therefore directed toward an intended object or state of affairs. Meinong distinguishes between self- and other-regarding, or egoistic and altruistic, voluntary actions, and applies the four categories of emotional presentations to each. Meinong's value classification scheme, parallel in many ways, but also complementary to, his taxonomy of intended objects, provides a place for value judgments in every major category of ethical judgment. The basic concepts of value in the theory make it possible for Meinong to define such higher-level moral notions as justice and injustice, virtue and vice.

Desires for Meinong are intentional attitudes accompanied by emotional presentations directed toward desideratives. Desideratives, like dignitatives, in the previously explained sense, are objects of higher order. As such, desideratives are not fully reducible to ordinary objects and objectives, but constitute an additional subdivision supplemental to the extraontological semantic domain of

⁴³ Meinong 1915 (Meinong 1969-78, III). Findlay 1963, 303-21.

object and value theory. By contrast with dignitatives, Meinong maintains that desideratives are not merely the result of emotional attitudes, but are in some sense 'objective' subsistent abstract entities, and that desideratives presuppose dignitatives in somewhat the way that objectives presuppose objects. A nonsubjective desiderative or objective of desire might be to maximize happiness, or to treat all persons with respect. In this way, the category of desideratives fulfills the function otherwise served by abstract goals and principles in traditional normative theories. These, despite being proper objectives of desire, as subsistent entities, are more impersonal and absolute, and hence more removed from the vagaries of emotional presentation and psychological inclination, than dignitatives.

As in the development of object theory, there is a complex history of theoretical development and refinement in Meinong's reflections on problems of value. These begin with the early *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, extending to the mature work, *Über emotionale Präsentation*, the posthumous *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie*, and unpublished *Ethische Bausteine*. Meinong's later object and value theories together constitute an integrated if unfinished intentionalist system of descriptive and normative philosophy.⁴⁴

8. MEINONG'S PHILOSOPHY IN THE BRENTANIAN LEGACY

In or around 1905, Brentano experienced what historians sometimes refer to as his *Immanenzkrise*, a crisis of lost confidence in the immanent intentionality or intentional in-existence thesis of 1874. In the 1911 edition of *Psychologie*, titled *Von der Klassifikation der psychischen Phänomene*, Brentano rejects immanent objects, and announces his commitment to reism, an ontology restricted to actual particular existents. Brentano writes in the Foreword to his new treatise: "One of the most important innovations is that I am no longer of the opinion that mental relation can have something other than a real thing (*Reales*) as its object".⁴⁵

There follows from the first appearance of the *Psychologie* a wave of explanations and polemical replies meant to turn aside objections about the psychologism implied by the immanence thesis as misunderstandings of the original doctrine.⁴⁶ But by the time Brentano publicly repudiated the immanent

⁴⁴ See Findlay 1963, 264-302.

⁴⁵ Brentano 1925, II, 2 (my translation).

⁴⁶ Brentano 1925, II, 179-182, 275-277 ("Vom ens rationis. Diktat vom 6. Januar 1917"). See Mayer-Hillebrand 1966; Letter from Brentano to Anton Marty, 20. April 1910, 225-28.

intentionality thesis it was too late. The 1874 immanence thesis had already exerted both a positive and negative impact on the circle of thinkers that surrounded Brentano. The philosophers he had imbued with his vision of an intentionalist philosophy reacted in a variety of ways to the claim that thought is immanently intentional, for the most part accepting the intentionality of thought while rejecting its immanent intentionality. The perceived need to develop a nonimmanent intentionalism gave rise to object theory in the philosophy of Meinong and the Graz school, and eventually to transcendental phenomenology in Husserl. The thinkers who were to advance new approaches to the problems of philosophical psychology, epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory, adapting Brentano's empirical methods in psychology, had, before his rejection of immanent objectivity, launched out in several directions. All recognized that intentionality was somehow the key to the mind and the expression of thought in language and art, but all shared a sense of discomfort in a theory that seemed to seal off the mind from the world by making the intended objects of thought the mind's immanent residents.

Meinong's view of intentionality found expression in the domain of existent and nonexistent intended objects, and the *Außersein* of the pure object. Without some version of Brentano's intentionality thesis, Meinong's object theory could never have taken flight, since in comprehending its semantic domain it depends essentially on the concept of ostensibly intended existent and nonexistent objects of thought. But without rejecting Brentano's early immanence or intentional in-existence thesis, Meinong's theory of existent and nonexistent objects equally could never have ensued. The origins of Meinong's object and value theory lie in his modification of Brentano's early intentionality thesis, accepting thought as essentially intentional, but denying that thought is essentially immanently intentional.⁴⁷

Gilson 1976, 63: "Some of [Brentano's] disciples strongly resent the accusation of psychologism which is often directed against his philosophical attitude. In what measure they are justified in their protest is a difficult problem, whose solution would require a discussion of Brentano's doctrine as a whole. The truth about it seems at least to be, that Brentano often resorted to psychological and more or less empirical explanations, without ever losing the right feeling that, in philosophical problems, psychological necessities are of a more than empirical nature".

⁴⁷ This essay is dedicated to Roderick M. Chisholm, from whom I first learned to appreciate the rigor and subtlety of Meinong's philosophy.

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

on:**see also:**

| | |
|-------------------------------|--|
| act / object / content | 8 , 15.4, 15.5 |
| intentionality | 1.17, 6.5, 9 , 16.11 |
| logic and theory of judgement | 1.10-13, 2.6-7, 3.4, 7.13, 11 , 12 , 16.6, 16.12-13 |
| object | 7.4, 7.7-8, 8.3-5, 12.4-5, 16.3 |
| value /ethics | 1.15, 5.3-4, 15 |

CHRISTIAN VON EHRENFELS (1859-1932)

Among the extensive circle of Brentano's pupils, the philosopher Christian von Ehrenfels held a particularly unique position. He did not belong to the group of orthodox Brentano followers with regard to his philosophical convictions but rather had to be reckoned as a member of the outer circle of the Brentano School which produced such important personalities as Kazimierz Twardowski, Thomas G. Masaryk, Carl Stumpf or Alexius Meinong. And another fact must be kept in mind in order to trace back the roots of Ehrenfels' philosophical development. Ehrenfels, on the one hand, indulged in frequent philosophical discussions with Meinong who as a teacher as well as a friend remained attached to him throughout his life,¹ and on the other hand also was in cordial communication with Brentano which by far exceeded the usual teacher-pupil relationship.

1. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

When Ehrenfels first began to study at the *Hochschule für Bodenkultur* in Vienna, he did so mainly because of family considerations, since as the eldest of five children he was destined to take over the country estates possessed by the Ehrenfels family in Lower Austria north of the Danube. But soon the intellectual gifts of the young student began to develop in quite a different direction. During the winter term of 1879-80 Ehrenfels's interests focussed on philosophical subjects. Having enrolled at the University of Vienna he was attracted at once by the overwhelming personality of Franz Brentano. Due to his rhetori-

¹ Cf. Haller & Fabian 1985, 285 ff.; Fabian & Simons 1986, 62-65.

cal abilities, the fair way he treated his students, and his manifold philosophical interests he represented an almost ideal example of a teacher. Yet his powerful influence on his audience sometimes prevented many a student from maintaining intellectual individuality or from developing scientific independence. Ehrenfels belonged to those people who had this experience. Many years later he talked very openly and frankly with his teacher about his inner reflections when he had been student at Vienna university.

Especially with respect to our relationship I then developed the following directives: Brentano is an extremely intellectually productive personality who unfortunately, like most brilliant people, suffers from a characteristic concomitant disadvantage: from one-sidedness and biasedness which is a part of his particular, eminently developed character. Trying to convince him of some kind of result in a certain field of science or of even a general cultural field which was disagreeable to his nature, would turn out to be a completely futile effort which would lead me to becoming emotional and to falling out with my admired and highly deserving teacher to whom I am deeply indebted. So from then on I was much more determined to adopt the behaviour of the pupil towards the teacher in my future conduct to Brentano (a style familiar to me anyway) and to accept gratefully all good and worthy things that he still would give me. But when dealing with him I consciously intend to exclude all intellectual and emotional reactions which to my sense of delicacy cannot be assimilated by him — and I shall not be affected by his underestimation of what I appreciate (such as Meinong's *Vermutungsevidenz*), or by his scornful and derisive treatment of what for me great and praiseworthy (such as Wagnerian art). If he were an ordinary person, such behaviour would altogether be too arduous and perhaps incompatible with his self-esteem. But concerning Brentano, I do not feel humiliated at all in this role of a pupil. And I don't do him wrong, either. Brentano only wants to give, and not to receive. To him producing and sowing the seeds of thought is vital to the zest for life. In case somebody wants to reciprocate by adopting his manner, he will be silenced immediately by Brentano's superior dialectics and will be laughed at secretly (and sometimes even publicly). Well, as one likes it! As from now I confine myself to receiving from him. What he gives is really worth the effort I make; and my gratitude is honest and sincere. This my dear, venerable friend, was my intention 16 years ago, and apart from a few exceptions — I have kept to it, to this very day.²

For three years Ehrenfels not only attended the lectures of Franz Brentano but also joined the courses of Alexius Meinong, who was a university lecturer in Vienna at that time. Because Meinong moved afterwards to Graz, Ehrenfels followed him and completed his academic education in 1885 at the University of Graz. Beside his philosophical studies Ehrenfels was also concerned with dramatic poetry to which he attached as much importance as to his scientific efforts. Throughout his life Ehrenfels was possessed of three passionate interests: philosophy, poetry and music. Above all the works of Richard Wagner wrought a powerful impression on the young Ehrenfels, who made the pilgrimage to

² Letter from Ehrenfels to Brentano (December 5, 1907), extracts published in Fabian 1986b, 5-6. For Brentano's biography cf. Baumgartner & Burkhard 1990.

Bayreuth on foot for the first performance of *Parsifal* in 1882, and remained all his life an ardent follower and promoter of Wagner's work. Ehrenfels himself wrote a number of stage plays, some of which were performed even in public. In fact, for a while Ehrenfels was not sure whether he should not follow a career as a writer and poet. But finally he made up his mind for practical reasons and became a *Privatdozent* at the University of Vienna in 1888. Two years later he published his famous article "Über 'Gestaltqualitäten'" whose principal idea has shown itself to be so extraordinarily fruitful in psychology, giving rise to the twentieth-century movement of Gestalt psychology. In 1891 Ehrenfels began lecturing at the university of Vienna. The subject of his courses comprised chiefly the theory of value and was to stand in the centre of his scientific activity in the years following. The extensive two-volume *System der Werttheorie* is the most remarkable outcome of his early creative period. During this time Ehrenfels was called to the German University at Prague as the successor to Friedrich Jodl. His fellow colleagues were — apart from the pedagogue Otto Willmann — Anton Marty, Emil Arleth, and later Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil and Josef Eisenmeier. These together made up the core of the orthodox Brentano school, with whom Ehrenfels often engaged in a series of controversies. It is more remarkable that Ehrenfels remained nevertheless on good personal terms with his former teacher Brentano throughout the feuds. Other men whose friendship he cultivated included Sigmund Freud, Friedrich von Wieser, Gerhart Hauptmann, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Thomas G. Masaryk. About 1900 Ehrenfels appeared in public with the revolutionary idea of a regeneration of civilization combining it with a programme of the renewal of sexual ethics and eugenics, and this subject occupied his thinking and writing for more than a decade. The outbreak of the First World War was also a turning-point in Ehrenfels' life. Although he was able to publish his metaphysical work *Kosmogonie*, almost immediately thereafter he fell into a deep depression which kept him from working for four years. The conquest of this illness was marked by the appearance of the work *Das Primzahlengesetz*. A few years later he wrote a further, politically coloured play *Die Mutter des Legionärs* which was performed in Prague. The play concerned reconciliation between the German and Czech peoples, and for that reason Ehrenfels dedicated it to Thomas G. Masaryk, the first President of Czechoslovakia. At the age of 70, Ehrenfels retired, and he died in 1932 at his home, a small castle in Lichtenau, Lower Austria.

2. THE TWO TEACHERS: BRENTANO AND MEINONG

As to the fact that Ehrenfels explicitly acknowledged the important parts both Brentano and Meinong had played in his philosophical development, one may realize rather surprisingly that in the course of his philosophical career he became so independent, and that, furthermore, his scientific, ideological and artistic convictions expressed a point of view completely contrary to his two teachers. The debate with Brentano is particularly conspicuous. There are not just a few philosophical theses of fundamental significance which show a strong opposition to his great teacher: Ehrenfels denies that all emotional phenomena can be classified as one single category, he opposes Brentano's doctrine of intensity, and attacks straight away the conception of absolute value; it is true that both philosophers attach greatest interest to metaphysical problems, yet Ehrenfels did not keep up with Brentano's rationalistic monotheism but took a strictly dualistic hypothesis as a basis for his cosmological system. So it is obvious that, although Ehrenfels studied under Brentano for three years and afterwards kept in close contact with him for more than three decades, he cannot be counted in a strict sense as a member of the Brentano School. Moreover, Ehrenfels opts at times for Meinong's doctrines (especially with regard to epistemological and ethical issues) exposing himself to the harsh criticism of the orthodox Brentano Circle. Though the tensions between the Prague and Graz School sometimes put pressure on the relationship between Ehrenfels and his two teachers, yet they never seriously endangered the mutual respect and friendship.³ Among the writings remaining after Ehrenfels' death there is a manuscript in which he compares Meinong's and Brentano's personalities coming to the following conclusion:

So let me confess right away that I regard Brentano as the greater of the two as regards productive capacity. For keenness of intellect they were perhaps evenly balanced. But Brentano was, in my opinion, by far the more fortunately endowed scholar. He had an immediate instinct for that which was clear and essential and also for the admissibility, where appropriate, of abbreviated methods of thinking, whereas Meinong's mind seemed to be directly attracted to that which is intricate, minute and laborious. My impression was that Brentano also excelled more as regards economy of effort and the methodical influence exercised by the style of his verbal and written presentation. What we need is the brevity of clarity and not the prolixity of superfluous assurances. The sharp, whetted sword of exacting abstractions is to be used as the foremost scientific weapon — but in the struggle against living demons of delusion and obscurity, not in mock bat-

³ An insight into these personal relations is given by the (mainly unpublished) correspondence between Ehrenfels, Brentano and Meinong. Copies and transcriptions of these letters are deposited at the *Forschungsstelle und Dokumentationszentrum für Österr. Philosophie in Graz*. For the Ehrenfels-Meinong correspondence cf. Kindinger 1965, 65-81.

tle against the schemes of self-created objections. Language is an instrument, but can too often also provide pitfalls for objective thought.

If I then dare to value the philosopher Brentano more highly as an intellect than the philosopher Meinong, I do not want in what follows to reverse the order in the emotional-moral sphere. Nevertheless there were times in which there seemed to be no doubt for me as regards my decision in Meinong's favour. But many heartwarming sides of Brentano with which I came into contact, particularly in his last years — the way he bore his blindness, the mildness and human sympathy which transfigured his being in old age — have made it my duty to restrain my own judgement in this respect, not only outwardly, but also before myself.

All this had to be said so that what follows should not be misunderstood. Having said it, I must here stress that I was brought most impressively into contact with that living quality which can best be described as scientific conscience or scholarly morality not by Brentano but by Meinong. And yet all the conditions ought to have been here more favourable for Brentano.

Brentano was from the beginning for me the more imposing intellectual personality; he was by far the elder and more distinguished of the two (and in those days, as a lad coming up to Vienna from my native Waldviertel and the small town of Krems an der Donau, I still laid some store by outward distinction). Brentano held tutorials lasting several hours, and a private recommendation soon brought me into personal contact with him. Brentano was a charming interlocutor and an attractive figure in speech and appearance. None of this was true of Meinong. And yet it was through Meinong and not Brentano that I came to grips with moral seriousness of scholarship and a scientific sense of responsibility, the categorical imperative of the seeker and disciple of truth. I would not think of asserting that Brentano did not possess these emotional qualities. He had shown earlier and showed on many occasions afterwards the extent to which he partook of them.⁴

3. EHRENFELS' THEORY OF VALUE

In Ehrenfels' published writings, the works on value theory and ethics take special priority. This subject also plays an significant part in the discussions between Ehrenfels and Brentano, and therefore I shall concentrate on the debate on the foundation of value theory in the following outline. Ehrenfels points out already in his early article "Über Fühlen und Wollen" (which presents, on the lines of Brentano's descriptive psychology, an analysis of the concept of desire) that he considers the elaboration of a psychological theory of feeling and desiring as a necessary condition for building up an ethical theory. What is mentioned incidentally at the end of the paper concerning the relation between

⁴ "Über Brentano und Meinong", in Ehrenfels 1990, 427 ff. Quotation from English translation, in Simons 1994.

value and desiring is carried out at full length in a comprehensive programme Ehrenfels is involved with for several years.⁵

The fact that value and its negative equivalent are so often confounded with properties of objects is, according to Ehrenfels, due to nothing more than misleading linguistic usage caused by an deep-rooted human endeavour to objectiveness. A general determination of value must not start with the object, as if it is valuable in itself and is desired because of its worth; on the contrary, the striving for the object comes first and provides the basic constituent of the definition of value. "We ascribe value to those things which we either in fact desire, or which we would desire if we were not convinced of their existence. The value of a thing is its desirability".⁶ From this follows clearly that Ehrenfels holds a purely subjectivistic point of view. He derives the basic conceptions of value theory from the mental categories of feeling and desiring; these phenomena, as Ehrenfels understands it, are related to each other in such a way that the occurrence as well as the direction and intensity of desiring (which incorporates the acts of wishing, striving, and willing) is dependent on the feeling of pleasure or pain which arises with regard to the existence or non-existence of an object. Furthermore, just as the value of a thing is constituted by its desirability, so its worth corresponds directly to the strength or intensity of desiring. The determination of the strength of desire is deduced by Ehrenfels from a special law of relative advancement of happiness (*Gesetz der relativen Glücksförderung*) according to which the occurrence of striving or willing always increases the state of happiness in comparison with a state of non-striving or non-willing; the strength of striving results from the difference between the compared states of happiness. In so far as a distinct desire is dependent, both in its goal and intensity, on the relative advancement of happiness, we have to take into account that the phenomenon of desiring is not confined to those acts of striving or willing which take place actually. "It is obvious", as Ehrenfels points out, "that in the case of valuing an individual does not depend on its actual acts of desiring but rather on its capacity or disposition for experiencing such phenomena. The happiness of my future life remains valuable even if I am not conscious of it at the present moment and, therefore, I am unable to strive for; the reason is because my desiring will certainly occur as soon as I pay attention to or I am concerned of it".⁷ Values, to sum up Ehrenfels' psychological conception, have their origin in the dispositions of desiring which, in the last analysis, are dependent upon feeling-dispositions; granted that dispositions vary among human individuals it is yet plausible for Ehrenfels to assume an

⁵ *Werttheorie und Ethik* (1893/94); *System der Werttheorie I* (1897); *System der Werttheorie II* (1898). Reprint in Ehrenfels 1982.

⁶ *System der Werttheorie I*, § 18 (Ehrenfels 1982, 253).

⁷ *Werttheorie und Ethik*, ch. 2 (Ehrenfels 1982, 50).

average normal condition of mental dispositions which at any rate give rise to valuing acts.

When Ehrenfels goes on to work out further details of his system of value theory,⁸ one of the most important classifications he introduces is the general division into intrinsic values (*Eigenwerte*) and extrinsic values (*Wirkungswerte*). Intrinsic value is possessed by those things which are desired solely for their own sake whereas extrinsic value (effect value) is ascribed to objects which are desired for the sake of their effect, that is, as means to certain ends. The question which objects do attain, according to the majority of human individuals, intrinsic value and which ones effect value is answered by Ehrenfels by stating that striving for one's own pleasure or diminishing one's own displeasure possess the highest level of intrinsic value. To the realm of intrinsic valuation also belong all phenomena which are linked closely with vital functions of self-preservation and preservation of the human race (e.g. breathing, eating and drinking, sensory perception, propagation). But not only egoistic endeavours must be taken into account; also the mental phenomena of other individuals (which correspond to those phenomena that would be desired or detested by oneself) gain intrinsic worth, though to a lesser extent. On the other hand, the category of extrinsic values compared with that of intrinsic values has a far more extensive variety, since everything what is capable of being assumed as efficacious can function as means to certain ends. Ehrenfels contends, nevertheless, that there exists agreement among the great majority of individuals in respect to the numerous kinds of effect values: things which have extrinsic value are qualified either as economic goods or they deal with human conduct or qualities which undergo ethical valuation.

Even if someone were to regard ethics as something totally distinct from the conception of value developed here by me, and even if someone were to strongly stress the view that ethical values have to be classified as intrinsic values, it must be conceded at any rate that ethical values (i.e. the ethical qualities of our fellow-men like charity, honesty, magnanimity, and so on) represent moreover extrinsic values highly estimated by our fellow-men, and that, in addition, the majority is in agreement on the valuation of ethical qualities as far as it concerns the effect resulting from those qualities.⁹

For Ehrenfels, ethics can only be conceived and carried on as the psychology of ethical value-facts. The essential ethical phenomena are moral approval and disapproval; both of these acts express an ethical valuation whose objects are to be identified either with human actions or with desiring- and feeling-

⁸ As to the correlations between Ehrenfels' value theory and the concept of marginal utility developed by the Austrian economics C. Menger and F. v. Wieser, see Grassl 1982, and Fabian & Simons 1986. See also Dappiano's contribution below.

⁹ *System der Werttheorie I*, § 33 (Ehrenfels 1982, 294 ff.).

dispositions (since the latter is regarded by Ehrenfels as a necessary condition for performing human actions). What contributes to the promotion of the general good deserves approval, everything that is harmful to the common weal is judged by disapproval. An ethical valuation, according to Ehrenfels, states nothing else than the presence or lack of desiring- or feeling-dispositions which has to be strengthened or diminished in respect to the best promotion of the general good. As to the various interpretations of the concept of general good (*Wohl der Gesamtheit*) Ehrenfels opts for a point of view which makes allowance for the biological aspect of self-preservation and preservation of the species: greatest possible promotion of the general good means simply the "greatest possible promotion of what is biologically valuable".¹⁰ From a consideration of the desiring- and feeling-dispositions actually found in Western culture, Ehrenfels concludes that the dispositions positively valued are those whose increase above the actually occurring level would be necessary for the promotion of the general good. The striking circumstance that huge contrasts subsist between ethical valuations of different cultures, and also between different epochs within one culture, is for Ehrenfels an obvious consequence of the psychologically regulated nature of value-change. Not only in ethics but in the whole realm of human valuations an evolution and change of valuation takes place whose basic mainspring can be found, according to Ehrenfels' biological view, in the permanent struggle of values for their existence (*Kampfs ums Dasein der Wertungen*).¹¹

4. BRENTANIAN FOUNDATION OF ETHICS

This brief survey of the main points of Ehrenfels' value theory makes it clear beyond any doubt that there must be a harsh contrast, even more a strict incompatibility with the foundation of ethics worked out by Franz Brentano. From the very beginning, Ehrenfels was conscious of his controversial position with regard to Brentano's conception, since Ehrenfels had been introduced to the subject of value theory not by Brentano but by his second teacher Meinong.¹² Nevertheless, Ehrenfels is not afraid of getting into a debate with his admired friend

¹⁰ *Grundbegriffe der Ethik* (1907), 13. Reprint in Ehrenfels 1988a, 231. The great importance Ehrenfels attaches to human self-preservation and preservation of the human species is closely related to his ideas concerning the biological regeneration of mankind. For Ehrenfels' reformative projects of social and sexual ethics cf. Rug & Mulligan 1986; Fabian 1986b, 28-40.

¹¹ *System der Werttheorie I*, § 48-50 (Ehrenfels 1982, 316-325); *System der Werttheorie II*, § 17 (Ehrenfels 1982, 467 ff.).

¹² Cf. Eaton 1930, ch. VI, VIII; Fabian & Simons 1986, 62-65.

Brentano. As it is typical for his openness, he opposes already in his early writings Brentano's classification of mental phenomena according to which feeling as well as desiring and willing belong to the same category, i.e. the class of 'interests' (*Akte der Gemütsätigkeit*).¹³ For example, the feeling of sadness that occurs because of the loss of a precious thing differs in a certain way from the desire for getting the missing object back; according to Brentano, however, the phenomena of feeling and also those of desiring and willing fit into a continuous spectrum which may present itself as follows: sadness – longing – hope – desire (craving) – courage – act of volition (resolve). Brentano does not deny that these are different phenomena but argues that they have to be considered as a continuum which cannot be separated by a categorial demarcation line as it is the case of the other group of mental phenomena which divide into the two distinct classes of 'ideas' (*Vorstellungen*) and 'judgements' (*Urteile*). Ehrenfels does not accept Brentano's classification of the acts of interest according to which those phenomena form only one single class: On the one hand, Ehrenfels refers to cases where feeling occurs without desiring and vice versa desiring without accompanying feelings, and therefore it seems to him impossible to find out a characteristic attribute which would qualify both phenomena as belonging to the same category. On the other hand, he points out that there is indeed a sharp breaking in the continuum mentioned above, namely where sadness changes to longing since the latter expresses a striving which holds even more in the following sections of the continuum. There are further objections to Brentano's analysis of feeling,¹⁴ but the most significant consequences are involved with the arguments raised by Ehrenfels against Brentano's doctrine set forth in *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* (§§ 18-31). There Brentano claims a categorial difference between the phenomena of ideas, judgements, and interests (the latter also called 'loving' and 'hating'). Interests comprise a wide range of phenomena including hope, fear, regret, desire, wish, will, resolve, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, pleasure, pain, and so on. Brentano puts much emphasis upon the fact that there are analogies between judgement and interest: in a similar way as something is affirmed or rejected by a judgement, the acts of interest express love or hatred (pleasure or displeasure). Just as it is self-contradictory simultaneously to affirm and to deny the same thing, so it is self-contradictory in the sphere of interests simultaneously to love and to hate the same thing (in the same respect). This analogy does apply, according to Brentano, to another aspect, too. Just as there are some things which we can

¹³ Ehrenfels, "Über Fühlen und Wollen", § 5 (Ehrenfels 1988a, 29-37); Brentano 1925, ch. VIII (IV), §1.

¹⁴ Ehrenfels also criticises Brentano's idea of reducing intensity to extensiveness, cf. "Die Intensität der Gefühle. Eine Entgegnung auf Franz Brentanos neue Intensitätslehre" (Ehrenfels 1988a, 98-112; also 208-210).

be certain are true because they are evident to us (i.e. we can have no doubt concerning the correctness of their affirmation), so there are some things we can be certain are good (i.e. we can have no doubt that it is correct to love them). Obviously it is not the case that whatever is loved or capable of being loved is something that is worthy of love and therefore good. For Brentano only those objects which are loved by a love experienced as being correct obtain the qualification of a primary (intrinsic) good. As examples of acts of interest which are experienced as being correct he mentions love for pleasure, for having ideas (presentations), for knowledge; or, on the other hand, hatred against: displeasure, sadness, error. Yet Brentano acknowledges that there is an important disanalogy between judging and interest. Whereas one thing cannot be more true than another, one thing can certainly be more good, i.e. better than another. The reason why an object is worthy of greater love (or vice versa, worthy of being rejected with greater hatred) is not because of the higher level of intensity of loving (or hating). Instead of the concept of intensity Brentano introduces the concept of preference (*Vorziehen*). There are not only acts of correct love/hatred but also acts of preferring which are experienced as being correct as well; this is realized in such cases in which we prefer something that is good and known to be good to something that is bad and known to be bad, or in which we prefer the existence of something that is known to be good to its non-existence, or in which we prefer more intense pleasure to less intense pleasure or less intense pain to more intense pain. For the highest practical good, that is, good concerning that which we are able to attain, Brentano holds that secondary goods (i.e. goods reckoned as means to certain ends) are summable, and that the greatest overall sum is to be sought.

In reply to this theory of absolute value, Ehrenfels concedes that Brentano has worked out probably "in the only logically consequent and consistent way the conception of an intrinsic good (*an sich Gutes*) and of a general law in its strictest sense".¹⁵ But, nevertheless, Ehrenfels' main objections are directed at the assumption according to which the acts of interest are comparable to evident judgements. Ehrenfels denies that there are acts of loving or hating which are experienced as being correct; the characteristic moment of the evident (*Evidenz*) maintained by Brentano is not a genuine one but can be explained more plausibly by the fact that certain acts of approval or disapproval are simply experienced by a great majority of individuals. Furthermore, the case of love for displeasure or of hatred against pleasure is not something which is a

¹⁵ *Werttheorie und Ethik* (Ehrenfels 1982, 151 ff.). Ehrenfels criticises Brentano's theory in the article quoted (Ehrenfels 1982, 151-158); see also *System der Werttheorie I*, § 16 (Ehrenfels 1982, 247-251); *System der Werttheorie II*, § 38 (Ehrenfels 1982, 558-561); "Fragen und Einwände an die Adresse der Anhänger von Franz Brentanos Ethik" (Ehrenfels 1988a, 206-219). Cf. Rutte 1978.

contradiction in itself as Brentano concludes; rather it is only clashing with the normal disposition of human nature and it is not logically impossible. As to the distinguished acts of preferring Ehrenfels rejects the supposition that there exists some sort of evident or objective correctness. The reason why we prefer certain things to other things, or why some objects are desired with greater love than other, has to do solely, according to Ehrenfels' psychological analysis, with the strength or intensity of the acts of interest. With reference to the correct acts of loving, hating, or preferring Brentano makes effort to define absolute values (e.g. *das in sich Gute*, *das in sich Schlechte*, *das in sich Bessere oder Vorzüglichere*) and to lay down the general maxim of human conduct according to which the highest practical good is to be promoted in every possible way we can attain. As to the definition of the highest practical good, however Ehrenfels maintains that it is unnecessary to draw upon absolute values because this concept is determinated sufficiently in that what is given by 'general good' (*Wohl der Gesamtheit*). After all, Ehrenfels regards his general value-system as a theory by which the various phenomena occurring in the realm of human valuation can be explained in a comprehensive and consistent way, and therefore he concludes that the conception of absolute value is dispensable altogether.

Specific indications as to how Brentano criticised in general Ehrenfels' concept of value and how he reacted in detail to Ehrenfels' objections can hardly be drawn from his published works. Usually Brentano was very reluctant to comment publicly on the philosophical views developing among his followers and pupils. Even though any direct reference to Ehrenfels in Brentano's works cannot be found,¹⁶ it must, of course, be assumed that the ethical questions induced frequent discussions between them.¹⁷ From the time when Ehrenfels published his first important essays on value theory there exists a letter which illustrates in a very significant style how Brentano reacted to Ehrenfels' ethical doctrine. In the following the most characteristic paragraphs of this document are cited to close this essay:¹⁸

What a pity that you — misled by such delusion — plunged into a doctrine which, compared to the real one, can only be called ethical nihilism. Your heart so susceptible to ideals has no real ideal. In ethics the eternal majesty is replaced by the contemptuous

¹⁶ The controversy with the critics of Brentano's doctrines was taken over often by the members of the orthodox Brentano Circle. Oskar Kraus, for instance, mentioned Ehrenfels in his publication "Die Werttheorien" (412-417), but confined himself to briefly rejecting the critique of Brentano without going into further detail about Ehrenfels' own value theory.

¹⁷ Ehrenfels himself made a hint at this point, cf. *Werttheorie und Ethik* (Ehrenfels 1982, 152, footnote).

¹⁸ I am grateful to Peter Simons for his assistance as to the preparation of the English version of this article.

judgement of a single human day. You would like to maintain your conscience, but it no longer is the voice of eternal truth but that of superstition which — deriving from every day opinions — only for this reason is in some accordance with them. God is denied, not listened to by atheists of past times. The concept of the absolute infinite good should be a meaningless word. On the other hand certain values created by man vary from country to country! My poor dear friend! Where there is such pitiable inward destruction of an essentially noble mind, a destruction which I am afraid even produced disturbances in his practical life, which deprived him of his inward peace and his works of many a smart virtue, I need not be afraid that you could become suspicious that I out of narrow-minded vanity and dogmatism could cling to my own assertions... But where shall I let myself be carried away to? You need not be worried and think I am speaking out of hatred or envy. I am not unaware of the un noble passions which for a long have been attributed to me — I know very well — though not from you but from a good many other people.— Oh well! It worries me and I would be sad if my worries became real, but there is prevailing hope that what you and I have in common makes you know what other people do not realize, and that my word may lead you to a critical review of long-standing opinions which have not yet been criticised by any authority and without such amendments I cannot promise anything good for your philosophical future. Do follow accurately the rules which in respect to friendship are considered as holy! Otherwise I would respect you less and would not have dared to express what I have said without being able to rely on our friendship.¹⁹

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¹⁹ Extract from an unpublished letter from Brentano to Ehrenfels (December 9, 1893).

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

on:

see also:

value /ethics

1.15, 4.7, **15**

EDMUND HUSSERL (1859-1938)

1. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Before he attended Brentano's lectures in Vienna between 1884 and 1885, Husserl concentrated almost entirely on mathematics.¹ From 1880 to 1881 he was a member of Weierstrass's and Kronecker's school in Berlin,² where he explored the theory of Abelian functions, the calculus of variations and analytical functions.³ During the semester he spent in Berlin, Husserl also attended the lectures of Erdmann, Kirchhoff, Lazarus and Paulsen⁴ and read widely in Lotze, Bain, Helmholtz and Spinoza.

A central theme of Husserl's research prior to the 1880s, one with which he was concerned throughout his career, was the question of the continuum. If we examine his intellectual interests in those years, in fact, we find that they address two fundamental problems: the spatial-temporal continuum and the operations of the mind. As we shall see, these two mathematically-based topics were given detailed treatment in his subsequent writings on phenomenology because of their relevance to his investigations of infinitesimal variations according to differential calculus and of the representation of sets.

¹ There is a vast bibliography on Husserl's enormous output, to which the reader is referred for individual topics. See Lapointe 1980. Here we are mainly concerned with those Husserlian themes which bear a close relation to Brentano's thought. For a biography of Husserl, see Malvine Husserl, Ethen 1936 and Schuhmann 1977. On the pre-phenomenological period, see Illemann 1932. Memoirs and personal information can be found in Spiegelberg 1959.

² See Strohmeyer 1938, LXIX; Biermann 1989, 26-14; Mittag-Lefler 1910 and Behnke 1966, 13-40.

³ See Grattan-Guinness 1970 and 1980.

⁴ See Schuhmann 1977, 6.

One of the problems which occupied mathematicians at the end of the nineteenth century was the nature and origin of the concept of number. One side of the debate was led by Helmholtz, who attempted to deduce the concept of number psychologically; on the other side were ranged Boole, Schröder, Peirce and Frege. All of these thinkers shared a common interest in the general question of mathematical theory and in the analysis of the mental procedures and operations which constitute arithmetic. The fundamental difference among their various theories was their points of departure: some of them looked for the foundation of arithmetic in ordinal numbers,⁵ others in cardinal numbers.⁶ But the theoretical question underlying all their theories was an ontological one, and it concerned the reality or non-reality of the objective substrata posited as the basis of numbers.

Husserl took up an intermediate position, which was Cantorian as regards aggregates, and Kroneckerian in the ordering of these independent aggregates in a series.⁷ After receiving his teaching qualification in Halle in 1882, Husserl returned to Berlin and worked as an assistant until 1884. At the end of the year he moved to Vienna, where he attended the lectures of Exner, Königsberg, Stefan, Weyr and von Lang.⁸ In this period he was reading Hegel, Fick, Lange, Spencer and Mach. In 1884 he attended Franz Brentano's lectures and decided to devote himself to philosophy.⁹

Husserl began his academic career in 1901 as an associate professor. He was appointed full professor in 1906 in Göttingen, where he formed his first circle of students, which successively gave rise to the realist phenomenology of Munich. In 1916 he accepted the chair recently vacated by Rickert in Freiburg and stayed there until 1933 when, because of his Jewish origins, he was forced to relinquish his professorship by the Ministry of Culture of Baden. After refusing an invitation to move to Los Angeles, he was able to attend conferences in Vienna and Prague, but in 1937 the Ministry of the Reich refused him permission to go to the Ninth Congress of Philosophy in Paris. He died the following year, in 1938. His last book, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, published by Landgrebe in Prague, was swiftly removed from the bookshops after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. His immense output of unpublished manuscripts and anno-

⁵ This is Helmholtz's and Kronecker's position.

⁶ This is Cantor's conception. Husserl and Cantor studied together in Halle and it was Cantor who introduced Husserl to Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*. On Cantor see Meschowski 1967. When working with Cantor in Halle, Husserl developed an interest in the theory of variations: see Husserl 1983 and Miller 1982.

⁷ As to the development of this topic see also Husserl 1901, 3rd Logical Investigation, § 20.

⁸ See Schuhmann 1977, 9.

⁹ The Husserl Archive (X, IV) contains one of his annotations: "*me totum abdidi in studia philosophica duce Francesco Brentano*".

tations was rescued by van Breda, to whom we owe the creation of the Husserl Archive in Louvain.

2. IN VIENNA

When Brentano moved from Würzburg to Vienna in 1880, he already enjoyed a substantial reputation among philosophers for his studies on Aristotle.¹⁰ First as a full professor, then as a *Privatdozent*, Brentano lived in Vienna until 1895.¹¹

Husserl heard about Brentano from Masaryk and decided to attend his lectures from 1884 to 1885. In those years Brentano was teaching courses in practical philosophy and was seeking to recast elementary logic on the basis of descriptive psychology and the problem of the continuum, with particular regard to Bolzano's theses set out in his *Paradoxien des Unendlichen* of 1851. Brentano touched on many other topics in the lectures he delivered in this period, and which Husserl attended: he gave practical classes on Hume's *Essay on human understanding* and the principles of morals, on Helmholtz's theories expounded in *Die Tatsachen der Wahrnehmung*, and on those of Dubois-Reymond as set out in his *Grenzen der Naturerkenntnis*.

The linking theme of all Brentano's lectures in these years, as Husserl himself recalled, was that of presentation (*Vorstellung*) — which he analysed in its various forms and classified into intuitive and symbolic, clear and obscure, proper and improper, concrete and abstract presentations.¹² These were all key notions in Husserl's first writings on the philosophy of arithmetic.¹³

Husserl was particularly impressed by Brentano's analysis of the presentations of fantasy in relation to perceptive relations. He wrote: "Brentano has

¹⁰ See Brentano 1862 and 1867.

¹¹ Here too, Brentano's lectures attracted large audiences: as well as Husserl, his pupils included Meinong, von Ehrenfels, Kraus, Twardowski, Masaryk, Meynert and Freud. The first volume of *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* was published in Vienna in 1874.

¹² The Brentanian term *Vorstellung* is usually translated as 'presentation', not as 'representation'. Presentation indicates that consciousness has a certain content (perceptive and mental as well) in a specific current moment-now. On the term in general see Lalande 1926 and, in particular, Grossmann 1977. From an experimental point of view too, see also Benussi 1923. Brentano elaborates two kinds of presentation: sensitive presentation which relates to perception, and noetic presentation which concerns attributive synthesis. On this see the entry 'Brentano' above.

¹³ In these years Brentano also analysed the essential aspects of the theory of judgement in terms of a descriptive analysis of its conscious moments. He drew the conclusion that any form of judgement can be linked to an existential one. An existential judgement is irreducible, according to Brentano, because it is cannot be modalized further. On the relationship between Husserl and Brentano as regards psychology in particular, see Bruck 1933; Bell 1990.

conducted broad analysis of this question <the relation between imagination and sensation>, the broadest I know, in his lectures <on imagination> and he concludes that there is no essential difference between sensation and imagination'.¹⁴ This issue, as we know, was to become central to all subsequent phenomenological analysis.¹⁵

In these years Husserl maintained contact with the other disciples of Brentano, until in 1886, on the advice of Brentano himself, he left for Halle.¹⁶ In that city he attended Stumpf's lectures in order to extend his knowledge of psychology and to go more deeply into what was then his principal interest: the question of the continuum. These were also years, though, in which he continued to explore the topics of geometry, homogeneous and non homogeneous continua, formal logic and mathematical logic.¹⁷ Above all, as he himself declared, "in my mathematical and phenomenological research, and in my logical research in the years 1886-1896, the idea of ontology moved to the forefront".¹⁸ The relationship between mathematics and psychology therefore became stronger, even though the latter took the particular form of descriptive psychology.¹⁹

Husserl was now regarded by Brentano's followers themselves as the 'new star' of their circle. He was also one of the small group of pupils whom Brentano frequented in his free time outside the university. He continued to correspond with Brentano²⁰ — who, however, never recognized him as a full-fledged member of his school because of the transcendental development of his phenomenology.²¹ Husserl, for his part, always considered himself a Brentanian. Despite his distress over the theoretical dispute with his teacher — which, as we shall see, centred on the development of a systematic theory of objects that included ideal objects as well — Husserl visited Brentano in St. Gilgen, a *Schönbühl* and then, for the last time, in Florence in 1907. Here, on Brentano's bidding, he explained his phenomenological theory and his struggle against psychologism, but failed to convince his master of the correctness of his position.²²

¹⁴ Husserl 1891b, 40b.

¹⁵ Husserl also spent some time with Brentano in the summer of 1886 at St. Gilgen near the Wolfgangsee. During their excursions into the nearby mountains, he was able to explain his theories further. All the available information about this period can be found in Kraus 1919 and in Schuhmann 1977, 16 ff.

¹⁶ In a letter to Stumpf, Brentano introduced Husserl as a "mathematician who is also an assiduous student of philosophy". Cf. Schuhmann 1977, 17.

¹⁷ The Husserl Archive contains the manuscript on homogeneous and non-homogeneous continua. K I 50/47; B I 10/116-7.

¹⁸ See also F III, 1/118b, and Schuhmann 1977, 16 ff.

¹⁹ See Melandri 1989, 14.

²⁰ See Ehrenfels' letter to Meinong of 16 February 1886 in Fabian 1986, 17.

²¹ Cfr. below, § 11.

²² Kraus 1919.

3. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC

Husserl obtained his teaching qualification (together with Stumpf, Cantor and Knoblauch) in 1887 by submitting a thesis entitled *Über den Begriff der Zahl* — which was later to constitute the first chapter of his *Philosophie der Arithmetik* published in 1891.²³

Since 1890 he had been studying Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Leibniz, Bolzano and Kant (whose work he also examined in the light of Laas's positivist criticisms).

Husserl's first writings, which date to these years, reveal that his points of reference were his studies of mathematics under Weierstrass and his intellectual contacts with Brentano. From Weierstrass he inherited the problem of determining the concept of number (*Anzahl*)²⁴, from Brentano and the Brentanians those aspects of the concept of number that relate to mental operations.

From a general theoretical point of view, it is possible to define number in material definition and/or formal terms. A material analysis of number conducted on the basis of the features of psychic activity addresses numerical evidence and intuition; a formal analysis of number, by contrast, addresses results in themselves, that is, logical calculus, without considering the activity that produces them. Generally speaking, Husserl and later mathematical phenomenologists were mainly concerned with material analysis, while logicians concentrated on formal analysis. However, for Husserl's theory it was possible both to give a Fregean definition of number and to investigate how the concept of number originates in our psychic activity, as Piaget would subsequently do.

Husserl set out his conception of number in *Philosophie der Arithmetik*.²⁵ His theory (which was accused of psychologism, above all by Frege)²⁶ can be summarized in the following four, interconnected points:

²³Husserl had planned two volumes of *Philosophie der Arithmetik*. See Strohmeier 1983. The preliminary analyses for the second volume were published posthumously in Husserl 1970 and 1983.

²⁴ See Willard 1984 and Willard 1989, 1-27; Bachelard 1957 and Martin 1956.

²⁵ Husserl 1891a. The book was dedicated to "*Meinem Lehrer Franz Brentano in inniger Dankbarkeit*". It received a number of reviews: see Frege 1893, Hildebrand 1893, Elsas 1894. Although a second volume was planned, it was never published: *Logische Untersuchungen* appeared instead. On the young Husserl cf. Münch 1993; on Husserl and Frege see Mohanty 1982.

²⁶ Frege's criticisms accusing Husserl of psychologism induced him to go deeply into the problem of logic. Cf. Frege 1893, 313-332, and Spiegelberg 1965, I, 93. On the relation between Husserl and Frege see Mohanty 1982, Sommer 1985, Pietersma 1967, Solomon 1970, Aquila 1974, Drummond 1985. On the question of the relationship between psychology, mathematics and logic see Grattan-Guinness 1982.

1. His theory related closely to his studies of the continuum and, even more so, to Lagrange's conception of multidimensional space and Riemann's concept of space²⁷ (which, as we have seen, was one of Husserl's chief intellectual concerns during his pre-phenomenological period).
2. It was also influenced by Brentano's theories. In the Brentanian conception, number was the product of a collective connection (*kollektive Verbindung*) wrought by the mind. Number and multiplicity were not a result of an abstraction process which operated on the concrete wholes in which they are given; nor could number be related to general concepts. In Husserl's view, "they are not those single contents, but the concrete aggregates as wholes in which they are embedded".²⁸

Husserl defined his notion of *aggregate* (*Inbegriff*) by stating that we have an aggregate when different elements are simultaneously presented to the consciousness as a unitary whole, even if they preserve their distinctive features. An aggregate is therefore some sort of conceptual correlate to an unifying act²⁹. The term 'aggregate', as Husserl later explained in the 3rd Logical Investigation, therefore expressed a categorial unit corresponding to the form of thought and indicates a correlate of the act of unification. Consequently it is not something that *per se* concerns the sensibility, but it is independent of the sensible contents given in intuition. Essential to the formation of an aggregate are neither its contents nor its constitutive elements, but the *form* which unites them and their distinction. A numerical aggregate, in particular, comprises both the units and the connection among them.

3. Husserl distinguished between primary relations (the natural connections among objects which manifest themselves in the contents of perception) and secondary relations (the connections among objects resulting from subjective activity).³⁰ These latter relations Husserl unfortunately called 'psychic' relations, although³¹ the collective connection of 'psychic' rela-

²⁷ See Riemann 1973. Note that Riemann was a pupil of Herbart, and therefore also had a psychological background.

²⁸ Husserl 1891, 13. Cf. Simons 1982, 160-198.

²⁹ Husserl 1900-1, 1st Investigation, § 26; 4th Investigation, § 9.

³⁰ Husserl 1891a, 66. It was Stumpf who distinguished between independent and dependent contents according to the relationships to which they belong. Husserl returned to the topic in his 1894, where he emphasized the useful role of psychology in defining the structures of consciousness and therefore in clarifying the symbolic functions that operate in the formation of logical calculus. The article concentrates on the topics of spatial presentations (Lotze and Stumpf) and figural qualities (Ehrenfels). The theory of parts and moments is also dealt with in Brentano 1982. On Stumpf see the entry "Stumpf" in this volume.

³¹ As Willard has pointed out, it had been clear to Husserl since 1891 that his analysis of number was an evaluation of the categorial characteristics of objects, although some

tions is, in fact, according to Husserl, that kind of mental operation which generates the *formal concept of object* (*Gegenstand*). The distinctive feature of collective connection, as regards both number and multiplicity expressed in ordinary language by the syncategorematic word *and*, is *conjunction* which combines the individual elements of the whole in an unitary set.³² Number is therefore the outcome of the activity of counting, of joining something as a 'something in general' (*etwas überhaupt*).

The act of joining is the only invariant in the formation of concrete sets or aggregates. The 'something in general' instead stands for the concept of 'collective': the object corresponding to the act of joining is a general object which represents solely the formal connection among contents instituted by the act. The concepts of multiplicity (*Vielheit*), of aggregate and of unity that underpin Husserl's theory of number derive from Bolzano's *Wissenschaftslehre*, which was one of his principal sources, together with works by Weierstrass and Cantor.³³

Every object of presentation, psychic or physical, abstract or concrete, given through the senses or by the imagination, may be unified with any other object and with any number of objects in an aggregate: for example, 'the moon, Italy, a sentiment and an angel'. A multiplicity is therefore a group of objects with the sole characteristic of being governed by a specific form: e.g., all *x* and all *y* governed by the form of theory *A* are the multiplicities of *A*, etc.

4. Finally, there are a number of resemblances between Husserl's theory and those of Mach³⁴ and Ehrenfels³⁵ on figural qualities — the qualities of objects perceived as wholes and not as a sum of their individual constitutive elements — in the perceptive realm.

Husserl incorporated the notion of figural quality into a general theory of part and whole. His mereological theory distinguishes between wholes, parts of wholes and connections among parts.³⁶ Parts are either independent (pieces) or

characteristics of objects are given in higher-order acts which contain other acts as parts of themselves: Willard 1984 and Willard 1991b, 365-369.

³² In short, a collective connection arises when, in considering a multiplicity, we change its contents at will but preserve the form of unity that connects them. Clearly, Husserl inherited the concept of variation and in particular of eidetic variation from his mathematical studies.

³³ Cf. Bolzano 1851, 2-3. Note that, however, according to Bolzano, the aggregate results from a *compound of things* which are connected by the conjunction; in other words, it is not due to a collective connection, which is a Brentanian notion.

³⁴ Mach 1922, 130.

³⁵ Von Ehrenfels 1890, 114.

³⁶ This theory is presented analytically in his 3rd Logical Investigation. See Smith 1982, Simons 1986, Libardi 1990, Albertazzi 1994a and 1995a.

non-independent (moments). The difference between them is that independent parts can be presented independently of the wholes to which they belong, while moments cannot. For example, I can present to myself the half of a square bisected by a diagonal or an arm independently of the body, but not a line without length or a colour without extension.

Husserl called figural quality (*Gestaltqualität*) a non-independent part (content). This non-independent part or moment can only be totally separated from its whole subsequently, in reflection and by means of abstraction. Figural moments therefore pertain to the perception of wholes, which precedes the perception of their individual parts.

The notion of figural quality is also present in Husserl's theory of number, where he calls it a qualitative moment of unity connected with the *immediate* apprehension of a multiplicity given *by intuition*.³⁷ When we apprehend a multiplicity, for example a gaggle of geese or a flock of birds, we apprehend this whole as something simple, not as a collective composed of individual contents *and* their relations. Gaggle, flock, etc. are qualities of the *whole*, of the aggregate, and do not pertain to its individual elements: in this sense Husserl calls them quasi (sensible) qualities, or second order qualities.³⁸

The collective connection involved in the learning of a melody, of a figural whole or of a multiplicity takes the form of an immediate conjunction and fusion (*Verschmelzung*) of individual contents whereby the unitary whole is created.³⁹ Although the Husserlian problematic of the figural qualities or moments of unity has yet to find satisfactory solution, it is possible to distinguish between figural properties of an aggregate 'in general' (as in the case of a series of contiguous dots which are seen as a line, or of a sensory content deriving from several sensory fields which is given in some sort of simultaneity), and figural properties of a multiplicity, which depends on material sensory contents (as in the case of 'gaggle', 'flock'). The complex notion of number, and its correlative notions of aggregate, multiplicities etc. provided a ready-made basis for all subsequent phenomenological inquiry.⁴⁰

³⁷ The themes of contents or non-independent moments was developed in his 3rd Logical Investigation. On the question of figural qualities in mathematics see Becker 1975, 384-7, Smith & Mulligan 1989 and Libardi 1990, 1.1. On figural quality in general see Albertazzi 1993a.

³⁸ Husserl 1891, 202.

³⁹ We owe the concept of fusion in a psychological sense to Stumpf and to his studies on musical consonance. It was used by Husserl in his 3rd Logical Investigation to define the notion of moment or dependent part, which therefore had ontological meaning. On this see below.

⁴⁰ Note that, according to Husserl, the concept of multiplicity precedes that of number: a multiplicity entails that a plurality of non-homogeneous elements falls within our perceptual range, while number is already a particular kind of multiplicity, a *determined multiplicity*. See Husserl 1891, 9, 14. On the concept of etceteration in mathematics see Kaufmann 1930, and Albertazzi 1989f.

4. THE TEMPORAL CONTINUUM

Husserl concentrated on the continuum right from his early investigations in mathematics. Brentano, however, came to the problem more indirectly: through his analysis of Aristotele's studies of the perceptive continuum, and only partially through the mathematical analyses of Dedekind, Cantor and Poincaré.

Brentano's theory of continua asserted that the concept of continuum, like all our concepts, is intuitive. Intuitively, we have presentations of objects, which alter or remain the same in a sort of phenomenal (multi)stability; objects which have no exactly defined parts and boundaries.

For both Husserl and Brentano there was a component of the continuum, namely the temporal continuum, which was closely bound up with the theme of intentionality and the structure of consciousness. Since all the members of Brentano's school focused their analysis on the question of presentation (*Vorstellung*) and its evidence in inner perception, it was extremely important for them to understand the nature, dimensions and duration of the psychic present.

The question had been first raised by Kant and was then discussed by 'psychologists' like Erdmann and Benecke.⁴¹ Brentano entered the debate by introducing the topic of intentionality, which he took in part from the medieval philosophers, and by concentrating in particular on the process of inner perception; he also drew a distinction between a phenomenological (i.e. phenomonic) continuum, which was perceptive in nature, and a mathematical one which was instead produced by scientific idealization.

Although Brentano made various changes to his general conception of temporal continuum in his intellectual career,⁴² his basic premise never varied: the experience of time is tied to inner perception and therefore to psychic phenomena.

The theoretical difficulty that induced Brentano to alter his conception of inner time was the problem of presentation — which as real presentation was restricted to the moment-now, but as modification belonged to the past and to the future, and was therefore unreal. The contradiction between the reality of the moment-now and the unreality of its modifications provoked Husserl's criticisms of Brentano both in his lectures *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, delivered between 1893 and 1917,⁴³ and in *Logische Untersu-*

⁴¹ The notion of psychologism is a rather vague one; basically, it maintains that psychology is the foundation of philosophy. See Eisler 1912, 1088-1092.

⁴² See in this volume the entry 'Brentano'.

⁴³ The history of these lectures is a complicated one: Husserl first became interested in temporal analyses in Göttingen in 1904-5. Edith Stein was initially commissioned to edit the manuscript of the lectures delivered before 1910; they eventually appeared, but were edited by

chungen.⁴⁴ In his analysis of the problem, however, Husserl himself raised further questions: how many presentations are there in a moment-now, and what validity do contents have independently of their presentation at a certain moment?

Husserl began to reject Brentano's theory of the continuum of the Vienna lectures in the early 1900s.⁴⁵ His disaffection coincided with his partial abandonment of the method of descriptive psychology so that he could conduct further analysis of genetic type and investigate the whole problem of intentionality — in which his interest had been aroused by Twardowski's book of 1894.⁴⁶ However, Husserl had already begun to pursue these two lines of inquiry in *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, which in fact bore the subtitle: 'Psychological and logical investigations'.

By a genetic method of phenomenological inquiry Husserl did not mean a psychologicistic method *à la* Wundt; that is, a method that reduces concepts to their psychological subjective origin as mental events. He meant a method which addresses the origin of concepts in categorial (i.e. *formal*, according to Husserl) terms, and which justifies their validity *a priori*: a transcendental method, one might say.⁴⁷

From this point of view we may state that Brentano's descriptive method — which Husserl, indeed, never entirely abandoned — dealt with the products more than with the functions of thought. For its subject-matter it took mental conditions considered in the pure abstraction of the moment-now, just as the elements of consciousness were the subject-matter of morphological and static analysis; it was therefore not concerned with their *a priori* genesis, since, for descriptive psychology, this was simply given integrally with their evidence.

Instead, the genetic method of Husserl's phenomenological enquiries examined the *categorial structure* of this evidence and was therefore obliged to investigate the origin of conceptual categories like identity, succession, causality, which are an output of the formal structure of consciousness. An undertaking

Heidegger, in 1927, for *Jahrbuch für phänomenologische Forschung* under the title *Edmund Husserls Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*. The text of Husserliana X, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, edited by R. Böhm, includes other subsequent writings. Finally, R. Bernet published an edition in 1985 for Meiner, with the title *Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917)*. This edition included the texts of Husserliana X, part B and arranged the manuscripts in a different order.

⁴⁴ Husserl 1900-1.

⁴⁵ See Kraus 1929; Brough 1984, § 5; Albertazzi 1989c, 7-19 and Albertazzi 1991, 89-111.

⁴⁶ On this see Schuhmann 1991.

⁴⁷ Husserl was not always clear about this distinction, at least before the 1920s. Cf. Husserl 1900-1, 2nd Logical investigation, 4, 8; Husserl 1973, 14, 40-41; Hua I, 114.

of this kind entailed reconsideration of the entire structure of consciousness, of psychic acts and of their products: contents, internal objects, meanings.⁴⁸

Further analysis of the structures of intentionality also gave Husserl a better understanding the nature of phenomenological *facts* (*Erlebnisse*) — which he considered to be ontological primitives — and the structure of subjectivity, and led him to stress the functional aspects of consciousness.⁴⁹

In Husserl's view, Brentano had made the mistake of not distinguishing among the different *ways* in which consciousness intentionally addresses its subjects. He had consequently failed to analyse the structural features of the various psychic acts to which different types of content and object correspond. Husserl, for his part, tried to justify the ontological-formal givenness of the objects to which consciousness is directed by analysing the structure of acts.⁵⁰

5. INTENTIONALITY

As we have seen, a fundamental problem for the Brentanians was the nature of the psychic present. Brentano had taken the fantasy to be the origin of inner time, whereas Husserl identified it in a subsequent moment of consciousness. In Husserl's view, the *Phantasie-Vorstellung* described by Brentano in his Vienna lectures did not belong to the initial moment of affection in presentation.

According to Brentano, in fact, connected to each presentation is a continuous series of presentations, each of which reproduces the content of the previous one and stamps upon it the temporal features of 'pastness'. This type of *original association* is an operation of the fantasy, which from presentation to presentation produces the *modifying* temporal element which qualitatively alters the presentation. In fact, we do not perceive time, succession or change, but apprehend them as a modification of the previous presentation as performed by the fantasy.

According to Husserl, Brentano's (Viennese) conception comprised: 1. Only what is present is actual (metaphysical prejudice); 2. Only what is present can

⁴⁸ Contents correspond to the different presentations of the object in the various intentional acts; the inner object is an ontological correlate to a plurality of objectified acts, while meanings correspond, at the level of expression, to inner objects. On this see below § 6 ff. See also McBride & Schrag 1983, 225-43.

⁴⁹ Synonyms for *Erlebnis* are *Ereignis*, *Vorkommnis*: namely, something which takes place and in which the ego has a particular epistemic condition; that is to say, it judges it with evidence. See Künne 1986, § 2 and Sommer 1985, part 3.

⁵⁰ Smith 1989, 24-7; Poli 1992a and Poli 1993a.

be perceived (gnoseological prejudice); 3. Experience of an object depends on a mental content (psychological prejudice). In short, Husserl's criticism is substantially this: the psychic present is not an instantaneous moment but a temporal extension. In the extension of the present we apprehend an 'original impression' which corresponds to Brentano's moment-now.⁵¹ Within the moment-now itself, moreover, several simultaneous original impressions are possible.

Secondly, the original impression is apprehended in a continuity of 'primary memories', which should not be confused with the secondary memories (actual memories).⁵² The primary memory is a kind of mental image which accompanies the persistence of the original impression in the extension of the psychic present; rather like the tail of a comet, as Husserl put it. Within the present, therefore, the original impression is *retained* for a certain interval of time.

Consider, for example, a short melodic sequence in which the first note sounded is retained while the following ones are being played. Within the single act of presentation corresponding to the psychic present, therefore, each original impression assumes the temporal position (of 'precedent') with respect to the one that follows it.

Thirdly, the continuity of the retention of impressions also entails that it in some way anticipates the future (by means of 'protention'). In short, this is no longer a matter of a moment-now but of a present surrounded by a sort of temporal halo.⁵³

The fundamental difference between the (Viennese) conceptions of Brentano and Husserl is therefore that, for Brentano, presentation comes about in the instantaneous moment-now, whereas for Husserl we perceive objects in succession, with a certain duration, within an enlarged psychic present. Obviously, absolutizing Brentano's conception (reism), if the presentation is momentary then only it is real, and to this moment must be attributed also its temporal modification by the fantasy. According to Husserl, instead, fantasy involves *presentification*, that is, the reproduction of an impression that has already been felt in a successive moment.⁵⁴

An important feature of Husserl's analysis of the nature of *presentification* was the ordering he gave to the temporal continuum. Presentifications too, like presentations, are presentifications-of; they are intentional, even though this is second-order intentionality, because they undergo further temporal modifications. Husserl called these modifications *retentional* because they come about by

⁵¹ Husserl 1956, 67, 100.

⁵² Husserl 1956, 81.

⁵³ Husserl 1956, 31.

⁵⁴ For an analysis of presentification see Husserl 1966a, texts prior to 1919; Husserl 1950-2, §§ 43, 99-117; Husserl 1973, Appendix 32. On the whole problem see Husserl 1980.

being retained in the continuum of consciousness.⁵⁵ Briefly, retention is the 'original awareness' of what is past, or, better, a foundational layer of psychic life.

The structure of Husserl's theory of consciousness has been confirmed by experimental results carried out by Benussi, Bonaventura and Calabresi, who could be loosely labelled as 'descriptive psychologists', belonging to the school of Brentano.⁵⁶ In fact, Benussi was a pupil of Meinong at Graz and Bonaventura and Calabresi studied under De Sarlo at Florence. De Sarlo, a friend of Brentano, made a major contribution to the development of descriptive psychology in Italy.⁵⁷

The analyses developed by these descriptive psychologists showed that within a certain phenomenic temporal duration, which can be identified as 'present', we have a presentation of different objects in a succession, however they are perceived as simultaneous in the temporal duration of psychic present.

But Husserl's most striking innovation *vis-à-vis* Brentano was his analysis of the structure of intentionality, which for Brentano was simply the *property of the act* directed towards something. Prompted by his readings of Twardowski, Husserl developed a systematic theory of intentionality which distinguished it into two different kinds. In Husserl's analysis the stream of consciousness flows in two different directions: it has both latitudinal and longitudinal movement.

According to Husserl, in fact, Brentano developed an outline of the morphology of the parts of the act, but failed to consider the dynamic structure of the act itself, i.e. of the flow. Husserl's analysis of the content of the act of presentation identifies a number of constants.

In particular, phenomenological analysis enables identification of a dual and temporal structure of presented phenomena, of temporal ones in particular⁵⁸, namely:

⁵⁵ According to Bach & Chen 1990, 22-30, any bidimensional and static representation of the structure of consciousness, of one of its parts or one of its moments, is bound to be inadequate. A diagram using multidimensional geometries or the geometry of fractals might be useful here. In fact, a complex system, even that of the moment-now, is never in static equilibrium and could be incorporated into a modern theory of 'organized criticality'. Another possibility is given by the theory of categories when it applies only to the static nature of noemata. See Baruss 1989, 25-41 and Peruzzi 1988.

⁵⁶ From this point of view presentation in Husserl can be understood as the unitary and simultaneous presentation of distinct and successive phases within the temporal extension of the psychic present. Each phase (part) of the perception intends more than its object now-point and connects with the following phase by means of what we may call the immediate memory, which lasts for the entire duration of the act and accompanies the overall formation of content in its various phases. Cf. Albertazzi 1994.

⁵⁷ Cf. Albertazzi 1991b Albertazzi 1993b and 1993c. On Benussi cf. Albertazzi 1995b.

⁵⁸ Also spatial phenomena constitute themselves into a temporal continuum: every ordering into above/below, before/behind, etc., presupposes a simultaneous 'flow' of spatially ordered impressions.

1. the first direction of the act forms a so-called 'immanent time' in which there is duration, formation and change of the object which lasts. *Objectual correlates* of this intentional direction are the moments or non-independent parts of the act itself, like the aspects, figural qualities and the phenomena of phenomenal salience which help to form the object;

2. the second direction forms only the ordering into succession of the phases of the flow and permits the internal localization of objects by giving them a place (*Lage*) and a position (*Stellung*): as such, this second direction is not strictly speaking 'temporal'. It is simply the set of the localizations of the presentness of the phenomenal object. Not always, indeed, do presence and existence coincide. Consider the illumination effect and conjurer effect, which are phenomena of phenomenal pre-existence.⁵⁹ The *objectual correlates* of this second intentional direction are those phenomena which have been variously called 'fringes', 'transitive parts' (James), 'comet tails' (Husserl himself), 'before / after' relations, *Bewußtseinslage* (Marbe), 'implicit apprehension' (Stout).

The two directions of intentionality envisaged by Husserl therefore account for the phenomenic or perceptive continuum: that of continuous change (of the so called flow of consciousness) and that of succession of discrete perceptions, that is of perceived objects (sounds, colours, movements, events in general).

6. EXPRESSION AND MEANING

The nature of the phenomenological fact, analysed from a genetic point of view is to be found in Husserl's lectures on the inner time and in his lectures on the passive synthesis. The process of the passive genesis of experience concerns the perceptive aspects connected to the *association of sensible materials*, such as patches of colours, sequences of sounds, etc., which follows Gestalt laws.

The nature of the phenomenological fact was a theme also analysed throughout the *Logische Untersuchungen*.⁶⁰ Here, however, Husserl examined the phenomenological fact from the point of view of its meaning, in particular the relation between logical and grammatical form.

In his Introduction to *Logische Untersuchungen* Husserl criticised Brentano for being excessively radical in reducing logical forms to grammatical forms, and he stressed that, precisely because of the importance of the *grammatical*

⁵⁹See Michotte 1962, 367.

⁶⁰ The first volume, *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik*, was published in 1900; the second, *Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorien der Erkenntnis*, in 1901. In 1913 the second revised edition of *Prolegomena* was published, and Logical investigations I-V were issued. Logical investigation I was reissued in 1921, in the old version.

analysis of meanings, one should never think of this analysis as being entirely complete. Meanings, in fact, even before their expression and grammatical categorization, must be given *conceptual* specification. Since in Husserl, as we have seen, both the genetic and the descriptive aspects of the facts under scrutiny are always present, meaning certainly cannot be immediately identified with 'linguistic meaning'.

The analysis of meaning, in fact, comprises both a linguistic aspect (theory of language as speech acts theory and the theory of semantic reference) as well as a cognitive aspect involving the doctrine of intentionality: here meaning is an ideal correlate of the acts of consciousness⁶¹.

A major role in Husserl's development of Brentano's theory of meaning was played by Twardowski's distinction between act, object and content of presentations.

Twardowski joined the Brentanian circle of Vienna in 1885. In 1894 Husserl wrote an article on the nature of presentation and intentional objects which, he said, set out to rebut Twardowski's arguments.⁶²

Husserl criticised Twardowski for failing to distinguish between the mental presentation (*Bild*), which belongs to content and has psychological origins, and ideal meaning (*Bedeutung*).

As Husserl explained in detail in his 1st Logical Investigation, although content may change in relation to the different presentations of the object, meaning remains unaltered: meaning is not a constitutive part of the act; it is not psychological in nature, but logical. Moreover, the mental picture is merely a special instance of intentional consciousness connected with the imagination. In literature and in science, in fact, we do not have presentations through images. What is important, according to Husserl, is the individual capacity to refer to the object on the basis of a mental image.

Husserl's 1st Logical Investigation explored the nature of meaning from the point of view of the modalities of the acts of consciousness. In other words, it analysed the constituent parts of the *act of signifying*. Husserl wrote that "all objects and references to the object are what they are for us solely by virtue of the acts of intentioning, which are essentially different from them and in which they are made present to us and confront us as intentioned units".⁶³ Intentioned units, as we have seen, are the phenomenological contents formed within inner time.

⁶¹ Cf. Küng 1972, 20.

⁶² See Husserl's letter to Meinong of 5 April 1902, in Kindiger 1965, 107. This was the manuscript "Intentionale Gegenstände" of 1894: Husserl 1980, 303-48. On this see Schuhmann 1993. Marty had already analysed modifying adjectives: see Marty 1911, Twardowski 1894 and the relative entries in this volume.

⁶³ Husserl 1900-1, 1st Logical investigation, § 10.

Considering the nature of the act that confers meaning as a whole — regardless of its physical or phonetic features — Husserl distinguishes between *signifying intentions* and *filling intentions*. An intentional act, in fact, may be empty, in the sense that it cannot be made to refer to an object: its object, for example, may also be an illusory or contradictory entity like a ‘round square’.

Signifying intentions (acts which confer sense) are psychic acts endowed with intentional direction. Filling intentions (acts which fill intentions with meaning) are the acts that strengthen, confirm and complete the intentional direction towards an object: they are therefore acts *correlative* to signifying intentions and provide them with a *general object* because they are able to refer to both an empirical and an abstract object. As we saw in *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, in fact, by ‘general object’ Husserl meant the formal connection among the contents of the aggregate of an act of unification.

Husserl stated that “the filling act is the act expressed by the complete expression; when we say, for example, that an utterance gives expression to a perception or to an imagining”.⁶⁴

Examples of signifying intentions are also ‘ π ’, ‘regular icosahedron’,⁶⁵ and, generally speaking, the kind of presentations which merely intend their objects. This means that such presentations are merely *representatives*. The main distinction, then, is between intentions (perceptions) and mental presentations: a difference which consists in a difference of *internal quality of the act* or of the structure.⁶⁶

Consider the case of perception. As Husserl had observed in his lectures on inner time, the phases of perception manifest themselves as empty intentions, as anticipations which still need to be filled. The perceptive phases, as signifying intentions, are filled when a *synthesis of identification* takes place which unites them at the level of meaning. Depending on how this synthesis comes about, we have different forms of experience: for example, an object may turn out to be different from what we expected, it may be illusory, or it may be exactly as the first phases of perception anticipated it to us. Whatever the outcome of the perceptive process, and however it is modified by the satisfaction or disappointment of our initial expectations, the objectual referent must remain the same, because it is the condition for any perception whatsoever to be possible.

⁶⁴ Husserl 1900-1, 1st Logical investigation, § 9.

⁶⁵ Husserl 1900-1, 5th Logical investigation, § 6.

⁶⁶ On this topic cf. Musatti 1964.

7. HUSSERL'S DESCRIPTION OF MEANING

We have seen that, for Husserl, the act of signifying involves at least two elements: an act towards something and some sort of *object* which is addressed.

In direction towards an object, Husserl wrote, we must keep distinct the *object*, in the mode in which it is given, and the *content*, the mode in which the object is presented to the consciousness. Although Husserl's argument here has often been accused of idealism, he was not in fact questioning the reality of the empirical world.⁶⁷ He was simply propounding a more sophisticated version of the Aristotelian theory which distinguished various levels and various components in the individual processes of consciousness, beginning with the initial moments of the perceptive process.

In *Erfahrung und Urteil*, Husserl described two distinct modes whereby the images of objects of perception are formed. The ontic image (configuration) is the way in which the features of the object are presented to us in affection, according to its prototypicity: the object is, for example, near, distant, of a certain shape, of a certain colour, and most of all it is apprehended as a certain kind of object which is familiar to us: as a house, for instance.

The mental image (content), on the contrary, is that aspect of object which relates to the *way* in which we mentally present it to ourselves. Acts which confer sense, therefore, and acts which fill intentions create a dual pattern of meaning whereby, in perception, the object which is simultaneously intended and 'given' does not confront us as a duality, but as a single object.⁶⁸

Husserl therefore gave at least three interpretations to the term 'content' which should be kept distinct. Content is: (i) correlate of intentioning, (ii) correlate of filling and (iii) meaning, which results from the first two senses. Brentano's theory of the intentional act, of the (synsemantic) object and of the content therefore found very different development in Husserl.⁶⁹

Husserl argued that the phonetic or graphic characters that constitute linguistic units are not indicators of meaning, but *expressions* of it. Signifying does not simply involve being the sign of something.⁷⁰ Indeed, if it is true that every sign is a sign of something, not all signs are meaningful; that is to say,

⁶⁷ Husserl 1950-2, I, sect. 2, § 55.

⁶⁸ Husserl 1939, § 24; but see also Husserl 1900-1, 6th Logical investigation and Husserl 1950-2, I, sect. IV, §§ 128-35.

⁶⁹ Husserl 1900-1, 5th Logical investigation, § 45. This passage sets out his criticisms of Twardowski's theory of the dual direction of intentionality towards objects and through the content. Only recently have the phenomenological analyses of Thom and Petitot provided mathematical tools for explanation of specific aspects of the categorial structure of intentional acts.

⁷⁰ If by sign we mean indication.

not every sign expresses a specific sense. Within the phenomenon of indicating, therefore, we must distinguish between *signal* and *expression*.

A signal is a purely indicative sign; it stands for something more, it indicates something other than itself. An expressive sign or expression presents two aspects: a physical one, which can be represented both by a mark on a piece of paper and by a phonetic whole; and a psychic aspect which is constituted by the set of cognitive contents ('lived experiences') connected with it. We may thus say that linguistic signs also have an indicative *function*.

According to Husserl, a linguistic expression, in fact, has three functions: (i) it informs about a mental content of the speaker; (ii) it expresses a meaning, which may also be 'private'; and (iii) it refers to an object. These distinctions are essential because the distinction between intending and expressing rescues Husserl from psychologism, and the distinction between meaning and object prevents him from collapsing the one into the other.⁷¹

The fact that signifying expressions can also operate independently of real discourse makes it clear that their function is not just a communicative one, or not predominantly so, as Marty and Brentano maintained in their linguistic theory. In this sense, although Husserl's theory of language had close links with the linguistic theory of the school of Brentano, the basic difference between them is that Husserl attributed the status of ontological object also to ideal objects.⁷²

8. ADEQUACY, EVIDENCE, TRUTH

In the 6th Logical Investigation Husserl described the ('dynamic') unity of expression and of expressed intuition. He stated that we are aware of a completion of meaning when an object remains unaltered in the passage from a signifying act to a filling act — that is, when the signifying act, in referring to something, is filled in the act of the corresponding intuition, which offers the corresponding object to it in *ongoing* perception.⁷³

Again in the 6th Logical Investigation, and in explicit criticism of Brentano, Husserl declared that it is impossible to maintain the distinction between external and internal perception, and also asserted that the pairings internal / external perception and adequate/inadequate perception can never coincide.

⁷¹ On the theory of meaning in Husserl see Mohanty 1982 and Münch 1993.

⁷² Husserl 1900-01, ch. 1-2. Cf. also Kraus, Introduction to Brentano 1911. Cf. Brentano 1971.

⁷³ Husserl 1900-01, Sixth Investigation, § 8.

According to Husserl, in fact, the adequacy or inadequacy of a perception do not depend on whether this is an external or internal perception, but on the relation between content and object. We have an inadequate perception when content and object are divided, in the sense that intention cannot be filled by any of the present contents: in this case we have merely a signifying intention which cannot achieve saturation. We have an adequate perception, by contrast, when a signifying intention is directed towards a content which is present in such a way that its given sense content coincides with the object of perception. This Husserl called the 'true object'.

Husserl identified two types of adequacy deriving from the filling of signifying acts. The first type, which he called 'natural' adequacy, concerned the intuition, for instance in the description of an event.

The second kind of adequacy is *founded* in natural adequacy and applies to the *process of abstraction* from sense data: when, for example, we first state that 'all A's are B's' and then describe the representation of the subject of this judgment; or, in general, when we describe the features of a perceptive object which are not directly perceivable (for instance the 'number of oscillations' in a sound we can hear). This second kind of adequacy, Husserl maintained, was amply and rigorously evident.

Evidence, therefore, is *not a property of an act*, as for Brentano, but an *objectifying act* in itself, whose correlate is truth or 'being as true'. More specifically, truth concerns acts, and 'being as true' concerns their correlates. Truth and falsity, therefore, apply to more than just judgements and their correlated states of affairs.⁷⁴

Indeed, as far as acts are concerned, truth is either (i) the adequacy of the intention towards the true object or (ii) an ideal relation among the cognitive essences of coincident acts. As regards *correlates*, however, truth is either (i) an object given in the modality of the intentional object, or (ii) a state of affairs and the identity between what is given and what is meant.⁷⁵

9. NOESIS AND NOEMA

Husserl wrote in the first book of *Ideen* that, since the work was an inquiry into *descriptive phenomenology*, it did not depart radically from the phenomenology of *Logische Untersuchungen*. In 1913, however, he declared that "it was im-

⁷⁴ Husserl 1900-01, § 39.

⁷⁵ Husserl 1900-01, § 39. On the concept of truth see in this volume the entry 'Truth theories'.

possible to raise his previous work to the level of *Ideen*".⁷⁶ In any case, ever since his first edition of *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserl had called his phenomenology a descriptive psychology.⁷⁷ What, then, was the relationship between his descriptive psychology, his phenomenology and his transcendentalism? Husserl probably provided the answer himself when he stated that we must distinguish two levels of phenomenology: that of phenomenological psychology and that of transcendental phenomenology.⁷⁸

At both the levels, however, he conducted a phenomenological inquiry, which took for its subject-matter the categorial structure of the acts of presentations.⁷⁹ In particular, *Ideen* explored presentation within a phenomenologically restricted framework.

The first book of *Ideen* conducts further descriptive analysis of the theory of meaning from the point of view of the acts: of signifying and filling intentions. A particular state of affairs, in fact, is now considered not in its genesis, but in its categorial structure, once it has been phenomenologically reduced — for Husserl a process which coincided with the description of the pure phenomenon of consciousness.

Husserl stated that corresponding to each act of consciousness (*noesis*) there is its correlate (*noema*).⁸⁰ He has, however, three different conceptions of noema, and they should be kept distinct: (i) the noema as *temporal correlate* contemporaneous with the act as noetic phenomena; (ii) the noema as ideal identical sense, i.e. as meaning (*Bedeutung*); (iii) the noema as constituted unitary object of the act.⁸¹

As to the structure of noema, it is structured along two dimensions: it has a *noematic sense* and a *noematic nucleus*. Noematic sense is 'that which is perceived as such': for example, 'that tree in blossom there in the garden',⁸² regardless of whether the tree actually exists or not in the real world. Noematic sense, then, is also the case of perceptive illusions. The noematic nucleus, then,

⁷⁶ Husserl 1950-2, preface, X.

⁷⁷ Rather than representing a radical change of direction, *Ideen* was the realization of Husserl's long-standing project to write a 'critique of pure reason': Biemel 1959, 209. See also Husserl 1984, II, §§ 35-36.

⁷⁸ Husserl's transcendental turn also comprises a shift from the level of transcendental phenomenology to that of constitutive phenomenology. Husserl B I II/128a. On this see Schuhmann 1971, 4-5.

⁷⁹ The first book of *Ideen* appeared in the first issue of the journal *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*. The two other books were published posthumously.

⁸⁰ On the development of the concept of noema in analytical philosophy, see Küng 1972, 15-26 and Follesdal 1969, 680-7.

⁸¹ Cf. Bernet 1990, 71.

⁸² In Husserl's words, it is "the correlate which belongs to the essence of phenomenologically reduced perception", Husserl 1950-2, I, 91. On this see Harney & Mohanty 1984.

comprises the ways in which ‘the perceived as such is given as the identical pole of reference for the various intentional acts’.

In the noema, therefore, there are always features which belong to two different intentional directions. Noematic sense is given by the different ways in which the consciousness is intentionally directed towards something, and corresponds to the objectivization of signifying intention. The noematic nucleus concerns the identity of reference, and corresponds to the objectivization of filling intention.⁸³

In sum, the phenomenological object — analysed in its essential features — is an ontological correlate of objectified phenomenal data — that is, of contents of perception which are constituted by the functions of dual intentionality, one of which modifies content, the other of which maintains identical reference within the variations of (inner) temporal characters.

Husserl developed this theory at different levels of inquiry, as we have seen: on a genetic level in the lectures on internal time and in those on the passive genesis of experience, and on a descriptive level in *Ideen*. His hypothesis, which at bottom suggests a kind of categorial morphism of the structures of multi-layered reality, connected by the ontological relation of foundation, has not yet been wholly demonstrated experimentally.⁸⁴

To date, as to the formal structure of the acts, the best results have been obtained by Benussi’s empirical analysis of the time of consciousness,⁸⁵ by Gestalt psychology with its hypothesis of dynamic isomorphism, and also by Bonaventura and Calabresi’s empirical researches on the nature and duration of the psychic present, already mentioned.⁸⁶ As to the ‘material’ structure, so to speak, in contemporary research some elements of naive physics, or the phenophysics of Jean Petitot, seem to move in the same direction.

10. FROM DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

In summing up the relationship between Husserl’s and Brentano’s theories, I shall restrict myself to two aspects: what orthodox Brentanians thought, and what Husserl himself wrote on the subject.

After its revision by Brentano himself, *Psychologie I* was edited and republished in 1924 by Kraus, who added a long introduction and a series of

⁸³ See Albertazzi 1989c.

⁸⁴ Cf. Albertazzi 1993a.

⁸⁵ Benussi 1913. While Brentano was in Florence, experiments measuring the psychic present were conducted in De Sarlo’s laboratory. See Bonaventura 1961 and Calabresi 1930.

⁸⁶ Katz 1948, Petitot 1990 and Albertazzi 1991a, 1993b, 1993c, 1993d.

explanatory notes. These are of particular interest because they clarify, or rather stress, the differences between Brentano's theory and that of his disciples — in particular Meinong's theory of objects and Husserl's phenomenology. We therefore have a first-hand account of what the orthodox Brentanians thought of Husserl's defection from their ranks.

Kraus begins his Introduction by drawing a clear and emphatic distinction between descriptive psychology,⁸⁷ genetic psychology (which he intended *à la* Wundt) and their respective methods. He affirms that genetic psychology uses the inductive-empirical method proper to the natural sciences, whereas descriptive psychology employs an empirical-apperceptive method: empirical because it is based on internal experience, apperceptive because it is intuitive. The descriptive method is superior to the genetic method because it enables us to know general truths 'at a stroke and without induction', thereby ensuring the a priori and apodeictic character of psychognostic laws. However, as we have seen, the genetic method of Husserl's phenomenology — being an enquiry into the categorial structure of presentations — was not as Kraus conceived it. In any case, for Husserl one of the main differences between genetic and descriptive method was the omission or otherwise of psychic time when the constitution of objects, contents and meanings is considered.

Kraus goes on to make a second important theoretical point by examining the use of the term 'object'. In Brentano, he writes, we may distinguish an auto-semantic use of the term whereby 'object' is synonymous with 'thing' or 'entity' and is obtained by abstraction from these entities; and a synsemantic use of it as in the expression 'having something as object', which refers to the intentional relation. According to Kraus, certain initial ambiguities in Brentano's theory of the object induced Husserl and Meinong to overlook the synsemantic function of the term 'object'. The fundamental difference between Brentano and his followers therefore derives from the fact that Brentano did not grant any 'mode of being' (*Seinsweise*) to 'ideal objects' (*ideale Gegenstände*) or non-things (*Undinge*) whereas these were entities that proliferated in his followers' theories.

These criticisms are to be treated with a certain amount of caution. On the one hand, they are based on the carefully formulated conceptual change to his theory that Brentano began to develop in the appendix to *Psychologie II*; on the other, the theoretical question to which Kraus refers is much more complex than his treatment would have it appear.

⁸⁷ Note that Brentano used the word *deskriptiv* for 'descriptive', and not *beschreibend* as Wundt and Dilthey did. Note also that the term does not appear in *Psychologie I*, but only subsequently in a series of lectures delivered in 1887-8. Brentano later adopted the term *Psychognosie*. See Brentano 1982, IX.

The question of ideal objects is systematically explored by Husserl in *Ideen*, and we should not forget that the point of departure of his analysis was transcendental reduction, which performed the specific task of bracketing the entire precategory realm of perception — an area which, in Husserl, was subjected to analysis of a predominantly genetic kind.

Consequently Kraus's criticisms of Husserl require revision: for Husserl, too, the task of a pure or descriptive psychology was the morphological listing of the elements and structures of consciousness. However, Husserl maintained that this kind of analysis was only possible in the case of a phenomenologically reduced consciousness, a conclusion he drew from his analysis of the acts of the stream of consciousness and its objects.⁸⁸ A continuously modified content is a part of a continuous change which is impossible to analyse as an object. By bracketing the longitudinal aspect of consciousness, so to speak, we are able to consider contents as discrete, since they are the correlate of the single acts of (actual) presentations.

A third point of divergence between Husserl's phenomenology and Brentano's psychology, according to Kraus, was their different treatments of external perception and the nature of sensory qualities. For Brentano, external 'perception' coincides with sensation, because we can only speak of 'perception' in the strict sense with respect to inner (evident) perception. Hence, Brentano argued, and here he revealed the influence of Locke, we perceive the qualities (colours, smells, sounds and so on) we attribute to external things, but we have no proof that they are actually part of them.

Husserl's conception was different at this point. As Kraus also notes, he considered sensory qualities to be the real constituents of perception. In Husserl's view, for example, both the transcendental 'grey-coloured physical object' — a grey book, for instance — which is present in sense perception,⁸⁹ and the qualities of this perception⁹⁰ which constitute its elements, or better its components (*Bestandteile*), exist.

Moreover, within perception Husserl isolated the contents of consciousness relative to the different aspects of the presentation of the transcendent object: the contents of consciousness therefore, as we have seen, correspond to the

⁸⁸ According to Husserl, determination of the elements of consciousness and their connection, which was the aim of descriptive psychology, is only possible if we consider the structures of inner perception, independently of its real presence. On this see Willard 1991a.

⁸⁹ Albertazzi 1992.

⁹⁰ As regards qualities, for Husserl these are the real constituents of perception because they belong to the physiological sensorial apparatus that constitutes perception. However, we must distinguish between primary and secondary qualities relating to the different levels of passivity and receptivity that form experience. On these themes see Husserl 1966b.

different sensory qualities of perception, deprived of their genetic dependence on their relative acts of presentation.

Kraus's criticisms of Husserl are summed up by the fact that his explanation of perception relied on a complex and excessive array of conceptual tools which included both presentations and synthetic concepts — and this was contrary to the descriptive rules of Brentano's psychognosis. At issue, once again, are the Kantian features of Husserl's phenomenology.⁹¹

As we have seen, it was Husserl himself who settled the issue in his note to *Ideen*.⁹² Here he stated very clearly that although the aim of phenomenology was to be descriptive, this could only be made possible by altering one's normal attitude, i.e. by adopting the particular method of 'phenomenological reduction'.⁹³

The problem of reduction (in its various aspects, eidetic, phenomenological and transcendental⁹⁴) therefore constituted the main key to phenomenology.

By bracketing the natural realm in which phenomena are given to the mind, Husserl intended to uncover the pure phenomena of global consciousness. Being as consciousness precedes any possible foundation — i. e. analysis of the laws of dependence — of the objects of the empirical world. And from this point of view Husserl's 'transcendental shift' was perfectly justified because it was not a deviation, but a careful and radicalized version of descriptive psychology. There was, Husserl noted, a "curious and persistent parallism" between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, because to every structural (eidetic) consideration there must correspond an empirical one. Phenomenological idealism, in fact, did not deny the existence of the world, but rather sought to clarify its meaning and legitimacy.

⁹¹ The role played by synthetic concepts in contemporary research is now stressed by cognitivists like Talmy and Lakoff and psychologists like Rosch. Cf. Talmy 1983; Lakoff 1987; Rosch et al. 1976, 382-439 and Rosch & Mervis 1975, 573-605.

⁹² The gloss was first published in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, 11 (1930). It was used as the Preface to the English edition of *Ideen* published in 1931, translated by W.R. Gibson.

⁹³ Husserl 1930, § 1.

⁹⁴ Transcendental reduction involves the constitutive acts of consciousness. Eidetic reduction involves, in definitional terms, the 'vision of essences', or more simply 'description', the objectivization of the operative moments of the functioning of consciousness: that is, the individuation of a structural logical moment, as in the case of figural qualities. In *Logische Untersuchungen* it corresponds to categorial intuition or the 'transcendental pole of identification'. See Husserl 1900-1, 2nd Investigation, § 2 and Husserl 1939, § 87. The basic difference between individual and eidetic intuition is that in the former an individual is given, in the latter a universal. Eidetic and transcendental reductions cannot be separated, and they correspond to the two different aspects of phenomenological reduction — the aspect of activity (noesis) and the aspect of objectivation (noema). On these topics see Melandri 1960, ch. 2.

As regards Brentano, Husserl declared that *his* was a phenomenological psychology, if by phenomenological was meant a kind of psychology which restricts itself to the pure description of inner experience in the manner of Locke, Hume and Mill. But precisely for this reason Brentano's psychognosis, according to Husserl, was still a naturalistic psychology — like atomistic psychology or indeed Gestalt psychology, which Husserl explicitly cited.

Husserl's phenomenology operated on another level. He wrote: "It is not enough to affirm that every consciousness is 'consciousness-of', and then specify, as regards type, the various modes of consciousness, as in Brentano's classification (with which I cannot agree), the classes of 'presentations', of 'judgments', of 'phenomena of love and hate'; we must instead examine the different categories of objects, purely as objects of a possible knowledge, and identify the forms of essence, which we must connect synthetically, of the possible 'multiplicities' by means of which the consciousness of the identity of any individual object of the category in question achieves a describable synthesis".⁹⁵

The ideal is still the Kantian one of a philosophy which can be formulated as a science, above all as a *rigorous science*, one which rests "on an ultimate foundation or, which is the same thing, on an ultimate responsibility and guarantee of itself, a science therefore in which no predicative or ante-predicative obviousness is an unexplored cognitive field".⁹⁶

This rigorous science is *a priori* in the sense that it examines the categorical structure of transcendental subjectivity — of pure reason, Kant would say — and its objects, and provides the basis for a phenomenological philosophy of which it clarifies the essential strata and the methods required to gain access to them.⁹⁷

11. BRENTANO-HUSSERL: A RELATIONSHIP

In conclusion, some idea of the personal and intellectual relationship between Brentano and Husserl can be obtained from their correspondence, of which around forty letters written between 1866 and 1916 survive.⁹⁸

From these surviving letters one deduces that many others have been lost: for example, Husserl's dedication to Brentano of his *Philosophie der Arithmetik* went unanswered for fourteen years. The sole testimony of this

⁹⁵ Husserl 1930, § 6 and Husserl 1911.

⁹⁶ Husserl 1930, § 1. See Schuhmann 1990.

⁹⁷ Husserl 1930, 7.

⁹⁸ Cf. Spiegelberg 1978, 95-116.

episode is a note of thanks by Brentano, which is in any case incomplete, dating back to 1891: it was probably never posted.

From his Viennese semesters (1884-1886) onwards, as we have seen, Husserl had close contact with Brentano on three occasions: when he was invited by Brentano to St. Gilgen, to Schönbühl, and to Florence. From the overall tone of the letters one realizes that Husserl held Brentano in some sort of veneration, and was grateful to Brentano for his formative influence on his philosophy. This, however, did not prevent him from insisting on pursuing his own philosophical path independently of his master.

Brentano, for his part, always respected Husserl's capacities, but also criticised him for alleged 'expressive vagueness', not to mention his annoyance at his pupil's over-frequent preoccupation with academic matters. In short, as he wrote to Stumpf in a letter of introduction for his pupil, Husserl was, and would substantially remain so for Brentano, a highly gifted mathematician.

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

on:

see also:

| | |
|------------------------|--------------------------|
| continuum | 1.18 |
| content / meaning | 2.4, 7.4, 7.9, 8.3, 12.5 |
| descriptive psychology | 1.4, 1.7, 2.2, 3.3 |
| intentionality | 1.17, 4.3, 9, 16.11 |
| language | 2.3, 2.9-10 |
| time | 1.19, 8.4, 10.6-7 |
| truth | 12.8, 13 |

KAZIMIERZ TWARDOWSKI (1866-1938)

1. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Kazimierz Twardowski was born in Vienna,¹ where from 1885 to 1889 he studied under Brentano and met the Brentanians of the period.² In 1891 he submitted his thesis *Idee und Perception. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung aus Descartes*, but since Brentano was only a *Privatdozent*, discussed it with Robert Zimmermann, one of Bolzano's pupils. After graduating he went to Leipzig for a short period to join Wundt's circle of students, and then moved to Munich to study under Stumpf. In 1894 he returned Vienna, where he wrote his major work, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen*. The following year he moved to Lvov, where he taught until 1930. In 1898 he published *Wyobrażenia i pojęcia* [Images and concepts] as both an extension and a simplified version of his theory. A modified German version of the book came out in 1902 bearing the title *Über begriffliche Vorstellungen* and a further Polish version *O istoicie pojęć* [On the nature of concepts] in 1923.

Twardowski inherited from Brentano a number of Aristotelian influences, notably his realism and the correspondence theory of truth. Indeed, the realistic conception of truth would become one of the salient features of the Polish analytical tradition. In his essay "Über sogenannte relative Wahrheiten", Twardowski criticised those who failed to distinguish between unconditionally true (or false) statements and statements that are only relatively so. He accused those who committed this error of having confused idiomatic expressions with

¹ On Twardowski, see Czezowski 1939-40 and 1960; Ingarden 1939-49; Pazkowska 1976; Pazkowska-Łagowska 1977; Grossmann 1977; Dąmbaska 1978; Buczyńska-Garewicz 1980; Haller 1982; Modenato 1984; Besoli 1988; Smith 1989, Jadacki 1992, Albertazzi 1992, Schuhmann 1993.

² For further information, see Smith 1989.

scientific expressions. The distinction between a relative truth and a non-relative truth applies only to idiomatic expressions, which are true only in a metaphorical, indirect sense; by contrast, as regards judgments as such, it is not possible to speak of relative or non-relative truths, for a judgment is either true, and therefore always and everywhere true, or it is false, and therefore always and everywhere false.³ Of Twardowski's relatively few published works, also worth mentioning is his "O czynnościach i wytworach" [Actions and products] of 1911.⁴

Twardowski's arrival in Lvov in 1895 was an event that had profound repercussions on the development of Polish philosophy, as well as a significant effect on the whole of Polish culture. His philosophical style, his constant insistence on clarity of exposition, the rigour of his arguments, his considerable organizational skills, and his innovative theories were all factors which generated a new intellectual climate and gathered around him a wide circle of colleagues and disciples, many of whom rose to positions of national and international eminence. Suffice it here to mention Łukasiewicz, Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński, Leśniewski and Tatarkiewicz from the first generation, and Tarski, Lindenbaum, Mostowski, Ossowski and Sobociński from the one that followed.⁵ The fact that thirty of his pupils became professors at Polish universities gives a purely quantitative idea of Twardowski's influence as a teacher. He reorganized the teaching of philosophy in the universities, giving it a structure which remained unchanged until after the Second World War; he founded in 1897 the Polish Philosophical Seminar, in 1901 the Polish Society of Experimental Psychology, and in 1904 the Polish Philosophical Society; he promoted the review *Przegląd filozoficzny*, and in 1911 founded *Ruch filozoficzny*, a bio-bibliographical journal informing Polish scholars of international developments in philosophy.⁶

2. TWARDOWSKI'S PHILOSOPHICAL STYLE

In an important essay of 1919, "On clear and obscure styles of philosophical writings", Twardowski declared: "the obscurity in the style in which some philosophers write is not an inevitable consequence of the factors inherent in

³ Twardowski 1965, 335. This anticipates Quine's distinction between eternal and permanent sentences.

⁴ Some extracts from the *Nachlaß* have been published in Pelc 1979.

⁵ Woleński 1989 has listed 81 scholars as members of the school founded by Twardowski.

⁶ *Ruch filozoficzny* is still being published, with many of its original features, by the University of Toruń as the quarterly review of Polish Philosophical Society.

subject matter of their analyses, but has its source in the vagueness and obscurity of the way they think... An author who does not know how to express his thoughts clearly does not know how to think clearly either, and therefore his thoughts do not deserve our efforts to guess them".⁷ This position would characterize the whole of Twardowski's work and strongly influence the philosophical movement that he founded. It explains the intense attention that both Twardowski and his followers devoted to the problem of language and to the clarification and specification of its constituents. It also explains their constant interest in the analysis of philosophical expressions; an interest that qualifies Twardowski as one of the pioneers of semiotics in Poland, a thinker whose teaching was brought to full fruition by his followers.⁸

On the subject of Twardowski's philosophical style, it could be noted that Twardowski assimilated from Brentano not so much his individual theoretical positions as his basic rigour of approach, his mistrust of pompous language, his ceaseless endeavour to eliminate the obscurity and vagueness from his ideas, and his search for rigorous philosophical knowledge (which was probably Twardowski's principal legacy, although one not always easily to identify and therefore one often underrated). These in turn became the dominant characteristics of the Polish School, which displayed an essential unity and homogeneity, not because its members' positions and interests happened to coincide (on the contrary, they were greatly diversified) but because the school developed what Scholz has aptly called "a new philosophical style".⁹

3. METAPHYSICS AND SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY

As said, Twardowski inherited from Brentano a deep suspicion of philosophical *systems*. In Twardowski's view, philosophical activity was first and foremost the specific and detailed analysis of particular problems, and in this it was no different from science. Metaphysical inquiry too, he maintained, should be conducted on this basis: the problems of metaphysics were to be resolved scientifically; that is, with clarity, without internal contradictions, and in accordance with the procedures of science.¹⁰ As long as these criteria were respected, everyone was free to construct their own metaphysical theory. Indeed, Twardowski claimed, metaphysical ideas — even though they do not express objective knowledge — play a positive role in the development of science

⁷ Pelc 1979, 1-2.

⁸ See for instance Pelc 1979.

⁹ Casari 1979, 30.

¹⁰ Zamecki 1977.

because individual sciences often borrow ideas, concepts and theories from metaphysical systems, and metaphysical systems in their turn borrow back from those sciences ideas, concepts and theories in a non-scientific state.¹¹ Zamecki has written that the general tone of Twardowski's observations shows that, although he may have criticized philosophical conceptions of the world and life because they are still at the non-scientific or pre-scientific stage of human knowledge, he nevertheless envisaged their development into sciences in the future. For Twardowski this development was a never-ending process in which science and philosophy coexist as partners which draw upon each other's resources. Hence particular attention should be paid to those philosophical conceptions of life and the world that can be corrected and brought closer to science.¹²

4. CONTENT AND OBJECT

As regards Twardowski's contributions to philosophical theory, Ingarden stressed that the attribution to himself of the original distinction between the act, content and object of presentation¹³ was not only historically inaccurate¹⁴ but neglected the fact that Twardowski's work contained the first systematic theory of object since scholasticism and Carl Wolff's ontology.¹⁵ And this was well before the work of Meinong and Husserl, who made careful study of Twardowski's theory. Furthermore, one should remember that the complications, if not the ambiguities, of Twardowski's ideas served as the point of reference and the inspiration for the later theories developed by Leśniewski and Kotarbiński; theories, one may argue, which were also an attempt to resolve Twardowski's difficulties.

Twardowski's starting point was Brentanian: he first considered the distinction of psychic phenomena into the three major classes of presentations,

¹¹ Twardowski 1965, 383.

¹² Zamecki 1977, 50. I owe this observation to Franco Coniglione.

¹³ I use the term 'presentation' instead of the more usual 'representation'. The use of the latter as the translation for 'Vorstellung' and '*rapraesentatio*' implies the presence of a certain degree of symbolization. In this sense it is Kantian. My intention, Brentanian in origin, is to be absolutely neutral and to suggest only pure presence to the mind. See Albertazzi 1989, 56 and Smith 1989, note 29.

¹⁴ In fact the distinction was originally proposed by Zimmermann and by Kerry. By the latter see Kerry 1885-1891. According to Ingarden, Twardowski generalized and improved Kerry's theory.

¹⁵ Ingarden 1939-40, 23. For a preliminary comparison between Twardowski and Wolff see Poli 1992.

judgments and feelings — where presentations have an object, judgments assert or deny the object's existence, and feelings approve or disapprove of it. Twardowski then constructed the crucial analogy (and here he also drew on the work of Marty) between natural phenomena and the linguistic expressions that designate them. In the specific case of the psychic phenomenon of presentation (the only one examined by Twardowski in his book of 1894), this analogy concerns the name. This is a 'categorematic term', by which Twardowski meant that it is a linguistic designating device which, as the expression of a presentation, also conveys a content. These clarifications, however, are not particularly illuminating, since they only (or at least to a large extent) reiterate Brentano's initial thesis.

The analogy between name and presentation entails that a name must have three parts, or that it performs three functions structurally akin to the three functions of presentation. Analysis of the tasks of a name, in fact, shows that: (i) it communicates to the listener the existence of a mental act within the speaker; (ii) it communicates the content of a presentation, (iii) it designates an object. Linguistic analysis therefore provides the instruments with which to analyse and understand the characteristics and properties of mental acts.¹⁶

An ambiguity arises here, however. There is something existent in presentation, but it is not clear what this something is, for presentation can involve both the content and the object of presentation; indeed Brentano used the two concepts interchangeably.¹⁷ This raises an important question: Are the object and the content of presentation really different, or are they are simply two names for the same 'something' in the presentation?

Twardowski answers the question by asserting the non-identity of the object and content of presentation and by drawing a distinction between the content's mode of being present and the object's mode of being present.

Twardowski's theory of the three constituents of presentation asserts that whatever can be presented is presented as an object, regardless of whether this object exists or does not exist, whether it is possible or impossible or even contradictory. Hence, the limit of the presentation is set by the limit of being an object. In Twardowski's theory, therefore, the object is the simple 'something' that can be presented and whose modes (existence, possibility) are extraneous to its correlation with the presentation. Thus the object, as a correlate to the presentation, is always real, but this does not entail that it is also existent or possible. It is precisely for this reason that Twardowski's theory of the object is a *daseinsfreie Wissenschaft*. In other words, his theory of object is a theory of

¹⁶ For a proposal to extend the list to four functions by including Bühler's *Auslösung*, see Poli 1989.

¹⁷ Brentano 1973, 202.

Sosein, according to the distinction later introduced by Mally and then developed by Meinong.¹⁸

5. DETERMINATION AND MODIFICATION

In order to differentiate object from content, Twardowski resorted to the Brentanian classification of adjectives into determining and modifying. Every expression that amplifies, narrows or articulates the meaning of a term is determining. For example, 'high', 'good', 'lazy' can all be determinations of 'man'. A modifying adjective, on the other hand, is an attribute which transforms the meaning of an expression. Hence a false friend is not a friend and a false diamond is not a diamond. When we describe what a painter does, for instance, we can say that he paints either pictures or landscapes, and we can call the object he produces a painted picture or a painted landscape. However, the adjective 'painted' has a different function in each expression. It is determining in the first case because a painted picture is still a true picture, a real picture. It is modifying in the second case, because a painted landscape is not a real landscape, but only a painted picture. Therefore the picture represents a real landscape which does not cease to be such because it has been painted.

The verb 'to present' has the same semantic structure as the verb 'to paint' and, in this sense, two 'things' correspond to it: a presented object and a presented content, where 'presented' has determining value for 'content' and modifying value for 'object'.

With appropriate changes, we may apply the theory of modification to the features of the 'something' present in a presentation, so that 'presented' has a determining function for the content and modifying function for the object. Therefore the object in a presentation is not a real object, only a presented one. A presented content is determined by the adjective 'presented' just as a painted picture is determined by the adjective 'painted'. This amounts to saying that these are two cases of internal, nuclear qualification, in the specific sense that a picture is not a picture if it is not painted and a content is not a content if it is not presented. In other words, being painted and being presented are constitutive of the entity 'picture' and of the entity 'content', respectively.

We had also seen, however, that the modifying expression may be used in a determining sense to show the presence of a certain relation between that particular object and that particular content. We can therefore state that the content is present *within* a presentation, while the object is present *through* the content.

¹⁸ Poli 1990.

Of the various elements of the foregoing analysis — which was certainly known to both Leśniewski and Kotarbiński — what particularly interests us here is the effects of the modifying use of a word. From what has been said it is evident that modification can transform a term into something which no longer denotes the object denoted by the term in its original use but which nevertheless maintains some kind of connection with it. Apart from modifying adjectives, the predicates 'is', 'is not', 'true', 'false' are particularly interesting in this regard.¹⁹

Those who analyse the behaviour of modifying adjectives should bear in mind that they are never reducible only to a specific complement of the terms to which they are applied. If we consider Twardowski's own examples, that of the false friend for instance, it is not sufficient to say that a false friend is not a friend, i.e. a non-friend; we must add, or at any rate remember, that a false friend is somebody who seems or appears to be a friend, even though he is not really such. Likewise, a false diamond is not solely a non-diamond, it is rather an object which is not a precious stone even though it may resemble one. A dead man is not just a non-man, but something that *used to be* a man. We may also add that a painted landscape is not a real landscape, but a picture, and a thought or represented object is not an actual object but an intentional one.²⁰

6. OBJECTLESS PRESENTATIONS

From the position set out in the previous section Twardowski derived the thesis that every presentation has its own object. His doctrine of the necessary presence of an object within every presentation directly contradicted Bolzano's theory of the existence of presentations without an object. These latter Bolzano classified into three main groups: (i) presentations of nothing, (ii) presentations of objects characterized by incompatible features, like 'round square'; (iii) presentations of objects which do not belong to the realm of experience, like 'golden mountain'. In these three cases, according to Bolzano, there is no object of presentation. Twardowski formulated his rejoinder as follows.

As regards 'nothing', Twardowski noted, first, that this is not a categorematic expression and hence it does not directly pertain to the realm of presentations. 'Nothing' always entails 'not something', where the 'something' belongs to the presentation and 'not' is a syncategorematic modification of the categorematic 'object'. The problem is thus that of understanding the function of

¹⁹ For some preliminary analyses see Dappiano & Poli 1994.

²⁰ On this see Poli 1993.

negation. When negated, the presentation is split into two parts, but what we separate is not the presentation of the negated something, but the presentation of something which is superordinate to the presented object. When I say 'not Greek', I do not divide Greeks, but a correlate that is superordinate to them, like 'human beings', who may be 'Greek' and 'not Greek'. Negation — 'infinetization' in mediaeval terms — therefore relates to the genus to which the negated term belongs as a species. This is an extremely important point if we are to avoid semantic confusion — and it emerges with great clarity if we approach the matter from the point of view of substitutability, since items which can be acceptably substituted for 'not Greek' are, for example, 'Italian', 'Albanian', 'Yugoslavian' but not 'shoe' or 'green'. Hence negation requires the availability of a genus pertaining to the negated species. However, the 'something' does not have a class to which both itself and its negation can belong, simply because if this genus were available, it would be a 'something' itself. So 'nothing' in its quality as 'not-something' is not a name but a complex expression in which negation has syncategorematic significance.

As regards Bolzano's other two types of objectless presentation, we may recall the three functions of the name, and in particular the designation performed by every name. Whether the designated object has contradictory properties or whether it lies outside the realm of experience does not alter the fact that it is still a 'something' which we may judge as non-existent. That it is possible legitimately to speak of 'object of presentation' in these cases as well, becomes clear if we consider the differences between object and content, since the properties of the former are not those of the latter. The object 'round square' is as such round and square, whereas its content is neither round nor square.

We can therefore assume that every presentation presents an object, just as every name designates an object, regardless of whether it exists or does not exist, is possible or impossible.

The existence of the something present in a presentation is not, therefore, genuine existence, because 'existence' in these contexts is a modifying term. The reality, in the sense of the objectuality, of the object should not be confused with its existence. The object is always real because it is the correlate of an actual (and in this sense existing) presentation, although this is not to imply that we can pass from the reality of object to its existence *tout court*.

7. TWARDOWSKI'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT

The whole question can be framed in even clearer terms by saying that for Twardowski 'object' is synonymous with 'conceivable'. The entire spectrum of

the conceivable has objectual status. Things, however, only relate to a specific segment of the conceivable.

We may sum up the above-defined characteristics of the object thus:

1. The object is the 'something';
2. Being an object is different from having existence;
3. The genus of objects understood as simple 'somethings' is the highest genus.

To these three initial characterizations we may add that the object of a presentation can always also be the object of a judgment and an emotion. In these two latter cases, we may say, following the mediaeval philosophers, that the object is *verum* and *bonum*.

Thus metaphysics takes the form of a theory of objects, independently of the additional features attributed to them by the sciences that came after metaphysics; that is, without considering whether objects are physical or non-physical, mental or non-mental, real or unreal, existent or non-existent.

8. THE PARTS OF THE OBJECT

According to Twardowski, an object is a whole which may be formed by parts. These latter are of different kinds, and different kinds of relation hold among them. The presentation of any 'something' involves both its presentation as a whole and the presentation of its parts, where the latter are partial objects to which certain elements of the content of the presentation correspond.

For Twardowski, a whole is a compound of material and formal elements. A general analysis of the various material parts of the object must at least draw the distinction between simple parts and complex ones. Simple parts are those which do not admit to any further division; complex parts are those which can be further divided and therefore contain other parts. If material constituents are complex, we have more immediate parts (first-order material parts) and more remote parts (second-order parts, third-order parts, and so on).²¹ If we take, for example, the presentation of a book, we may say that (the presentation of) its pages are its first-order material parts (of the presentation of the book), whilst the size, colour and other characteristics of the pages are second-order material parts (of the presentation) of the book and first-order material parts (of the

²¹ Twardowski 1977, 47.

presentation) of the page. Thus the order of the parts depends on which particular whole is being considered.

Complex parts can be broken down further into what we may call transitive and intransitive parts, according to whether the whole is homogeneous or non-homogeneous. An example of a breakdown into transitive parts is the division of an hour into minutes, and of minutes into seconds. These are called transitive parts because it is just as meaningful to say that an hour is composed of minutes as it is to say that an hour is composed of seconds. An example of intransitive parts is provided by the division of a town into its houses and of the latter into their windows. Traditional philosophy distinguished, in this regard, between parts that are homonymous with the whole and parts that are not.²²

Concerning the presentation, and therefore the concepts used in presentation, the parts that make up the whole may be such that they always and univocally constitute it into the same form, or they may constitute it into different forms. For instance, the concept 'extension' is univocal, whereas 'red' is multivocal: we may use 'red', in fact, to refer to the colour of a ball, to the red of the spectrum, and to red as a colour.

A third distinction can be drawn between the independence and dependence of parts with respect to the whole that contains them. In this case, parts that exist by themselves are independent, while dependent parts must be further subdivided into those that are unilaterally dependent because they are dependent on another part, and those that are bilaterally dependent because they stand in a mutual relation of dependence. As a matter of fact, however, if we return to the problem of presentation, Twardowski himself reminds us that the distinctions just introduced are unacceptable, since they rely on the concept of existence. Hence, in the case of presentation, we must replace the concept of existence with that of presentability.²³

In general, we may say that the material constituents of the object are its parts, while the formal constituents of the object are constituted by the relations among the material constituents of the whole.²⁴ The form of the whole is defined as the totality of its formal constituents.

A further and important problem is the distinction between part and property. For instance, a soldier is a part of an army, but he is not a property of that army. Likewise a minute is a part of an hour but it is not a property of the hour. We may concur with Twardowski in calling metaphysical parts the properties of the object: that is, the parts that may be *distinguished* within a whole by abstraction but cannot be materially *separated* from it. Thus metaphysical parts are extension, colour, weight, identity, and so on. This

²² Twardowski 1977, 48.

²³ Twardowski 1977, 49.

²⁴ Twardowski 1977, 46.

definition enables us to articulate the concept of property into at least two different cases. In the first, a property is a *relation* which designates any part whatever of a whole with respect to this same whole. Thus *having* minutes as its parts is a property of an hour, just as *having* a colour is a property of a body. The second distinction concerns metaphysical parts and involves the designation of just one of the terms of relation, irrespective of the whole of which they are parts. Twardowski adds that it is in this sense that we speak of things and of their properties, setting them against each other in a specific way.²⁵ The difference resides in the different roles of the auxiliary verbs used. Thus metaphysical parts *are* parts of an object whereas, in the case of non-metaphysical parts, an object *has* this or that part. Metaphysical parts can also become non-metaphysical parts should they be transformed into secondary individuals, for example by nominalization.

If the property relation is in its turn part of the whole, then these relations are possessed by the object just as much as its material constituents. And this leads us into an infinite regress.²⁶ In order to escape from the impasse, Twardowski introduces the concept of essence. The essence of an object is the totality of property relations from which all the other property relations of the object can be derived.²⁷

Regarding the formal constituents of the object of presentation, Twardowski distinguishes the relations between the parts and the whole (primary formal constituents) from the relations among the parts of a whole (secondary formal constituents). Primary formal constituents are then further divided into constituents in the strict sense, like those that connect the whole with its parts, and constituents in their loose sense, like those that enable us to state that the whole is greater than its parts; that it resembles them in certain respects and differs from them in others; that there is coexistence or succession between the whole and its parts; and so forth.²⁸

There may be further relations among the different types of formal constituent of a whole: these are second-degree relations, because they have primary relations as their objects. If we proceed further, we obtain relations of the third, fourth, fifth degree, and so on. I shall use 'order' when referring to material constituents and 'rank' when referring to formal elements.

²⁵ Twardowski 1977, 55.

²⁶ Twardowski 1977, 56.

²⁷ Twardowski adds: because of the causality relation. Put in these terms, the argument is Kantian.

²⁸ Twardowski 1977, 51.

Between the material and formal constituents of the object, the principle holds that the number of the material constituents of an object determines that of the formal ones.²⁹

9. THE PARTS OF CONTENT

Like the object, the content of representation also possesses material and formal parts. In general, the content of presentation of a compound object, presented as a compound, comprises three groups of first-order material elements: (i) presentations of first-order material constituents of the object; (ii) presentations of property relations between the object as a whole and first-order material constituents; (iii) presentations of the secondary formal constituents of the object.

There is a determining connection between the material constituents of the object and those of the content: in other words, to the material constituents of the object of a presentation there correspond certain material constituents of the content.³⁰ The connection does not operate in reverse, however, in that not all the material constituents of the content have as their object material constituents of the object. As we have seen, in fact, there are material constituents of the content that correspond to the formal constituents of the object.

The relationship between the material constituents of the object and those of the content is governed by two conditions. First, not all the material constituents of the content reflect those of the object: as said, some of the material constituents of the content are formal constituents of the object. Second, not all the material constituents of the object can be translated into constituents of the content.³¹

The object is presented by the content in a way that is determined by the manner in which the parts of object are joined together in a whole. The material constituents of presentation are of the following three kinds:

1. Mutually separable parts, like the pages of a book.
2. Mutually inseparable parts, like colour and extension.
3. Unilaterally separable parts, like a genus and its species.³²

Mutually separable parts do not require the other parts of the object in order to be presented; mutually inseparable parts can be only distinguished from the

²⁹ Twardowski 1977, 59.

³⁰ Twardowski 1977, 65.

³¹ Otherwise presentation would simply be impossible.

³² Twardowski 1977, 61.

presentation of the other parts of the object, they cannot be separated from it; unilaterally separable parts are characterized by the fact that if A can be presented without B, this does not entail that B can be presented without A.

Of the formal constituents, the most important are the property relations between the overall content and its material parts.³³

Among the material first-degree constituents of the content there obtain relations, that is, formal constituents of first degree of the content.³⁴

The first order material constituents of the object are formed out of the material constituents of all the following orders. If this were not the case, no material constituents of first order could be presented. We may state, therefore, that higher-order material constituents are presented through the content, even if they are not noticed, and hence that there is never an adequate presentation of any object.³⁵

10. DIRECT AND INDIRECT PRESENTATIONS

Hitherto we have analysed direct presentations. To these must now be added their indirect counterparts: those presentations, that is, in which an object is presented to us by means of its relations with other objects. These are relations that point to an unknown object on the basis of the determinateness of the relation and the knowledge of an initial object to which we apply the relation. For example, in the expression 'father of Socrates', 'Socrates' is the known term, 'father of' is the relation. Yet we do in fact know a number of the characteristics of unknown objects, that is, of these indirect presentations. In the above example, we know that we are dealing not with 'an *object* which stands in the relation of being the father of', but with 'a *man* who stands in the relation of being the father of', and so forth. A particular instance of indirect presentations is constituted by negative presentations.

We have another case of indirect presentation in the general presentation. For Twardowski the object of a general presentation is different from that of each of the single presentations it comprises — and here he draws on Kant's distinction between the individual presentations of which we have intuition and our general ideas of concepts. This is therefore a generic presentation, or better one relative to a generic object. Hence the presentation of a triangle is neither the presentation of a right-angled triangle, nor that of an isosceles triangle, nor that of a scalene triangle, even though in each of these cases it is the

³³ Twardowski 1977, 66.

³⁴ Twardowski 1977, 71.

³⁵ Twardowski 1977, 72.

presentation of a 'something' and hence of a *unum*. The difference between direct and general presentations is that general presentations are always indirect and never intuitive. This point was also stressed by Aristotle, who added the further consideration that non-intuitive presentations must be accompanied by intuitive ones.

Finally, mention should be made of certain flaws in Twardowski's analysis. Although the relation between individual content and individual object seems relatively straightforward, the kind of object that corresponds to generic content is less clear. Twardowski explicitly rejects the hypothesis that the generic concept corresponds to a plurality of individual objects, and holds firm to the position that a content is always and only connected to one object.

11. TWARDOWSKI AND KANT

In effect, at issue here is the extent of Kant's influence on Twardowski; an influence which is particularly marked in Twardowski's treatment of the object of presentation and of the general object, and the consequent importance attributed to the concept of characteristic note.³⁶ A Kantian bias, in fact, can be detected in many of Twardowski's main arguments. Given that the thesis of Kant's influence on the Brentanian tradition has often been systematically rejected, Twardowski's own views on the matter are of particular relevance. Regarding the object of presentation, in his book *On the content and object of presentation* we find, in the first paragraph of section 7, the following explicit declaration: "In calling what is presented by a presentation its object, we give a meaning to this word which Kant had already attached to it". Twardowski continues: "The highest concept — we read in Kant — with which one usually begins a transcendental philosophy, is the division into what is possible and what is impossible. However, since all division presupposes a concept which is to be divided, an even higher concept must be mentioned, and this is the concept of an *object in general* (taken in a problematic sense and leaving open whether it is something or nothing)".³⁷ Again: "We have to modify the sense which Kant attaches to the word 'object' in only one respect. According to Kant, the object can be 'something' or 'nothing'. We have already said earlier (p. 19 f.), in contrast to Kant, that 'nothing' cannot be taken to be a name for objects of possible presentations, but must be viewed as a syncategorematic expression".³⁸

³⁶ For these analyses I have drawn in particular on Albertazzi 1992.

³⁷ Kant 1781, B, 259, my emphasis.

³⁸ Twardowski 1977, 32.

Turning to the idea of characteristic note, Twardowski declares that “one cannot mistake the agreement between our definition of the characteristic note and Kant’s”.³⁹ Kant’s influence is also apparent in Twardowski’s resultant concept of the general object, when he states that “This simultaneous excitement of individual presentations through names which mean general presentation is the meaning of the Kantian view that the concept (= general presentation) is related *mediately*, by means of a characteristic which can be common to several things, to the object, while intuition (= individual presentation) is *immediately* related to the object”.⁴⁰ Therefore, the influence of Kant on Twardowski, especially in some of his theoretically most significant passages, is beyond doubt.

Albertazzi notes that this Kantian influence is an important factor in interpretation of Twardowski for two reasons. First, it enables us to distinguish Twardowski’s ontology from traditional metaphysics. In fact, Twardowski says nothing about the essential nature of the transcendental object; his analysis only considers the object of presentation. The second reason is that it locates Twardowski’s ontology within the modern theory of ontology founded by Wolff and which addresses the problem of the foundation of consciousness.⁴¹

12. GENERAL PRESENTATIONS

Twardowski also stressed that the distinction between object and content is crucial to definition of the concept of characteristic note; that is to say, it is crucial to definition of the essence of the object. Since a characteristic note (*Merkmal*) is a part of the object, we must pay careful attention to the distinction between presentative notes — which belong to the object and are parts of it — and the constituents or elements of the content. The former are parts of the object, not parts of the content. As Twardowski puts it, they are constituents of the object which are presented by means of the presentations of the object.⁴²

As said, for Twardowski characteristics designate the essential parts of the object. In a broad sense, we can also call characteristics those parts of the

³⁹ Twardowski 1977, 79.

⁴⁰ Twardowski 1977, 104. Note the difference between ‘object in general’ and ‘general object’. The distinction is subtle in formulation, but decisive in content. The object in general is the form of ‘being an object’; the general object is instead the concept. Curiously, the critical literature ignores this distinction, which is absolutely crucial for correct understanding of Twardowski’s thought. Only in Albertazzi 1992 do we find the distinction made explicit for the first time.

⁴¹ On Wolff and Twardowski see Poli 1992.

⁴² Twardowski 1977, 81.

content which correspond to the characteristics of the object — although we must bear in mind that the characteristics of the object constitute the object, whereas what we have termed the characteristics of the content are not sufficient to constitute the content. From this point of view, Twardowski once again adopts a Kantian position. For Kant, it was the characteristics of an object that form our knowledge of it: thinking is knowing by characteristics. Twardowski reaffirmed this idea by asserting that a characteristic of a thing is something the knowledge of which constitutes the knowable part of the thing. What characterizes general presentations is that ‘*what is common as such*’ to different individual presentations is presented. Hence it follows that the object of a general presentation differs from the objects of the individual presentations subordinate to it. “The general presentation differs from the the individual presentations which are subsumed under it only in that through the former one conceives, in addition to a characteristic, also a certain relation between certain constituents of the object and certain constituents of other objects, namely the common possession of these constituents”.⁴³ Moreover, “The object of the general presentation is a part of the object of a subsumed presentation, a part which stands in a relation of equality to certain parts of objects of other individual presentations”.⁴⁴ Twardowski finished his analysis with the following words: “the general object is in a certain way a metaphysical constituent of the individual objects which are subsumed under it”.⁴⁵

Also worth noting, before we conclude this discussion, is Twardowski’s remark that in languages which have preserved the definite article, the noun connected with it is normally the name of the general object.⁴⁶

For Twardowski, there are no presentations involving a plurality of objects. All presentations are individual. Those which apparently have a plurality of objects are in fact presentations of constituents, *presented as a whole*, which are common to several objects. In this sense, a general presentation is always an indirect presentation, not an intuitive one. This position is once again Kantian. Kant maintained, in fact, that general presentations are those of concepts which are connected to objects by means of characteristics pertaining to several things. Hence Twardowski’s general object is a metaphysical constituent of objects. Since the general object is constituted by elements which are presented as a whole, it possesses the characteristics of an individual. The lack of direct presentations of general objects also tells us that they are secondary, fictitious entities. In other words, they are whatever corresponds to abstract single terms; they are, that is, the result of the process of nominalization.

⁴³ Twardowski 1977, 99.

⁴⁴ Twardowski 1977, 100.

⁴⁵ Twardowski 1977, 105.

⁴⁶ Twardowski 1977, 101-02.

In sum, we may conclude that both Twardowski's point of departure (the object in general) and his conclusion (the general object) have close affinities with Kantian theory.

From the foregoing analysis we may list the following kinds of 'object' in Twardowski's theory:⁴⁷

1. The object in general, which corresponds to 'being an object'.
2. The ontological object or the real-world object.
3. The intentional object (the presented object).
4. The general object or concept.

13. APPENDIX: THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL

I have already mentioned the leading role played by Twardowski in the foundation of the Lvov school (subsequently the Lvov-Warsaw school). The situation that greeted Twardowski on his arrival in Lvov was not particularly encouraging; but nor was it, for that matter, in any of the other Polish universities at the time.

In 1871 the University of Lvov had been granted the right to teach its official courses in Polish, a concession which encouraged the return of Polish scholars from other European countries. Among the most interesting Polish philosophers at work at the time, mention should be made of Jozefem Supiński (1804-1893) and Wojciech Urbanski (1820-1889), exponents of so-called 'Lvov pre-positivism'.⁴⁸ Other academic figures of a certain interest were Alekzander Raciborski (1845-1919), a historian of philosophy and a scholar of Spinoza and J.S. Mill, Alekzander Skorski (1851-1928), a historian of Polish philosophy, and Marcisław Wartenberg (1868-1938) a metaphysician with an empirical, inductive and hypothetical approach.⁴⁹

As regards the other Polish universities, active in Warsaw before the Russian occupation and the consequent replacement of the Polish university with the imperial Russian-language university, was Henryk Struve (1840-1916), the leading exponent of so-called 'maximalism', as opposed to the 'minimalism' of 'Warsaw positivism'.⁵⁰ This latter was influenced in particular by Comte, J.S.

⁴⁷ Albertazzi 1992.

⁴⁸ Cf. Skarga 1964, 227-29.

⁴⁹ Zamecki 1977, 8-10; Tatarkiewicz 1948-50, III, 359-60; Coniglione 1990, ch. 1.

⁵⁰ Tatarkiewicz uses the terms 'maximalism' and 'minimalism' to refer to two styles of thought: "philosophy of the former kind sets itself enormous tasks and endeavours at all costs to accomplish them; it obviously wishes to do this as reliably as possible, but if certainty is not

Mill, Darwin and Spencer, and took the form of the outright rejection of romanticism and idealism. Close to the positivists was the Kantian Adam Mahrburg (1855-1913), who shared with them the common purpose of combatting Struve's 'antiquated' doctrines. The other great centre of Polish culture, the predominantly Catholic city of Cracow, was distinguished by the study of the history of Polish and mediaeval philosophy. Among the scholars at work in Cracow, worthy of mention are the spiritualist Wincenty Lutosławski (1863-1954) and Władysław Heinrich (1869-1957), an Avenarius scholar and a proponent of radical positivism.⁵¹

Twadowski's arrival in Lvov from Vienna in 1895 had an explosive impact on this intellectual *milieu*.

The school that he founded was certainly the peak of Polish philosophical achievement in the 20th century. Against it all other philosophical currents in the country, from phenomenology and its outstanding representative Roman Ingarden to Catholic and Marxist philosophy have had to measure themselves.⁵²

Pratically everybody came under its spell and influence. The conception of philosophy, of its subject-matter, task, and method, the standards of philosophical thinking established by the leading exponents of the Warsaw school have been universally accepted. Although the school existed without interruption for less than twenty years, there emerged a living tradition, oral and written, which has turned out to be an intellectual force, with a considerable power of resistance and of attraction, that survived the test of historical catastrophies and upheavals.⁵³

The first three generations of philosophers associated with the Lvov school comprised over eighty scholars, and the bibliography of their books and articles amounts to almost ten thousand items.⁵⁴

possible, then even in a non-certain manner. Philosophy of the second kind considers only what is certain and it solves problems as long as they can be resolved with complete certainty. The former directs itself above all to the tasks it has set itself; the latter to the means at its disposal. The former is an ambitious philosophy, the latter is characterized by a more reflective abstinence... In antiquity, neo-platonism was indubitably a maximalist doctrine, Pyrrhonism was minimalist; scholastic philosophy of the 13th century was maximalist, that of the 14th century minimalist; in the modern age Spinoza belonged to the former type of philosophy, Locke and Hume to the latter". Tatarkiewicz 1948-50, III, 8-9.

⁵¹ Tatarkiewicz 1948-50, III, 359.

⁵² The bibliography on the Lvov-Warsaw school is quite limited. Some fundamental references are Kotarbiński 1959, Jordan 1963, Skolimowski 1967, Franke & Rautenberg 1972, Zamecki 1977, Giedymin 1985, Hempoliński 1987, Woleński 1989, Szaniawski 1989, Coniglione Poli & Woleński 1993. Of major relevance is Woleński 1989. Among anthologies, see McCall 1967, Pelc 1979, Pearce & Woleński 1988.

⁵³ Jordan 1963, 42.

⁵⁴ It is obvious that I cannot give adequate treatment to the entire movement in the limited space available here. For example, it would be interesting to follow some of its 'lateral'

The first of Twardowski's followers explicitly to address logical themes in the strictly technical sense was Jan Łukasiewicz. The first generation of logicians to receive their training under Twardowski and Łukasiewicz included, among others, Ajdukiewicz, Czezowski, Kotarbiński, Zawirski and Kaczorowski. In 1912 this first group was joined by Leśniewski. After 1915 Łukasiewicz, Leśniewski and Kotarbiński transferred to the recently reopened university of Warsaw, Czezowski moved to Wilno, and Zawirski to Poznań. Belonging to the new generation of philosophers in part engendered by these movements were Lindenbaum, Jaśkowski, Presburger, Słupecki, Sobociński, Tarski and Waisberg. After the Second World War, in which several Polish philosophers lost their lives, a third generation of scholars appeared, of whom the best known are Mostowski, Lejewski, Wiegner and Greniewski.⁵⁵

It may be of some interest to compare the doctrines of Polish scientific philosophy with the practically contemporaneous theories of the Vienna Circle. In doing so, one should not commit the error of treating the Lvov-Warsaw School as merely an off-shoot of Viennese neo-positivism, although it is an error with illustrious precedents ranging from Roman Ingarden to the critical

branches, such as the entire complex of Polish philosophy of law, from its pioneer Petrzycki to the work of Ziemiński, Wróblewski, and Opalek; but this is clearly impossible. For a review of Polish philosophy of law see Ziemiński 1987. The literature divides between analysis of the development of the School and of its culminating period. In certain respects, the two world wars represent key turning-points in Polish philosophical history: the First World War because of the migration between the universities of Lvov and Warsaw of numerous scholars (after the war, Lvov was in Russian territory); the Second World War because of the questions raised by the advent of the new regime. The thesis of a thematic difference between the first and second phase is advanced in Jordan 1945, 10-11 and in part in Zamecki 1977, 52-3. According to these authors, the Lvov phase was predominantly psychologistic in character, while the Warsaw one was mainly logicist. This interpretation has been vigorously contested by Woleński 1989, 305-6, who asserts that the School's character remained substantially unchanged, and that the Warsaw phase can be viewed at most as a new stage in the School's development. Equally forthright is Woleński's description of the final phase of the School, which he regards as largely coinciding with the end of the Second World War. Ajdukiewicz instead points to 1953 as marking the end of the tradition begun by Twardowski: its demise in effect coming with the retirement of the third generation of scholars. In any case, there is no doubt that since the 1950s it has made little sense to talk of a specifically Polish philosophy. Partial but nevertheless significant evidence for this is the fact that today almost all Polish research of any importance is also published in English, although many of the traditional analyses of the Lvov-Warsaw school are largely unknown because, still today, they are only available (when they are) in Polish.

⁵⁵ Mention should also be made of another strand of logical research, which proceeded independently of the influence of Twardowski and Łukasiewicz. This centred on the University of Cracow and was founded by J. Sleszyński (1854-1934). Its leading member was Leon Chwistek (1884-1944), a mathematician, logician, essayist and painter. Chwistek studied the theory of types and the axiom of reducibility, developing a non-ramified theory of types, i.e. the so-called simple theory of types. He then worked on the minimalist foundations of mathematics. In 1930 he moved to Lvov. Chwistek's pupils included W. Hepter, J. Herzberg and J. Skarżeński.

stance adopted by the Polish Marxists after the Second World War. The Polish school developed independently of Viennese positivism, although both movements drew their inspiration from what was in many respects a common source: almost all the most authoritative critics agree on this point.⁵⁶ In Woleński's words:

It should be noted that when one recommends the autonomous treatment of the theories of the Polish philosophers, the intention is not to cast doubt on the links between the Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School, nor to affirm that they are altogether irrelevant... Neo-positivism and the Lvov-Warsaw School belong to the same ideal formation, namely, analytical philosophy... There are some essential similarities between them, such as precision and exactness, the minimalist approach in philosophy, the appreciation of the role of logic as an instrument for philosophical analysis, the emphasis placed on language... But something more must be said. Among the various currents of analytical thought, the Lvov-Warsaw School comes closer to logical empiricism as regards its methodological principles, while it is less close to Moore, for example, or to the Oxford analyticists. There are, however, differences in their essential conceptions which go beyond issues of philosophical method.⁵⁷

These differences, moreover, can already be discerned in Twardowski himself and in his criticisms of scientism, and in the attempt by some members of the Vienna Circle to dismantle metaphysics. The Poles never accepted, for example, Carnap's early endeavour to dispense with metaphysics and to replace it with the logical analysis of language, or with the decomposition of philosophical problems into logical syntax. For the Poles, the semantic dimension of philosophical analysis was indispensable for the construction of a scientific philosophy.⁵⁸

The alleged subordination of the Lvov-Warsaw school to the doctrines of the Vienna School, albeit with some minor elements of originality, is a view so widespread that it warrants further comment. The following quotation from Ajdukiewicz, a frequent contributor to *Erkenntnis*, is apposite:

In Poland there is no faithful follower of the Vienna Circle: that is, I know of no Pole who has accepted and assimilated the principal doctrines of the Vienna Circle. The affinity between certain Polish philosophers and the Vienna Circle rests at most on the similarity of their methodological approaches and on the similarity of the problems treated. Among their common features one may mention the following: first, anti-irrationalism and therefore the postulate that only those assertions can be accepted which are provable by means of an accessible test; then, the postulate of conceptual clarity and of precise language. As well as these two features, I would also stress the assimilation of the conceptual apparatus of the logistic and the particular influence of symbolic logic.

⁵⁶ Jordan 1963; Skolimowski 1967; Zamecki 1977; Woleński 1989.

⁵⁷ Woleński 1982, 175.

⁵⁸ Woleński 1982, 177.

As regards the sphere of problems, of principal importance are problems concerning scientific knowledge and therefore the problematic of so-called meta-theoretical research. To this is connected an interest in semantics stemming from the conviction that the search after scientific knowledge can only proceed if it reflects upon its own language. Closely linked with this is investigation into the foundations of science and hence investigation that is no longer meta-theoretical but intra-theoretically concerned with the specific foundations of individual sciences, especially the deductive sciences.⁵⁹

The interest of this extract resides in its emphasis on shared characteristics, in its explicit denial of a conceptual derivation or dependence. Also significant, however, is what Ajdukiewicz omits from his list, notably the fact that the Lvov-Warsaw School never accepted a meaningfulness criterion that was entirely based on verification. Moreover, as regards metaphysics and more in general philosophy, the attitude of the Poles was more liberal than that of the neo-positivists. The Polish School "from its very beginning represented such an attitude towards metaphysics at which logical empiricism arrived only after successive liberalizations of its early and radical criteria, which was due, among other things, to the reception of Tarski's semantic ideas".⁶⁰ Finally, the analysis of language, however important, was not considered so essential as to justify the reduction of philosophy to a logical theory of science.

The unity of the Lvov-Warsaw School consisted less in its sharing of a common doctrinaire corpus than in a common attitude towards philosophical problems. Zawirski wrote:

It must be noted, to our disadvantage or perhaps advantage, that while the logical positivists form on the whole a coherent and consolidated camp, we had a programme, people worked with much effort, and success, on the clarification of many special issues, but nobody was in a hurry to undertake a great synthetic study, being convinced that it was still too early to do this.⁶¹

The shared features of the philosophical stance adopted by the Poles were anti-irrationalism, the conviction the philosophical inquiry should be inspired by scientific method, and confidence in the utility of logical techniques.⁶² One may assert that the Poles never regarded metaphysics as 'senseless', and that they never considered logic in general to be the prime purpose of philosophical research. They instead regarded it as an extremely powerful and useful tool for clarification of philosophical problems. The Polish philosophers were never tempted to 'dissolve' metaphysics and its problems, if anything they constantly sought to 'resolve' metaphysical issues.

⁵⁹ Ajdukiewicz 1935, 151-2.

⁶⁰ Woleński 1989, 299.

⁶¹ Zawirski 1947, 9-10; cit. in Woleński 1989, 307.

⁶² Jordan 1963, 44-5; Woleński 1982, 183.

We may close this excursus by briefly considering those common features that enable us to talk about a Polish philosophical movement which, for all the differences (sometimes major ones) between the positions of individual scholars, always wittingly and deliberately maintained its unitary character.

First, the movement shares a common genealogy which descends from Twardowski, the movement's founder and its prime point of reference as regards the meaning (also ethical) of philosophical inquiry. For all the members of the School, the aim of philosophy was to build knowledge. Philosophical research was therefore to be conducted with seriousness and rigour.

A second factor resides in the intellectual importance of Twardowski's successors. Unlike other philosophical movements dominated by the personality of their founder, in the Lvov-Warsaw School the successors achieved greater renown, international as well, than their master. One notes with interest that this did not lead to the dissolution of the School; instead it helped to develop an awareness of the rationality of its philosophical enterprise and of the need for open and unbiased comparison.

In theoretically more specific terms, the common foundation of the entire school was its logic-based anti-irrationalism,⁶³ the constituents of which were the postulate of clarity, intellectualism, an interest in logic, a traditional conception of truth, epistemological and axiological absolutism, an '*verstehende*' view of the human sciences, and minimalism.⁶⁴

One may therefore say that the Lvov-Warsaw School inherited from Twardowski — and indirectly from Brentano — a realist, objectivist position and the correspondence theory of truth. The members of the school made a positive assessment of philosophy which, according to a formulation taken from Twardowski, was the 'science of science'. They abstained from constructing philosophical systems (perhaps with the exception of Kotarbiński) and instead devoted themselves to minute logico-semantic analysis of philosophical and scientific concepts, using and very often inventing logical tools for the purpose.

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

| on: | see also: |
|-------------------------------|--|
| content / meaning | 2.4, 6.6, 6.9, 8.3, 12.5 |
| logic and theory of judgment | 1.10-13, 2.6-7, 3.4, 4.4, 4.6, 11 , 12 , 16.6, 16.12-13 |
| metaphysics | 3.5, 16.15 |
| modification | 2.8 |
| object | 4.5-6, 8.3-5, 12.4-5, 16.3 |
| presentation / representation | 1.9, 9.2, 9.4 |

PART II: TOPICS AND INFLUENCES

ACT, CONTENT, AND OBJECT*

In what follows, I will deal with some aspects of Brentano's theory and terminology concerning the nature of the psychical, i.e. his descriptive psychological analysis which is, in fact, an early phenomenological theory about mental states, their structure, their mutual relation, and their intentional correlates (objects and contents). This theory goes along with his ontological theory of mind, which is an application of Aristotelian substance-accident or part-whole ontology, to the realm of mind, or more concretely, to a thinking person.¹

Taking the teachings of the natural sciences (the world existing outside of us and its physical laws) for granted, Brentano develops a special, individual ontology of mind (facts and motivational interrelations of the psychical). In describing the two aspects of the minds intentional relations to things other than itself and the self-relating character of psychical phenomena, Brentano describes both the inner world of mind and the outer world of inner world (general ontology). The analysis of phenomena (phenomenology) serves as link between special and general ontology.

While writing his dissertation on Aristotelian ontology,² Brentano also considered the psychological aspect of the "multiple *meanings* of (dependent and independent) being". The psychological question he explicitly worked out in his *Habilitationsschrift* (Brentano 1867b) not without making use of ontology when considering the relation of passive (sensitive 'life functions') and active mind (higher 'modificationnal' functions).³ The mutual relation of

* I express my thanks to Mauro Antonelli and Josef Röhl for helpful comments, and to Aaron Mishara for reading the text.

¹ Cf. Chisholm 1978, 1981, 1982; Smith 1987.

² Brentano 1862.

³ Brentano 1867b, ch. 2-4.

psychology and ontology I see realized in the entire work of Brentano from its beginning onward.⁴ It is a dominant interest of each of the respective writings — on ontology at one side, and on psychology at the other — that may hide the changes of aspects⁵ when primarily he investigates things (physical phenomena) in the one case and the ways the mind is directed at, or the mind and its goal, the *knowledge of his object*,⁶ in the other. We should note, I believe, that both aspects belong to one reality, and the knowledge thereof is *one*. (Cf. Brentano 1982, 130.)

Concerning the question of how we gain knowledge of objects, i.e. the question about the nature of our relations to objects, we have to distinguish two procedures.

- (1) We have to state a *conceptual* (and only conceptual, not real) distinction between physical and psychical phenomena. According to Brentano's distinction of natural science and psychology we are presented with objects *as* physical or psychical objects. This distinction is carried out within the 'intentional pair of correlates' and its 'parts':⁷ Appearing phenomenon *vs.* psychical phenomenon/act/function; object of thinking *vs.* facts of thinking (*Tatsachen der Wahrnehmung*); terminus of relation *vs.* fundament of relation.
- (2) We have to reflect on *our modes of relations* with respect to their objects. The modes of relation, in turn, function as rationale for the above named distinction.

1. PHENOMENA

Appearing phenomena are called *Gegenständlichkeit* by Brentano. The way we have appearances he calls *Gegenständlichkeit haben*.⁸ In the words of Carl Stumpf, there are "appearances and psychical functions" (*Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen*).⁹

⁴ Cf. Brentano 1862, 28-30.

⁵ The change of aspects is manifest in the state of what he calls 'noticing' (*Bemerken*). Cf. Brentano 1982, 31-65. Cf. Brentano 1924, 72 (Engl. 51); 1925, 33 (Engl. 197).

⁶ Cf. Brentano 1862, 29.

⁷ Brentano 1982, 20-27.

⁸ Brentano 1982, 146.

⁹ Stumpf 1907. Cf. Lotze 1846, 142-264. Lotze names the soul a "phenomenological expression" (*phänomenologischer Ausdruck*). Reflecting on the appearances, functions and meanings of the soul (*ibid.*, 152 f.) he develops a "phenomenology of self consciousness" (*Phänomenologie des Selbstbewußtseins*). (*Ibid.*, 222.)

The objects, or phenomena, in a primary respect, are 'in themselves'. The fact *that* we have appearances and *how* we get them and *what* they are *for us* is to take a different viewpoint or attitude (in a secondary respect) towards them.¹⁰

A phenomenon is, at first sight, something which appears to us so that we gain a concrete empirical presentation of it. A phenomenon of this sort (a 'primary object') may be an external or own physical state or event; or it may be an own psychical state, taken as object of consideration. By doing so, the (former) psychical state is modified. It is no longer what it was. (One's own anger, taken into consideration, is gone.)

By phenomena I understand that which is perceived by us, i.e. what is perceived by us in the strict sense of the word. This, f.i., is not the case in the external world. To be a phenomenon, something has to be in itself...

All phenomena are to be called inner (phenomena), because they all belong *to one reality*, be it as constituent elements or as correlates...

If we wish to describe the psychical domain we must first show how, in general, the objects for our psychic activities and the differences in the modes of relations are to be understood... The classification according to differences of objects is sufficient... for the reason that the psychic relations and their differences belong to the objects, too.¹¹

Natural science, according to Brentano, considers physical phenomena as they are perceived by 'normal and pure', 'outer' perception. So, natural science, as well as its sister-science (*Schwesterwissenschaft*), psychology, has to start from perception and experience.¹² Every science has to begin with perception, yet not every perception is founded on sense-perception. So psychology is analogous to natural science insofar as it has to proceed *methodo empirico-inductivo*: completely enumerating the psychic phenomena, classifying them in natural groups, discovering the general laws of their succession, deducing more specific laws from the general ones, verifying specific laws by facts of experience. Yet there's "no way from physical ones", because there are "intransgressible borders or boundaries of the (genetic) explanation of nature" (*unüberschreitbare Grenzen der Naturerklärung*).¹³

¹⁰ Cf. Brentano 1867b, 75 and 82 — referring to Aristotle, *De Anima*, II, 4, 415 a 16; Brentano 1924, 177 f. (Engl. 127 f.); Brentano 1925, 32 f.; Brentano 1982, 147 ff.

¹¹ Brentano 1982, 129 f., 132; my emphasis. Translation by B. Müller.

¹² Brentano 1924, 40 (Engl. 29).

¹³ Brentano 1924, 66 f. (Engl. 47).

2. PHYSICAL PHENOMENA

- (a) Physical Phenomena (ph. ph.) Brentano explains by examples such as a colour one sees; a chord one hears; warmth, cold, odor one senses.¹⁴ Ph. ph. are 'outer' or 'primary' physical objects which we sense by their appearing qualities (Lockean qualities).¹⁵
- (b) We come into contact or gain acquaintance with appearances and aspects of something (of some thing, not of no-thing which can not appear) and thus they are for us of 'phenomenal' or 'intentional existence'¹⁶ and only of 'intentional existence'. They are, compared with psychical phenomena, short of the character of reality, as we cannot directly be aware of their real existence,¹⁷ of how they really are. We therefore cannot define them, but only exemplify them: "What we are about is the clarification... by an example... not a definition... of the two names: physical phenomenon – psychical phenomenon".¹⁸

To deal with the question what ordinary external things really are — this is the duty of an investigation by natural science. Natural science therefore is "of essential interest" for psychology, "as instrument, influencing factor".¹⁹ And natural science is, *methodologically*, a paradigm for a Brentanian empirical psychology. While natural science investigates physical objects, events, their constituents and physical laws, psychology has to investigate how ph. ph. appear to us, how they are objects for the mind, how we believe in their existence (according to Brentano we indeed do believe in the external world)²⁰ and how they are *in* the mind (their intentional in-existence).

- (c) Ph. ph. are not only purely 'outer objects', but any sort of 'primary' appearances, insofar as and only when they appear to the mind. So they are not mind-dependent but *before*, in front of the mind.

The things are not representations (*Abbildungen*) of our thoughts, but our thoughts are built up according to the things.²¹

¹⁴ Cf. Brentano 1924, 112 (Engl. 79).

¹⁵ Cf. Locke, *Essay concerning human understanding*, II, 8, 10. Cf. Brentano 1979, 44.

¹⁶ Brentano 1924, 132 (Engl. 92).

¹⁷ Cf. Brentano 1924, 14; 132 (Engl. 10, 92-94).

¹⁸ Brentano 1924, 110 f. (Engl. 78).

¹⁹ Brentano 1882, 76.

²⁰ Cf. Brentano 1979, 88.

²¹ Cf. Brentano 1862, 29.

Whenever something appears to us, we are presented with it, and we *know* about this relation. Having a conscious presentation of something is the ‘fundamental’ psychic (intentional) relation which enables us to have additional ‘superposed’ psychic relations such as judging about the presented (thing) and loving or hating it.²² In the having of a psychic relation we at the same time and incidentally (*en parergo*) have a “secondary” reflexive perception (i.e. apperception) of our psychic life, of our “subjective relation to something” (*subjektisches Verhalten... zu etwas*).²³

That is to say, when we are conscious of something, we have multiple relations to that of which we are conscious. Each relation is such that it entails consciousness of ourselves. Being conscious of ourselves whilst we have different relations (to different objects, and their parts) enables and entitles us to distinguish and to classify our psychic relations. The basic rule (*Grundregel*) for classification, Brentano holds, is to apply “the natural procedure” (*naturgemäße Vorgehensweise*).

Classification should follow from the study of the objects to be classified, not from an *a priori*-construction.²⁴

In analogy to natural science which investigates ordinary external objects and classifies them, psychology deals with inner objects and classifies them (the psychical relations and their differences belonging to the objects).²⁵

Brentano goes on to specify the general name ‘object’ by giving examples in order to show their ‘content’. The ‘content’ of physical objects is presented to us *via* our senses. We therefore have sensed feelings (*Empfindungen*) such as pain. Such sensed qualities of psycho-physic origin are not to be confounded with psychic sensations (*psychische Empfindungen*) which may accompany the former. Brentano emphasizes that one should be aware of this equivocation (of *Empfindung*). Otherwise one wouldn’t realize the difference between sensing pain in the foot and the accompanying psychic reaction, the *difference* between feeling pain and being angry about feeling pain. Someone who failed to notice this difference would have to admit that he’s mentally perceiving the pain in the same place that he’s feeling the pain: in the foot, and this would have to be admitted even if the foot were amputated.

This example shows, that the physical phenomena (or primary objects of this sort) are sensed locally and that we are presented with a sensed quality even if, as in this case, the place (foot) is not there (but a surrogate place (of foot)).

²² Cf. Brentano 1924, 136: “We have determined the psychical phenomena as *presentations* and such phenomena which rest *on presentations* as their basis”. Cf. Engl. 97.

²³ Brentano 1955, 16.

²⁴ Cf. Brentano 1925, 28 f. (Engl. 194).

²⁵ Cf. Brentano 1982, 132; Brentano 1925, 216 (Engl. 324).

Here we have the case above mentioned, that there are insurmountable difficulties in going from (neuro-)physics to psychology.

Physical phenomena are individually sensed by someone as extended and localized. We are able to observe them, though we don't have a justified belief (in Brentano's strict sense of justification) that they 'exist' as they appear. In saying that some (physical) thing appears to me, I do have a sensation of something 'being' localized, 'having' sensible qualities, 'being' observable. I express a belief, or a judgment that I take it to be existing. But such a belief, such a judgment may not be justified (*nicht motiviert*) by 'inner experience'. I am only entitled to say, that it is I, or me, to whom something is presented and who senses something qualitatively and localized. That is to say that if I sense some object (which as an 'intentional correlate' of my sensation 'need not exist') I necessarily sense qualities located somewhere.²⁶

According to Brentano's concept of intentionality, any psychic (i.e. conscious) act always refers to "something" presented. This is the case whether this something is a commonsensical thing, a directly or indirectly given thing, or a thing in specie or in general, the thing *as* thing, a conceptual thingness, i.e. something thingly.

This view is similar to Bolzano's: "Something contradictory, f.i. a quadrangular circle, or $\sqrt{-1}$, is thinkable, and it is thought by us really, whenever we speak about it. Something is unthinkable for us if and only if we have no presentation of it".²⁷

Any conscious presentation, any conscious sensation, is not merely to be characterized by its referring to something in a primary act. It is also related to itself in a simultaneous secondary act.

"Every consciousness, upon whatever object it is primarily directed, is concomitantly directed upon itself. In the presenting of the colour hence simultaneously is a presenting of this presenting".²⁸

This presenting of the presentation is an 'adjoining', 'corresponding', 'accompanying presentation', a 'presentation of inner perception'.²⁹ The self-conscious 'secondary' act accompanies the 'primary' act and depends on it. If I were not presented with something I would not be able to have a knowledge of it and I would not have myself as object of further psychic acts.

²⁶ Cf. Brentano 1952, 200. Brentano here points toward his pupil Carl Stumpf, who for a while at least, did not agree with Brentano in this respect. In his *Tonpsychologie* (Vol. I, 1883, Vol. II, 1890) Stumpf in fact denied that sensorial qualities are localized (Brentano: '*raumbestimmt*') but rather maintained the *symbolic* use of room (*Raum, Ort, Topos*). To this cf. Baumgartner 1994.

²⁷ Cf. Bolzano 1837, § 7. Cf. J.St. Mill, *System of Logic*, Book I, Ch. II, §§ 1 and 3.

²⁸ Brentano 1982, 22. Translated by B. Müller, forthcoming.

²⁹ Brentano 1982, 132, 133.

3. QUALITATIVE CONTENT ASCRIBED TO OBJECTS

According to Brentano we must not multiply objects unnecessarily but rather analyse our relations towards them.

As already pointed out, I can say by analysis that every object of my sensations has spatial and qualitative properties. Any sensible object has as its content a sensible quality which 'fills' a sensible space. I can have something as primary object only when I sense something specifically: locally and qualitatively.

Brentano specifies the primary objects of sensations as continuously filled (*konkomitiert oder durchwohnt*) by qualitative moments as their 'space-filling' (*raumerfüllende*) parts: bright and dark; coloured and non-coloured.

He thereby means that in all primary objects the difference between bright and dark, and coloured and non-coloured (i.e. the degree of saturatedness and non-saturatedness; chromatic and non-chromatic colours) is a *sense-quality*. The difference between bright and dark according to this view is not restricted to the visual sense but is sensible to all senses "often in an identical, often in an analogous manner". Bright and dark are taken to be *genera* (general qualifications, 'contents' of these objects). The number of senses is to be determined according to the number of genera for bright and dark and of their extremes, white and black, because the genera themselves are 'insurmountable'.³⁰

Since the differences bright – dark and coloured – non-coloured are to be taken as qualities which fill our various sensory-spaces (*Sinnesräume*), these qualities appear not only as localized but as localizing qualities. They qualify and determine spaces and borders and bind them by the extremes of the boundaries, black and white. As a result of the analysis of sensation, the phenomenal space is not only restricted by the differences bright – dark and coloured – non-coloured, but filled by these qualities, respectively by the degrees of brightness or saturatedness, the degrees and mixed phenomena of these qualities.

The degrees of qualitative contents seem to correspond with the degrees of intensity. Yet, for Brentano, intensity is not a quality of its own but a measure of density, i.e. saturatedness of the phenomena (*Maß der Dichtigkeit der Erscheinungen*).³¹ Intensity seems to rise and fall according to the number of qualitative elements in a sensory-space. This means that we can speak of intensity only in the domain of phenomena of the senses and not in phenomena of thinking, judging, loving, hating. It further means that the intensity of

³⁰ Cf. Brentano 1979, 157-175, esp. 161.

³¹ Brentano 1979, 73. Cf. also Brentano 1925, 151 f. (Engl. 286 f.).

sensing has to meet the intensity of the sensed, because each part of our sensing corresponds to a part of a qualitative sensory-space.

Following Chisholm, of the correspondence of sensing and (sensed) quality, we can speak of a correspondence in terms of speaking adverbially. Thus we are sensing qualitatively (spacely, locally, colourly, intensively) according to the qualitative contents. A given object necessarily (apriori) is such that it bears certain qualities. An object is partly *determined* by its qualitative contents. And it is also determined by the fact that it is located. A colour f.i. bears a certain quality; and it appears on a certain place (*Topos*). Both the quality and the place *together* are the individualizing factors of something sensed.

4. TEMPORALITY OF OBJECTS OR TEMPORALITY OF OUR RELATIONS TO OBJECTS?

One may ask whether objects of sensations are fully determined by their quality and locality. Isn't there a temporal determination also?

It appears that Brentano at first seemed to hold this interpretation. Just as physical phenomena are determined spatially, they are also temporally presented to us in an absolutely determined manner. Physical objects appear in such a manner that they "have different temporal determinations" (*mit ihren verschiedenen zeitlichen Bestimmtheiten*).³² Temporal differences are observed as inhering in objects. Their temporality according to this observation is included in their presentation as a qualitative moment. But assume this were so, we would have a past-time-presentation of things past, a present-time-presentation of present objects, etc. But is there a past-time-presentation? Brentano holds that every presentation is given 'in time', specifically in present time, *modo praesenti*. The problem now seems to be that we are presented with momentary objects only, objects which briefly appear in a 'spotlight', so to speak. Brentano now holds that in sensations of objects and their differences there is an actual intuition of time (*Zeitanschauung*) involved. We experience something adjoining our sensation. Brentano calls it 'proteraisthesis' (former awareness) or 'spontaneous association' (*ursprüngliche Assoziation*). It is in this way that we experience the source of our concept of time.

Proteraisthesis is exemplified by experiencing something being (shortly) before another thing or after another thing, such as the experience of perseverance, motion, and change of objects, the hearing of a word, a syllable, a sequence of a song or a part of the song. By experiencing proteraisthesis

³² Brentano 1924, 190 (Engl. 135). Cf. Chisholm 1993, 11-23.

phenomena we are enabled to build the abstract concepts of posteriority, presence, future and temporal continua.³³

Take a triad *c-e-g*, and in this sequence. We could say that in being presented with a musical note *g* at a time *t*, our proteraisthesis of the note *e* presents note *e* as past and note *c* as even more past. We are presented now, at time *t* with something past and with something even more past. Can we say, that notes *c* and *e* 'are' in the past or that they have some sort of property of being past? This wouldn't be a proper determination. The expression 'something past' doesn't express a genuine, but a 'modifying' attribute, it doesn't imply its (genuine, present) 'existence': "A sound is not strictly, but only in a modified way, contained in a past sound... 'Past' relates to 'sound' not as a determining enriching, but as a modifying description".³⁴

When we hear the note *g* (as primary object of our example) we have the experience of an accompanying proteraisthesis, which has as its primary object not the past note *e*, but the present memory of the past presentation of tone *e*. So we have a *modified intentional relation*.

All our sensations occur 'in' time, in a temporal continuum which we are able to notice. What there is, exists as temporal border or boundary of both, of what has been and of what will be. This *Zeitliche* (i.e. *modo praesenti*) according to Brentano is a *Reales* we relate to *modo recto*; whereas to something past and something in the future as borders or boundaries of the temporal we relate only *modo obliquo*.³⁵

So it seems obvious that not the objects of our sensations but *our relations* towards them underly temporal modifications.

"While something, originally given in present time, appears as past more and more, there are no other objects presented, but the same thing is presented in an other way, in an other mode of presentation".³⁶

5. MODES OF RELATIONS TO THE OBJECT

We have spoken about primary objects and their local, qualitative, and temporal determinations. We were able to discuss these only as objects of sensations, as non-real (*uneigentliche*), 'only phenomenally' existing, 'objectively' given, mere intentional, believed objects or as "contents" perceived in

³³ Cf. Brentano 1976, XXV, 56, 59.

³⁴ Brentano 1982, 94, 19.

³⁵ Cf. Brentano 1956, 158-172.

³⁶ Brentano 1976, 96. Cf. also Brentano 1974, 45-52.

different modes by the subject.³⁷ On the other hand, it was stated that the subject and its parts, its intentional acts and its self-consciousness, are real things *qua* 'inner perception'.

Brentano had said in 1874, that he distinguished primary and secondary objects only 'conceptually'.³⁸ 'According to the nature of things' there has to be some prior object of presentation somehow prior, so that we are enabled to refer to, yet we have the 'primary' object (e.g. a note) in one and the same act in which we perceive the 'secondary' object (e.g. the hearing of this note). In one and the same psychic act, there occurs a "characteristic amalgamation of the accompanying presentation with its object" (*eigentümliche Verschmelzung der begleitenden Vorstellung mit ihrem Objekte*) because of its twofold energy (*Diploseenergie*).³⁹

Brentano considered this 'amalgamation' of a psychic relation with its object in a twofold way in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*. He held that the act and the object belong to *one reality* though they conceptually are different. The treatises on *Deskriptive Psychologie* and time-consciousness provided as one of its results the concept of the "modifying determination" (*modifizierende Bestimmung*). A synthesis of presentations (*Vorstellungssynthese*) of a *Reale* — a concrete thing or name — and of a modifying adjunct — such as past-time-adjuncts, *non-realia*, *irrealia*, *negativa*, *possibilia* (e.g. former minister) — is not able to explicate and determine its 'objects'. Only real, autosemantic names or concepts 'tend' to evoke presentations.⁴⁰ No-names do not; they do not 'motivate' presentations and there is, consequently, no thinking evoked.

We here are confronted with Brentano's progressive dichotomy of the real and not-real. 'Real' is the abbreviated expression for someone being presented with a real thing; judging about a real thing; loving or hating it. 'Existence of an object' is the abbreviated expression for the existence of someone who is presented with something real, something concrete, something of the same genus as the thinker: The thinker and his "psychic acts and their differences belong to the (real) objects".⁴¹ Because of the 'amalgamation' of thinker and object there is no need to maintain the difference of the objects on the one hand and the different relations towards them on the other.

³⁷ Cf. Brentano 1924, 124 f. (Engl. 88 f.).

³⁸ Brentano 1924, 179. Cf. also 180 f. (Engl. 127).

³⁹ Brentano 1924, 183 (Engl. 130).

⁴⁰ Cf. Brentano 1966, 377; Brentano 1925, 2 and 246 (Engl. 345 f.).

⁴¹ Cf. Brentano 1925, 216 and 239 (Engl. 324 and 339); Brentano 1966, 217.

6. THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE

Brentano raises the question what something 'real' means.

Perhaps the question is solved best this way: The expression 'real' is akin to expressions like 'water', 'air', 'beer'. Any object of a presentation, *if it exists*, is real, be it a mere boundary, a physical part of a body, a substance *per se*, or a substance together with one or more accidents, or a collective of those; and the presentation being either determined individually or being universal.⁴²

We see there is no shortage of realia provided only that they belong to the most general homogenous univocal concept of our thinking: to the *Reale, Dingliche, Seiende im allgemeinen*.

There are real things *simpliciter*; parts of things; whole things; continual things; collective things; whole things insofar as they have parts; continual things and collective things which are certain determined wholes (*Kollektive diskreter Dinge*).⁴³ They consist in discrete real parts out of which they are composed.

"A properly distinct presentational relation refers to a whole as well as especially to its parts which then appear related to each other in a determining fashion".⁴⁴

In analyzing a non-distinct whole we get a distinct presentation of it. A determined connection of genuine parts provides (functions as) an enrichment of their presentation, and so for parts of parts. By a multiple clear and distinct presentation of one thing we gain 'a new' differentiated presentation of concrete or attributive unity of it (a synthesis only via analysis). There is no alien moment in it.

Of some complex things such as of some person who himself is related to something, we obtain a more clear and distinct presentation by considering the complex thing with respect to those moments of it in which we have a direct (*modo recto*) presentation and of which we have co-presentations (*modo obliquo*).

A notorious example for this is Brentano's lover of flowers (*Blumenfreund*). When I have a presentation of a *Blumenfreund* I am presented with the *Blumenfreund* directly, *modo recto*. And I am presented with the flowers he loves indirectly, *modo obliquo*. I have a presentation of the composition *Blumenfreund modo recto* and *modo obliquo*. In identifying both presentations

⁴² Brentano 1966, 380; Posthumous writings *Metaphysik M 83*, 13, § 36.

⁴³ Cf. Brentano 1933, 66.

⁴⁴ Brentano 1925, 145 f.

of him and the flowers I gain a “attributive connection of the presentations” (*attributive Vorstellungsverbindung*).⁴⁵

We are able to gain a presentation *modo obliquo* only when we have a presentation *modo recto*. One should take care to be aware of the *Schein der Zweigliedrigkeit*.⁴⁶ The *modi obliqui* are conceptually one sidedly dependent (*einseitig abhängig*) on the *modi recti*, which are one sidedly detachable (*einseitig ablösbar*). There are many one-sidedly detachable (autosemantic) things, and there are some more onesidedly dependent (*relativliche*) things and compositions of them to be analyzed and brought together to an analyzed synthesis.

Explicating his *Transzendentalphilosophie* (the theoretical foundational part of his *metaphysics*), his ‘phenomenology’ of the reale, and ‘ontology of mind’ Brentano in my view does not reduce or minimize reality to a ‘truncated world’ as Bergmann states, but rather demonstrates a rich reality by the multiple modes of relations to what there is (*mannigfache Modalbefassung des Seienden*).⁴⁷

7. PSYCHICAL PHENOMENA

So far, I have considered Brentano’s theory about intentionality of the act-object correlation. I have dealt with both sides of an act. Now I look more explicitly into the psychic aspect.

Psychical Phenomena (ps. ph.) Brentano exemplifies by the marks or properties (*Merkmale, Eigentümlichkeiten*) as follows:

Any presentation (“the act of presenting, not the presented”) via sensation or imagination is such as hearing a sound, seeing a coloured object, sensing warm or cold; thinking a general concept; judging (recollecting, expecting, inferring, doubting, and the like); emotion (willing, loving, hating and the like).⁴⁸

Ps. ph. are classified by Brentano as *acts* of presentation; *acts* of judging; *acts* of emotion.

Acts of presentation are the ‘fundamental’ ps. ph.; judgments and emotions are ‘superposed’ ones.⁴⁹

There is a hierarchical interrelation from ‘bottom’ upwards in ps. ph. in such a way that

⁴⁵ Brentano 1925, 145-7.

⁴⁶ Brentano 1933, 174.

⁴⁷ Cf. Brentano 1933, 1924, XLIV (Kraus); Bergmann 1967, 238 ff; Brentano 1933, *passim*.

⁴⁸ Brentano 1924, 111 f. (Engl. 78 f.).

⁴⁹ Brentano 1924, 112, 136 (Engl. 80); Brentano 1982, 84.

- (1) Ps. ph. are either presentations or based upon presentations. Presentations are one-sidedly separable, independent ps. ph. Judgings and emotions are one-sided dependent on presentations which are constituent parts of the superposed phenomena.
- (2) Presentations are of a (relative) simple content; judgings and emotions presuppose and include presentations and are, *in addition*, affirmative or negative attitudes, loving or hating attitudes towards the presented thing.⁵⁰ Brentano emphasizes, that we do not have (symbolic) presentations of presentations such as *Vorstellungsvorstellung* (Bolzano)⁵¹ but perceptual presentations (*Wahrnehmungsvorstellungen*) of objects, things.
- (3) A mere aggregate or a mere 'bundle' or a simple association of presentations (*komplexe Vorstellungen*), does not per se form judgments and emotions; presentations are not judgments but *motivate* them.
- (4) Ps. ph. differ in their modes of relation, yet they always appear as parts of a conscious unity.⁵²
- (5) Ps. ph. refer to their objects in different ways. There is not only a different attitude towards one and the same object when we either have a presentation or different aspect presentations of it or when we judge about it or when we have an emotional attitude towards it.

There are also, as pointed out above, different *modes* of attitudes in any ps. ph.: (a) temporal modes of attitudes and (b) direct and indirect modes of attitudes. Brentano here holds:

- (a) "That it is impossible to have presentations in a general temporal mode"⁵³ and that a specific temporal mode is necessarily involved in any presentation. The presentation changes according to its temporal modes (present, past, future). A present presentation is a direct one (*modo recto*); a future or past time presentation an indirect/modified one (*modo obliquo*).
- (b) A second differentiation of modes of presentation is the differentiation of direct and indirect modes in that respect that the direct mode is fundamental for presentation, as it is present in any presentation. The indirect mode is given, in addition, "whenever we think about a psychic relation". In this

⁵⁰ Cf. Brentano 1924, 126 (Engl. 89).

⁵¹ Bolzano 1837, § 90, *Symbolische Vorstellungen*, where he deals with the special presentations in which the very concept of presentation occurs. Bolzano, finding no better name (*in Ermanglung eines schicklicheren Namens*) calls them *symbolische oder Vorstellungsvorstellung*, which is a "presentation of a mere symbol" (*Vorstellung von einem bloßen Zeichen*).

⁵² Cf. Brentano 1924, 137 (Engl. 97).

⁵³ Brentano 1925, 144 (Engl. 280).

case we think about someone who performs a psychic act (a thinker) directly, and what he is thinking about (his thought) indirectly.⁵⁴

TABLE I

| Description of classes of acts | | | | | |
|--|--------------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|-----------------------------|
| 1. <i>Fundamental acts</i> | | | | | |
| ↓ | | | ↓ | | |
| sensory presentation | | | conceptual presentation | | |
| ↓ | | | ↓ | | |
| e.g. imagination, reflexes | | | e.g. original association of time | | |
| ↓ | | | ↓ | | |
| presentation and implicit assertoric belief of a primary object | | 'proteresthesis'; presentation and modifying attribution of a primary object | | conceptual noetic perception and conceptual affective perception | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | ↓ | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | 2. <i>Superposed acts</i> | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | ↓ | |
| sensory phenomena in relation to a <i>primary</i> object | | a past/future presentation of a <i>primary</i> object | | fundamental relations of acts to their <i>secondary</i> object | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | superposed relations of acts based on, and motivated by, fundamental acts | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | ↓ | |
| contain a presentation of something concrete sensorial | | ↓ | | purely noetic acts | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | purely epithymetic (affective) acts | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | ↓ | |
| primary objects, concrete things composed by con- rescent / concomitant parts, specific spatial quality | | qualities which fill a space (e.g. colour, sound) | | presentation of something present, concrete and of something which is in a temporal distance to it | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | presentation and evident, apodictic affirmation and apperception | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | presentation and emotive relation to its secondary object | |
| ↓ | | ↓ | | ↓ | |
| genus spatiality | genus brightness/darkness | genus (un)saturatedness | genus temporality | genus noesis (judgment) | genus affection (love/hate) |
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| concept of spatiality | concept of brightness/darkness | concept of (un)saturatedness | concept of time | concept of judgment | concept of affection |

⁵⁴ Cf. Brentano 1925, 145 (Engl. 281 f.); cf. Husserl's (1896) differentiation of presentation into concrete sensory perception (*Anschauung*) and concept (*Begriff*) (1990-1991, 137-176).

- (6) These modes or modifications may take place in any psychic act, not only in presentations. In so far as there is any modification in the presentation it follows that the modifications take place in the superposed acts (*termini*) as well. If there are classes of presentations, there will be classes of judgments and emotions, too. The reason for this is that presentations serve as the bases and the motivations for the other acts. They provide the 'material' for and 'motivate' the other (superposed) acts.
- (7) The description of ps. ph. is a direct description of these ps. ph. as they are, i.e. their nature (*die Dinge, wie sie wirklich sind; die Sachen selbst*) together with their internal structure.
To describe an act is to describe first of all the 'fundament of a relation'. Its terminus need not exist.⁵⁵ The external object of this relation is given 'objectively', as object, as *esse relative*. It is given as terminus of the relation which is, if existing, co-present. (The judgment that there is a thought about A is indeed equivalent to: there is an A-thinker.)⁵⁶ If the object is an inner object (an other psychic act), this object is regarded by Brentano as primary object of a former secondary ps. ph. and it is treated in analogy to ph. ph.
- (8) Ps. ph. are characterized by the medieval terms 'intentional inexistence', 'mental inexistence', 'objective inexistence'; in Brentano's terms, by a reference to a content, direction toward an object, or immanent objectivity: "A ps. ph. contains something as object, though not every ps. ph. in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on."⁵⁷

Ps. ph., in contrast to ph. ph., are not only of 'intentional in-existence' but also of *real* existence.⁵⁸

Ps. ph. are directly evident by 'inner experience';⁵⁹ they can be perceived in the strict sense of the word.⁶⁰ We are directly aware of them, when they occur. We can distinguish them from one another. And we know what it is to have presentations, what it is to judge, what it is to have emotions.⁶¹

⁵⁵ Cf. Brentano 1956, 193.

⁵⁶ Brentano 1930, 32.

⁵⁷ Brentano 1924, 124 f. (Engl. 88).

⁵⁸ Cf. Brentano 1924, 129 and 132 (Engl. 92 and 94).

⁵⁹ Brentano 1924, 128, 139 ff. (Engl. 91, 101 ff.).

⁶⁰ Brentano 1924, 129 (Engl. 92).

⁶¹ Cf. Brentano 1924, 195. Cf. Chisholm 1988, 15-17.

8. 'INTENTIONAL IN-EXISTENCE' OF PHENOMENA

Brentano emphasizes⁶² three essentials of the mental / intentional / objective inexistence:

- (1) It is an immaterial existence *in* the mind.
- (2) Inexistence (*Einwohnung*) is not a non-existence but rather an existence in the improper (*uneigentlich, nicht-wirklich*) sense.
- (3) Existence in the proper (*eigentlich*) sense has not to be confounded with inexistence; otherwise this would involve a contradiction. At a later point Brentano states, in agreement with Hamilton, that "a subject-object" is essential to mental inexistence.⁶³

Brentano explicates this subject-object inexistence/coexistence by quoting a passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (1074, b 35-36; cf. also 1072, b 20): "Knowledge, sensation, opinion and thinking about always seem to relate to something else, but only incidentally to themselves".

Ps. ph., though they are internal, never are 'subjectively subjective' as Hamilton supposes with regard to feelings. They never lack an object of some sort. By way of intentional relation they are eo ipso related to something (*etwas*) which in turn stands in relation to one or more ps. ph. So this something is an *esse relative*.

Ps. ph. are qualified by their 'twofold energy' (*Diploseenergie*) of relation. While they are directed to something else, a 'primary object', they are at the same time reflexively directed to themselves as 'secondary object'. They thereby show themselves in inner experience to be exactly what they are. If we are aware of them explicitly, we know of our ps. ph. directly and of the ph. ph., the correlates of ps. ph. indirectly, that is, relatively.

Ps. ph. are such as 'sensings' (*Empfindungen* — cf. § 2 above and this § infra), which 'are presentations'. They are 'in themselves' and as such they are "fundamental presentations of real (present, concrete) psychic contents". They *indicate* something else as they are also "fundamental presentations of real physical phenomena (objects)" or of "presentations of something which doesn't exist really"⁶⁴, but of which we have content presentations.

This view is similar to what Twardowski⁶⁵ calls objectless presentations (*gegenstandslose Vorstellung*): Twardowski deals with the problem of

⁶² Cf. Brentano 1924, note.

⁶³ Brentano 1924, 127 (Engl. 90).

⁶⁴ Brentano 1982, 133, 139, 144.

⁶⁵ Twardowski 1894, § 5.

presentations to which no object corresponds. He thereby refers to Bolzano.⁶⁶ Bolzano's examples are as follows: nothing, round square, green virtue, golden mountain.⁶⁷ Twardowski draws the following conclusions: 1. The expression 'nothing' cannot mean a presentation; 2. Any presentation has an object. Sentences with properties which exclude each other in fact show, by analysis, that a presentation takes place and a psychical content exists.

The expression 'objectless presentation' is such that it involves a contradiction. For there is no presentation which wouldn't have a presentation of something as object; there is no such presentation. On the contrary there are many presentations whose object doesn't exist, either because this object comprises inner contradictions and therefore cannot exist; or because the object in fact doesn't exist. But even in this case an object is presented, so that one is entitled to speak of presentations whose objects do not exist, but one is not entitled to speak of presentations having the property of being objectless.⁶⁸

Brentano maintains the distinction between presentations and other acts. In presentations something is *only* presented, in judgments the same thing or the presented content, respectively, is judged. Saying that something does not exist *means* judging about the presented thing. It means the denial of the existence of the presented thing altogether or to deny something of it.

At another point Brentano reexamines the concept of presentation: "I haven't criticised the concept of presentation basically enough and meant that presentation doesn't take part at all in acts of confirmation or rejection".

The rationale for this is: "There is no act which doesn't contain a judgment relation, because in every act the inner awareness of the act takes place, and so we have in fact two classes of acts, 1. acts of presentations and judgments, 2. acts of emotions".⁶⁹

Brentano here further maintains that, in the case of sensations, the primary object of sensation and the act of sensation itself is affirmed. This act of judgment is a 'lower judgment'. The judgment about the lower judgment therefore is a higher judgment.

So "our acts of thinking begin with affirmative judgments" (i.e. lower judgments). 'Higher judgments' such as rejections are more complex judgments and have not the same presentations as bases but refer to the *same object*.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Bolzano 1837, § 67.

⁶⁷ Cf. Höfler & Meinong 1890, §§ 6, 17.

⁶⁸ Twardowski 1894, 29 (my translation).

⁶⁹ Brentano 1903, 25 and 26.

⁷⁰ Brentano 1903, 28. In A. Meinong, 'inferiora' serve as bases for 'superiora'. Meinong, in contrast to Brentano, rather deals with modifications of *objects* whereas Brentano argues in favour of modifications of *relations* to an object. Cf. Meinong 1899, esp. § 7, "Erfahrungsgegenstände und fundierte Gegenstände".

There seems to be a difficulty involved here concerning the phenomena of sensings and their objects.

We may dissolve this difficulty if we consider:

- (1) That the presentation of a 'real physical phenomenon' can be an imaginatory presentation or a fantasy presentation⁷¹ of something real. This need not exist;
- (2) Something real, which is presented *indirectly* or *modo obliquo*, is thus a byproduct in a *modified* way (vide above: modes of presentation).

An other way to meet this difficulty is taking a presentation as a ps. ph. in which no contradiction is involved. When I have a presentation (imagination) of a golden mountain, I imagine a golden colour *and* a mountain; I know that I have these presentations. My presentation is a 'sensory consciousness' (*sinnliches Bewußtsein*).⁷² It does not judge about the existence of its object or its content. It just *has* it. But as soon as someone speaks about his having "a presentation of something which doesn't exist really", his (higher) judgment *about* his presentation is involved.

We can also meet this difficulty in discerning the two equivocal uses of the word *Empfindungen*.⁷³ We speak (at least in the German language) of *Empfindung* in the meaning of

- (1) 'I sense a colour' (*ich empfinde eine Farbe*), and
- (2) 'I feel joy' (*ich empfinde Freude*).

*Empfindung*₁ refers to a physical phenomenon or, analytically (in the Brentanian sense) spoken, to the "real contents" (logical parts/elements) of such a phenomenon, to its necessary spatiality and to the necessary qualities which fill a space or are necessary concomitant parts of a space — even if there is no concrete space (but only something in analogy to space / something space-like) here and now.⁷⁴ So *Empfindung*₁ means, in the words of Chisholm, to sense qualitatively, or appearing to qualitatively. *Empfindung*₂ is a presentation of a certain psychological phenomenon, a joy about *Empfindung*₁, and its qualities.

*Empfindung*₁ refers to something sensed (*Empfundenes*); *Empfindung*₂ is a self referring act of sensing, referring to the sensed 'primary object', or the content of, only indirectly, and to the act of sensing itself directly. It comprises

⁷¹ Cf. Brentano 1924, 111 (Engl. 79).

⁷² Cf. Brentano 1928.

⁷³ Cf. James 1890, ch. 7.

⁷⁴ Cf. Brentano 1982, 88-92, 144.

itself as 'secondary object'.⁷⁵ Here is a unity of both the act of sensation and of what the sensation is about: A joy about a joy.⁷⁶

9. THE ACT-CONTENT DISTINCTION

Or could we say 'a joy *in* a joy'?

It seems to me that Brentano, in his analysis of the modes of ps. ph. is describing the kinds of relations, and by doing so, the modes and states of 'intentional inexistence'.

When we reflect on our relations to an object we comprise the having of this object in different ways. We may say it is present to us or it is in front of our mind. Sometimes we say it is 'in the mind'.

Brentano holds that an act always has a content, not always an object. A content is always the content of an act, of which it is one-sidedly dependent. If there is no act, there is no content, and if an act takes place, it will have a content.

It seems that the act-content is to be looked at in analogy to the twofold energy of an act (a ps. ph.): In the same act, a primary relation to an object takes place and, incidentally, a secondary relation to itself. Similarly we may say that while the act takes place (other relating, to an object if it is there, or not), at the same time and incidentally, the content is given.

In general, Brentano speaks of a content as included in an act.⁷⁷ So content is regarded as a 'concomitant' part of any act, not a (really) separable part, but a (mere) 'distinctional' part.

The one-sided relation between act and its content may be stated this way: An act, if it takes place, comprises a content. An act has a comprising function (*Einschließen*). The content is included in the act, is an act-implicit part (*Eingeschlossenheit*).

Being a (proper, implicit) part of something according to Brentano's mereology means that the part is (partly) *characterizing* the whole in which it is inherent. Being a part further means to *individualize* the whole (the accidental whole act). One could now say, that a content (partly) characterizes and individualizes the act.

But the content *per se* is a mere dependent, concomitant, distinctional, part of an act. So the content takes place when the act takes place, and changes

⁷⁵ Cf. Brentano 1924, 127 (Engl. 90); 1928, 78.

⁷⁶ Cf. Brentano 1982, 133: In a sensorial presentation of something there is simultaneously a presentation of this presentation, a *Wahrnehmungsvorstellung*.

⁷⁷ Cf. Brentano 1982, 134-145.

whenever the act changes, and not vice versa. One may now say: The description of a real whole by its dependent part would be a modified, not proper, description. It would be a description of the whole by or after an 'improper distinctional part'. Thus the description would be a 'modified', not a 'pure' one. On the other hand, being a *proper* part means that it is given simultaneously with, or in the act. So it may serve to properly describe the act from inside, so to say. And it may serve to logically describe (define) the acts structure while the act takes place. This may be regarded as a 'pure' description.

Brentano's descriptive undertaking is to make *explicit* what is given implicitly, to make sure (evident) what is given confoundedly. In this sense the explication of the implicit content is an analytic treatment *about* the implicit content, and the modes of their implication.

The verbalization of a content is a statement about the *acts* content, is stating the fact *that* something takes place in the act. It is a propositional attitude about the *act-content*.

We may form propositions about it in stating "that there is an object in the mind" or "that there is/exists an inexistence". Brentano holds that substantivated infinitives (*Substantivierte Infinitive*) such as *the being* of something; and that propositions (*objektive Nebensätze; daß die Sache sich so verhält*) show an improper use or an improper extension of the word *to be*. It is used as if there were such things as propositional entities and substantivated infinitives which could stay on their own, independently of someone who performs propositions etc. and to which is ascribed an infinite existence (the being as such; *das Sein als solches*). In a proper speech we should not speak of an 'existence' or 'being' of a content. This would be an improper speech (*uneigentliche Rede*). What there *is* is one who performs an act which on its side bears a content. (I can perform an act, not a content.) Describing a content therefore is, properly speaking, attributing/ascribing the content to an act. And it is describing the act (a whole) from the viewpoint of a content (a part). As Brentano would say, it is the description of a whole according to its part (*einem Teile nach*). The content is the explication of the *meaning* of an act, not of the object of an act. When we regard meaning as act-implicit (in analogy to a secondary ps. ph., *sekundäres Bewußtsein*), the content is given incidentally. If we are aware of the act content *explicitly* (*wenn wir den Inhalt 'bemerken'*), we regard the content in analogy to a primary object. But Brentano emphasizes that "The analogy between contents and objects bears no legitimation. The contents

cannot become objects as vice versa no object can destinate the totality of a content".⁷⁸

"There is no justification for this analogy... drawn between contents and objects... just as, on the other hand, no object can be the whole of a content".⁷⁹

We may perhaps say that there is an analogy between *treating* the act-content-relation and the act-object-relation. But the analogy in respect of the act-content-relation is a one sided relation only. The act-object-relation may be regarded as a mutual relation: The content is a mere *ens elocutionis vel rationis* whereas the object may be both: an *ens elocutionis* (a thing *as* thing), and a *real* thing.

If we regard the content as an independent thing (i.e. act independent thing) we would make the mistake of substantiating an *ens non reale*; we would unnecessarily, and indeed wrongly, multiply 'things'. We would take an improper moment (*Merkmal*) to be the real whole.

A content is the meaning or signification (*Bedeutung*) of an act in so far as it is the expression or the proposition⁸⁰ of *how* it is implicitly thought, and *that* it is thought. A content, it seems to me, has the function of a concomitant proposition/confirmation that the act takes place. If the act doesn't take place, the content will not be there.

Take an example⁸¹ of Brentano's: *Wer Gott nennt, gibt seine Vorstellung von ihm zum Ausdruck* (God is the object of my act of presentation; my expression *contains* implicitly, *that* I have this presentation).

Wer sagt: es gibt einen Gott, bringt seinen Glauben an ihn zum Ausdruck. My belief in God/my judgment about the existence of God is the act; God is the object of my belief/my judgment; my propositional attitude, *that* I believe/judge to be a God would be the content of my actual believing/judging. The content (the statement *that* I believe in the existence of God) is to make an indirect and secondary statement about my actual believing in God.

The difference between act and content, it seems to me, is not a real difference but only a distinction or conceptual difference. It is the distinction of a knowing/believing/judging etc. act and a confirmation or *stating that* I know/believe/judge. But this job is already done by inner awareness, which has

⁷⁸ Brentano 1925, 161 (Engl. 239). Cf. Brentano 1924, 182 and 188 (Engl. 129 and 134); cf. also Brentano 1930, 103.

⁷⁹ Brentano 1973, 293. Cf. Brentano 1925, 161.

⁸⁰ Stumpf 1919, 106 f.: In seiner *Logik* nimmt Brentano "den Ausgang von Betrachtungen über die Gedanken und ihren Ausdruck in der Sprache und unterscheidet sowohl bei den Namen wie bei den Aussagen das, was sie *ausdrücken* (die psychischen Funktionen, die sich in ihnen kundgeben) von dem, was sie *bedeuten*. Eine Aussage bedeutet, daß etwas anzuerkennen oder zu verwerfen sei. Dies nannte Brentano den Urteilsinhalt. Er kann sprachlich in infinitivischer Form oder in Daß-Sätzen ausgedrückt werden".

⁸¹ Brentano 1955, 18.

a judgment function. So, extra content statements seem, in a way, redundant; in an other way, a sort of 'externalization' of (inner) psychic functions.

In the sense of Brentano we can say that a content of a ps. ph. is something which is a concrescent part of ps. ph. Therefore, describing the content (if possible) would mean to describe the act from inside. The act, so to say, would describe itself in its totality in inner awareness. This would be an explicite 'determining description'.

Here we have a good example of the essential role of parts in Brentano's thought, of his 'principle of mereological essentialism'.⁸²

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⁸² Chisholm 1982, 8. Cf. Baumgartner & Simons 1993, 53-77.

TABLE 2

| Unity (not simplicity) of consciousness (conscious ps. ph.) Description of components (parts and elements) of consciousness and their interrelation | | | |
|--|--|--|---|
| real separable parts (=acts) \exists | | mere distintional (not separable) parts \exists | |
| mutual separable parts (m.s.p.) such as seeing-hearing | one sided separable parts (o.s.s.p.) such as seeing - noticing of seeing; presenting - judging; presenting - loving / hating | proper distintional parts 1. concomitant/concrescent parts of act (e.g. quality, directedness, evidence, modality of an act) 2. Logical parts / one sided distintional separability e.g. sensing - sensing colourly - sensing redly 3. Parts of the intentional pair of act correlates of an act: subject - immanent object (seeing, something seen) 4. Parts of ps. relation primary relation to an object - secondary reflexive relation (seeing a coloured thing - reflexion on this seeing a coloured thing) last proper dist. parts (= elements) | improper distintional parts qua modification (improper objects of proper distintional parts, 1-4) e.g. ad 3. modified parts of the intentional pair of correlates a) in the (real) act: seeing colourly entails colour only in a modified way; b) in the object (the not real act-correlate): seen colour entails colour not as proper distintional part but only in a modified way (qua modifying distinction) parts of these parts a) in the (real) act: seeing specifically colours entails a specific colour in a modified way b) in the act-correlate: seen specific colour entails a specific colour not as proper specific distintive part but only in a modified way (qua modifying distinction) last modified dist. parts (= elements) |
| parts of m.s.p. (e.g. parts of seeing; parts of hearing) | parts of o.s.s.p. (e.g. seeing of a spec. colour) | | |
| last parts of these parts, showing no further mutual separability (= elements = accidents; accidental wholes, entailing an individual substance) | last parts of these parts, showing no further one sided separability (= elements = subject (substance = fundamental reality of ps. ph. (element which individualizes the consciousness)) | | |

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

on:**see also:**

act / object / content
existence / in-existence
intentionality

4.4, 15.4, ,15.5
9.5-8
1.17, 4.3, 6.5, 9

INTENTIONALITY

1. INTENTIONALITY PAST AND PRESENT

When Brentano adapted the notion of intentionality from medieval philosophy he had three purposes in mind:

- (1) the definition of psychology as an independent and objective science alongside physiology,
- (2) the justification of a dualism of physical and psychological phenomena,
- (3) a new and systematic classification of psychological phenomena.

Thus the stage was set for the Brentano School. Anton Marty, Carl Stumpf, Edmund Husserl, Kasimir Twardowski, Christian von Ehrenfels, and Alexius Meinong started projects in philosophy of language, psychology, logic, phenomenology and ontology, which had Brentano's aims in their background. These projects were all defined in terms of the notion of intentionality.¹

Today the interest in intentionality is quite different. Many philosophers employ this notion without accepting Brentano's aims. They do not regard psychology as a separate science alongside (neuro-)physics, they adhere to an identity theory of mind and body, and their interest is not an exhaustive classification of mental phenomena. Daniel Dennett's work is typical in this

¹ It is noteworthy, however, that the term 'intentionality' itself and its cognates are not so frequently used by Brentano's pupils as one would expect. Marty, for instance, merely speaks of a 'subject-object relation' as characteristic of mental phenomena (Marty 1908, § 43). Meinong only tentatively speaks of 'intentional objects', but he clearly advances Brentano's thesis that all mental phenomena have objects which are given in presentation (Meinong 1977, 46). Only Husserl talks freely of 'intentional experiences' and 'intentional relations', but with some reservations of 'intentional objects' (Husserl 1970).

respect. Dennett accepts 'descriptive' or 'folk psychology' only insofar as it is a largely successful device for explaining intentional behaviour, not as a set of irreducible psychological truths.² Dretske diverges from Brentano even further by calling intentionality a "mark of the mental *and* the physical".³ His problem is "how purely physical systems could occupy intentional states",⁴ which is not Brentano's problem at all.⁵

Nonetheless these philosophers are interested in the puzzles to which the notion of intentionality gives rise. Roderick M. Chisholm is famous for having drawn attention to the puzzling questions Brentano left behind:

The general phenomenon of intentionality has two sides. One is that our beliefs, desires, and other intentional attitudes may be 'directed upon' objects which do not exist (Diogenes looked for an honest man.) The other is that, among the objects that do exist, there are some upon which our beliefs, desires, and other intentional attitudes may be directed (there is a dishonest man whom the police is looking for). Some philosophers are puzzled by one side and ask 'How can our beliefs and desires refer to objects that do not exist?' Other philosophers are puzzled about the other side and ask 'How can our beliefs and desires refer to objects that do exist?'.⁶

Chisholm speaks here of two problems, the *problem of nonexistence* and the *problem of objective reference*. These problems correspond to two readings of Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental: (1) the *ontological thesis* that whenever we think there is something existing 'in our minds', and (2) the *psychological thesis* that each mental act involves an intentional reference to something 'outside the mind' of the subject.⁷ In fact however, as Chisholm's examples reveal, there are at least four questions to be distinguished:

- (Q1) How can we believe something that is false?
- (Q2) How can we look for what does not exist?
- (Q3) How can we have false beliefs about something?
- (Q4) How can we look for anything at all?

² See Dennett 1987, ch. 2. As a heuristic device the intentional idiom is ontologically neutral, hence compatible with an identity theory. Similar reasons may have led Brentano to define psychology as the study of mental *phenomena*, not as the study of a mental *substance*. Therefore R. Aquila can argue that even Brentano's position is compatible with an identity theory (Aquila 1977, 1).

³ Dretske 1980, 282. For Dretske intentionality is a matter of bearing information, and this is something that both mental and physical phenomena do.

⁴ Dretske 1980, 285.

⁵ H. Field attributes this problem to Brentano in 1978. He is justly criticised for this in Haldane 1989.

⁶ Chisholm 1967a, 201f.

⁷ See Chisholm 1957 and 1984a.

Questions (Q1) and (Q3) arise for *propositional attitudes* like believing, desiring, doubting, expecting that something is the case. Questions (Q2) and (Q4) arise for *non-propositional attitudes* like loving, imagining, expecting somebody or something.⁸ Do these questions require a particular order of treatment? Must a theory of propositional attitudes be based on a theory of non-propositional attitudes, or is it the other way round? And is there some priority of (Q3) over (Q1) and of (Q4) over (Q2)?

In the Brentano School non-propositional acts are taken as basic, but for different reasons.⁹ The Meinongian tradition assigns to every mental act, whether propositional or not, whether true or false, misdirected or successful, an *intentional object*. These objects stand in dependence relations to each other. The complex object of a propositional act, what Meinong calls an 'objective', depends on the simple objects of non-propositional acts. For this reason the latter acts must be fundamental for Meinong. By contrast, Husserl and his followers do not assign an object to every mental act. They focus on the notion of *intentional directedness*. This directedness Husserl first explains for acts with simple objects, then for acts where the object is missing and then he transfers both explanations to acts directed at states of affairs.¹⁰ Unlike Meinong, Husserl is not committed to an ontological dependence of complex acts on simple presentations.¹¹ It is the notion of 'directedness' and the order of its explanation which make non-propositional acts basic for Husserl.

Just as the Brentano School is divided into these two traditions, modern theorists of *Mental Representation* are divided by a similar question. Does our talk about representational states commit us to such entities as Mental Representations or even to a Language of Thought? Jerry Fodor takes Mental Representations seriously and defines them as symbols realized in thinking, just as words are realized in speaking and writing. This position contrasts with the position of John Searle who attributes a representational content directly to mental acts without invoking any intermediary entities for doing the representational work.

There is one assumption which all participants in this debate, whether modern or traditional, agree on: they all accept propositional entities. Meinong accepts objectives, Husserl accepts states of affairs, and Fodor and Searle

⁸ Note that most intentional verbs can be used both for ascribing propositional and non-propositional acts.

⁹ There are exceptions if 'Brentano School' is taken in a wider sense. G. Bergmann, for instance, claims that "the content of every awareness is propositional" (Bergmann 1972, 292).

¹⁰ This strategy is already outlined in Husserl's early criticism of Twardowski. See Husserl 1979, 312.

¹¹ In fact Husserl argues against Brentano's view that judgements and other mental acts include simple presentations within them (1970, 23-38). I discuss this foundational view of Brentano in section 4.

accept propositions.¹² They accept these entities as the *objects* of our propositional attitudes. Not so Brentano after 1874. His account of belief and desire makes do with the same entities as are already involved in his analysis of non-propositional acts. But it is not clear what those entities are to which Brentano is committed from the beginning. That makes it difficult to say what Brentano's strategy is in answering questions (Q1)-(Q4).

In what follows I want to explore this idiosyncrasy of Brentano's theory, not as a historical curiosity, but as a source of inspiration for dealing with contemporary issues. I start out from a standard version of the representational theory of mind (section 2). I then consider two possible ways of attributing such a theory to Brentano (sections 3-5). The first approach emphasizes the fundamental role of presentations. The second approach leads to the result that only acts which are neither propositional nor non-propositional can play this fundamental role. In the final section I briefly consider the merits of this latter interpretation.

2. INTENTIONALITY AND REPRESENTATION

In present philosophical jargon the notion of intentionality is intimately linked to the notion of representation. To see how this link is established we may consider the following principles used by John Searle:¹³

- (P1) Intentionality is that property of mental states and events by which they are directed at objects and states of affairs.
- (P2) Mental states are directed at objects and states of affairs by representing them.
- (P3) Mental states represent objects or states of affairs by being satisfied under certain conditions.
- (P4) The condition of satisfaction of a mental state determines which object or which state of affairs it is directed at.
- (P5) If the satisfaction conditions of a mental state are not satisfied, the state lacks an intentional object, but still has a representational content.

I shall refer to these principles as *Searle's Theory of Mental Representation*, (ST) for short. The problems raised by this theory are numerous. I mention here only the most important ones.

¹² The difference between these types of entities is explored, both from a modern and a traditional perspective, in Künne 1987.

¹³ See Searle 1983, ch. 1.

1. First of all it may be questioned whether 'intentionality' is a property, and if it is, whether it is a property of mental states and events, as principle (P1) tells us. Perhaps only *persons* are directed upon objects. Mental states and events may then be called 'intentional' only derivatively because of what it means *to be* in such a state or *to undergo* such an event, not because of any peculiar property these states and events exemplify.
2. Principle (P2) raises the question whether intentionality is only a special case of a more general phenomenon which is to be found outside the mental domain as well, e.g. in linguistic utterances. If intentionality is just a special case of representation, there is no reason why it should have any priority. On the other hand, if intentionality *is* basic, then we must show how all other forms of representation can be derived from intentional states.¹⁴
3. Principle (P3) tells us that successful representation is a matter of satisfying some conditions.¹⁵ But what *kind* of conditions? There are conditions for a linguistic description to apply, for requirements to be met, for desires to be fulfilled, for a flower to open its blossom, etc. Is there anything in common to these various cases of 'satisfaction'? Naturalism assumes that we can explain linguistic conditions in terms of mental conditions, and mental conditions in terms of biological or physical ones. But so far this is only a promise, and in fact there may not be anything like *the* satisfaction of a condition.
4. Conditions of satisfaction help us, according to principle (P4), to distinguish between different beliefs, different desires, different intentions, etc. How fine a discrimination is this? For instance, can beliefs about cats and beliefs about members of a phenomenologically indistinguishable species have the same conditions of satisfaction? Is a desire to drink identical with a desire to get rid of thirst? The latter desire might be satisfied also by taking a pill. Is there a single criterion for handling all such cases?
5. Finally, there is a problem about discriminating mental states which are satisfied by nothing. According to principle (P5) we identify such states in the same way as we identify states which *are* satisfied. We identify them in terms of their representational *content*, not in terms of what they fail to represent. This solution becomes problematic if there are states whose

¹⁴ I discuss the case for the primacy of the intentional in my 1986. See also Young 1972 and Chisholm 1984b.

¹⁵ Again, one could question the ontological status of a 'condition' as something distinct from the event or fact which satisfies it. I assume here that talk about 'conditions', e.g. truth-conditions, can be analysed as carrying no ontological commitment.

content requires that they have an object as well. There may even be states whose object is an actual *part* of their content.

These problems are prominent in contemporary discussions about intentionality. Here I must leave them aside because I want to turn to the problem which makes (ST) unacceptable from Brentano's point of view. This is the univocal treatment of objects and states of affairs.

3. BRENTANO'S RULE

In a letter to Anton Marty, dated 2.9.1906, we find the following passage:

We are not considering the question whether contents of judgement exist *qua* contents of judgement. We want to consider rather whether something exists in and by itself, which, under certain conditions, may *become* the content of a judgement, and indeed of a correct judgement.¹⁶

The distinction Brentano introduces here is delicate, but important. To consider a content *qua* content means to consider it as something *contained* in a mental act. But what does 'containment' mean here? Usually we think of containment as a relation between physical entities, for instance between a beetle and a box containing it, or a molecule and a drop of water. But this may not be the correct model for psychological states and events. Physical wholes may continue to exist without some of their parts. The box might be empty and the drop of water may loose some molecules. A mental act, however, cannot exist without a content or with some parts of its content missing.

So we might rather think of shapes or surfaces and how they are 'contained' in a three-dimensional object. However, this model may not fit either. Even if every three-dimensional object has a complete shape and a complete surface, its shape and its surface may change while the object remains the same. But can the content of a mental act change while the act remains the same?

Brentano had his own model of containment which escapes these difficulties. According to him individual things have essential parts which make up the substance they contain.¹⁷ Applying this model, Brentano can say that the content is contained in an act like the substance is contained in an individual thing.

¹⁶ Brentano 1966a, 82.

¹⁷ A clear exposition of Brentano's model of substance and accident is given in Chisholm 1978.

But this raises another difficulty. Substances, for Brentano, can exist by themselves, without being contained in anything. Is this also true of the content of a mental act? Can the content exist without being the content of some act?

This is the crucial question Brentano raises in the letter to Marty. When we consider the content as existing in itself, it is like a property that may or may not be exemplified. A content would be 'exemplified' or 'realised' or 'instantiated' if there is a subject entertaining or grasping the content, as we like to say. But what do we mean by that?

A promising answer here is to say that a content is grasped when it acquires a certain *role* or *function* for the subject. In general, if something acquires a certain function it must exist beforehand. For instance, something can function as a sail only if it exists as a piece of cloth beforehand and then is turned into the sail of a boat. Similarly, there would have to be entities around which can be turned into the content of an act by grasping them. But there are no such entities according to Brentano. Therefore he rejects the whole idea of *becoming* the content of a mental act as misguided.

There is a striking similarity then, after all, between the content of a mental act, as Brentano conceives it, and the surface of an extended body. Surfaces exist only as the external boundaries of three-dimensional objects. They are necessary parts of these objects and vanish with them. The same Brentano says of the mental content: it comes into being and vanishes with the act.¹⁸ Most importantly, however, nothing can 'become', or 'take up the role' of a surface. This is just what Brentano wants to deny for mental contents as well.

In his early lectures Brentano uses the terms 'content' and 'object' interchangeably. Therefore he must also deny that there are entities which become the objects of our thoughts when we think about them. Something is an object, Brentano must say, whether or not we have thoughts about it. Let us call this the *absolute* use of the term 'object'. It is to be distinguished from the *functional* use, when we say that something is 'taken as an object' in a mental act. To avoid ambiguity, I shall henceforth say that acts take something as a *referent*. According to this terminology, 'being the referent' is a function or role which objects play by standing in the appropriate relation to a mental act or a thinking mind.¹⁹ Indeed, this is a role that anything can play. Anything whatsoever may become a referent of our thoughts: individuals, properties,

¹⁸ See Brentano 1956, 59 (this note from 1917 is reprinted also in Brentano 1966b, 394). Brentano speaks here not only of the content of the mental act, but also of its object. This can be understood only in terms of his theory of intentional inexistence which will be discussed below.

¹⁹ Thereby the objects may be said to acquire a *converse intentional property* like 'being thought about', 'being desired', etc. See Chisholm 1982. The use of the notions of 'role' and 'function' in this context was suggested to me by Morscher 1986.

propositions, numbers, etc. We can admit such entities as referents without admitting them as objects in the absolute sense.²⁰

Having distinguished between the terms 'object' and 'referent', we must ask whether a similar distinction is needed for the term 'content' as well. Brentano's answer, indicated in the letter to Marty, is 'No'. The notion of 'content' is admissible only in an absolute, not in a functional sense. I call this *Brentano's Rule*:

(R) No object, no property, no proposition, nor anything else can become the content of a mental act by getting related to a subject performing the act.

To see the force of this rule it is best to consider a theory violating it. I take Fodor's theory of propositional attitudes as a recent example. In his analysis of 'belief' Fodor proposes the following scheme:

(FO) For any organism O and any proposition P , there is a relation R and a Mental Representation MP such that: MP expresses the proposition that P and O believes that P iff O bears R to MP .²¹

There is a general objection to Mental Representations which can be traced back at least to Thomas Reid.²² The objection is that such entities have no explanatory value. Applied to Fodor's scheme the argument would be that it is no easier to explain the relations between O and MP , and between MP and P respectively, than it is to explain directly the relation between the organism O and the proposition P . We gain nothing by introducing Mental Representations as intermediary entities, e.g. as symbols in a Language of Thought.²³

Brentano's Rule goes one step further. It attacks the very explanations Mental Representations are supposed to give, whether they actually succeed in this or not. What these entities are supposed to explain, in Fodor's case, is how we get related to propositions although we cannot perceive them like ordinary objects. When we perceive a cat, for instance, we have a sensual representation of it. Similarly, Fodor suggests, we need a non-sensual representation of a proposition in order to take an attitude towards it. Once we *are* related to a proposition, it becomes the content of our mental state.

²⁰ An argument supporting this claim will be given in section 5.3.

²¹ Fodor 1990, 16, see also Fodor 1987, 16f.

²² See Lehrer 1989.

²³ Fodor thinks that the relation between O and MP can be explained in functional terms, and the relation between MP and P in causal terms. An opponent may insist that in each case the three-place relation ' O takes MP to represent P ' will have to be invoked, and this three-place relation is as difficult to explain as a two-place relation holding between O and P .

Fodor's Mental Representations are supposed to do exactly what according to Brentano's Rule cannot be done, namely to turn an independently identifiable entity into the content of a mental state.²⁴

Adherence to Brentano's Rule thus forces us to reject Fodor's theory. Do we also have to reject Searle's theory (ST) sketched above? In this theory states of affairs are introduced alongside objects. To make this acceptable from Brentano's point of view we have to choose between two strategies:

- (A) We may treat states of affairs as entities which are represented in mental acts like objects. In this case they are the *referents*, not the *contents* of our mental acts.
- (B) Alternatively, we may treat states of affairs as the *contents* of mental states. In this case all reference to states of affairs must be analysed as a reference to mental acts in which these states are contained.²⁵

In the rest of this paper I want to explore these alternative strategies of obeying Brentano's Rule. Both strategies can get support from Brentano's scattered writings. My main interest, however, is not exegetical. I hope to show that serious confusions arise if these strategies are not kept apart.

4. INTENTIONALITY AND PRESENTATION

There are two major theses in Brentano which suggest a substantial agreement with Searle's theory (ST):

- (B1) Mental acts are presentations (*Vorstellungen*) or phenomena based on presentations.
- (B2) Presentations are characterized by the intentional inexistence of an object.

The background of thesis (B1) is Brentano's threefold division of mental phenomena into presentations, judgements and emotional attitudes. Presentations are distinguished from all other acts by showing no contrast between

²⁴ Would it help to say that the Mental Representation *MP*, not the proposition *P*, is the content of *O*'s mental state? Not at all. The Mental Representation *MP* is identifiable independently of standing in relation *R* to some organism *O*. Thus, *MP* would not in itself be a mental content, but would become one by entering relation *R*, thus violating Brentano's Rule.

²⁵ A different way to express strategy (B) would be to say that states of affairs can be referred to only *in obliquo*, not *in recto*. I think it is less misleading to say that what cannot be referred to *in recto* is not a referent at all.

positive and negative. There is, for instance, no opposite to sensation, as there is an opposite to accepting and loving. For this reason Brentano refrains from calling presentations 'true' or 'false'.²⁶

Suppose we accept this tripartition. Does it imply that the category of presentation is fundamental to judgements and emotional attitudes? Not immediately. It is not sufficient to point out the relative independence, simplicity and generality of presentations, as Brentano does.²⁷ We also need an argument why there should be a dependence at all of complex mental phenomena on simple ones. Such an argument will not come forward unless one accepts the following premise:

- (K) Whenever somebody judges or takes an emotional attitude towards something, he *knows* in some way or other what he accepts or rejects, loves or hates.

Starting from this premise Brentano seeks an explanation of the knowledge we have of our own mental states. He suggests that it springs from a kind of self-reflexiveness. In every mental act there is contained an awareness of this very act.²⁸ The act, Brentano says, takes itself as its secondary object (as its secondary referent in our refined terminology). This self-reflexiveness, however, does not yet give us what we want. It may exhaust itself in the fact that whenever we judge or desire we know that we judge and desire *something*. It need not include knowledge of *what* we accept or reject. That a mental act is given to us as a secondary referent does not imply that its primary referent is known to us too. Why, then, is it that we always know what the primary referent is?

Here principle (B1) gets its grip. We know what we judge or desire, Brentano can say, because we have presentations of what we accept or reject, love or hate. It is the act of presentation which makes us acquainted with the referents of our mental acts. This acquaintance is generally guaranteed if all mental acts are based on presentations.

²⁶ See Brentano 1956, 33. Negative presentations are rejected by Brentano in a letter to Marty dated January 25, 1906. This still leaves open the possibility that all presentations have the character of *positive* judgements. In fact this was Brentano's view between 1903 and 1906. In several dictations of this period he announces his return to the Aristotelian position which unites judgment and presentation in a single category. See Brentano 1987 and manuscript Ps 37. In later manuscripts (e.g. Ps 7) and in the second edition of his *Psychology*, however, Brentano again defends his original tripartition and the view that in judging a second relation is added to the relation of presentation (see Brentano 1973, 201 and 1966, 100).

²⁷ Brentano 1973, 266f.

²⁸ Brentano 1973, 275f.

That the act of presentation is *epistemologically* fundamental for Brentano is confirmed by the synonyms he employs for it. He says that a presenting occurs whenever something “appears to us”,²⁹ when it is “given to us in consciousness”,³⁰ etc. These notions suggest a very strong epistemic contact, similar to Russell’s ‘knowledge by acquaintance’. But the relation need not be that strong. The argument we are looking for requires only that we always have *some* epistemic contact with the referents of our own mental acts.

Why must there be such a contact? Could one not accept, reject, love or hate something without knowing what the object in question is? There is no *prima facie* reason why we should not be intentionally related to things even when we are completely mistaken about what these things are. However, what we must have at least is some *conception* of what we accept, reject, love or hate. We must know at least what we *take* those objects to be. In Brentano’s terms, this means to have a presentation of the object, even if no such object exists in reality.³¹

How much agreement is here between Brentano’s position and a representational theory of mind? Premise (K) is not necessarily part of such a theory. However, there is a similar principle which would seem to fit very well into Searle’s theory (ST):

(P6) When we are in a mental state we always know in what kind of state we are and we know the conditions of satisfaction of this state.

To know the conditions of satisfaction of a state is to know which object would satisfy it. Thus it seems that the conditions of satisfaction play the same role here as presentations play in Brentano’s theory. Whereas Brentano says that no act can have a referent without being based on (or being identical with) a presentation of this object, Searle’s theory claims that no act can have a referent without having conditions of satisfaction.

This agreement, however, is merely superficial. In (ST) conditions of satisfaction are identified as the representational *content* of mental acts. This move will not work for presentations. It would mean to identify a simple *act* of presentation as the content of a more complex act. The reasons against such an identification are twofold: (1) First, a simple act of presentation may occur separately without being the content of a more complex act. It would become a

²⁹ Brentano 1973, 198.

³⁰ Brentano 1956, 197.

³¹ Note that an infinite regress would get started if another act were required for knowing which object one takes to be the referent given in presentation. Presentations must be ‘epistemically transparent’ in the sense that they directly reveal what they represent (or misrepresent).

content only when a more complex act is built on it, thus violating Brentano's Rule. (2) Secondly, we would lack an explanation of what the content of a *simple* presentation is. Such presentations are not based on more basic acts and therefore would have to be identical with their own content. This would put into question the whole distinction between an act and its content.

For these two reasons I think that Brentano's analysis of complex acts as based on presentations has no use for a notion of representational content besides the notions of act, object and referent. We can see this from the following analogue to Fodor's scheme for analysing beliefs:

(BR) For any subject *S* and any object *O*, there is a relation *R* and a presentation *P* such that: if *P* represents *O*, then *S* accepts *O* iff *S* bears *R* to *O*.

The difference to Fodor's scheme (FO) is that in (BR) the main relation holds between the subject and the object *O* and that this relation is *not* reducible to simpler relations between *S* and *P*, and *P* and *O* respectively. Therefore, Brentano's presentations are not comparable to Fodor's Mental Representations. The latter, but not the former are entities mediating between an act and its object.

There is nothing in (BR) that could be identified as the content of the analysed belief. The presentation *P* cannot be the content for the reasons given above. Identifying the object *O* as the belief-content would lead to the same objections raised against Fodor's scheme. The role which object *O* plays here depends on the fact that *S* bears *R* to *O*. In this way the object can only become the referent, not the content of the belief.

The same reasoning applies if we replace the object *O* by a state of affairs. According to scheme (BR) a state of affairs, too, can become only the *referent*, not the *content* of a belief. This is the result described in strategy (A) at the end of section 3.

5. INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE AND THE NONEXISTENCE PROBLEM

That we found no space for the notion of content in Brentano's theory has an obvious reason. So far we have not considered presentations of objects which do not exist. It is here that the notion of representational content seems indispensable. Brentano, it is said, has no adequate solution for the problem of

how we are mentally related to non-existent objects.³² The reason given is that Brentano makes no use of the content-object distinction. It was only later in the Brentano School that this distinction was gradually worked out.³³

However, Brentano did have an answer to the non-existence problem. In every mental act, he says, something 'intentionally inexists' in the act. This is so whether or not there also is an existing object at which the act is directed. But what are these 'inexisting' elements which are assumed to be present in every mental act? Let me split up the question into three sub-questions:

- (1) Are intentionally inexistent entities *subjective* entities?
- (2) Are intentionally inexistent entities *real* entities?
- (3) Are intentionally inexistent entities *identical* with the entities which we have beliefs about, think about, desire etc.?

It is often deplored that Brentano did not give a clearcut answer to these questions. Not surprisingly, then, there is much disagreement about his correct interpretation. And there is also disagreement about how far Brentano changed his views on these matters. Since I am not concerned with exegetical details here, I take the liberty of putting Brentano in a more favourable light. According to my reading his answer to all three questions is negative. However, this does not mean that we have to drop the idea of 'intentional inexistence' altogether.

6. ARE INTENTIONALLY INEXISTING ENTITIES SUBJECTIVE ENTITIES?

A subjective entity can be characterized as an entity whose ontological status depends on its private accessibility. For an entity to be subjective there must be a special way of knowing about this object and there must be exactly one subject which has this special knowledge. Sensations and experiences are usually cited as prime examples of entities for which these conditions are satisfied.³⁴

Does Brentano introduce a domain of subjective entities when he speaks about 'intentional inexistence' or 'immanent objectivity'? If 'to inexist' means

³² See e.g. Kent 1984, 35.

³³ For an excellent survey of this development within the Brentano School see Simons 1992.

³⁴ It is not essential for a subjective entity that it ceases to exist when it is not 'experienced' or 'perceived'. What makes it subjective is the *possibility* of experiencing or perceiving it in a way which no one else can do.

'to exist internally in a mind' and if 'immanent' means to be privately accessible, the answer is 'yes'. But from a letter to Anton Marty again we know that Brentano protested against this interpretation of his early view:

It has never been my view that the *immanent* object is identical with '*object of thought*' (*vorgestelltes Objekt*). What we think about is *the object* or *thing* not the 'object of thought'. If, in our thought, we contemplate a horse, our thought has as its immanent object — not a 'contemplated horse', but a *horse*. And strictly speaking only the horse — not the 'contemplated horse' — can be called an object.³⁵

Thus Brentano would say if two persons, A and B, think of a horse, there are not five entities to be distinguished: the two persons, the horse, and in addition one immanent object in the mind of A and one immanent object in the mind of B. Rather we have only the two persons and their common object. If they are not thinking of a particular horse, this common object must be universal. Universals do not exist 'outside the mind' as individual horses do. But neither do they exist internally like experiences. What, then, does Brentano mean by calling the universal horse an 'intentionally inexistent' entity?

In order to avoid the subjectivist misinterpretation various authors have suggested that 'intentional inexistence' is not an ontological term at all.³⁶ According to them, to say that an object 'inexists' is just to say that there is a thought directed upon this object. For this to be possible the ontological status of the object is irrelevant. Even non-existent objects could be referents of our thoughts on this view.

I think that neither the subjectivist interpretation nor the proposed alternative do justice to Brentano. Happily there is a third alternative.³⁷ In calling an object 'intentionally inexistent' Brentano may characterize it as a necessary part of an intentional act. This is the status of the universal horse which inexists in A's and in B's thoughts.³⁸ For Brentano universals exist *only* as something contained in thoughts.³⁹ Since they can be parts of mental acts of

³⁵ Brentano 1966a, 77f.

³⁶ Aquila and Kent are most explicit in this respect. See Aquila 1977, 17f. and Kent 1984, 32f.

³⁷ Perhaps this third reading of 'intentional inexistence' is also closest to the origins of this notion in Aristotle and the Scholastics. This historical question is discussed by a number of authors, e.g. in Chisholm 1957 and 1967b, Spiegelberg 1976, McAlister 1970 and 1976, Maras 1976, Münch 1986, Hedwig 1978, Richardson 1983, Smith 1988 and Runggaldier 1989.

³⁸ Mally's relation of 'encoding' is close to 'inexistence' in this sense. It has been used, however, for different purposes than here intended. Zalta in 1989 uses the notion of 'encoding' for stating identity conditions of abstract *objects*, whereas I suggest using it for an account of how mental *acts* are built up.

³⁹ Brentano 1966a, 64.

different persons, they cannot be subjective.⁴⁰ In this way Brentano may avoid the subjectivist Charybdis without running into the Scylla of equating 'inexistence' with 'being the referent of a mental act'.

Does this third interpretation also work for mental acts directed at individual things?⁴¹ Should we say that, when A and B think about their common friend C, this friend C becomes the 'immanent object' of their thoughts? I shall argue below that in these cases too there is a universal involved, and that this universal element is what 'intentionally inexists'. Thus, if A and B have different memories of C, there is a further entity D which is common to both of their memories. This additional entity will have to be non-real, as I shall argue next.

7. ARE INTENTIONALLY INEXISTING ENTITIES REAL ENTITIES?

In the preface to the second edition of his *Psychology* (1911) Brentano announces the following change of view: "I am no longer of the opinion that a psychic relation could ever take anything else than something real as its object".⁴² The doctrine *Nur Reales ist vorstellbar* became the slogan of Brentano's later philosophy. Since this was an innovation we must ask what kind of non-real entities Brentano earlier counted among the entities to which we stand in psychic relations. The 'contemplated horse', we have seen, is a controversial example. If we trust Brentano's own judgement he never thought of a 'contemplated horse' as an object in the strict sense. What we take as a referent are simply horses, or, when we think of somebody contemplating about horses, the subjective horse-experiences of this person. These experiences are as real as the horses themselves.⁴³

Another possible candidate for a non-real entity is mentioned in an influential passage of Brentano's early logic lectures:

⁴⁰ One should not be misled here by passages in which Brentano argues against the view that universals exist 'in the mind', because what exists 'in the mind' is something subjective. For instance, he writes to Anton Marty: "One could not say that universals *as universals* are in the mind, if one of the characteristics of the things existing in the mind is 'being thought by me'" (Brentano 1966a, 78). The point here is that what is thought by me is subjective, and not really an object in the strict sense (like the contemplated horse). However, since immanent objects are objects in the strict sense, universals are obvious candidates for this category.

⁴¹ These are the cases Brentano is primarily interested in when he analyses appearances of particular qualities of tone, colour, warmth, etc.

⁴² Brentano 1973, 2.

⁴³ This possibility is acknowledged by Brentano in a fragment of 1902. The 'contemplated A', he says, is something actual and true if there is an actual contemplation about A. (Brentano 1966a, 26f.). On this reading there would be no reason for Brentano to eliminate the 'contemplated A' from his reistic ontology.

One thing should be emphasized again, namely that it is peculiar to the (intentional) relation that one of its terms (is) real, the other one not. One would be mistaken if one took as its term the outer (and perhaps (often) real) object.

Such an object can be absent completely, the immanent one never.

And if it is there, it is to be distinguished from the immanent one.

If one says, the presented is in the presenting subject, the recognized in the recognizing subject, the lover has the loved one in his heart, we also say: the *picture* is within him, the presented is presented but not real, the loved one loved but not really within him; as in the sense in which she is within him she is nothing real.⁴⁴

The picture-metaphor was taken up by Brentano's students for explaining what an 'immanent object' is. Indeed they took the metaphor as revealing an ambiguity in Brentano's use of the notion of 'object'. Höfler suggested calling the immanent picture the 'content' of a presentation; Twardowski followed him in this respect.⁴⁵

However, Brentano's students may have taken him too literally on this point. Pictures which are 'carried in ones heart' are subjective entities. They are non-real only in the sense of being not really objects, i.e. objects in the strict sense. This makes the picture-metaphor highly inappropriate for explaining what Brentano means by an immanent object. The immanent object, he emphasizes in a manuscript of 1899, is no less an object than any real thing: "one should take care not to think that what exists only as an object but is not real, is not really an *object*. It is really an object, but it is not real".⁴⁶

So one cannot accuse Brentano of applying the term 'object' to entities which are not really objects at all. Yet he may have fallen victim to an ambiguity between what I called the 'absolute' and the 'functional' sense of the term 'object'. Which of these notions is intended by Brentano when he characterizes the immanent object as non-real?

If the absolute sense is intended, then the classification into real and non-real objects is an ontological one. It is on a par with classifications like concrete / abstract, individual / general, extended / non-extended, determinate / indeterminate, causally efficacious/causally inefficacious, etc. If in his early lectures Brentano did add the real/non-real distinction to this list, then he changed his view radically when he eliminated all non-real entities later. The reason for this change of mind, one might guess, could have been that an autonomous domain of non-real objects divorces the mind from the real world. So Brentano might have realized that according to his early theory it becomes mysterious how reference to the external world is possible.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Manuscript E.L.73, 99.

⁴⁵ See Höfler 1890, 6 and Twardowski 1894, 4.

⁴⁶ Manuscript Ps 21, 1.

⁴⁷ The mystery is how one act can have two different objects in the same sense of 'having an object'. To escape this difficulty it is natural to say that one of these entities is not an object

No such radical break occurs if the classification into real and non-real objects is intended as a classification of *referents*. It then concerns not the ontological status of the 'immanent object', but the role it plays in mental acts. The question is not whether there *are* non-real entities, the question is whether these entities are real *referents* of our thoughts. When we read the slogan *Nur Reales ist vorstellbar* as an answer to this latter question, then non-real entities need not be eliminated from a reistic ontology. They must only be kept outside the domain of reference and given some other role in our mental life.

I want to outline now how this second interpretation helps to understand Brentano's conception of intentionality.

8. ARE INTENTIONALLY INEXISTING ENTITIES IDENTICAL WITH THE ENTITIES WE HAVE BELIEFS ABOUT, THINK ABOUT, DESIRE, ETC?

When Brentano talks about intentionality he usually starts with the lapidary statement: "Anyone who thinks thinks something".⁴⁸ The reasoning following this claim has become standard: Since all thinking is thinking something, all thinking is directed upon an object. Yet, the intended object need not exist. So we face the twin-problem of objective reference and of non-existence.

As I indicated in section 1, this kind of reasoning is problematic because it treats propositional attitudes as if they were non-propositional. The real premise of the argument is this: Whoever thinks, thinks *of* some *thing*. Here the term 'thing' stands for an individual term. It cannot be replaced by a that-clause, like the pronoun 'something' in phrases like 'He believes something', 'He desires something', etc.

The difference between 'thinking something' and 'thinking of some thing' is blurred by introducing special entities like propositions or states of affairs. 'Thinking something' then becomes equivalent to 'thinking *of* some proposition' or 'thinking *of* some state of affairs'. As I said at the beginning, the advantage of treating propositional and non-propositional attitudes in one stroke was exploited in the Brentano School, but not by Brentano himself.

in the strict sense, but only a 'content of thought'. A critical exposition of this kind of reasoning is given in Küng 1984, 32ff.

⁴⁸ E.g. 1973, 321, 1966b, 323, and manuscript Ps 9. The standard English translation of this statement as 'Anyone who thinks thinks of something' is misleading.

Brentano was not satisfied with describing all mental acts as cases of a simple subject-object relation.⁴⁹ Instead he proposes a different scheme:

One might also try the following. We can say not only that whoever is thinking is thinking of something, but also that he is thinking of *something as something*, as for example one thinks of a man as a man or in a less definite way as a living creature. But that second 'something' we added, and always have to add, must obviously be univocal, too, if the term for thinking is univocal.⁵⁰

Unfortunately Brentano does not give any reasons for these claims. Why is it that we always have to think of a man *as something*? Why can we not simply think of a man without adding a second term? And why would the notion of thinking lose its unity if the term 'something' did occur ambiguously in the scheme 'thinking of something as something'? What is the criterion of univocality here?

Brentano leaves us in the dark with these questions. We may try to answer them by taking a closer look at the relational form '*x* thinks of *y*'. For this relation to obtain between a subject *S* and an object *O*, *S* and *O* must satisfy certain necessary conditions. *S* must be thinking of *some* object, and *O* must be a referent of *S*'s thought. Thus we may replace the simple scheme:

(i) *S* thinks of *O*.

by the conjunctive form:

(ii) *S* thinks of an *x* and *x* satisfies condition *C* and *O* = *x*.

The first conjunct describes a mental state of *S*, the second conjunct specifies an object as a referent of this act. However, the truth of (ii) is not *sufficient* for (i) to be true. *S* may think of an object *x*, not because *x* satisfies condition *C*, but for some other reason. For instance, *S* may think of his brother because he is talking to him, but not because he is informed about the bank robbery which his brother committed. Suppose now that the brother robbed the bank together with Ortcutt. Then *S* thinks of a man, namely his brother, who satisfies the condition of having robbed the bank, and Ortcutt satisfies this condition too, but it does not follow from this that *S* has any thoughts about Ortcutt at all.

⁴⁹ Nevertheless Brentano uses this terminology himself, e.g. in a manuscript of 1903: "Every psychic act shows relations of subject to object, which I have called by a shorter term, deriving from a usage in the Middle Ages, an *intentional* relation" (Brentano 1987, 25).

⁵⁰ Brentano 1973, 321.

To rule out such counter examples, analysis (ii) must be strengthened. There are two ways of doing this. One possibility is to quantify the variable x from inside. We then get the scheme:

(iii) S thinks that *some* x satisfies condition C and O satisfies C .

This scheme is ambiguous. The scope of 'thinks that' may end at the first conjunct or it may include the second conjunct as well. In the first case (iii) is no improvement on (ii). S may entertain the general thought that there is somebody who robbed the bank without suspecting anyone in particular. On the other hand, if (iii) is of the form ' S thinks that (p and q)', it splits up into two clauses each of which describes a mental state of S , but neither of which is of the form (i). In our example, S might think that somebody robbed the bank *and* that Ortcutt is guilty. With this complex statement we attribute to S two new mental acts, instead of giving an *analysis* of what we originally ascribe to him in (i). Thus the move from (ii) to (iii) is at best a method for *eliminating* the non-propositional form ' x thinks of y '. It is a method which Quine can accept,⁵¹ but certainly not Brentano.

The trouble with (iii) is that in describing mental states as propositional we do not escape the question what the *object* of a mental state is. Quine rejects this question because he hopes that from a strictly scientific point of view "the essentially dramatic idiom of propositional attitudes will find no place".⁵² Brentano's tenet was exactly the opposite. He wanted to establish psychology as a science which takes our common talk about mental states seriously. Therefore Brentano must also take seriously the question what the objects of our mental states are.

The second possibility of strengthening analysis (ii) takes care of that. It consists in binding the variable x from outside as follows:

(iv) For some x , x satisfies C and S thinks of x .

From (iv) we obtain (i) by existential instantiation together with the premise that O satisfies C . I propose to take (iv) as the correct analysis of Brentano's scheme:⁵³

⁵¹ See Quine 1960, 156. Note that the proposed elimination concerns only the stronger reading of ' x thinks of y ', not the weaker version (ii). Quine need not object to saying that x thinks of an object irrespective of any condition C which x must satisfy. In (ii) the y -position is treated transparently, whereas Quine eliminates the opaque occurrences of singular terms.

⁵² See Quine 1960, 219.

⁵³ In many respects this analysis resembles Chisholm's theory of direct and indirect attribution. See Chisholm 1981 and 1990, as well as Pasquarella 1988. Chisholm's basic scheme is

(BS) *S* thinks of something as something.

The first 'something' is represented by the variable *x* and the second 'something' is represented by the condition *C*. With this analysis at hand we can try to answer the questions raised earlier:

1. Why do we need the second 'something' in (BS)?
2. Why should the two occurrences of 'something' have the same meaning?
3. What are the objects of the mental states described according to this scheme?

The answer to question (1) is that thinking of an object cannot be a *basic* or *simple* fact. One cannot think of an object without thereby also being in a more complex state. When we say that *S* thinks of *O*, this ascription must be seen as derived from an instantiation of form (iv). In order to derive (i) from (iv), we need the premise that *O* satisfies condition *C*. That is why the second occurrence of 'something', which we have represented by *C*, is indispensable in Brentano's scheme.

Why should the two occurrences of 'something' be univocal? According to our analysis they belong to different grammatical categories; the first is an object-variable and the second is a predicate-variable. There is univocality only in one sense: The variable *x* must range over the same objects to which the predicate 'satisfies *C*' applies.

Finally, let us consider the question what the objects are of a mental state that is analysed in form (iv). Again, the answer depends on how we understand the term 'object'. If the question concerns the *referents* of the mental state, anything *we* accept in our domain of quantification may be a referent of *S*'s thought. But if we ask for the objects which 'intentionally inexistent' in the mental state of *S*, it is the condition *C* we are asking for. We then want to know the reason that *S* himself has for thinking of an object that *we* identify as the referent of his thoughts.

What we envisage here is the interplay between the *analysis* of a mental act and the way in which we *ascribe* such an act to a subject. This shows, I think, how complicated Brentano's theory actually is. If I am right, the distinction between the *referent* of an act and the object *as which* the referent is taken by the subject, reflects the difference in perspective between the person describing a mental state and the subject to which the mental state is ascribed. (In the case of a self-ascription this would be the difference between first-level mental states and the level of meta-mental reflection.) Since this is a distinction which

'*S* takes *x* to be *F*'. What I have tried to do here is to motivate the introduction of this scheme by showing how it can be expressed in terms of the simpler form '*S* thinks of *x*'.

we always have to observe, it is essential that the objects which we have beliefs about, which we desire, etc., are not confused with the 'objects' which intentionally inexistent in our thoughts.

9. A FINAL QUESTION

Brentano's theory of intentionality has turned out to be a lot more complicated than a simple subject-object theory would be. Brentano's theory is loaded with ontological and epistemological problems which I have only touched here. Before one takes up these problems one by one, it would seem legitimate to ask what advantages Brentano's theory offers. What are the merits of complicating things in the way Brentano does? This will be our final question.

A very simple theory of intentionality results if one reduces all mental states to propositional attitudes and if one then defines each of these attitudes as a specific relation to a state of affairs. Is there any reason, besides ontological scruples, why one should not proceed in this way?

From Brentano's point of view, I think, there is. Just as thinking of an object cannot be a simple relation, being intentionally related to a state of affairs cannot be either. Here too, we must start from a more general truth (where '*t*' ranges over states of affairs):

(v) For some *t*, *t* satisfies condition *C* and *S* is intentionally related to *t*.

Of what kind is the condition *C* here? Certainly the state of affairs *t* need not *obtain* in order that *S* can be intentionally related to it. Yet the only reason for *S* to think of this particular state of affairs are the conditions under which *t* obtains. So (v) can always be expanded to the following form:

(vi) For some *t*, *t* obtains iff *p*, and *S* is intentionally related to *t*.

This raises a problem: What is the difference between the state of affairs *t* and the condition of obtaining iff *p*? What, for instance, could we mean by distinguishing between the state of affairs that the bank was robbed and its 'property' of obtaining iff the bank was robbed? When we give up this distinction for lack of good reason, the idea that states of affairs are the referents of our thoughts threatens to collapse.

With Brentano's distinction between referents and 'intentionally inexistent' objects, however, another possibility opens up. Instead of putting states of affairs into the category of referents, we may consider them as objects that are

essentially parts of our thoughts. States of affairs would then be non-real, but objective entities like universals. In the terminology of the representational theory of mind, they would be the *content*, not the objects of our thoughts. This strategy, which I mentioned at the end of section 2, is an alternative to Searle's theory which seems worth pursuing.

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

on:

see also:

existence / in-existence

8.6, 8.8

intentionality

1.17, 4.3, 6.5, 16.11

presentation / representation

1.9, 7.6, 7.10

HIGHER-ORDER OBJECTS

1. INFERIORA AND SUPERIORA

The attentive reader of Meinong's essay "Über Gegenstände höherer Ordnung..." will notice that, from the very beginning, he introduces the concept of non-independence in relation to the facts of direct experience or perception. There must be a reason for Meinong's use of the negative forms 'non-independence' and non 'dependence' when quite acceptable terms from any dictionary are available. The reason is the following: we exist in a world in which observable events are independent of each other ; that is, we live in a world which cannot be identified in a flux of experiences which are totally interconnected or — to use an expression by W. James — bound by "ubiquitous relations". Least of all do we exist in a world which fluctuates through continuous gradations which neither separate one event from another nor reduce themselves into definite borders between one thing and another, as happens in Bergson's metaphysics, where the task of fashioning this indistinct flux into 'facts' is left to needs and to purely pragmatic exigencies. From the beginning, Meinong's thought assumes a world which is no more than what it actually is, when it is not being merely thought or represented, but when it is being carefully observed in an endeavour to avoid the distractions of a philosophical language corrupted by the idea that everything is within everything and that everything depends on everything else. Before it is problematized or even 'spoken', Meinong's world is that collection of enumerations which any of us, at this moment-now, finds within his or her ascertainable horizon and considers in the spirit of one who has the task of filling an inventory. In short, Meinong's world is the world as it is.

Those who start from an indistinct and magmatic experiential flux later find themselves confronted by the task of separating things, and this they must do

whether they address others in writing or in person (the last line of Plotinus' *Aenneades* describes the only circumstance in which this task would be futile), because some of the words used in utterance of the theory must correspond to something which is not confusable with anything else. This task is difficult and demanding. Indeed it is sometimes even grotesque, as when Bergson teaches us that our needs like beams of light affect indistinct and continuous becoming, and thus receive usable and well-defined objects. One may wonder if any section would be adequate for any object or if in the indistinct the invisible objects which light extracts already harboured, and how the light-bearer could know that they were in that very place (and usually needs are in a hurry). Of course, the same applies to current 'constructivist' theories of perception. Deducing facts and real events from a tissue of functional relations or from a flux is a task for metaphysics; while one of the duties of science is to show which of a vast collection of facts are independent of each other, how some of them are formed by constituents which are non-independent of each other, which are functionally connected in a definite way, observable and, if we wish, formalizable.

Thus the independence of the systems that fill the space of world with different roles is primitive; and the non-independence of observables belonging to some system is derived.

Four nuts thrown onto the table one after the other form a quadrilateral, the shape of which depends on the position of the nuts. Slightly moving just one of them changes more that one property of the quadrilateral. The quadrilateral is therefore non-independent of the position of the nuts. But it is independent of the colour of the tablecloth, of the size of the table on which the nuts have been thrown, of the (natural or artificial) light which illuminates the room, of the noise made by the two children playing with other nuts, and — note — of the philosophical opinions of those observing the nuts, as well as of any theory of perception. The quadrilateral is a higher-order object; the four nuts are its 'inferiora'; the 'superiora' depend on the 'inferiora'. There is an asymmetric relationship between 'superiora' and 'inferiora': a 'superius' without 'inferiora' is not possible, but the reverse is not the case. "What is now the bearer of a higher-order object may later appear without it".¹ One nut may be found in a drawer, another in a shopping-bag.

¹ Meinong 1899, § 3.

2. STIMULI AS *ENTIA RATIONIS*

The tiles for a mosaic may be stored in different boxes; those who look into these boxes will fail to gain an idea of the mosaic or of any coloured representation. It is evident, though, that an already-constructed mosaic is formed only by tiles. "The fact is that if something appears as an 'inferius' this does not say anything about its importance in supporting a 'superius'".² Careful observation of a tile never reveals the place which it must occupy in order to help construct a certain picture. There is nothing inherent to a tile which places it in a necessary relationship with other tiles. But the overall scene depicted by the mosaic requires that each tile must occupy a particular position.

Although these obvious and very simple observations mark a clear advance on the speculative schemes of psychophysics, they contain the germ of an error.

Classical psychophysics is distinctly speculative in character: it compares various parameters of the physical stimuli that, in controlled situations, impinge on the peripheral sense organs with sense impressions or sensations, or more severely with certain quantitative data that is possible to obtain in different ways from the observers. Comparisons are drawn between parts of the world pertaining to different regions — or better data located at different levels: so-called 'stimuli' and sensations. Stimuli are obviously invisible to the observer, but their relative sensations (even before the subject starts to show the behaviour that the experimenter expects from him/her) are obviously ascertainable. Stimuli are invisible because they are ideally located at the beginning of a chain of facts which are more or less known and which subsequently in a mysterious — and hypothetical — manner give rise to a sensation. True, in the laboratory we often hear expressions such as "when the mouse sees the stimulus...". However, such expressions are merely the dialectal remnants of an imprecise way of behaving in which the verb 'to see' has a totally different meaning from its conventional one. Nobody ever 'sees' stimuli, by definition. But the sensations (if we insist on thus denoting certain elements of direct experience available to observation by one or more spectators) are ascertainable facts, again by definition.

Psychophysics then establishes the relations between ideal entities — *entia rationis* (stimuli) which are the result of certain real operations — and fragments of an effective ascertaining. The stimulus is operationally defined a moment before it has impinged on the peripheral organ. The sensation has no need of any definition. What visibly happens — in this speculative framework — is regarded as the effect of an indirectly defined cause. The cause lies in the space-time of physics, the effect in the effective time-flow and in a region of

² Meinong 1899, § 3.

the space of ascertainties. The hereafter lies in this world, and in between there are infinite models of metaphorical minds. Ideally located in these minds are all possible justifications for the anomalies revealed by comparison of a certain representation of stimuli against the real and ascertainable features of some sensation. Meinong was well aware of this (the question is not posed in a manner qualitatively different from before), and it is exactly what he wanted to avoid. Stimuli are (ideally) parts of physical reality; the colours, the sounds and the tiles of any mosaic are parts of the real world. Any attempt to explain the latter as effects of the former is precarious, and it is an error to think that the former are constitutive elements of the latter. An observable fact certainly has its constitutive elements, it is enough to observe it carefully to see these elements implicated. An observable fact certainly obeys to laws: we live, not in a chaos of sensations, but among things with which we interact. There are thus laws that govern the union of constitutive elements, and they must concern explanation of how things are made. This is scientific curiosity, one that is wholly naturalistic but also totally central to any programme of foundation of a philosophy of knowledge. Only a few years before Meinong, Mach had shown very well, in principle, that this was the fact of the matter but without drawing the furthest consequences entailed by his premises. What he called "space sensation" was in fact already form and structure and required the use of a logic different from that of sensations.

The speculative step just described separates the problem of perceptions from psychophysics and founds the science of objects, and any science of observables in general, on an epistemologically autonomous basis. The question is no longer 'under what physical conditions do the sense organs evoke a certain world of subjective sensations?', but 'what constitutive norms control the formation and the stability of things?'.

3. MULTIPLYING THE NUTS

There are the tiles, therefore, and there is the completed mosaic. There are norms, discoverable by various empirical and observational procedures, which connect the completed mosaic to the visible elements into which it is divisible. There operates, in some way, a relation of 'production' which starts from elements and converges on the completed product. It seems logical that the nuts and the tiles are the 'inferiora' and that organizations of elements are the 'superiora' formed by relationships which connect 'inferiora' to each other in various ways. Hence it follows that the 'inferiora', taken together with the connecting

relationships, determine the ascertainable properties of 'superiora'; and from this derives the asymmetry of the relation between the latter and the former.

It is here that Meinong fails to see the limit which obstructs the complete development of his theory of objects. He overlooks the fact that the 'inferiora', by entering into a reciprocal relationship, may stop being what they were when they were not part of that relation, thereby rendering the assertion "what is now the bearer of an object of superior order may later appear without it" impossible to interpret.³ It is important to understand that this *may* happen, and hence that it does not always and necessarily happen (i) because by understanding it we do not tend towards a universal interactionism like 'everything depends on everything' and (ii) because this speculative choice confines the problem to the strictly empirical level, obliging any speculation on terms and their relations to specify themselves into files which are not only ascertainable but even experimental. Experimental in the naturalistic sense, as in a laboratory.

This is by no means to imply that any inferius preserves its properties intact when it joins a system of relationships; that is, when it starts to occupy a specific and discernible place in the whole of a certain 'thing'.

Nor, moreover, does it imply that a pair of definitely interconnected inferiora, with or without loss of their initial (and now already ideal) identity, will not come jointly to constitute an inferius for something else. But since it *may* happen that an inferius changes its aspect by entering into a relationship with something which is also observable, in this case we will have to consider it a superius, transformed by its new contacts (if it is true that superiora change as a result of transformations made to inferiora). That is to say, a system of relationships (both large or small) could be the inferius of a term — no longer as such, of course — which functional dependence has rendered into a superius.

This does not entail that we must imagine terms and relationships as nuts and spatial distances, or as tiles and spatial contiguities, i.e. as pieces of things that are smaller than the compounds in which they may appear; compounds which are necessarily bigger than the elements into which they can be broken down. This aspect of the question is present, and can be addressed in various ways: but it does not provide the basis for the superiora/inferiora relationship, which is functional. And if we examine the interplay of functional dependencies within a complex of relationships among apparent inferiora, we soon discover that there are also relationships of mutual foundation among the aspects which are present in objects. So much for the theory.

Without conducting analysis of a real and complex object like a pipe or six bars of a piano sonata, let us examine a simpler example obtained by multiplying Meinong's nuts (Fig. 1).

³ Meinong 1899, § 3.

Fig. 1a





Fig. 1b



The dots stand in certain very simple spatial relationships (the repetition of an identical spatial relation). In each of the two pictures they form two rectangular shapes, one thinner than the other. The thinner one is arranged crosswise. In Fig. 1a the thinner rectangle is above the bigger one, in that at the right it is below. Why do some points placed in the central part of the two pictures belong in the first case to one and in the other case to the other of the two? In other words, what should be changed in the pictures so that this does not happen?

We can remove, for example, all the overflowing dots from the bigger and horizontal body in the picture 1a. Although this is banal it compels us to say that the relationships among the overflowing dots that have been removed are foundational with respect to the pattern of the dots in the centre (at the intersection, as it were, between the two shapes). They form two superiora that are inferiora for the status of those other dots — which are the constitutive inferiora, through spatial relationships, of the central part of the transversal bar. But the transversal bar stays *above* that body, which is also rectangular but horizontal, and formed in its turn out of homogeneously distributed dots. This means that the dots in question belong to the transversal bar and form a single entity with the projecting appendices towards the north-east and south-west. But, as we have seen, they belong to it because it has these appendices. So: *is the bar the foundation the appendices, or are the appendices the foundation for the bar?*

The horizontal shape also passes behind the bar: although the bar is superposed on this body it does not interrupt it, and for this reason we say that it stays below. So also this shape, in the area of the intersection, is made up of dots, but they are not visible because the transversal bar covers them. All of these dots are located exactly behind a certain dot which constitutes the horizontal bar. The occluded part is present 'behind', with that typical form of presence which characterizes all partially occluded objects (amodal presence).

The horizontal band is partially occluded; the occluded part is of the same material as the visible parts, i.e. it is made up of dots which are arranged like the knots of a square-mesh net. But none of its dots in that zone is visible, because it is hidden by a dot of the horizontal bar. Hence the inferiora are invisible, but the texture is not interrupted and these dots exist amodally: they — far from being founding inferiora — form a superius that is founded by the visible parts of the horizontal bar, which, according to Meinong's logic, should find everywhere its inferius made of dots, but it is not because it is a superius! Now: *do the visible dots found the horizontal band, or does the horizontal band found its dots where they are visible?*

The above reasoning can be repeated for Figure 1b, and would be a good exercise for the reader; indeed, it would be even more interesting to apply it to two further, somewhat more complex, pictures (Fig. 2), one of which has a square with two opposing corners included in the square-mesh net. The

question is how these corners are founded by the dots which lies round about; and if it is not the square that founds the specific appearance of 'corner' to two of these dots, then this — in an excessively simplified conception — would contribute to found the picture in its globality.

Fig. 2a





fig. 2b



4. *ESSE EST PERCIPi*

The postulate of inferiora which invariably remain the same, and of superiora which derive from inferiora has a certain sense that I shall now seek to clarify. When conducting the experiment from which the above examples were taken, I operated only on dots. I took self-adhesive black disks and placed them in certain places chosen at random according to an abstract experimental plan — i.e. according to the stages of a certain logical scheme — and stuck them on sheets of cardboard. In building these ‘patterns’ I moved only disks, I operated only on dots; and, in a certain sense, the whole result depended on the position of the dots.

Isn’t this a good reason to think that the real inferiora are the disks, and that the real superiora are what remains? If we take as the independent variable what our hands have manipulated in order to produce certain effects, we must answer in the affirmative. And our answer will be correct within the framework of a simple and pragmatic realism: what is ascertainably given is real; and real, therefore, is any form of observable under any condition, with all its discernible properties, as well as the relations among such properties, provided that the latter present themselves in a phenomenally explicit manner; provided, that is, they are not the result of inductions, conjectures or abstracting reductions to their basic elements — even for the noblest and most fruitful purposes.

This distinction is not difficult to draw. It is enough to distinguish between what is actually present in ongoing experience and what is ‘thought of’, between the cognitive integrations of phenomena and phenomena themselves. I *see* that the triangle has three sides or three angles, but I *know* that the sum of the internal angles is an angle of 180°: I do not see this latter property, but I know it. I also *know* that I cannot make a billiard-ball move with the idea of a billiard-cue; and I *know* that my ashtray is a Christmas present, although I simply *see* that it is transparent and even heavy (I do not need to weigh it: I *see* it is heavy).

Suffice it to say that the ascertainable properties of things are real. *Esse est percipi* and vice versa; and this is in perfect agreement with Meinong’s theory.

When I arrange my black dots in a certain order on the white cardboard sheet, at first I see the creation of something that relates to Meinong’s four nuts, little geometrizations of visible space, limited objects of a higher order: let us call it of the first level. Here there are terms and relations, nuts and virtual lines among nuts. These are clearly visible inferiora which do not change their aspect because they have been stuck in a particular pattern; and they perform a role in the clearly visible superiora based upon them.

But an unexpected phenomenon arises at this point; one irreducible to the pure geometry of the position of the dots. A community of dots already stuck or

about to be stuck on the cardboard is self-segregated in comparison with other dots already attached to the surface. Nothing has been done to isolate this community as an autonomous shape from the rest. A good phenomenological analysis will explain the reason for this segregation, although it is analysis which cannot be conducted here. Since this new shape does not limit the other one, but is placed upon it, so that we can reasonably talk of non-visible parts in the objects under our observation. Therefore a front and a back, even the white of the background among certain rows of dots, becomes clearer. The experimental phenomenological explanation will have to consider all these circumstances and verify how one helps to determine another, or how co-determination comes about between two or among more of them. The phenomenological analysis able to explain these facts cannot use the only two ingredients represented by dots and by the relations among dots.

It is certain, however, that construction of the picture — its material realization on the sheet of cardboard — uses only dots and spatial relations, i.e. a ruler and a pair of compasses. Herein lies Meinong's mistake (which is also the mistake made by many other interpreters with little familiarity with experimental investigation): namely that of believing that the ingredients of complex structures can be reduced to the elements in constructing them. We may call this the 'operational error'. It prevents us from seeing that the final perceptive outcome, apart from a certain complexity which is in any case not substantial, depends on a subtle dialectic between factors and components and components and factors of such components which are irreducible to the act of arrange material dots and to their positional relationships.

The procedure following in constructing the pattern is not important: since the completed product is under observation, it has no history; and the knowledge that it has been realized using particular materials and according to such rules constitutes a pure and simple cognitive integration of the considered object which — as a real and observable structure — does not have any observable consequence upon it.

5. OBSERVATIONS ON COLOURS

We built our objects out of dots in order to respect the example of the four nuts and to show the inner limitations to each theory of 'inferiora-superiora'; but it is obvious that not many of the objects of common experience are constructed in this manner. Retrieving the inferiora in the world of common experience is a difficult undertaking, because we usually have to do with relatively homogeneous surfaces and with more or less clearcut divisions between homogeneous

regions. Under these more usual conditions it is not easy to distinguish — analytically — a thing from the parts of a thing. Meinong develops a number of important insights in his analysis of this serious question. First, also homogeneity has parts. Consider a uniformly coloured square: there is a part above and a part below, a right part and a left part. Although these parts are not visibly defined by borders, we cannot deny that they exist. We may also speak of the upper left part and of the lower right part of the square, or of its central zone. A segment is not made up of dots, as geometry maintains, but its discernible parts are its extremities and the portion lying between them. Our reason for saying this is not that if we tell somebody to mark a spot in the upper right part of a square he does so, or if we tell him to consider the right extremity of a horizontally placed segment he does so; nor is it because, when looking at the different parts of homogeneously coloured shapes, our eyes move here and there. We say it because, even if our eyes rest on a spot of the picture and we say nothing to anybody, and if we do not think of anything, the picture continues to have distinct regions, even though they are not definitely divided. Any division will be in some way arbitrary, but some divisions will be less arbitrary than others. “Having parts does not mean being divided into parts”.⁴ There is a special kind of chromatic homogeneity, namely shading, which is the just perceptible and progressive passage from some chromatic parameters to others. A horizontally arranged rectangle, like a piece of ribbon, can be red at its left edge and light pink at its right one, and between these two edges the red progressively merges into a different and increasingly lighter pink. The ribbon has differently coloured parts, although we cannot definitely establish the border of any of them.

One notes with interest that if a clearly visible vertical black line is drawn in the middle of this piece of ribbon to mark the border between its right and left part, the lighter part unexpectedly becomes much lighter, and the darker one much redder, as if the border line concealed a change and not a transition (the gradation is, by hypothesis, the same everywhere). Being a part defined by a border it confers a sort of autonomy to the zone, and a sort of right to the internal redistribution of colour. I do not know if Meinong was aware of this observation of Mach’s, but it is assuredly of considerable importance in the complex phenomenology of the zones of world called ‘parts’.

Furthermore, the opposite phenomenon exists, as evidenced when slight changes are made to the situation considered. If we takes a chromatic atlas — for instance Harald Köpper’s *Dumont’s Farben Atlas* or the Italian equivalent published by Zanichelli and edited by Folco Douglas Scott — as the eye moves across the page, we note that shadings of all colours and level gradually and

⁴ Meinong 1899, § 14.

persistently develop from one side to the other, from one corner of the table to the other. Only careful observation of a single, isolated rectangle of colour allows us, not without difficulty, to see that the colour internal to it is homogeneously distributed; but it is sufficient for our attention suddenly to include a slightly larger field and the colour of any chromatic tessera seems gradually to merge with the colours of the adjoining tesseras, as if the tinted stamps were rather holes made in the white sheet, and we see a completely shaded tint that is toning down with an identical gradient in any place behind this white grating. Reflection on these simple circumstances allows us to address at the level of experimental phenomenology two opposing tendencies which connect the parts and the whole at a mere discourse level (“Parts are unity as well as the whole they form”).⁵ On the one hand, there is the autonomy of the part which, supported by a border, tends to be internally as homogeneous as possible; on the other, there is the hegemony of the whole — i.e. the whole page of one of these atlases — which, in spite of the borders between side and side, tends to impose its own global characteristic of gradation also on the single tesseras that constitute it. In the first case, the coloured element endowed with gradation tends to lose it; in the second, the homogeneously coloured element tends to acquire the gradation that it lacks. “It is well known how easily a ‘violinist’ with ‘feeling’ can change discreet into a melody, no matter of what sort, in the more in-discreet continuum”.⁶

This is only one of the questions we address when we seek to develop a theory of the production laying (existing) between *superiora* and *inferiora* from cases in which the latter are punctiform events to cases in which they are portions of surfaces which are homogeneous in themselves (also shading is a form of homogeneity) and in some way delimited. Meinong says that colours “probably or surely lack the faculty of appearing as objects of superior order”;⁷ but cases like this clearly demonstrate that even very limited and simple chromatic structures can undergo internal changes caused by characteristics that are present elsewhere, and in this sense they resemble the object constituted by the four nuts, rather than this or that nut of the four in question.

6. TEMPORAL STRUCTURES

Matters are further complicated when the structures considered (I use the term ‘structures’ to refer to objects that resist analysis based on the ‘inferiora-

⁵ Meinong 1899, § 14.

⁶ Meinong 1899, § 14.

⁷ Meinong 1899, § 3.

superiora' scheme, according to the examples discussed above) have a temporal development. This complication is reflected in the complexity of Meinong's arguments, which in the section devoted to time — the section which concludes his study of higher-order objects — occasionally border on confusion. As often happens in texts by authors of genius, the farrago of Meinong's argument is frequently shot through with astonishing insights. The first consists in his analysis of the prolonged observation of an object which homogeneously fills everything visible, the homogeneous blue of the sky. It is impossible to mistake the blue of the sky, even when the mind is preoccupied by physicalistic perplexities: this homogeneously coloured total field "is (we might almost say) insuperably reliable". Indeed, "it could of course be hallucinatory too, without compromising the validity of the knowledge derived from perception": the observer "will be always allowed to linger as long as he wants, practically speaking, on the object of his observation, without a sensible weakening in the clarity and reliability with which he knows the object of his observation".⁸ This paradigm comprises two important concepts: the certainty of perceptive experience as such, and the restriction of such certainty to the perceptive event 'under observation'; i.e. as long as it lasts. It is less easy to be certain of the pregress, and analysis of series or temporal structures involves the presence of the pregress.

Meinong's second exceptionally important intuition consists in his distinction between lasting and punctiform objects. This distinction captures with extreme precision the link that joins space with time. "A point is what has no parts" runs the Euclidean definition. A punctiform object in time has no parts, in fact. If we rap the surface of a table with the point of a pencil, the 'tap' is perfectly perceptible and distinct against the background of the usual noises around us, but it is impossible to distinguish between the moment at which it starts and that at which it ends: in the 'tap' the beginning and the end coincide. This very important property can be captured by a paradox: *when the punctiform event happens it has already happened*.

Prolonged events have a beginning and an end: a single ring of the telephone starts and then stops. *When such events happen they are happening*. We can perceive them in their central part, in the memory of their beginning and as we wait for them to cease. In these circumstances we may achieve exact perception of what is meant by Meinong's expression "time of presentness" (which he borrows from Stern).⁹ Before being a concept, the psychic time of presentness is an experience. And it is a curious experience given that even though it is the container within which any real experience necessarily happens (and is also

⁸ Meinong 1899, § 16.

⁹ Stern 1897.

imagined, if we think of an act and not of its content), most people spend their lives without realizing it; without noticing, that is, that when they listen to a melody or watch a train pass by they are witnessing moment by moment the collapse of the world into an irretrievable 'already been' past, one painfully close to the becoming of any event. It might be said this is a seldom experienced phenomenon. On the other hand, von Helmholtz found by means of careful investigation that almost no adult is aware that he or she has perceived after-images in his or her life provided that they have invariably occurred in the visual field after the prolonged observation of colours or lights.

'Time of presentness', I believe, eludes the attention of the majority because, even before being an experience, it is a condition of any experience. Hence psychology has found it difficult to isolate the question of the perception of the 'unity' of events precisely because the existence of unity renders a non-chaotic experience in the Kantian sense possible, and it has consequently developed a categorial role in the constitution of immediate factuality. The same applies to identity. These are concepts of great antiquity which refer to percepts discovered only much later and submitted to phenomenological analysis because — for almost any speculative purpose — discussion of them seemingly exhausted the field of possible explorations.

'Time of presentness' (later called psychic present, phenomenal present, or — referring to Bergson — *durée réelle*) is on certain occasions perceivable as a clearly present aspect of the event that occurs within it. When the telephone begins to ring, for a moment we hear perfectly that it has just started — but we do not have sufficient time to focus on the idea that it is already enduring: it has evidently started, and it is homogeneously present like a sound which started a moment ago (different from a sound that lasted for a period, and also from a small sound or continuous noise that we suddenly realize we are hearing, instantly deducting it from our distraction). Sometimes a sound to which we were not paying attention suddenly stops, and we instantaneously hear that 'it has been', that it lasted until a moment ago, and that this silence is just present, present in the present.

Punctiform objects fall within the time of presentness in their completeness, and with all their characteristics, even when they are somewhat more extensive than the 'tap' produced by a pencil lightly rapped on the table. They exhibit all their observable properties jointly (if they are sounds: loudness, intensity, timbre, harmonic function in the melodic context, relative duration, and so on) in a fraction of time of presentness — which, note, is not 'their' time of presentness, but the time of presentness of the experience in which they are included — even if sometimes, after their transformation into immediate memory, doubts arise as to their connotations, and the impression remains that these events were too short to be well observed. However, also this characteris-

tic belongs to their observable properties; properties for which Meinong coined the appropriate term “transient events”.

The fact that these events occur entirely within the realm of ascertainments is demonstrated by uncountable circumstances which can be subjected, with few technical complications, to laboratory experimentation.

Suppose that a friend is playing on the piano a rapid cadenza like the one assigned to the harpsichord in the fifth *Brandenburg Concert*, or simply a rapid scale. It is evident after superficial logical-linguistic analysis that an event of this kind is not describable — moment by moment — by the statement: “I hear just one note, I remember many of them in the immediate past and I wait for many others in the near future; moreover, the note I now hear is of a duration equal to that of the notes I hold in my memory”. The ‘fit’ between event and description breaks down, because the event is not made in this way. (The first part of the description is valid for the act of listening to a quite long note after listening to rapid flourishes of notes). The event is constituted in such a manner that only mention of the presence of many little notes together authorizes a truthful description; but it must involve a succession: “I hear a rapid sequence of notes which is similar to an already occurring rapidity in the immediate past”.

If the time of presentness were a moment long, say a thousandth of second, then we would hear only one note and would remember the previous ones according to the first description. But if the ‘fitness’ of such a description fails, this means that things are not made thus. A problem arises here: the five or six notes that I am now listening to are all equally present, and it is impossible to say which of them is more present than the others. But since they come one after the other, and since the sense of the melody resides precisely in this, they are necessarily in succession, i.e. not present together. This paradox enjoins acceptance; or better it is a contradiction which needs to be tolerated. It lies in the linguistic device used to emphasise facts rather than in the facts themselves. The experience of rapid sequences of events is formed by successive events that are all jointly present. Everyday language has been fashioned to deal with gross matters, and the technical languages of philosophy, as well as of those sciences which seldom use formal instruments, often contain absurdities which derive from this fact. Not surprisingly, a linguistically paradoxical expression is an effectively good phenomenological description, if facts stay in this way. And they exactly stay so: I would ask the reader to stop reading, take a pencil, paying attention to what is going to happen, and produce a rapid discharge, almost obliging his hand to tremble, keeping the point of his pencil very close to the surface. The reader will assume the acoustic result of this motor behaviour with extreme attention, trying — as it were — to intercept the presumed ‘tic’ that is more present than the others, to realize that it doesn’t

exist. Indeed, going on in the operation more times, since the exercise which is repeated makes the production of quite rapid discharges easier, he surprisingly will find at a certain moment that it is impossible to attribute a certain heard thrust to a certain movement of the hand, because the motor discharge soon assumes an almost independent development, and that is merely parallel to the acoustic succession of the thrusts; without, on the other hand, a sure biunivocal relationship among the elements of a series or of another one.

I ask the reader to consider this pause in his reading as a printed example on the page, as if it were a picture (for instance no. 3). Producing an acoustic example (in this case a recording of Paganini's *Perpetual Movement* would also perfectly fit; after some bars, in fact, this composition evokes a vivid sense of simultaneous presence in the succession, in "resounding together one after the other, but which one after which other?") is exactly like inserting a picture into the text. It is, in other words, an invitation to suspend for a moment the logical philosophical angers of the higher faculties to make room the precategorially real field — i.e. reality — which any speculative farrago wants to bear, and that in the meanwhile stays there, as it is, without showing concussion for our argumentative efforts. There are pictures that on the page, don't show anything of them, like the diagrams of engineers, but show only themselves (this is a typically Brentanian concept).

Time of presentness is hardly accepted by Meinong, and this is as it should be, because it demonstrates that it is a concept that *must* be accepted, willy-nilly. English philosophy (after Russell) often provides a very appropriate example: "if the universe had been created two minutes ago, with all that it comprises, memories and testimonies of the past and illusions of history and of autobiography... how would we know that a divine trick had been played on us?". Nobody, as far as I know, has ever tried to shorten the time between now and this supposed creation. A minute ago. Half a minute ago (more and more). But not four milliseconds ago! This is nonsense, because four milliseconds ago I was here, under my direct control. The present that results from a creation of two minutes ago cannot arise from a creation that is supposedly part of it, that perhaps divides it in the middle (if time of presentness lasts 150 msec., how can its creation be imagined as happening 75 msec. ago?). If Meinong had considered this problem, it would have persuaded him to accept Stern's time of presentness with less reluctance. What probably annoyed him was that he had to surrender to the crude presence of a few simple facts.

7. THE CASE OF THE LIVED PRESENT

A discovery by Benussi — Meinong's disciple — confirms that it is possible to restrict the time of presentness in certain circumstances, and therefore to move the moment of Russell's false creation too much near in the times axis in physics. In a replication of Benussi's experiment by Vicario (see Vicario 1973), an electronic device produced sounds in the sequence La (100 msec) — white noise (35 msec) — Sol (100 msec): La and Sol being the keys located more or less in the middle of the piano keyboard (La 440).¹⁰

In the presence of this brief acoustic discharge it is impossible not to hear the following sequence: La — Sol — very brief pause — noise. In the programmed sequence of sounds produced by the device, the white noise came between the two notes. The acoustic event, however, contains two sounds in rapid succession, a very quick fall from La to Sol, and, well separated by them, a 'crak', a very brief noise.

The phenomenon can be explained in theoretical terms, but in any case the order in the time of physics has not been preserved in the audible order, and in the latter the two sounds typically appear together in the sequence. They echo even when the brief noise appears for a short time.

With the means available to Benussi there was little further that he could do. Today, however, the sequence of sounds can be produced in various, as it were, magnitudes: for example, if we make the two notes last for six seconds and the interposed noise for a little more than two seconds, we distinctly hear a La, a noise, and a Sol.

If we repeatedly shorten the three phases in the same proportions, we eventually hear the sequence: sound — noise — sound. Only by overcoming a certain measure next to the one above-referred we suddenly have a different order: finally the alien body (the noise) and the two sounds adjoined together, almost for elective affinities.

It is the critical magnitude of this time-frame internal to the time of presentness that causes the temporal displacement (*Zeitverschiebung*); a magnitude so close as to allow a contiguity by elective affinities instead of following a point-to-point correspondence between the time of physics and the time of perception. Real time cannot be broken down into points, and thus no wonder.

If Russell's creation is incorporated into durations with properties such as these, only paradoxes result. Within these durations, creation might happen after the perception of the created world.

The importance of the perceptive *Zeitverschiebungen* — apart from that investing individual experimental problems and the models that more or less

¹⁰ Cf. Vicario 1973.

appropriately connect them to each other — resides in the fact that their existence imposes a certain interpretation of time presentness, apart from others. This interpretation states that, for a given observer, the flow of time is not made up of a succession of pieces, even if it could contain pieces into succession. It comprises a zone characterized by its accessibility to the reordering of events; and therefore, albeit for a short period, the functional connections among events can proceed forwards or backwards. Accordingly, the act of listening to a melody must no longer be considered — according to von Ehrenfels' scheme — as a succession of notes, plus a succession of relations among notes. Here too the scheme 'terms plus relations' looks somewhat weak, and adapt to illustrate just very elementar situations, imagining then — on the logical level — the rest of the world paradigmed on these.

I believe that, after surrendering to the factual evidence implicit in Stern's idea, Meinong failed to understand that with it everything changes: the existence of a stretch of time which is ascertainably real and characterized by a certain more or less definable duration, in which we absolutely always exist, and in which the events of experience are distributed, cannot simply be accepted without incurring further consequences. If we only accept that there is a time presentness where a myriad of short successive events are ordered one after the other, we should conclude, with Meinong, and surprisingly, that the sense of a melody appears to us exactly when its last note is struck (Meinong's coherence is always admirable, also when it is erroneous). In fact, if a melody is a superius with respect to its individual notes, "a distributed superius would then consist in the representation of this adding object appearing at the end of the succession, or in the representation first of all of the inferiora and then also of the added one, but simultaneously with the last inferior". Before all the notes have been played, there is no melody: "in fact it is impossible to represent a superius if its inferiora or just a part of them are not represented".¹¹ This would be true if melodies were notes + intervals (terms + relations).

But the advancement through time of a melodic line which can be only abstractly decomposed into notes and time relations among notes consists in the progressive appearance of an object which is already in itself complete, like the progressive development of a landscape seen from the window of a train; which is a landscape even before we have seen it, as various as it could reveal itself in time.

Were the ongoing development of a melody to consist in the note-by-note establishment of relations (intervals) among notes, we would not tend to perceive a *future* in comparison with a given note, the last to arrive in

¹¹ Meinong 1899, § 21.

chronological order (establishing a moment in the flow of listening, as in a snap). And yet this future exists and its phenomenal evidence is the basis for the meaning of the musical sentence — and, moreover, for the meaning of the sentences that we usually say speaking. Of course, we are not clairvoyants able to predict the future. The future is an immanent aspect of the time of presentness, here and now, one of its constant requirements; but if it is neglected, any analysis of events as they develop breaks down. Such is the melody, because it is a complete object even if it is only partially heard, and it is in the process of development, like a pen only partially concealed by a sheet of paper, a newspaper in the pocket of a coat, a postcard we see in the act of posting it (and of course, as numerous experiments have shown, all of these — the postcard, the pen and the newspaper — could be devoid of their unseen part, but we would nevertheless see them as complete).

It may be objected that this applies only to melodies that we already know; melodies of which we can imagine the total development even after a bar and a half. The fact of the matter, however, is that the harmonic and dynamic properties implicit in a melodic development, even if they are very elementary, pre-represent in some non-indefinite way, even if it is achievable with different sonorous aggregates, what is up to now covered by the rim of present.

Hence, although some superiora are already present when certain inferiora are not yet present, we must eliminate the distinction as deceptive, because in the world of the true and ineludible objects of ongoing experience what sometimes appears to be a superius determines its supposed inferius, and is effectively its inferius. Moreover, more or less extensive items of temporal sequences co-determine each other, exactly as in the non-temporal examples analysed in sections 3, 4 and 5 of this essay.

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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TABLE OF CROSS-REFERENCES

on:

see also:

time

1.19, 6.4, 8.4

LOGIC IN THE BRENTANO SCHOOL

1. TERMINOLOGY

The term ‘the Brentano School’ will here be understood to comprise Brentano and his immediate students, that is, those who studied with him either in Würzburg or in Vienna. In practice, those whose contributions to logic I shall consider in any depth number precisely three: Brentano himself, Meinong, and Husserl. I shall not consider students of students of Brentano, for although some of these, in particular Ernst Mally and Jan Łukasiewicz, contributed to logic, they cannot be reckoned among the Brentano School: Mally belongs to Meinong and Graz, Łukasiewicz to Twardowski and Lvov (later to Warsaw). However, I shall briefly survey the influence of the Brentano School at the end.

I shall consider contributions to deductive logic, the methodology of logic, and the philosophy of logic. I shall not consider inductive logic, the logical structure of scientific theories or the theory of probability, except where they are germane to deductive logic (in the work of Meinong).

The format of the paper is that in each of the three major sections (Brentano, Husserl, Meinong) I first survey the primary literature sources and mention one or two useful works of secondary literature, before proceeding to a summary of the relevant aspects of the work in question. I prefer this to an elaborate system of page references which is out of place in an introductory survey article.¹

¹ There is no general monograph on the logic of the Brentano School. More of the individual papers I have written on various aspects of this topic are collected in my 1992.

2. BRENTANO

Sources: Brentano first aired his opinion that traditional logic is in need of reform in his lectures in Würzburg in 1870, and some of the ideas found their way into *Psychology from an empirical standpoint* (1874). A compilation by Franziska Mayer-Hillebrand of notes on logic from Brentano's *Nachlaß* was published in 1956 with the title *Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil*.² A more extensive discussion of Brentano's reforms can be found in my paper "Brentano's reform of logic" in Simons 1992.

For Brentano the axioms and inferences of deductive logic are versions of the Principle of Contradiction, so that all logical truths are analytic. His logical views are based on his descriptive psychology of the primary bearers of truth and falsity, namely *judgements*. Statements are true or false by virtue of being the linguistic expressions of true or false judgements. Very early in his philosophical career Brentano rejected the subject-predicate analysis of judgements, particularly as he had found it in John Stuart Mill. Brentano corresponded with Mill about this, and secured an admission from Mill that he (Brentano) was right that there are non-subject-predicate judgements. In place of the subject-predicate analysis, Brentano proposed one which made basic judgements affirmations or denials of existence. Brentano called such judgements (both positive and negative) 'existential judgements'. Existential judgements like 'Horses exist' and impersonal judgements like 'It is raining outside' cannot plausibly be tortured into subject-predicate form. Nowadays we find this quite a commonplace observation, but for Brentano it came as a revelation. It fitted in particularly well with his view that judgements are based on and presuppose ideas or presentations, e.g. the idea of a horse, the idea of rain outside. Judgement may then be said to consist in a positive (affirmative) or negative attitude to the object of such presentations. On no account can such judgements be taken to consist in the ascription or denial of something called existence to (or of) some object or other: Brentano accepted Kant's view that 'existence is not a predicate', but whereas Kant, like Bolzano, Frege, and Russell, went on to qualify this by saying existence is not a predicate of individuals, or a first-order predicate, but is a predicate of concepts, or second-order predicate, for Brentano existence is no predicate at all, rather what we have are correct and incorrect affirmations and denials of objects.

The next step consists in showing how erstwhile categorical judgements can be put into existential form. This is easy: for *Some A are B* we have *There is an*

² The Mayer-Hillebrand compilation does not fulfil the standards of exact scientific editing, mixing documenta and parts of documenta from different periods with no attempt to make their sources clear. A critical edition of the lecture notes used at the University of Vienna in 1879 and again in 1884 (Husserl attended the later course) is being prepared by Johannes Brandl and myself.

A B (or: *An A B exists*), for *No A are B* we have its contradictory opposite, *There is no A B* (or: *No A B exists*), for *Some A are not B* we use nominal or term negation and get *There is an A non-B*, and finally for *All A are B* we have *There is no A non-B*. As Brentano realises, this necessitates a reform of the logic of terms, since universal propositions with an empty subject term are automatically true, which means that subalternation and conversion *per accidens* are no longer valid. This reduces the number of categorical syllogisms from the 24 of Aristotle to only 15. A similar rejection of traditional existential import had been carried out somewhat earlier by George Boole.

Brentano notes that by using what amount to four basic concepts, namely nominal conjunction, nominal negation, and two proposition-forming operators, viz. 'There are' and 'There are no', he can effect a radical simplification of the rules of logic. Expressing conjunction by juxtaposition of term letters, negation by switching between upper-case and lower-case fonts (as in Jevons), affirmation (existence, there are) by '+' and rejection (non-existence, there are no) by '-', he can symbolize the categorical forms as

I: AB+
E: AB-
O: Ab+
A: Ab-

The traditional terminology of positive for A and I and negative for E and O is inappropriate to Brentano's symbolism and he drops it in favour of calling all universals negative and all particulars positive. Since conjunction is obviously commutative and associative, the order and bracketing of nominal conjuncts is irrelevant and there is no reason to call one term 'subject' and another 'predicate' any more, especially as we may conjoin more than two terms. The simple or complex term which is accepted or rejected Brentano calls its material or object. The sole axiom which Brentano explicitly mentions is a form of the principle of contradiction

(PC) Aa- *There is no A non-A*

For immediate inference Brentano mentions two rules of inference:

(a) Every positive judgement remains correct when any part of its material is omitted. (b) Every negative judgement remains correct when its material is arbitrarily enriched.

Schematically,

(a) $AB^+ \text{ therefore } A^+$

and

(b) $A^- \text{ therefore } AB^-$.

Mediate inference is effected using two further rules

(c) $AB^-, A^+ \text{ therefore } Ab^+$

(d) $AB^-, Ab^- \text{ therefore } A^-$.

Syllogisms of the traditional form can be deduced from these rules. For example *Ferio* is derived using (c) as follows:

- | | | |
|-----|------|-------------------------|
| (1) | MP- | |
| (2) | SM+ | |
| (3) | SMP- | from (1) by (b) |
| (4) | Smp+ | from (3) and (2) by (c) |
| (5) | Sp+ | from (4) by (a) |

and *Celarent* is derived using (d):

- | | | |
|-----|------|-------------------------------------|
| (1) | MP- | |
| (2) | Sm- | |
| (3) | SPM- | from (1) by permuting terms and (b) |
| (4) | Spm- | from (2) likewise |
| (5) | SP- | from (3) and (4) by (d). |

Brentano goes on to deal with some propositional inferences within this framework using nominalized sentences.

Traditionally, inferences such as subalternation and conversion *per accidens* were regarded as valid, as were syllogisms like *Darapti*; these inferences depended on the tacit assumption that the subject term of a categorical proposition is not empty. Brentano described a judgement like *Every A is B*, where the subject term has existential import, as a *double judgement* and took it to consist of an affirmation of existence (*A exist*) fused with a dependent non-judgemental part which ascribes a predicate to this object or denies a predicate of it: so we have *A exist and they are B* for the A form with existential import, and *A exist and they are not B* for the corresponding E form. For the purposes

of inference, Brentano noted that no new judgement form needs to be introduced, since the logical effect of using double judgements is simply to add another premiss of the form A+, which is in any case redundant for the I and O forms. In this way the remaining 9 of the 24 Aristotelian categorical syllogisms may be derived.

Brentano's development of the better-known parts of traditional logic on the basis he gives is simple and elegant, but his treatment is not especially exact and makes a number of implicit assumptions which need to be spelled out. Brentano had, for bad reasons, formed a negative opinion of mathematical logic, and neither he nor his students attempted to put his work on a solid formal basis. His philosophical opinions also inhibited him from developing formal principles of reasoning concerning modal or relational matters, so that, despite his innovativeness in the treatment of logical form and its effects on traditional syllogistic, his efforts amount to a reform of formal logic of much less significance than the revolution instigated by Frege, Peirce and others at about the same time.

If Brentano's own rather modest reform of traditional logic did not exert great influence, his views on truth were much more influential, and indeed can be said to have played a major part in making the philosophy of truth a major issue in the twentieth century.³ In a series of essays and notes, Brentano considered the traditional Aristotelian theory of truth, according to which a judgement is true if things are as they claim it to be and false if things are otherwise. At first he was inclined to think of this in terms of some kind of correspondence between the mind and things, as in the classical formulation *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, but he was uneasy about, and soon fully rejected, the assumption that there are special entities, which he rather tentatively considered under the term judgement contents, whose very existence secures the truth of judgements. This assumption was nevertheless popular among his students: Stumpf, Marty, Meinong and Husserl all accepted the existence, in some mode or other, of correlates of whole sentences or judgements and therewith of some form of correspondence theory of truth. Marty called these *judgement contents* like Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl called them 'states of affairs' (*Sachverhalte*) and Meinong called them 'objectives' (*Objektive*).

Rejecting correspondence, Brentano needed another source for the objectivity of truth, and considered himself to have found it in the notion of *evidence*. Some judgements are self-evidently true, others self-evidently false, and yet others are not evidently true or false. Because he did not want logic to be subjective or relative, Brentano was forced to consider such evidence as infallible, and thus laid himself open to the obvious objection that people are

³ See Woleński & Simons 1989.

fallible in logic as much as elsewhere. Evidence also provided Brentano with an explanation for the status of alethic modal propositions. To say that a proposition or judgement is necessary is not to say it concerns a different subject matter than the plain non-modal judgement, but merely to claim that it may be affirmed with evidence.

3. HUSSERL

Sources: The primary sources for Husserl's views are now all available in the *Husserliana* critical edition: all of the *Philosophy of arithmetic* (1891) (*Hua* XII), *Logical investigations* (1900-01) (*Hua* XVIII-XIX), and *Formal and transcendental logic* (1929) (*Hua* XVII), early essays on logic and related subjects in *Aufsätze und Rezensionen* (1890-1910) (*Hua* XXII) and the abortive attempts to complete the second volume of the *Philosophy of arithmetic* in *Studien zur Arithmetik und Geometrie* (*Hua* XXI). All of these contain relevant previously unpublished material from the *Nachlaß*. Two books contain accessible accounts of Husserl's views on logic, in particular in relation to his earlier philosophy: Dallas Willard's *Logic and the objectivity of knowledge* (1984) and David Bell's *Husserl* (1990). On the formal theory of part and whole see my "The formalization of Husserl's theory of wholes and parts" in Simons 1992.

Husserl was a mathematician by training, so of all Brentano's students, one might have expected him to have contributed most to formal or mathematical logic. However, Husserl's interests lay more in the philosophy of logic, and it is there that his contribution is strongest, as we shall see below. He had attended Brentano's logic lectures in Vienna (1884-5) and was by no means a traditionalist in logic. In the 1890s Husserl reviewed Ernst Schröder's *Vorlesungen zur Algebra der Logik*, and kept abreast of developments in logic in Germany, on which he wrote survey articles until 1904. While having reservations about the philosophical basis of Schröder's work, Husserl admired the latter's technical skills, and in his own notes used a version of Schröder's symbolism.

In the late 19th Century there was a running debate between two schools of thought in logic. One school, known as extensionalists, held that exact logic of terms could only be concerned with classes; the other school, known as intensionalists, held that logic is properly concerned with concepts rather than classes. It can be seen that the terms 'extensionalist' and 'intensionalist' had a somewhat different signification then from the ones employed nowadays. The extensionalist view was popular among mathematicians, and was generally associated with English logicians like Jevons and Venn, and the algebraicists like Schröder, whereas the intensionalist view was more popular among philosophers, especially on the continent. Husserl showed, against assertions of extensionalists, that Schröder's calculus could be perfectly well interpreted as a calculus of concepts rather than classes. His own view was that intensions or

concepts are prior to extensions, and this was one reason why he rejected Frege's definition of numbers in terms of extensions. However, Husserl, like Schröder, regarded logical calculi as capable of more than one interpretation, and did not deny that an extensional interpretation could be given. Husserl's views got him embroiled in an acrimonious and unenlightening debate with a logician called Voigt.

Husserl made rather little of Frege's logical innovations, although we know he dipped into the *Begriffsschrift*. In this he was no worse than his more specialized contemporaries like Schröder and Cantor, who, like Husserl, were unable to penetrate Frege's symbolism. In some unpublished notes, Husserl experimented with Fregean ideas, including the quantifiers, in a Schröderian symbolism, but after 1891 he published nothing more on mathematical logic, though he had much to say about the philosophy and methodology of logic.

Husserl's principal contribution was not to logic as such but to the philosophy and methodology of logic; the job of the philosopher is not to produce new logical systems but to clarify the epistemological foundations of logic. It was through him rather than Frege that psychologism in logic, the view that the laws of logic are empirical psychological or anthropological generalizations about thinking, received its most well known criticism, in the *Prolegomena to pure logic* which formed the first volume to appear (1900) of the *Logical investigations*. It is a matter of no small debate among scholars how far this anti-psychologism was caused by the hostile review of Husserl's 1891 *Philosophie der Arithmetik* by Frege. Two extreme positions have both been upheld: one, that Husserl fully subscribed to psychologism until Frege's penetrating critic lifted the scales from his eyes, the other that Husserl had either never been an adherent of psychologism in the first place or had already made the anti-psychologistic turn unaided. The truth appears to lie somewhere between. Husserl had already ground to a halt in work on the second volume of the *Philosophie der Arithmetik*. The reasons are complex, but it seems that one source of his dissatisfaction was his rejection of the empiricist 'inattention' theory of abstraction he had upheld in the earlier work. But the work had never exhibited naturalistic psychologism of the sort Husserl later criticised: the psychology it tried to apply was the *a priori* descriptive psychology of Brentano. Some of Husserl's terminology, e.g. the description of the relation colligating elements of a manifold as *psychisch*, was however gravely misleading. He later said to William Boyce Gibson that Frege's criticism was the only one for which he was truly grateful, that it alone "hit the nail on the head".⁴ But it is unlikely that this was the nail of psychologism: more probably the theory of abstraction, which Frege also criticised, was the problem. While

⁴ Boyce Gibson 1971, 66. The remark was made on 24 June 1928.

Frege caught Husserl when he was already ready to abandon aspects of his former approach and was ripe for persuasion, Husserl never accepted every aspect of Frege's view of logic, e.g. he never retracted his view that his account of number was superior to Frege's (rightly, in my view).

Having rejected psychologism, Husserl embraced an explicit Platonism and described the domain to be investigated by pure logic as 'ideal', that is, a domain of entities outside space and time. This Platonism was influenced more by Lotze and especially Bolzano than Frege. Of particular importance for the philosophy of logic is his Platonism of meanings. It is in the objective theoretical laws governing these that Husserl finds the justificatory basis for the normative injunctions of logic: theoretical disciplines must serve as the basis for normative ones.

Husserl did not consider it his job as a philosopher to formulate new systems of logic. That is in his view a task for the mathematician. Unlike Brentano therefore, he welcomes the advances in logic brought about by its mathematization:

It is not the mathematician but the philosopher who oversteps his legitimate sphere when he attacks 'mathematizing' theories of logic and refuses to hand over his temporary foster-children to their natural parents.⁵

Husserl's views on the status and methodology of logic were at this time some of the most advanced and sophisticated anywhere, despite the fact that he was not engaged in doing logic as such. Firstly, logic is stratified. The first level consists in those laws which permit meanings to be combined significantly. These resemble what has since come to be termed formation rules, except that Husserl's laws concern ideal meanings directly rather than their perceivable linguistic vehicles. The laws governing the combinations of meanings (and so distinguishing sense from nonsense) constitute a universal grammar, an old rationalist idea which Husserl's work, especially in the 4th Investigation, "The distinction between independent and dependent meanings and the idea of pure grammar", went some way towards reviving. On the basis of this grammar the *a priori* conditions of formal consistency can be investigated. This is what roughly corresponds to modern logic, except that Husserl interprets *formal* more widely than do most modern logicians: not only the logical constants such as conjunction, negation and quantification are formal, there are also other formal concepts such as part-whole, dependence, and cardinal number. Thus Husserl's 3rd Investigation, "On the theory of wholes and parts", is itself a philosophical prolegomenon to and sketch of a branch of formal logic/ontology embracing the formal concepts part-whole and dependence. Husserl also

⁵ Prolegomena, § 71.

envisages (but does not execute) the inclusion of a theory of probability within the area of formal logic, a desideratum which has been approached in subsequent years, though the integration Husserl looked for has yet to take place. The third and final tier of logic concerns truth, not just consistency. Husserl is here essentially influenced by Bolzano. The proper task of logic is that of a theory of science (*Wissenschaftslehre*), and the archetype of a science is that of a deductively closed body of knowledge concerned with a single field, that is, an internally connected *theory* rather than a mere arbitrary body of truths.

Secondly, logic is essentially a two-sided enterprise. One side investigates the laws of consistency and consequence among judgements or propositions, the other investigates the corresponding relations among the formal models or, as Husserl calls them, *manifolds* of objects corresponding to these judgements. This two-sidedness is related to, though importantly different from, the later distinction in formal logic between syntax and semantics. Whereas in the tradition of formal logic from Carnap and Tarski to the present, syntax and proof theory have been concerned with syntactical relationships among expressions, and semantics with the correlation of expressions with their semantic values (objects, truth-values etc.), in Husserl's case the correlation is presupposed as given, and Husserl holds that in talking of laws of logic we are at once stating which deductive relations hold among propositions while at the same time stating laws applying to any realm of objects that serve as interpretation for these propositions. So although Husserl does not as such anticipate the modern idea of logical semantics, he has discerned enough differences to allow such a semantics to be formulated within his overall view.

In his much later *Formal and transcendental logic* of 1929, Husserl adds little to this picture of pure logic except some terminology: the theory of relations among judgements or propositions becomes formal apophantics, that of connections among manifolds becomes formal ontology. The overall enterprise of logic, which integrates it fully with pure mathematics, is called *mathesis universalis*. Husserl also elaborates in greater detail the distinction between formal and non-formal components in propositions. For the most part however, the original view is simply elaborated at greater length. What the later work adds is the view that the laws of formal logic cannot be accepted as given but stand in need of a 'transcendental' justification, one which shows them to be conditions of the possibility of rational thought. These transcendental justifications are meant to replace the Platonistic position of the *Investigations*, which Husserl could no longer accept as the ultimate justification because it depends on the unconditional acceptance of an ontological position whose assumption cannot be justified solely from the fact that we think. Without exception however, Husserl's accounts of these transcendental conditions are far less convincing than the laws he attempts to justify, so were it not that

Husserl maintains his former position as regards formal logic, one would be forced to the opinion that he had managed to abandon his own considerable advances in the philosophy of logic. As it is, the transcendental part of the later work can largely be jettisoned without damage to the basic viewpoint on formal logic.

In summary, we can see Husserl as a visionary philosopher of logic who left it to others to fill out the details of his vision, which owes ultimately perhaps more to Leibniz than any other philosopher. The influence of Brentano on Husserl is by contrast strongest in other areas.

4. MEINONG

Sources: Meinong's works are available in eight volumes in the *Alexius Meinong Gesamtausgabe* (1968-78), and include in particular *On assumptions* (1902, 2nd ed. 1910), and *On possibility and probability* (1916). Still the most accessible account of Meinong's views is John Findlay's *Meinong's theory of objects and values* (1963), but there is more about logic in Richard Routley's monumental *Exploring Meinong's jungle and beyond* (1980). For a detailed account of the complicated relationships between Meinong and Russell and Meinong and Łukasiewicz respectively see my essays "On what there isn't" and "Łukasiewicz, Meinong, and many-valued logic" in Simons 1992.

It is something of a paradox that Brentano's student Alexius Meinong, who, for all his expertise in many areas of philosophy, was no logician, should have made a significant contribution to the development of various areas of non-classical logic. Meinong wrote no work, not even an essay, not even a part of a book, on logic. In his published *Nachlaß*,⁶ there are two sets of lecture notes (from 1910 and 1913) on what Meinong calls "object-theoretic logic". But they contain much more object theory than logic. Meinong's main interests were psychology, value theory, object theory, theory of knowledge. Apart from his famous public controversy with Bertrand Russell, he had little contact with well-known logicians. In Graz, the house logician was Ernst Mally, and Meinong was content to leave the assimilation of new advances in logic and the working-out of their implications to Mally. Nevertheless, Meinong exercised considerable influence on the development of modern logic, especially non-classical logic. It is one of Austrian philosophy's little ironies that Meinong had more influence on the development of logic than Austria's greatest logician Bernard Bolzano.

Meinong had, indirectly, a minor hand in the development of classical logic. Russell's theory of definite descriptions in his famous 1905 paper "On

⁶ Meinong 1868-1978, *Ergänzungsband*, 209-272.

denoting” is directed in part against Meinong’s theory of impossible objects, and is meant to avoid the need to postulate them. Russell was never in any way inclined to accept Meinong’s theory, but he was sufficiently preoccupied with it to want to formulate clear objections and a workable alternative.

The logical innovations begun and further inspired by Meinong have their origins in his theory of intentionality, the central importance of which he learnt from Brentano. For Meinong every mental act has an object or target, and different kinds of mental act have different kinds of object. We may divide acts into four groups according to two independent distinctions. An act may be on the one hand designative or propositional (these are not Meinongian terms), on the other hand it may be intellectual or affective. Intellectual designative acts are called presentations (*Vorstellungen*), intellectual propositional acts are judgements, affective designative acts are feelings or emotions, affective propositional acts are conations (desires, aversions). There is a third dimension, according to whether an act is ‘serious’ or has phantasy-character, but this, together with the affective side, is not considered here. All acts except presentation further have a positive/negative polarity, e.g. belief/disbelief, like/dislike, desire/aversion. The objects of intellectual acts might be called *entia*, and of these, the objects of presentation are things or *res*, which Meinong calls in German *Objekte*, while the objects of judgement (and its phantasy version, assumption) are called objectives (*Objektive*).

For Meinong, with very few exceptions, the things which are the objects of presentation are exactly as they are presented as being. Thus things may

C1 combine incompatible properties (the infamous impossible objects like the round square)

or

C2 lack both of a pair of contradictory properties (incomplete objects).

Further

C3 objects are as they are irrespective of whether they have being or not (the independence principle).

It was the impossible objects that led Meinong into controversy with Russell. In the first place this was because Meinong denied any kind of being to such objects, whereas Russell had been accustomed to thinking that all objects have being. But Russell soon concentrated his attack on the point that impossible

objects offend against the laws of logic. Meinong accepted Russell's diagnosis, writing

the principle of contradiction has never been applied by anyone to anything but actual and possible objects,... but once thought... takes the impossible into its sphere, what is valid on a narrower domain obviously requires a special examination, whose possible negative outcome in no way affects the validity of the old established results within the narrower sphere.⁷

Whereas Russell in effect said 'So much the worse for Meinong's impossible objects' Meinong, contraposing, in effect said 'So much the worse for the old laws of logic'. But Russell and Meinong were at cross-purposes as to what they meant by 'laws of logic'. Russell took Meinong's remarks as an admission that Meinong was prepared to assert propositional contradictions of the form

CD1 S is P and it is not the case that S is P

whereas Meinong pretty certainly meant the weaker

CD2 S is P and S is not- P .


Meinong resisted Russell's attempts to foist the stronger, propositional version on him, and in his posthumously published logic notes clearly distinguished between an inner or predicate-negation (Meinong says 'narrower') *S is not- P* and an outer, propositional or 'wider' negation *It is not the case that S is P* , and indeed employs two different symbols for the two distinct operators. So one can consistently accept an inner contradiction or impossibility CD2 without accepting an outer or propositional contradiction CD1. Meinong attempted to maintain, as far as he could, a propositionally consistent theory of predicate-inconsistent objects: he knew via Mally of the foundational paradoxes such as that afflicting Russell's set, but did not fully elaborate a theory of the resulting 'defective objects'.

The objects of judgement and assumption are objectives. These combine standard characteristics of propositions, namely being true and false (truth-bearers), and being the objects or objective contents of so-called propositional attitudes like believing, with standard characteristics of states of affairs, like being what make judgements true or false (truth-makers) and marking the difference between true and false ontologically. Only some objectives have being, namely those corresponding to true judgements. Meinong reserves the term 'true' for objectives which have been actually apprehended by someone.

⁷ Meinong 1868-1978, V, 222.

The corresponding objective property of objectives he names *factuality*, and describes such objectives as factual or facts. Originally, (in his work *On assumptions*, 1902 and 1910), Meinong considered that all objectives which do not have being are outside being and so, if apprehended, would correspond to false judgements. The corresponding property is unfactuality, and unfactual objectives may be termed *unfacts*. In this respect his underlying logic is classical.

By 1915-16, in his largest work, *Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit*, Meinong had significantly modified his position to accommodate possibility. Like Leibniz, under whose indirect influence Meinong here stands, he takes possibility as the basic alethic modality, but unlike Leibniz he requires it to be increasable (*steigerungsfähig*). In place of the Aristotelian gradation of NECESSARY, CONTINGENT, IMPOSSIBLE he takes the Megaric gradation of TRUE, POSSIBLE, FALSE, which is translated into his own terminology as a range of degrees of factuality from 0 (complete unfactuality) to 1 (complete factuality), a schema which Meinong calls the 'factuality line'. Any degree of factuality strictly between 0 and 1, i.e. neither completely factual nor completely unfactual, Meinong calls 'subfactual' (*untertatsächlich*). So the factuality line looks like



Since to be subfactual is to have some degree of factuality f in the range $0 < f < 1$, there can be no degrees of being subfactual; subfactuality is unincreasable (*steigerungsunfähig*).

How can objectives be subfactual? Meinong answers: Only when they are about (have as subjects) the incomplete objects allowed under C2. An example would be the object which has the sole properties of being a beefsteak and being eaten by me this evening. This object (call it BE) is not to be confused with any real steak which I might eat or do in fact eat. Any real steak is complete in its properties: it has a certain determinate weight, provenance, tenderness, shape etc., so that every objective about such a steak is either factual or unfactual: *tertium non datur*. The objective

OBE That BE (the beefsteak I eat this evening) weighs between 100 g and 150 g

is neither factual nor unfactual, since BE is indeterminate as to weight. It is instead subfactual. Whereabouts OBE comes in the scale of factuality between

0 and 1 is determined, according to Meinong, by considerations of relative frequency. If of all the (real) beefsteaks I have ever eaten or shall eat, one in four has a weight between 100 g and 150 g, then the objective OBE has a factuality of a quarter or 0,25. So by increasable possibility Meinong means something very close to what is some times called objective probability. On the other hand, what Meinong calls *Wahrscheinlichkeit*, is, as its etymology hints, the extent to which an objective seems true to someone, or its subjective probability.

So Meinong's theory of subfactuality gives him several things at once: an (albeit rudimentarily developed) account of objective probability as increasable possibility, corresponding to but not being identical with relative frequency, and the connected notion of contingency, i.e. the unincreasable state of being properly subfactual, as distinct from possibility, i.e. being not unfactual. It gives Meinong the choice of two scales of factuality: the continuous one $0 < p < 1$ for increasable possibility, with infinitely many values, and the discrete one 0, s, 1 for unincreasable possibility with just three values.

Meinong also took a few faltering steps in the direction of non-cognitive logics of norms and values, in that he intensively studied the ontology and logical relationships of values and norms. But though he mentioned a few simple formal principles, it remained for one of his students to produce the first system of deontic logic, or logic of norms. In Meinong's work we see elements which later came to be central in the theory of probability, considered as a property of propositions, as in Maynard Keynes, a rather strange and non-standard theory of alethic modality, and the admission of more than two semantic values for propositions (or objectives).

5. TWARDOWSKI AND THE INFLUENCES OF THE BRENTANO SCHOOL

Sources: The original papers by Twardowski are at present difficult to obtain.⁸ The influence of Twardowski on Polish philosophy and logic is discussed in Henryk Skolimowski's *Polish analytical philosophy* and Jan Woleński's *Logic and philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School*. On the theory of truth in Polish philosophy and logic see the essay "*De veritate*" by Woleński and myself.⁹

Kazimierz Twardowski, the last of Brentano's brilliant students, was not innovative in deductive logic, though he did lecture in Lvov on the reforms in logic of Boole, Brentano, Schröder and others. Twardowski is important mainly

⁸ A collection of primary and secondary materials in English is being prepared by J. Brandl.

⁹ *Caveat lector!* The essay as printed contains numerous printing errors, some serious.

for his general influence on the Polish School, in particular his idea of careful analysis combined with linguistic clarity and an emphasis on historical knowledge less stressed elsewhere among Brentano's followers. His main substantial contribution was a short essay defending the absoluteness of truth.¹⁰ In this he argues that supposed relativizations of truth to circumstances arise because the proper truth-bearer, a judgement, is replaced by a sentence type as truth-bearer, and this can obviously be given different meanings according to circumstance if it contains what we now call indexical expressions.

The first logician of international stature in the Lvov school was Twardowski's student Łukasiewicz, who introduced mathematical logic into Poland on the strength of his acquaintance with the works of Russell rather than through Twardowski's influence.¹¹ Łukasiewicz went on to become one of the foremost logicians of his time. Łukasiewicz is of course best known as the principal inventor of many-valued logic. What is less well known is that Meinong's ideas on probability and the questionability of classical laws of logic had a significant hand in this development. Łukasiewicz was also influenced in his anti-psychologism by Husserl, though he rejected the latter's philosophy. Several aspects of Brentano's metaphysical views, in particular his later reism and extensionalism, were congenial to such Polish thinkers as Leśniewski and Kotarbiński. Leśniewski's later logic of terms shows the remote influence of Brentano as well as Schröder and Frege. Of all the intellectual successors of Brentano, it was the Polish students of Twardowski and Łukasiewicz, including Leśniewski, Tarski, Lindenbaum and others, who were most active and innovative in logic, and it was the Brentanian *Geist* imparted to the school by Twardowski which ensured that respect for precision, clarity and mathematical logic did not go hand in hand with corrosive antimetaphysical positivism as in Vienna.

Meinong's influence was much more delayed: apart from the role they played in the thinking of Ernst Mally, whose ideas themselves enjoyed rather little influence, Meinong's views on non-existence and the laws of logic only began to find adherents in the 1970s, with the development by Terence Parsons, Richard Routley and others of what one might call neo-Meinongian logics. Some of Mally's ideas have been taken up by Edward Zalta. Meinongian ideas and their ilk today form a small but significant undercurrent in logic research.

Oddly perhaps, though Husserl's views on logic probably enjoyed the most widespread influence at the time they were published, his influence in particular respects has been the least. The anti-psychologistic stance was taken

¹⁰ Twardowski 1900 (1902).

¹¹ This emerges from Łukasiewicz's as yet unpublished diary.

up more or less independently by other, better logicians such as Frege, Russell, and Łukasiewicz, and it is their example which prevailed rather than Husserl's rather pompous pontification. (Things might have been somewhat different had the *Logical investigations* fallen into Russell's hands soon after their publication: after all, Meinong's influence among logicians is owed in good part to his public interaction with Russell.) Husserl's programme for logic was also too diffuse to be discernible in the writings of later logicians. Husserl had his friends and admirers among mathematicians, in particular Georg Cantor, David Hilbert, and Hermann Weyl, and the great Gödel also came to have a high regard for Husserl, though long after making his fundamental contributions to logic.¹²

We must admit that the logic of the Brentano School lies aside from the great achievement in logic of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is a delicate question as to exactly how significant its influence was: I incline to think the history of logic would not have been very markedly different without it, and that the chief claims of the Brentano school on our attention lie elsewhere.

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¹² I first learnt of this from a letter by Gödel to Barry Smith in 1975, but Gödel's admiration for Husserl is now general knowledge thanks to numerous references to it in Wang 1987. It seems Gödel first started studying Husserl in 1959.

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| on: | see also: |
| logic and theory of judgement | 1.10-13, 2.6-7, 3.4, 4.4, 4.6, 7.13, 12, 16.6, 16.12-13 |

LOGIC AND THE *SACHVERHALT*

1. THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC

Those who conceive logic as a science have generally favoured one of two alternative conceptions as to what the subject-matter of this science ought to be. On the one hand is the nowadays somewhat old-fashioned-seeming view of logic as the science of judgment, or of thinking or reasoning activities in general. On the other hand is the view of logic as a science of ideal meanings, 'thoughts', or 'propositions in themselves'. There is, however, a third alternative conception, which enjoyed only a brief flowering in the years leading up to the first World War, but whose lingering presence can be detected in the background of more recent ontologising trends in logic, as for example in the 'situation semantics' of Barwise and Perry. This third conception sees logic as a science of special objects called '*Sachverhalte*' or 'states of affairs'. A view of this sort is present in simplified form in the works of Meinong and in some of the Cambridge realists, but it received its definitive formulation in the writings of Adolf Reinach, a student of Husserl who is otherwise noteworthy for having anticipated, in a monograph of 1913, large chunks of what later became known as the theory of speech acts.¹

The laws of logic, according to Reinach, are "nothing other than general principles expressing relations between states of affairs".² The fundamental principles of traditional logic — for example that two contradictory judgments cannot both be correct — are, Reinach claims, derived and not primitive principles. For:

¹ See Reinach 1983 and the papers collected in Mulligan 1987.

² Reinach 1982, 339.

A judgment is correct if the state of affairs corresponding to it subsists; and two contradictory judgments cannot both be correct *because* two contradictory states of affairs cannot both subsist. The law relating to judgments thus obtains its foundation from the corresponding law relating to states of affairs.³

Our task here will be to establish how and why this *Sachverhalt*-based conception of logic arose within the circle of philosophers influenced by Brentano and Husserl. An attempt will then be made to draw some first implications for our contemporary understanding of logic and semantics from an examination of this hitherto neglected slice of philosophical history. Anticipating somewhat, we shall argue that an adequate science of logic would be one which would somehow manage to do justice to all three conceptions simultaneously. For on the one hand it seems that logic must have some relation to our empirical activities of thinking and inferring, and this primarily via the meanings or 'thoughts' which these activities instantiate. On the other hand however it seems that logic relates to thoughts and judgments only insofar as the latter are able to stand in that sort of relation to objects we call truth. If, now, we take the *Sachverhalt* as that on the side of the objects to which true thoughts or judgments correspond, then *Sachverhalte*, too, must fall within the province of logic.

2. PREHISTORY OF THE *SACHVERHALT*

Traces of the *Sachverhalt* concept are discoverable by hindsight already in Aristotle, above all in those passages where Aristotle speaks of the *pragma* as that on which the truth of the *logos* depends.⁴ Aquinas, too, takes the 'disposition of things' as the cause of the truth of a judgment,⁵ and similar views are present in the later middle ages, for example in the doctrine of the *complexe significabile* — of that which can be signified only as a complex — defended by Wodeham, Crathorn and Gregory of Rimini.⁶

Etymologically speaking, however, both '*Sachverhalt*' and 'state of affairs' derive not from these sources but from juridical uses of the term '*status*' in the sense of *status rerum* (state or constitution of things), as contrasted with the *status hominum* or state of a man (as slave, free, etc.). Thus the O.E.D. speaks

³ Reinach 1982, 376, n. 40.

⁴ Cf. Simons 1988, and for a history of the *Sachverhalt* concept Smith 1992.

⁵ '*Dispositio rei est causa veritatis in opinione et oratione*' (In *Metaphysicam*, IX, 11, n. 1897).

⁶ See Tachau 1988.

of a 'state of things' or 'state of affairs' as "the way in which events or circumstances stand disposed (at a particular time or within a particular sphere)".

The term '*status rerum*' is rooted especially in that branch of rhetorical theory which relates to the conduct of a trial. Here *status* is defined as the question which grows out of a given legal conflict. Thus for example Quintilian writes: "What I call *status* is called by others constitution, by others question, and by others that which one can infer from the question".⁷ '*Status*' in this connection signifies also in an extended sense "the way things stand, the condition or peculiarity of a thing in regard to its circumstances, position, order".⁸ An important role seems to have been played here by Goclenius, who draws a clear opposition between '*status*' and '*propositio*' from the point of view of the science of law. The *status* is, he says, "the fulcrum about which turn both the representations of the prosecution and those of the defence".⁹ The court's job is to determine which of these conflicting representations is true; in other words, it has to determine *how things stand* — *wie die Sachen sich zueinander verhalten* — in regard to the matters raised therein.

Leaving aside incidental occurrences in the first edition of Lotze's *Logic* of 1874 (§§ 138, 327, 345) the term '*Sachverhalt*' makes its first technical appearance in the German philosophical literature in a work published in 1879 entitled *General logic* by Julius Bergmann, a philosopher close to Lotze, who defended a doctrine referred to as 'objective idealism'. The more usual sort of idealism current in Germany at that time conceives the objects of experience and knowledge as being quite literally located 'in the mind' of the knowing subject. Windelband, for example, can define idealism in this sense as "the dissolution of being into processes of consciousness".¹⁰

As far as judgment is concerned, the idealists embraced the so-called 'combination theory', according to which the process of judging is a process of combining or separating concepts or presentations. Positive judging is thus the putting together of a complex of concepts, usually a pair consisting of *subject* and *predicate*. Before the rise of idealism, it had been assumed as a matter of course that the resultant conceptual complex may reflect an exactly parallel combination of truth-making objects in the world. Ever since Aristotle it had been assumed also that the phenomenon of judgment could be properly understood only within a framework within which this wider background of ontology is taken into account. The idealists, however, broke with both of these assumptions and substituted instead the thesis that the process of judging is to

⁷ *Institutio oratoris*, 3, 6, 2.

⁸ *Lexicon totius latinitatis*, IV, 478f.

⁹ *Lexicon philosophicum* (1613), 1081.

¹⁰ Windelband 1900, 463n.

be understood entirely from the perspective of what takes place within the consciousness of the judging subject.

The combination-theory, which had once been accepted not only by idealists but indeed by almost all philosophers,¹¹ shows its most positive side in Leibniz's experiments in the direction of a combinatorial logic. Towards the end of the 19th century, however, in part as a result of its association with the immanentistic views of the idealists, the theory began to be recognised as problematic. Above all, it appeared to be incapable of coping with existential and impersonal judgments like 'cheetahs exist', 'it's raining', and so on, in relation to which, because the judgments in question seem to have only one single member, combination or unification is excluded. Moreover, even in those cases where judging might be held to involve a combination of concepts or presentations, the need was felt for some further moment of affirmation or conviction — some 'consciousness of validity' in the idealists' terminology, or 'assertive force' in the language of Frege — in order that the theory should be able to cope with assumptions, and with hypothetical and other logically compound judgments in which complex concepts or presentations seem to be present as proper parts without themselves being judged.

At the same time, however, it began to become clear that to do justice to the truth of judgments it would be necessary to recognise once more some objective standard, transcendent to the judgment, against which its truth could be measured. If judging involves a combination of concepts, then it must involve also the conviction that there is some transcendent something on the side of the object corresponding to the conceptual unity thereby produced. Moreover, the truth of a judgment must involve there actually being some transcendent something of this sort. Attempts were therefore made to come to terms with such objectual correlates, to establish what, exactly, the objectual something is, which gets 'posited as a unity' in our acts of judging.

The objective idealism of Lotze and Bergmann is part of this move to break out of the confines of immanentistic idealism and to free logic from its bondage to the mental. Bergmann's *Sachverhalt* has precisely the role of the objective component, the *res*, with which the *intellectus* has to stand in *adaequatio*. Knowledge he conceives as that thinking "whose thought content is in harmony with the *Sachverhalt*, and is therefore true".¹² Bergmann's usage of '*Sachverhalt*' finds an echo in the second edition of Lotze's *Logic* of 1880, where Lotze introduces his treatment of judgment by distinguishing, in addition to purely

¹¹ See e.g. Aristotle, *De anima* 430 a 27f., *Met.* 1027 b, 1051 b, *De int.* 16 a 9ff.; Wolff 1728, 40; Kant 1800, 19. Even Frege's *Begriffsschrift* (I, 2) retains elements of this conception of judgment, in that Frege still sees his 'content-stroke' as preceding a sign which signifies a mere '*Vorstellungsverbindung*' or 'combination of presentations'.

¹² Bergmann 1879, 2-5, 19, 38.

immanent relations between presentations, also ‘material relations’ (*sachliche Verhältnisse*) between what he calls the ‘contents’ of presentations. It is only “because one already presupposes such a material relation as obtaining”, Lotze writes, “that one can picture it in a sentence (*in einem Satze abbilden*).”¹³

Both Lotze and Bergmann are here feeling their way towards a view of the objective standard or target of judgment as transcendent to the mind of the judging subject. In Lotze himself this culminates in a Platonistic view of the objects of judgment along lines more familiar from the work of Bolzano and Frege. (The latter, we might say, make a Platonic object out of the conceptual complex of the idealists.) But Lotzean ideas on the objects of judgment were developed not only by Frege. Lotze’s lectures were attended also by the two Brentanists Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty, both of whom will have a role to play in the story that follows. It was in fact Stumpf’s employment of the term ‘*Sachverhalt*’ in his logic lectures of 1888 which sparked, at least terminologically, the various *Sachverhalt*-ontologies put forward by the followers of Brentano around the turn of the century.

3. BRENTANIAN IMMANENTISM

Brentano, too, embraces elements of the immanentistic doctrine of the idealists. He goes beyond them, however, in his thesis that all acts are directed towards objects. This is Brentano’s much-mooted ‘principle of the intentionality of the mental’. Rarely, however, has this principle been properly understood. Note, first of all, that it does not assert that all acts are directed towards objects *in their own right*. Some borrow their directedness from other acts on which they are founded. It is ‘presentations’, for Brentano, which do the job of securing directedness to objects in every case.¹⁴ A presentation is any act in which the subject is conscious of an object without taking up a position with regard to it. Such an act may be either intuitive or conceptual. That is, we can have an object before our mind either in sensory experience (and in variant forms thereof in imagination), or conceptually — for example when we think of the concepts colour or pain in general. Presentations may be either (relatively) simple or (relatively) complex, a distinction recalling the British empiricists’ doctrine of simple and complex ideas. A simple presentation is for example that of a red sensum; a complex presentation that of an array of differently

¹³ Lotze 1880, 57f.

¹⁴ For Husserl, in contrast, judgments, too, are ‘objectifying acts’ in the sense that they have objects (*Sachverhalte*) of their own. See Smith 1990, and on the general issue of immanentism and intentionality in Brentano and his disciples Smith 1994.

coloured squares.¹⁵ Here, as in every other case, the presentation *is* a relation to an object.

On the basis of a presentation, now, new sorts of relations to objects of these sorts are built up. Above all, such objects can be *accepted* (in positive judgments) or *rejected* (in negative judgments). To the simple manner of being related to an object in presentation, in other words, there may come to be added one of two diametrically opposed modes of relating to this object, which we call 'acceptance' and 'rejection' respectively. A judgment is, somewhat crudely put, either the belief or the disbelief in the existence of an object given in presentation. This is the famous existential theory of judgment defended by Brentano. Its importance consists not least in the fact that it is the first influential alternative to the combination theory, a theory that had for so long remained unchallenged.

'Object', in the Brentanian context, is to be understood simply as: 'correlate of presentation',¹⁶ a notion embracing in particular simple and complex data of sense. Thus when Brentano talks of 'objects', he is not referring to putative transcendent targets of mental acts. As we can see by reflecting on the acts involved in reading fiction or on those cases where our acts rest on mistaken presuppositions of existence, the thesis that all mental acts are directed to objects in this sense, to objects external to the mind, is clearly false.¹⁷ Brentano is referring, rather, to immanent 'objects of thought', and in fact no distinction is drawn in Brentano's treatment in the *Psychology* between 'content', and 'object' in this sense. That which is thought of has, he insists, a merely derivative being. The act of thought is something real (a real event or process); but the object of thought has being only to the extent that the act which thinks it has being. The object of thought is according to its nature something non-real which dwells in (*innewohnt*) a real substance (a thinker).¹⁸

Confusion on this matter has reigned in the secondary literature on Brentano above all because his own statement of the intentionality principle in the oft-quoted passage from the *Psychology* (pp. 88f.) is not entirely clear. Brentano himself however appends a footnote to this passage in which he states explicitly that for him the intentionality relation holds always between an act and an object immanent to the mind. He points out that "Aristotle himself had spoken of this mental in-existence", and he goes on to elaborate Aristotle's theory according to which "the object which is thought is in the thinking

¹⁵ See Brentano 1973, 79f., 88f.

¹⁶ For Frege, in contrast, an object is defined linguistically, as the correlate of a name.

¹⁷ This thesis has nonetheless repeatedly been ascribed to Brentano, most recently by Dummett in his 1988, esp. ch. 5 on "The legacy of Brentano". In the revised English edition of this work (Dummett 1993), the relevant passages have been amended.

¹⁸ See Brentano 1961, 27.

intellect". This same thesis is to be found also in Brentano's more detailed formulations of his views in the *Descriptive psychology*, where 'immanent objects' are explicitly assigned to what Brentano calls the "parts of the soul in the strict or literal sense".¹⁹

Even on the immanentistic reading, however, Brentano's intentionality principle is not without its problems. It faces difficulties especially in dealing with negative existential judgments such as 'God does not exist', which seem, on the face of it, both to have and to lack an object. It was as part of an attempt to solve these difficulties that Brentano and his immediate successors began to reconsider the original thesis that acts of judgment get their objects (contents, matters) exclusively from underlying acts of presentation.

4. FROM OBJECTS TO *SACHVERHALTE*

The concept of object, for the Brentanists, arises when one moves from the psychology of presentation to the investigation of its objectual correlate. The concept of a state of affairs arises, similarly, when one moves from the psychology of judgment to the investigation of the ontological correlates of judging acts. Given Brentano's existential theory of judgment, such ontological correlates are initially seen by his followers as of the forms: *the existence of A* and *the non-existence of A*, but other types of judgment-correlate were also recognised: *the subsistence of A*, *the possibility of A*, *the necessity of A*, *the probability of A*, *the being B of A*, and so on.

As Stumpf himself later recorded, the term '*Sachverhalt*' was introduced by him in 1888 to stand for a 'specific content of a judgment',

which is to be distinguished from the content of a presentation (the matter) and is expressed linguistically in 'that-clauses' or in substantivised infinitives.²⁰

A copy of Stumpf's notes to his logic lectures of 1888 has survived in the Husserl Archive in Louvain, where we read:

From the matter of the judgment we distinguish its content, the *Sachverhalt* that is expressed in the judgment. For example 'God is' has for its matter God, for its content: the existence of God. 'There is no God' has the same matter but its content is: non-existence of God. (MS Q 13, p. 4)

¹⁹ Brentano 1982, esp. 10-27. This volume consists of notes to lectures given by Brentano in Vienna around 1890, i.e. before his subsequent turn to 'reism'.

²⁰ Stumpf 1907a, 29f.

Together with concepts and sets or aggregates, the *Sachverhalt* is assigned by Stumpf to the category of what he calls 'formations' (*Gebilde*). These are to be distinguished first of all from what Stumpf calls 'functions', i.e. from our mental acts themselves. But they are to be distinguished also from 'appearances', i.e. from sense data as classically conceived, and Stumpf is in fact here still operating within the broadly empiricist framework within which it is sense data which serve as the typical examples of objects of presentation. The latter, as Stumpf conceives them, are given to us as independent of the activities of mind. As organised or collected, however — for example as they occur in the context of an aggregate or set — they are taken up into consciousness in such a way that they are given to us as existing only as immanent to the relevant (in this case aggregating) act. A Stumpfian state of affairs, similarly, can exist only as the 'immanent content' of an actually occurring judgment. Hence it cannot 'be given directly and thus be real of itself alone, independently of any function'. *Sachverhalte*, like other Stumpfian formations, 'are factual only as contents of functions.'²¹ They

are not to be found anywhere separated off... in some 'supersensible realm' as entities existing in and of themselves. They do not exist as dead preparations or petrifications, but only in the context of the living being of the mind.²²

5. CONTENT AND OBJECT

Brentano and Stumpf have hereby reached a new sort of sophistication as concerns the objects of our cognitive acts. And this has allowed them successfully to break away from the combination theory of judgment. Their shared immanentism meant however that they were still unable to achieve clarity as to the relations between mental acts and objects in the world, and this precluded also a conception of the ways in which judgments may come to be made true by such objects.²³ Their immanentism precluded also a conception of the contents of judgment and of the meanings of sentences of a sort that would be fruitful for the purposes of modern logic. It is in this respect Kasimir Twardowski who makes the crucial break with the core thesis of the immanentistic position. In his *On the content and object of presentations* of 1894,²⁴ Twardowski puts for-

²¹ Stumpf 1907a, 30.

²² Stumpf 1907b, 34.

²³ Brentano himself indeed eventually embraced a so-called 'evidence theory' of truth, according to which truth is an entirely immanent matter. See Brentano 1961, Parts 3 and 4.

²⁴ Twardowski, 1977.

ward a series of arguments in defence of a distinction between the contents of presenting acts on the one hand, and their objects, on the other. The object of presentation he conceives broadly as a transcendent target of the act. The content he conceives as something like a mental 'picture' or 'image' of the object. Every act has, he claims, both a content and an object, though the object of an act need not in every case exist. Even non-existent objects are, however, seen by Twardowski as having properties of their own, a doctrine later transmuted by Meinong into the 'principle of the independence of being from being-so' and in this form taken as the basis of Meinong's theory of non-existent objects.²⁵

The distinction between content and object is initially drawn by Twardowski for presentations only. The act of judgment has a special *content* of its own, but in *On the content and object of presentations* this act is still seen as inheriting its *object* from the relevant underlying presentation. Three years later, however, in a letter to Meinong, Twardowski suggests that one should recognise also a special object of the judging act, in addition to the judgment-content.²⁶ He thereby effected a generalisation of the content-object distinction to the sphere of judging acts, in a way which yields a schema of the following sort:

TABLE 1

| presenting act | content of presentation | object of presentation |
|----------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| judging act | judgment-content | state of affairs |

One consequence of Brentano's immanentism is that judgments are conceived as real events in a way that leaves no room for any view of truth and falsity as timeless properties of judgments. This conclusion Brentano takes to imply that God, too, if he is omniscient, must exist in time, since the knowledge of which judgments are true and false must change from moment to moment.²⁷ Here, too, Twardowski moves in the direction of a view more adequate to the purposes of modern logic. In his paper "On so-called relative truth" of 1902, he argues forcefully in favour of a conception of truth as something absolute, a conception which would rule out the possibility that the truth of a judgment might change from occasion to occasion or from subject to subject.²⁸ Brentano's acceptance of the thesis that truth can change and judgment remain the same follows, Twardowski argues, from a confusion of *judgments* on the one hand with their *statements* or *expressions* on the other. Twardowski's argument here — which again reveals the influence of Bolzano²⁹ — is to be found in different

²⁵ The principle was first formulated as such by Ernst Mally. See Lambert 1983, 18.

²⁶ Meinong 1965, 143f.

²⁷ See Brentano 1987, 87f.

²⁸ Twardowski 1988, 38-58.

²⁹ Bolzano 1972, 125.

forms in the work of Frege and Russell, as also in the *Tractatus*, for example in Wittgenstein's remark to the effect that language "disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it" (4.002). In Twardowski's formulation, however, this argument is part of an attempt to come to an understanding of the mental acts involved in judging and of the ontological correlates of such acts. Thus Twardowski is not, like Frege, Russell or Wittgenstein, attracted by the more ambitious task of building an ideal or artificial language in which thought and its expression would coincide. True to the Brentanist heritage, his efforts are directed to the things and processes that are involved in actual judgments, not to the construction of abstract models or surrogates thereof. For all this, however, Twardowski's emphasis on the notion of absolute truth can be shown to have pointed his students in the direction of a truth-functional conception of logic in the modern sense. Further steps would however have to be taken before there could come into being among Twardowski's students in Poland a fully-fledged logic of propositions of the sort we now take for granted.³⁰

6. *SACHVERHALT*, OBJECTIVE AND PROPOSITION

Meinong, too, in his *On assumptions*, defends an opposition between two sorts of entity: objects and objectives, distinguishing not only between positive and negative objectives of being (*that A is, that A is not*), but also between positive and negative objectives of so-being (*that A is B, that A is not B*), as also between objectives constituted by objects and 'objectives of higher order' constituted by further objectives of lower order. Truth, possibility and also probability are, according to Meinong, attributes not of objects but of objectives,³¹ and as already intimated, it is objectives which provide the subject matter for the science of logic as Meinong conceives it.³² As Reinach remarks, however, there is a fundamental objection which must be raised against Meinong, namely "that his concept of objective runs together the two completely different concepts of proposition (in the logical sense) and state of affairs".³³

Clarity in respect of the distinctions between *Sachverhalt* and proposition, as also between both of these and the immanent contents of judgment was first

³⁰ On the influence of Twardowski's views in this respect see Woleński 1988.

³¹ This view makes itself felt in the early writings of Łukasiewicz, who studied for a time with Meinong in Graz. See e.g. his 1970b, esp. 37, and also the abstract Łukasiewicz 1987.

³² See Meinong, 1983, 129.

³³ Reinach 1982, 374.

attained by Husserl in his *Logical investigations* of 1900/01.³⁴ Here *Sachverhalt* and proposition are squeezed apart, and a conception of *Sachverhalte* as objectual truth-makers explicitly defended.³⁵ Husserl argued for a view of *Sachverhalte* as objectual judgment-correlates analogous to objects as the transcendent targets of presentations. Moreover, he saw that *Sachverhalte* can serve as correlates not only of acts of judging but also of special kinds of nominal acts (for example when we say that *S is p* 'is welcome', 'is probable', 'has as consequence that ...', etc.).³⁶

In the second volume of the *Logical investigations*, Husserl distinguishes further between the immanent content of a judging act and the *Sachverhalt* as transcendent target.³⁷ On the side of the act itself he distinguishes not only the immanent *content* but also what he calls the *quality* of the act — what makes it an act of *judgment, doubt, assumption*, etc. — a moment of the act which may vary even though its immanent content remains fixed.³⁸ This immanent content, now, is understood not in terms of 'images' or 'pictures' but rather as a more basic sort of component of the act in virtue of which the latter is experienced by the subject as directed to an object or state of affairs. The immanent content is

that element in an act which first gives it a relation to something objectual, and this relation in such complete determinateness that it does not merely precisely define the object meant, but also the precise way in which it is meant.

The content of the act

not only determines that it grasps the relevant object but also *as what* it grasps it, the features, relations, categorial forms, that it itself attributes to it.³⁹

Husserl now goes further still. He utilises the Aristotelian idea of a universal species becoming instantiated in its individual instances as a means of drawing

³⁴ This is to ignore the in some respects interestingly parallel story that is to be told in relation to the English term 'fact'. See Olson 1987.

³⁵ Russell, similarly, distinguishes in addition to the immanent content of a belief (which is for him a certain wholly determinate mental event), the 'objective' or 'actual fact that makes the belief true'. See Russell 1921, 14f. On the notion of 'making true' in general, see Mulligan Simons & Smith 1984.

³⁶ Husserl saw also that *Sachverhalte* can serve as the correlates of certain non-judgmental acts of wishing, questioning, doubting, etc., and in this he provided the first impetus to Reinach's subsequent work on speech acts. See, again, my 1990.

³⁷ Husserl 1970, VI, 28, 33, 39.

³⁸ Husserl 1970, V, 20. The role of Husserl's 'quality' corresponds to that of Frege's 'force'.

³⁹ Husserl 1970, V, 20.

a distinction between this immanent content of an act on the one hand and what he calls its 'ideal content' on the other. This ideal content is the immanent content taken *in specie* (as the objects treated by the geometer are the ideal species of the lines and shapes given in reality). And where an immanent content can be brought to expression linguistically, then the corresponding ideal content is called by Husserl the *meaning* of the given expression.⁴⁰

Husserl's theory of linguistic meaning and of the structures of meanings is thus part and parcel of his theory of acts and of the structures of acts, and his handling of the relations between language, act and meaning manifests a sophistication of a sort previously unknown among the Brentanists. Broadly speaking, we can say that the orthodox Brentanians had insufficient appreciation of the dimension of *logical syntax* — a price they paid, in part, for their radical rejection of the combinatorial aspects of the old 'combination theory' of judgment and truth. Thus they lacked any recognition of the fact that acts of judgment are distinguished from acts of presentation not only by the presence of a moment of assertion or belief, but also — on the level of what we might call 'mental grammar' — by a special ('propositional') *form*. A judgment must, in other words, have a certain special sort of inner complexity, which expresses itself linguistically in the form of the sentence and is reflected ontologically in the form of the *Sachverhalt*. The expression of a judgment must for example admit of tense and aspect modifications and also of modification by logical operators such as negation, conjunction, etc., as well as by operators such as 'it is the case that', 'it is possible that', 'it is necessary that', 'I think that', and so on.

Certainly Frege is responsible for some of the most important advances in our understanding of logico-grammatical form. It is ironical, however, that in his conception of sentences as special sorts of names, Frege is, as far as his treatment of the logico-grammatical peculiarities of judgment and sentence is concerned, no further advanced than was Brentano. Here, again, one has to look to Bolzano in order to find truly coherent anticipations of the idea of propositional form.⁴¹ But the idea of a science of 'logical grammar', of a formal theory of the categories of linguistic units (and of their mental counterparts) and of the categorial laws governing the combination of such units, was first conceived by Husserl in his 4th Logical Investigation. This work influenced in turn the development of the theory of grammatical categories by Leśniewski and his successors in Poland.⁴²

Husserl's theory has built into its very foundations the idea of a parallelism of structure between (1) immanent contents on the level of our empirically

⁴⁰ Husserl 1970, VI, 16f., 20.

⁴¹ Bolzano 1972, 127.

⁴² See above all Ajdukiewicz's essay of 1935 on "Syntactic Connexion", translated in McCall 1967. Compare also Gobber 1985.

executed acts and (2) ideal contents on the level of logic. He is thereby able to account in a very natural way for the fact that the laws of logic apply to actual thinkings, speakings and inferences, while at the same time doing justice to the necessity which accrues to such laws by virtue of the fact that they relate primarily to certain ideal or universal species and only secondarily to the immanent contents by which these species may come to be instantiated. Frege and his successors in the analytic tradition, in contrast, because they turned aside from questions of what Brentano and Husserl called 'descriptive psychology', thereby left themselves in a position where they were unable to do justice to the relations between ideal contents and the cognitive activities through which these become actualised or instantiated. The applicability of logic to empirical thinkings and inferences is thus rendered in their work all but inexplicable — an outcome which further reinforced the initial aversion to psychology on the part of philosophers of the analytic sort, and thereby also lent encouragement to those mathematical logicians who have wanted to conceive propositions as little more than theoretical entities of abstract formal theories. Brentano, on the other hand, and the more orthodox Brentanians, tended to the opposite, psychological extreme: because they feared the 'Platonism' of ideal contents, their treatment of logic was less than successful, and therefore so also was their treatment of the specifically logical properties of our judging acts.

Husserl goes beyond his Brentanist predecessors also in his treatment of ontology. Setting out from Meinong's idea of a 'theory of objects', Husserl initiates a new discipline of 'formal ontology', within which the formal concept of *Sachverhalt* — 'formal' because it can be applied to all matters without restriction — comes to be ranked alongside the formal concept of *object*. It is more than anything else this Husserlian discipline of formal ontology, as developed by Husserl's disciples in Munich, which led to Reinach's conception of logic as a science of states of affairs.

7. LOGIC AND THE *SACHVERHALT*

Simplifying somewhat, we can conceive Husserl's *Sachverhalt* as the creature of a naturalistic ontology: the *Sachverhalt* is a truth-making segment of reality that is 'thrown into relief' through an act of judgment.⁴³ Thus the Husserlian *Sachverhalt* is dependent upon consciousness for its demarcation, but it is independent in the sense that what gets demarcated — we might call it the

⁴³ A reading of Husserl's theory along these lines is developed especially by Johannes Daubert, *éminence grise* of the school of Munich phenomenologists to which Reinach belonged. See Schuhmann & Smith 1987.

matter of the *Sachverhalt* — exists independently of the act which brings this demarcation about. Only in the rarest of cases — where the matter is *per accidens* of a purely psychic sort — is the *Sachverhalt* a creature immanent to the mind in the sense of Stumpf. Certainly there are Platonistic elements in Husserl's logic and ontology, but these relate not to *Sachverhalte*, but to propositions, i.e. to the ideal species of the contents of sentence-using acts. Reinach, in contrast, defends a Platonistic ontology of *Sachverhalte*. In this he is inspired in part by Meinong and Bolzano, and in part also by Marty who had defended a view of *Sachverhalte* or 'judgment-contents' as 'that which grounds objectively the correctness of our judging'.⁴⁴ He goes further than all three, however, in embracing a clear distinction between propositional *meanings* on the one hand and *Sachverhalte* on the other. The totality of *Sachverhalte* Reinach conceives as an eternal realm comprehending the correlates of all possible judgments, whether positive or negative, true or false, necessary or contingent, atomic or complex. Objects, it is true, may come and go, but *Sachverhalte* are immutable (a view which is of course almost exactly the reverse of that embraced by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*). Reinach is in this way in a position to conceive *Sachverhalte* as the locus of existence of the past and of the future, that is, as truth-makers for our present judgments about objects which have ceased to exist or have yet to come into existence. He is by this means able also, in his fashion, to guarantee the timelessness of truth and falsehood.

Perhaps we can understand the motives which led Reinach to his somewhat peculiar view of logic and the *Sachverhalt* if we reflect on the fact that, the subject matter of logic having once been expelled from the psyche, it became quite generally necessary for logicians to provide some alternative account of what this subject matter ought to be. Frege himself, along with Bolzano and Husserl, had looked to ideal meanings, but ideal meanings have something mythological about them and they bring with them the problem of how they can be 'grasped' by mortal thinking subjects. As we know, many philosophers in the tradition of Frege (Wittgenstein, Dummett) looked in this connection to sentences, and to the 'institution of a common language', as an alternative to the Platonism of ideal meanings — though it is not clear why, given the diversity and changeability of human languages, this appeal does not face objections parallel to those which had earlier confronted psychologism. Reinach, in contrast, looked neither to ideal meanings nor to their expressions in language, but (as he saw it) out into the world, to the objectual correlates of judging acts. Many entities of this sort are, he insisted, unproblematically accessible, for example in perfectly ordinary acts of *seeing that*. A *Sachverhalt*-based founda-

⁴⁴ The Martian *Sachverhalt* must therefore be something whose existence is independent of consciousness. Moreover, it is clear that, on Marty's conception, there can be *Sachverhalte* corresponding only to judgments which are true. See Marty 1908, 295.

tion of logic can however serve as an alternative to psychologism only if it can guarantee the objectivity and necessity of logical laws. It was to this end that Reinach saw himself as being forced to conceive his *Sachverhalte* in a Platonistic (and therefore non-naturalistic) way, i.e. to grant them a special status of the sort that was granted to propositions by Bolzano, Frege and Husserl.

Platonism, here, means that *Sachverhalte* are transcendent not only to the mind but also to the world of spatio-temporal objects. It means that they are entirely independent of all mental activities; that they are such as to play no role in causal relations; and that they exist outside of time and space. In all of these respects Reinachian *Sachverhalte* resemble sets as standardly conceived. Like sets, *Sachverhalte* are built up (*inter alia*) out of ordinary objects in a way that somehow suspends the mutability of the latter.

The realm of *Sachverhalte* is, according to Reinach, complete, in the sense that there is a *Sachverhalt* precisely coordinated to every possible judgment. One reason for accepting a completeness of this sort on Reinach's part is that it allows him to uphold the unrestricted validity of logical laws such as the law of excluded middle. Another reason is his desire to maintain the correspondence theory of truth in its full generality. Too easily, perhaps, it allows for each variety of judgment an appropriate variety of truth-making states of affairs. This applies, in particular, to negative judgments, which are correlated with negative states of affairs. And while it may be possible to conceive a positive state of affairs like *this rose is red* as some sort of real complex (of the rose and its redness), no such view is possible for negative states of affairs like *this rose is not yellow* or *unicorns do not exist*, which cannot be counted as denizens of reality in any sense. The thesis of completeness in this way lends additional support to the remaining Platonistic elements of the Reinachian ontology.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, of course, contains a *Sachverhalt*-based correspondence theory of truth which dispenses with Reinachian Platonism and is at least in this respect more convincing. What Wittgenstein lacks, however, is an ontology of *Sachverhalte* of the sort that would allow him also to provide an account of the ways in which such entities are related to our everyday thinkings and other cognitive activities (for example to those acts of *seeing that* in which our judgments get verified). Reinach, in contrast, because his states of affairs may involve ordinary objects of experience, is able to show how our mental acts and states may relate, in different ways, to states of affairs as their objects, and how they may therefore stand in relations parallel to the logical relations which obtain (according to Reinach) among these states of affairs themselves. One of Reinach's most original contributions is in fact his account of the different sorts of acts in which states of affairs are grasped and of the various kinds of attitudes which have states of affairs as their objects, and of how such

acts and attitudes relate to each other and to the acts and attitudes which have judgments and propositions as their objects.

8. REAL SEMANTICS

It has become a commonplace that Bolzano, Frege and Husserl, by banishing thoughts from the mind, created the preconditions for the development of logic in the modern sense. By defending a view of thoughts or propositions as ideal or abstract entities, they made possible a conception of propositions as entities capable of being *manipulated* in different ways in formal theories. Just as Cantor had shown mathematicians of an earlier generation how to manipulate sets or classes conceived in abstraction from their members and from the manner of their generation, so logicians were able to become accustomed, by degrees, to manipulating propositional objects in abstraction from their contents and from their psychological roots in acts of judgment.

Now, however, we can see that the achievements of Bolzano, Frege and Husserl were part and parcel of a larger historical process, in which Lotze and Bergmann, but also Brentano, Stumpf, Marty, Meinong and above all Twardowski and his students in Poland, played a crucial role. We can see also that, as was clear to the author of the *Tractatus*, the squeezing apart of the two notions of proposition and *Sachverhalt* was no less important an achievement in the overcoming of psychologism than was the separation of judgment both from complex concepts on the one hand and from ideal propositions on the other.

It is noteworthy in this light that Tarski's 1935 essay on the concept of truth, the single most important work arising out of the Lemberg-Warsaw school founded by Twardowski and his students, rests precisely on a discovery of how it is possible to manipulate formally not only sentences or propositions but also certain special sorts of object-structures in the world to which these sentences or propositions can be held to correspond. Tarski attempts, we might say, to capture mathematically the highest common factor running through the family of correspondence-theoretic views of truth, a factor which can be expressed in the form of a thesis to the effect that *a true sentence is one which says that things are so and so, and things are so and so*. This thesis derives in the end from Aristotle. But it is taken by Tarski from his teacher Kotarbiński, who had derived it in turn from Twardowski's work on the *Sachverhalt* and on the so-called 'absolute' theory of truth.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ See Woleński & Simons 1989, 36ff., and compare Kotarbiński 1966, 106f.

Logical or 'model-theoretic' semantics since 1935 has departed considerably from those aspects of Tarski's work which reflected his original concern to find formal means of manipulating *ways things stand* in parallel to sentences or propositions. Model theorists have sought instead to exploit the mathematical resources which Tarski and others put at their disposal, and this has meant that their work has been confined to the construction and manipulation of abstract set-theoretic structures that have little or no relation to the actual world of what happens and is the case. Logic itself has hereby to a regrettable extent come to be freed of its relation to truth as classically conceived. More recent work, above all on the part of the situation semanticists, seems however to be pointing once more in the direction of a semantics that would be compatible with a *Sachverhalt* ontology of a more realistic sort, and to this extent there may perhaps be life yet in a conception of logic along Reinachian lines. Both Reinach and the situation semanticists suggest that we should shake ourselves free from the one-sided textbook conception of logic as a science of *propositions* conceived in abstraction from their realisations in the minds of thinking subjects and from their objectual correlates in the world. Logic should be seen, rather, not as a science of other-worldly 'bearers of truth', but as a discipline engaging whatever it is that can stand in truth-*relations*. And when matters are conceived in this light, then the temptation to embrace a special realm of propositions is much more easily resisted.

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on:

see also:

content /meaning
 logic and theory of judgement

 object
 truth

2.4, 6.6, 6.9, 7.4, 7.9, 8.3
 1.10-13, 2.6-7, 3.4, 4.4, 4.6,
 7.13, 11, 16.6, 16.12-13
 4.5-6, 7.4, 7.7-8, 8.3-5, 16.3
 6.8, 13

TRUTH THEORIES

It has been recently claimed that the single most important work produced by a member of the Lvov-Warsaw school is Tarski's article on truth.¹ Tarski's work belongs to a tradition of study in which the influence of Brentano's thought was ensured by the mediation of Twardowski. The paper by Woleński and Simons to which I refer analyses the positions of the leading members of the Lvov-Warsaw school, in particular the theories of Twardowski, Łukasiewicz, Kotarbiński, Leśniewski and Tarski. I shall here make closer scrutiny of the theories of Brentano and certain other members of his school. As well as Brentano, therefore, I shall be discussing Marty, Meinong and Husserl.

1. THEORIES OF CORRESPONDENCE

Despite the emphasis placed on Tarski's contribution, one should be wary of attributing a general correspondentist position to all the Brentanians. And one should also bear in mind that Brentano himself abandoned the version of correspondence theory that he initially held and took up a very different position: the evidence theory of truth. According to this theory, truth is founded on the fact that true judgements are those which can be judged with evidence; those where the presence of evidence excludes the possibility of error.² The account that I present below will reveal the deep roots of this theory in Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology.

¹ Woleński & Simons 1986, 392.

² Brentano 1962. For a summary of Brentano's ideas see Szrednicki 1965 and Kamitz 1983.

Given the complexity of my subject-matter, I shall first describe the particular version of correspondence theory that Brentano embraced, and then explain why he abandoned it in favour of the evidence theory of truth.

Aristotle developed both a weak version and a strong version of correspondence theory. The weak version is set out in *Metaphysics* 1011 b 26 ff, where he states: "It is false to say that being is not or that non-being is; it is instead true to say that being is and non-being is not". The strong version is contained in *Metaphysics* 1051 b 3 ff: "As regards things, their being true and false consists in their being united or in their being separate, so that true is the belief that things are separate which are effectively separate and things are united which are effectively united; false is the belief that things stand in a manner contrary to the way in which they effectively stand". As Woleński and Simons point out, these two versions do not seem to be equivalent, or at least they are not immediately so.³ The suspicion that they do indeed differ is substantially reinforced by the fact that the weak version can be interpreted in at least two distinct ways. First, we have the interpretation based on the existential reading of the copula which reduces sentences to the affirmation of the existence of their subjects. Second, we have the factive (or veridical) interpretation of the copula.⁴ In the former case, 'a man is' signifies that 'a man exists'; in the latter case, the copula in 'John is white' signifies 'is thus' or 'it is the case that'. Under this interpretation there is no restriction on existential propositions.

Brentano immediately rejected the strong version of the theory of truth, and for a certain period adopted the weak one. In the end, however, he rejected the weak version as well in favour of the theory of truth as evidence.

2. FRANZ BRENTANO

Brentano's rejection of the strong version of the correspondence theory of truth stemmed from his theory of the judgment. According to the traditional account, judgments are given by the union or separation of concepts or ideas.⁵ The strong correspondence theory of truth holds that whatever is united or separated in the world is also united or separated in the judgment. The fact, however, that there are impersonal judgments such as 'it is raining' and existential judgments such as 'Paul exists' seriously undermines the doctrine, because in these cases the judgment is not obtained by the union or separation of anything. Other difficulties are raised by judgments about non-existents. If truth is an *adaequa-*

³ Woleński & Simons 1989, 393.

⁴ See Woleński & Simons 1989, 393, and the essential Kahn 1973, 331 ff.

⁵ Aristotle, *De interpretatione*.

tio intellectus et rei, in the case of negative existential judgments of the kind 'A does not exist', if the judgment is true, that which is not is precisely the *res* which the judgment must adapt to.⁶ Further confirmation of the weakness of the traditional view is provided by false judgments of the kind 'dogs are cats'. These judgments are not false because they unite entities which in reality are separate; they would be false even if no cat existed, either united with or separate from any dog.⁷

These difficulties induced Brentano to reformulate the traditional definition of the truth of the judgment as follows: a judgment is true when it attributes to a thing something real which is given as one with it, or rejects of a thing a real part which does not exist as one with it. Brentano thus changed the doctrine expounded at the beginning of *De interpretatione* in such a way that truth and falsity are not bound together and dependent on *synthesis* (*Verbindung*) and *diairesis* (*Trennung*), but depend on the realm of reality to which they refer.⁸

However, this first change to the definition of the judgment was not enough. Brentano went on to specify that this applied to a simple judgment, whose truth consists in the fact that it states that something is real when it is real, and not real when it is not.⁹ For Brentano, therefore, the characteristic feature of judgments is not their combination or separation of terms, but the acceptance or rejection of something by the judger, with the additional condition that whatever is accepted exists and whatever is rejected does not.

This second stage in Brentano's analysis also led him to reject the weak version of the theory of truth as correspondence between thought and thing. Brentano adopted his new theory of evidence when he realized that the correspondence criterion generated a vicious circle: a judgment is true when it corresponds to things, but we do not know the nature of something when we have a true judgment of it. As Szrednicki points out, "the gap is either too big or too narrow".¹⁰ To escape from this impasse something else is required: which, for Brentano, was evidence, understood not as an intuition of the subject but as a characteristic of certain judgments.¹¹ His task was therefore to elaborate a theory of evident judgments.

Brentano began by distinguishing between two kinds of evident judgment: those relative to our inner perception, and *a priori* judgments. The most interesting aspect of this distinction is that judgments of the first kind (those

⁶ Morscher 1990, 192.

⁷ Szrednicki 1965, 17 ff; Modenato 1979, 147 ff. Brentano sets out his objections against the *adaequatio* in his 1874, 1911 and 1962.

⁸ Volpi 1976, 32-3.

⁹ Brentano 1966, 18.

¹⁰ Szrednicki 1965, 21.

¹¹ Brentano 1966, 137. Tatarkiewicz 1973, 215.

relative to inner perception) are all affirmative, whereas those of the second kind (*a priori* judgments) are all negative. This also means that the sphere of judgment is divided into two, so that one part comprises existence (to which affirmative judgments pertain) and the other comprises non-existence (to which negative judgments pertain). "The area to which the affirmative judgment is appropriate is the area of the *existent*, a concept to be clearly distinguished from that of *thing*; and the area to which the negative judgment is appropriate is the area of the *non-existent*".¹²

By reflecting on evident judgments we obtain the concept of correctness; once we have obtained this concept, we may extend it beyond the sphere of evidence to obtain the broader concept of *truth*.¹³ That is to say, we know by inner evidence that these two types of judgment are correct, and it is precisely this knowledge that enables us to establish their truth.

In order to obtain this truth, we must begin with an evident judgment and compare it with two other judgments, one which contradicts it and one which is 'blind', i.e. non-evident.¹⁴ The difference between evident judgments and blind judgments is that evident judgments are *Selbstgegebenheit* to the subject who judges, whereas the others are simply *Gegebenheit*.¹⁵ The subject in this case must relate the blind judgments back to their corresponding evident judgments, and only in this case can he judge with truth.

The two types of judgment exhibit two different forms of evidence. The judgments of inner perception are immediately evident, whereas *a priori* judgments are governed by a form of apodictic evidence. As regards the former, the guarantee of the correctness of the judgment is yielded by the judge's direct contemplation of the presentation which serves as the matter of the judgment. The latter are grounded on the distinction between assertoric and apodictic judgments. A judgment is apodictic when it is 'immediately caused' by the contemplation of the presentation that serves as the matter of the judgment, otherwise it is assertoric.¹⁶ We may say, for example, that all squares are rectangles because consideration of their contradictory square-which-is-not-rectangle obliges us to reject it. This apodictic rejection is the source of our *a priori* knowledge that squares are rectangles.¹⁷ In both cases, the evidence stems from contemplation of a single instance (the presentation actually given). The difference between the two cases arises from the fact that immediately

¹² Brentano 1966, 21; Modenato 1979, 150.

¹³ Chisholm 1986, 34.

¹⁴ Chisholm 1986, 35.

¹⁵ Volpi 1976, 41.

¹⁶ Brentano 1956, 128-9.

¹⁷ Chisholm 1986, 43. Note that this *a priori* knowledge is a form of generalisation from a single instance. This is clearly explained in Johnson 1922 (vol. II), 189-96.

evident judgments assert the existence of the object of the given presentation, whereas apodictic rejection deny the existence of its object.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF TRUTH AS EVIDENCE

The most developed form of Brentano's theory of truth is based on his theory of evident judgments. This in turn requires a theory of the judgment and, as we know, for Brentano a judgment is not the union or separation of concepts. The theory of truth as evidence also holds that, besides *what* is judged and asserted, also the *how* of the judgment and the assertion is important.¹⁸ More thorough understanding of Brentano's truth theory therefore requires analysis of his theory of the judgment, as regards both the *objects* of judgment and the *modes* of judgment.

I mentioned at the outset the distinction between the existential and the veridical meaning of the copula. Using the terminology of mediaeval philosophy, this is the difference between the copula as *secundum adiacens* and the copula as *tertium adiacens*; that is, between the structure 'A is' and the structure 'A is B' — where it is clear that the first copula has existential value while the second one is predicative. Brentano's problem was how to account for the relationships between a structure like 'A is B' and one like 'AB is'. In other words, we wish to know in which cases it is legitimate to pass from 'A is B' to 'AB is' (and vice versa).

If we employ Brentano's distinction between determination and modification,¹⁹ we can assert that all expressions on the basis of which 'A is B' is equivalent to 'AB is' are determining, while all those expressions in which this equivalence does not hold are modifying.²⁰

On applying this criterion, it becomes evident that true and false, used as terms, can be both modifying and determining. They are modifying in cases

¹⁸ At this stage there seem to be two (at least) alternative routes to take. The first asserts that attributing truth to a proposition amounts to a declaration that one agrees with that proposition: this we may call the performative theory of truth, which was introduced into analytical philosophy mainly by Ramsey's *Truth and probability*, although we owe to Strawson and his *Introduction to logical theory* the most systematic treatment of this point of view. The second route, the one followed here, leads instead to the adverbial theory of truth, which is closely akin to Brentano's doctrine. See Dappiano & Poli 1994.

¹⁹ Poli 1993b.

²⁰ For more detailed analysis see Poli 1992-3 and Dappiano & Poli 1994. 'A' and 'B' are terms, not descriptions. It is also essential to avoid deictics, i.e. one must avoid the structure of the so-called double judgment. With deictics, in effect, all the modes admit the equivalence that characterizes the determinants.

where they are applied to other terms, and they are determining in descriptions. This is evident in judgments like 'there is a false diamond' or 'there is a true friend'. These are not equivalent to 'a diamond is false' or 'a friend is true', which are distinctly ill-formed, whereas a judgment like 'the theory of evolution is true'²¹ is obviously transformable into 'there is a true theory of evolution'. This aspect of Brentano's truth theory is what has traditionally been called 'metaphysical truth' or the 'truth of things'. The other aspect, the more usual one, and which from this point of view follows from the first, concerns the truth of propositions. When reading Brentano one must keep both of them in mind, since his judgment is the acceptance as existent or the rejection as non-existent of a thing-like whole. Evidence, in this context, is *adaequatio* to the truth of the thing, to what this is in our inner perception. It is therefore evident that the traditional problem of truth as correspondence does not even arise, since both terms of the correspondence have been reinterpreted in a quite radical manner.

The further evolution of Brentano's thought gave rise to new developments of his truth theory. His analysis of inner temporality, in particular, led him to the view that all the objects of inner perception are synsemantic.

Brentano's theory bears a close resemblance to Abelard's conceptualization of the copula *tertium adiacens* as acting as a temporal indicator between the subject and predicate which denotes whether (the time of) the existence of the unity AB is anterior to, simultaneous with, or posterior to, the time of the enunciation (the enunciative present). The copula *secundum adiacens* instead states that the unity AB is one of the things that actually exist.²² These temporal references are incorporated into the AB structure. When the temporal reference is not explicit, this signifies not the lack of a temporal connotation, but that the temporal connotation is the durational present.²³ Using the distinction between determinants and modifiers in the terms cited above, this means that in the passage to the copula as *tertium adiacens* also the determinations may become non-real (= non-actual), because this structure admits a temporality of the object of judgment which may differ from that of the act of judging.

Abelard's theory of enunciative temporality, which, as we have seen, resembles Brentano's, has its roots in Aristotle. For Aristotle, the problem of truth (*aletheia*) derived in fact from the noetic activity of the *aletheuein*; that is,

²¹ The example is Kotarbiński's.

²² The references are to *Logica ingredientibus*, *Super peri hermeneias*, 336,27-340,18; 346,1-353,2; 359,9-370,15; *Dialectica*, 121,28-123,25; 129,18-26; 130,6-140,14; 159,11-170,30. On this subject see Jacobi 1985 and Dappiano & Poli 1994.

²³ Abelard, *Dialectica*, 123,2-5: "Male ergo per 'sine tempore' nomina, quae etiam temporis designativa monstrantur, Aristoteles verbis disiunxisse videtur; eiusdem, inquam, temporis consignificativa cuius et verba, idest praesentis".

from that philosophical *mode* (*hexis, habitus*) which consists in grasping²⁴ an individual whole.²⁵ The unity of the truth of a whole is constituted only *if and when* the man 'sees' with an act of philosophical *noesis* which, by involving a particular *hexis*, *modifies* the attitude of the ordinary judgment and brings, *in the durational present of the presentation*, the experience of the soul into correspondence with things.²⁶

To sum up, the truth or falsity of a (predicative) judgment of the kind 'A is B' is secondary, and it depends on the truth or falsity of a (thetic) judgment taking the form 'AB is'. The realm of thetic judgments is more extensive than that of predicative judgments,²⁷ and their truth is based on a radical *existential commitment* (positive or negative) to the objects of which we speak, and in which commitment we may identify the profound sense of Aristotle's *aletheuein*. The existential commitment, finally, is addressed to the unity 'AB' and does not derive from separate consideration of 'A' and 'B'.²⁸

We may say that 'AB is' is *absolutely existent* if the asserted content does not exhibit *consignificatio temporis*; that is, if the present is its sole temporal indicator: in this case what we have is a presentation. The expression is *locally existent*, i.e. endowed with a definite temporality, if the asserted content expresses a *consignificatio temporis*, in which case the problem arises of the relationship between the time of the judgment and the time of the judged.

4. ANTON MARTY

Marty's position on truth theory is usually distinguished from Brentano's by asserting that he was a proponent of the theory of truth as correspondence. In fact, however, Marty's was a modified form of the correspondence theory which was not too distant from Brentano's theory of evidence.

In the account of it furnished by Morscher, Marty's theory is based on three presuppositions: (i) the truth of a judgment consists in its correspondence with 'reality'; (ii) truth is objective (independent of persons and of their mental phenomena); (iii) truth is temporally dependent.

Some comments are in order here. Marty shared Brentano's doubts concerning the 'classical' theory of correspondence. In particular, he endorsed Brentano's criticisms of it based on negative existential judgments. For this reason

²⁴ *Thigēin: Metaphysics*, 1051 b 24.

²⁵ *Asyntheta: Metaphysics* 1051 b 18.

²⁶ *De interpretatione*, 16 a 5. For this interpretation see Dappiano 1993.

²⁷ Except in the theory of double judgments, where they are coextensive.

²⁸ On thetic judgments see Poli 1993a.

he defined truth as “*adeaequatio cogitantis et cogitati*”, where the ‘*cogitare*’ refers to the act of judgment and the ‘*cogitatum*’ to the content of the judgment. Truth, therefore, is guaranteed by a correspondence between the act of judgment and the content of the judgment.²⁹

Secondly, the objectivity of truth means that the same judgment can never be true for one person and false for another.³⁰

The third point is more interesting. The thesis of the temporal dependence of truth entails that a judgment may be true at one particular moment and false at another. Using Morscher’s example, we may say that in 100 BC it was true that the manuscript of this article would exist; that in 1995 it is true that the manuscript exists; and that in 2500 it will be true that the manuscript existed.³¹ This example reveals clear affinities between Marty’s theory and Abelard’s problem of enunciative temporality discussed in the previous section. However different Marty’s and Brentano’s theories may be, therefore, they both evidently derive from speculations which share the same conceptual referents.

5. ALEXIUS MEINONG

Meinong’s truth theory is again different and consists of a further radicalization of the reference, introduced by Marty, to the content of judgments. For Meinong, truth and falsity are properties of objectives not of judgments, even though they are properties of objectives in that they are apprehended by judgments or assumptions. Hence, in order to understand Meinong’s theory of truth, we must examine his theory of objectives.

It is sufficient for our present purposes to point out that Meinong’s objectives differ from propositions in, for example, Russell’s sense. Objectives may be false and have many other essential or accidental properties without subsisting or existing. We may speak of subsistent objectives only when referring to those objectives that are facts.

Those who maintain that propositions are entities, believe that they are those entities which may correspond to or match facts. They contend that when we judge or make certain assertions, we always have a proposition in mind. That is to say, we refer to facts through propositions.

For Meinong, however, there is no such entity that stands between our minds and facts. True objectives are purely and simply facts; they are identical

²⁹ Morscher 1990, 192-3. The reference is to Marty 1916.

³⁰ Although it may obviously happen that a certain person *believes* a judgment to be true while another person *believes* it to be false.

³¹ Morscher 1990, 192.

with them. A proposition is an objective seen from a particular point of view. His theory is therefore one of identity or of coincidence. Any objective which is factual is also pseudo-existent, and the conjunction of factuality and pseudo-existence makes the objective true. There is no entity which is true by virtue of its correspondence to a fact; the fact itself is true because it is the object of a judgment.³² Put otherwise, for Meinong factuality and truth belong to the same objective viewed from two different perspectives. It is the selfsame objective which is grasped by the act of apprehension, i.e. from the perspective of its pseudo-existence, simultaneously with its factuality.³³ In this sense, truth is a concrete moment in which the abstract aspects of factuality and of pseudo-existence can be distinguished. These do not coincide with truth, but are concretely given in it.³⁴

Meinong believed that it was possible to give partial justification for the theory of correspondence if one distinguishes between (i) the apprehended object and (ii) the object of an apprehending experience. In (i) an objective is considered *qua* objective, with respect to which the property of being apprehended is entirely external and accidental. In (ii) the objective is considered as an object of experience. In this case one may say that (i) resembles or corresponds to (ii).

The connection between Brentano and Meinong is therefore the thesis that an objective is true if it is factual, where factuality in turn is given through evidence.³⁵

6. EDMUND HUSSERL

Husserl used the term 'truth' in two different theoretical contexts: firstly in his analysis of the connection between evidence and truth, conducted in particular in Chapter V of the 6th Logical Investigation; secondly in his analysis of the foundations of logic, where the logic of truth is the third and conclusive layer after the realm of the co-possible and that of the unitariness of a principle of deduction. This latter analysis Husserl developed in *Formal and transcendental logic* and thus belongs to the most mature period of his thought. In this sense, it is more properly regarded as a product of the phenomenological school and, at

³² Findlay 1933, 84-8.

³³ Lenoci 1972, 209-10.

³⁴ Lenoci 1972, 214.

³⁵ Findlay 1933, 186-7. Meinong also maintains that when Aristotle spoke of being as true, he was in fact referring to factuality.

least *prima facie*, is furthest from Brentano's influence. I shall consider here only Husserl's theory developed in the *Logical investigations*.

Husserl began by distinguishing among various kinds of acts. The two acts fundamental to his analysis of the concepts of evidence and truth are the intentional act directed towards an object and the 'filling' act which saturates the former by offering in intuition, as actual perception, its corresponding object. The saturation produced by the filling acts admits to degrees or levels. We may say that a saturation is partial when there are aspects of the intentioning act which have not been saturated by the corresponding filling act. We may say instead that the filling is complete when the objectuality is effectively present or given just as it has been intentioned and all the partial intentions implicit in the intentioning act have been filled. Complete filling is definitive and final filling. As Husserl puts it, the complete filling is the ultimate goal of the progression of filling. When it is accomplished, the object itself is given in intuition exactly as it is in itself. In this case, presenting content and presented content are identical, and this yields the authentic *adaequatio rei et intellectus*.³⁶

Evidence intervenes here as the act of this perfect synthesis of coincidence. Like all identifications, evidence is an objectualizing act whose objective correlate is truth or being in the sense of truth. Note that, for Husserl, the expressions 'truth' and 'being in the sense of truth', although closely connected, are not identical. In fact, Husserl's theory propounds an interpretation of 'true', 'correctness', and 'truth' which encompasses the entire realm of objectualising acts. That is to say, truth and falsity, for example, do not refer only to judgments (to propositions) and to their respective objective correlates, states of affairs,³⁷ but to all acts, and to their corresponding correlates that have objectualizing capacity. Secondly, in order to give rigour to his terminology and to avoid conceptual overlaps, Husserl proposed using 'truth' with reference to acts, and 'being as true' with reference to their respective objectual correlates.³⁸ 'True' and 'false' in this acceptation therefore pertain to types of

³⁶ Husserl 1900-1, 419. Immediately afterwards he adds that the perfect adjustment of thought to thing can be understood in two senses. The first is as described in the main text. Here, thought intends nothing that the filling intuition does not present as belonging to thought itself. The second sense is the one in which the filling of the intention is conclusive and does not generate a further intention which requires filling. Cases may arise where the second form of perfect filling occurs but not the first. Husserl gives as an example the situation in which one is talking about the number of oscillations in an echoing sound. Here, complete saturation in the first sense does not come about because the intuition corresponding to the number in question is not given in actuality.

³⁷ Husserl 1900-01, 425.

³⁸ Husserl 1900-01, 426.

acts, while 'being as true' and 'being as false' (i.e. non-being) pertain to their objectual correlates.

Husserl's distinction among the various meanings of truth proceeded by differentiating among cases relative to acts and relative to their correlates, respectively. As regards acts, truth can be understood as (A1) the ideal relationship between the cognitive essences of coincident acts, or as (A2) adjustment of the intention to the true object.³⁹ In this case, one may also speak of correctness of the intention.

As regards the objectual correlates of acts, (B1) truth as the correlate of an identifying act is a state of affairs, and as the correlate of an identification of coincidence it is the identity between that which is intended and that which is given, or (B2) it is an object given in the form of the intentioned object.⁴⁰

Bearing in mind the progression to the limit introduced by Husserl, on the basis of which one may properly speak of truth only when the intention has been completely saturated, fulfilled, it is not difficult to recognize in (A2) and (B2) an echo of Brentano, just as traces of Meinong are recognizable in (A1) and (A2). Marty's proposals seems instead discernible in the combination (A2)-(B1); a reading which clearly reveals a shift in Marty's thought from analysis of acts to analysis of correlates: correlates of type (B1), in fact, are not based on acts of type (A2). Marty's thought therefore makes implicit recourse to acts, which, however, he did not thematize. Although we cannot here broach topics which belong to other, more specific enquiry, we can at least stress that Husserl's analysis, however briefly set out, took up and developed all the elements that we have considered, as well as introducing new ones which almost certainly derived from influences external to the strictly Brentanian context.

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³⁹ Note that Husserl talks of 'true object'. On the 'truth of things' see above, § 3.

⁴⁰ Husserl 1900-01, 423-4.

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on:

see also:

truth

6.8, 12.8

REISM IN THE BRENTANIST TRADITION

The term 'reism' was introduced by Tadeusz Kotarbiński to denote the philosophical view that the category of things is the sole ontological category.¹ Shortly after *Elementy* went in print, Kazimierz Twardowski pointed out in a letter to Kotarbiński, that a similar ontological theory has been elaborated by Franz Brentano in the last period of his life. In 1930, Kotarbiński delivered a lecture at 7th International Philosophical Congress in Oxford. After the congress, he received a letter from Georg Katkov with further information on Brentano's reism.²

Brentano refers in *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*³ to the following words in Leibniz's *Nouveaux essais*: "It is known also that it is the abstractions which occasion most difficulty when one desires to examine them minutely, as those know who are acquainted with the subtleties of the scholastics, whose most intricate speculations fall at one blow if we banish abstract entities and resolve not to speak ordinarily except by concretes, and not to admit any other terms in the demonstrations of the sciences, but those which represent substantial subjects".⁴ However, reistic contents were rather a second-

¹ Kotarbiński 1929, 67. This letter was published in Kotarbiński's 1966. The term 'reism' appears on p. 57 of the English edition.

² Kotarbiński mentions letters from Twardowski and Katkov in his 1930-1931. This paper contains a brief comparison of his views with those of Brentano. In Kotarbiński 1935 (his review of Kraus 1934) and in Kotarbiński 1976 one finds more comprehensive comparisons written by Kotarbiński himself. See also Smith 1990, 170-174.


³ Brentano 1925, 163; the first edition of this volume appeared in 1911. Brentano's reference to Leibniz is noted by Kotarbiński in his 1930-1931; Kotarbiński always stressed that Leibniz was a forerunner of reism.

⁴ Leibniz 1890b, 340.

dary element in Leibniz's philosophy. Thus, the very history of reism as a general philosophical view actually begins with Brentano.⁵

The first ontological doctrine of Brentano was a slight revision of Aristotle. In particular, Brentano adopted the Stagirite's view that the word 'being' has several meanings, and replaced the Aristotelian table of ten categories with a 'family-tree' of categories with eight basic rubrics⁶

(I)



Both the thesis that being has several meanings as well as the 'family-tree' (I) of categories are very remote from reism, for they are committed to abstract entities (Brentano spoke of *entia rationis* or *irrealia*), at least in the sense of moderate conceptual realism. The later course of Brentano's ontology may be seen as a constant departure from his early view.⁷

Brentano became a reist around 1904 but earlier he restricted the categories of irrealia which can be objects of presentations to four kinds, namely immanent objects, contents of mental acts (judging, loving, hating), relations, and


⁵ Ideas more or less related to reism appeared in philosophy before Leibniz; cf. Hiz 1959. One may mention, for instance, the Aristotelian concept of *protai ousiai*, the stoic theory of *soma*, the medieval doctrines of *singularia*, Hobbes' considerations on *corpora*, or Descartes distinction between *res extensae* and *res cogitans*.

⁶ Brentano 1862, 173. Brentano himself used Greek labels for his categories. The English terms are borrowed from Simons 1988, 47.

⁷ Mayer-Hillebrand 1966, 1-99, 399-403 gives extensive treatment to Brentano's ontological development (page-numbers henceforth according to Meiner's edition, Hamburg 1977); see also Szrednicki 1965.

collectiva. Especially, he rejected universals (*genera, differentiae specifice*) as genuine objects. This new theory is schematically illustrated by the following diagram

(II)



The last step in Brentano's ontological reductions consisted in abandoning any commitment to *entia rationis*.⁸ His final ontological 'table' may be expressed by a simple equality⁹

(III) being = *entia realia* = *things*

Things are particulars (concrete entities) which are fully determined and temporal. Brentano divided things into bodies (spatially extended) and souls. Since Brentano accepted souls in his ontological inventory, he was not a materialist reist. Brentano considered the concept of a thing (of something, of an object). Moreover, the sentences

(1) *a* is a thing

and

(2) *a* exists (*a* is)

⁸ *Anhang IX* ("Von den wahren und fiktiven Objekten") in Brentano 1925 (2nd book) is the first appearance of Brentano's reism in print. His earlier and later reistic writings were published in books collected from his *Nachlaß*, particularly Brentano 1930, 1933, and 1966a. Unfortunately, there is no single item in Brentano which gives a systematic and complete account of his reism. Brentano's reism attracted some of the so-called younger Brentanists, for instance Katkov 1930, Kastil 1933 and 1951 and Kraus 1925, 1929, 1930 and 1934.

⁹ God's existence was treated by Brentano independently of items in ontological tables related to that of Aristotle.

are not equivalent. (2) means 'a is now' (existence of a thing is asserted in *modus praesens*). On the other hand, the truth of (1) is entirely independent of time. So we can refer to things which do not exist, for instance centaurs.

Although Brentano entirely rejected a multicategorical ontology in his reistic period, he still kept several aspects of his former philosophical view, in particular the thesis

(3) *a* is an object if and only if *a* can be presented.

as well as the non-propositional theory of judgments which regards judging as correct (i. e. truly evident) in asserting (accepting) or rejecting objects which judgments are about. In order to justify reism, Brentano, assuming (3), had to show that only *concreta* (things) could be objects of presentations. This required a systematization of *irrealia*. Brentano offered several lists of *entia rationis* which however differ in details. Some of the typologies were invented by him to comprise earlier doctrines of *irrealia*. This is probably the case with the following specification of *entia rationis*.¹⁰

- (IV) (a) intentional or immanent objects;
- (b) contents;
- (c) states of affairs, including compounds like negative (*negativa*) or disjunctive (*disjunctiva*);
- (d) existence and non-existence;
- (e) modalities (possibility, necessity, impossibility);
- (f) relations;
- (g) probability of something;
- (h) *privativa* (for instance, blindness);
- (i) universals;
- (j) *Gestalten*;
- (k) time, space.
- (l) *collectiva*;
- (m) parts of things;

However, list (IV) does not quite fit Brentano's reism, for he (as a reist) included *collectiva* among things (Brentano changed his earlier view on *collectiva*; see diagram (II)). In my opinion, a more convenient point of reference in the present context is another systematization of *irrealia* by Brentano, namely¹¹

¹⁰ This list is based on Brentano 1966a, 390-393.

¹¹ Brentano 1981, 24-26. Brentano's list contains items (a)-(e) but for fairly obvious reasons I have completed (V) with *relativa*, time and space. I shall not enter here into problems

- (V) (a) intentional beings, for instance ‘a thought man’;
 (b) forms in Aristotle’s sense;
 (c) contents of judgments, in particular ‘non-being’, ‘impossibility’ or ‘possibility’;
 (d) *denominationes extrinsecae* related to accident in Aristotle’s sense, for instance ‘co-existence with’;
 (e) universals;
 (f) *relativa*;
 (g) time;
 (h) space.

Brentano offers two basic sorts of argument against *irrealia*. His first strategy is semantic and seeks to show that *irrealia* are nothing but linguistic fictions. Let us briefly see how Brentano dealt with particular kinds of *irrealia*.

Ad (Va). Take

- (4) *a* is a thought object.

Apparently (4) refers to an intentional object, namely ‘*a* which is thought’. However, everything required to drop the *ens ratione* in question reduces itself to a person, say *X*, who is thinking and an object which *X* is thinking about. Thus, (4) is expressible as

- (5) *X* is thinking about *a*.

However, (5) refers only to things, namely to a person *X* and an object *a*, providing that *a* is a thing. If *a* is non-thing, then other cases of reduction are to be used.

Ad (Vb) and (Ve). Forms and universals are subjected to the same treatment. For Brentano, universals are not determinate (so they cannot be things) but can be individuated by *concreta*. Now consider

- (6) Redness is a colour,

which seems to refer to the universals Redness and Colour. This commitment may be eliminated by

of the mutual exclusiveness of some rubrics in (V), for instance *denominationes extrinsecae* and *relativa*; see *ad* (Vd) and (Vf) below.

(7) some coloured things are red.

Ad V(c). One could say that sentences

(8) Centaurs do not exist

(9) Stones exist

concern the non-existence of centaurs and the existence of stones respectively. Using his non-propositional theory of judging, Brentano argues that (8) rejects centaurs but (3) accepts stones. So (8) and (9) are to be translated into

(10) There are no centaurs

(11) There are stones

which shows that existence and non-existence (or non-being) as *entia rationis* are redundant.

Also modalities as contents of judgements can be easily eliminated by

(12) a is necessary $\leftrightarrow a$ is asserted apodictically;

(13) a is impossible $\leftrightarrow a$ is rejected apodictically;

(14) a is possible \leftrightarrow ' a is apodictically rejected' is apodictically rejected.

(10)-(14) reduce apparent references to *irrealia* in favour of things only. The existence, non-existence, necessity, impossibility or possibility of something can be regarded as states of affairs of a sort. Thus, the reductions outlined in this section show how to dispense with some kinds of states of affairs.

Brentano also gives another (non-reductive) argument against the *entia rationis* considered in this section.¹² Since contents of judgments may be 'iterated', we obtain an infinite chain of *irrealia*, namely the existence of the existence of..., the existence of the non-existence of..., the possibility of the non-existence of..., etc. Brentano regards this proliferation of *entia rationis* as an absurd consequence.¹³

Ad (Vd) and (Vf). To simplify the discussion, I shall link *denominationes extrinsicae* to *relativa*. The reason for this is that *denominationes extrinsecae* are normally expressed as relations; Brentano restricted *relativa* only to special

¹² Brentano 1930, 95-96.

¹³ Note, however, that the validity of Brentano's argument essentially depends on the assumed logic of modalities. Some systems of modal logic (for instance, S1 or S2) have infinitely many mutually irreducible modalities, but others (for instance, S3, S4 or S5) are finite in this respect.

sorts of relations (for instance, causal or comparative) which perhaps could be, according to him, called *relativa propria*. However, the difference between *relativa propria* and others is not relevant in the present context. Take the sentence

(15) X is taller than Y

which seems to refer to the relation ‘to be taller than’. According to Brentano, if one thinks (15) then one is referring to X *modo recto* but *modo obliquo* to Y of which X is taller than. This may be expressed by

(16) X is a taller-person-than-Y

which indicates how reference to relations disappears.

Ad (Vg) and (Vh). Time and space are, according to Brentano, not separate beings but *modi* of things. Generally speaking, the following equivalences hold (the right-hand expressions refer to things only):

- (17) *a* exists now \leftrightarrow there is an *a* now;
- (18) *a* existed \leftrightarrow there was *a*;
- (19) *a* will exist \leftrightarrow there will be an *a*;
- (20) *a* is located in space \leftrightarrow *a* is spatially extended.

Brentano’s general argument against particular cases of irrealia is as follows. We refer to *irrealia* by words which look like names, but closer analysis (using *Sprachkritik*) shows that they are not naming expressions in the strict sense but belong to *syncategorematica* (*synsemantica*); Kraus proposed a very impressive label for *syncategorematica* which function as names: *Namenlarven*.¹⁴ Thus, only names of *concreta* are categorematic (autosemantic) expressions. For Brentano, the terms used for *irrealia* play an important role in our language because they contribute to simple ways of speaking. He compares this with the function of negative numbers in arithmetic which are fictions but simplify mathematical discourse.¹⁵ However, we could live without abstract terms: “Such pseudo-predications, however, can serve to express what we think. All

¹⁴ Kraus 1934, 68.

¹⁵ This analogy is, however, dubious. Assume the set-theoretical definition of numbers. This definition starts with natural numbers (positive integers) as cardinalities of finite sets. Then we define negative numbers as integers smaller than 0. Under this definition, negative numbers are ontologically *al pari* with natural numbers. To regard some (not all) mathematical entities as fictions, one must assume that other objects are mathematically real; Brentano’s analogy requires that natural numbers have a privileged ontological status.

of them can be transformed without changing their meaning; when only genuine names are used, then the psychic relations to the objects named are brought out most distinctly".¹⁶

Brentano's second argument against *irrealia* is contained in his general analytic argument for reism: "The expression 'to think' is univocal. To think is always to think of something. Since 'to think' is univocal, the term 'something' must also be univocal. But there is no generic concept that can be common both to things and not-things. Hence if 'something' denotes a thing at one time, it cannot denote a not-thing — an impossibility, say — at another time".¹⁷ This argument "from the univocality of thinking to the reistic univocality of something" appeared for the first time in Brentano's letter to Anton Marty (September 2, 1906)¹⁸ and was then repeated on various occasions,¹⁹ also in this form: "However different the objects of our thinking may be, all of them must fall under the same most general concept, namely, that of thing, an *ens reale*. If this were not the case, the term 'thinker' (i. e. 'one who thinks something') would be equivocal".²⁰ Brentano himself regarded this argument as conclusive.²¹

Brentano's analytic argument for reism certainly deserves attention. I note only one point.²² Assume

(21) 'to think of something' is univocal \rightarrow 'something' is univocal.

However, (21) does not imply that the word 'something' refers to things in the Brentanian sense. The only ontological conclusion we can derive from (21) (provided that (3) holds) is

(22) for any *a* and *b*, if *a* and *b* are objects, then both belong to the same ontological category.

Thus, the analytic argument for reism is in fact an argument for a unicategorical ontology, provided that the concept of object is defined by (3).

Kotarbiński's first steps toward reism were connected with his doubts concerning the existence of universals understood as general objects;²³ at that

¹⁶ Brentano 1981, 186.

¹⁷ Brentano 1966, 122.

¹⁸ Brentano 1930, 93.

¹⁹ Kraus 1934, 341-342; Brentano 1933.

²⁰ Brentano 1981, 24.

²¹ Brentano 1930, 106.

²² For more extensive discussion see Mayer-Hillebrand 1966, 399-400 (*Anmerkungen*), Farias 1968, 99-102, Buzzoni 1988, Woleński 1994.

point, he was greatly influenced by Stanisław Leśniewski and his nominalism.²⁴ Kotarbiński then rejected other abstract objects, like states of affairs, sense data, contents, relations, etc. His reism as an extensive ontologico-semantic theory was ready in 1929 and presented in *Elementy* (see footnote 1).²⁵

The ontological dimension of Kotarbiński's reism is indicated by

- (23) (a) any object is a thing;
 (b) no object is a state of affairs or a relation or property.²⁶

Then, according to Kotarbiński

- (24) a is a thing $\leftrightarrow a$ is a resistant and extended object (a material body).

Thesis (24) expresses pansomatism as an integral component of Kotarbiński's reism. Pansomatism excludes souls from the category of things. Radical realism is another thesis of Kotarbiński's which is closely related to reism. Under this view, there are no 'psychological facts' (for instance, impressions) but only experiencing bodies.

The second, semantic dimension of Kotarbiński's reism mainly concerns names. Kotarbiński, after Leśniewski,²⁷ defines names as expressions which can stand for b in the sentence

- (25) a is b ,

²³ Kotarbiński describes his own route to reism in his 1966b.

²⁴ It is interesting that Leśniewski in his criticism of universals referred to Marty; this is documented in Woleński 1990b.

²⁵ Kotarbiński 1966a is the main source for his reism; Kotarbiński 1955, 1961, 1968, 1978 are other writings on reism in English. The collection by Woleński 1990a contains studies on reism by K. Ajdukiewicz, A. Gawroński, P. Geach, A. Grzegorzczak, H. Hiz, J. Kotarbińska, Cz. Lejewski, M. Przelecki, V. Sinisi, B. Smith, K. Szaniawski, and B. Wolniewicz. See also Rand 1937-38, Lejewski 1976, Ajdukiewicz 1978 (this paper appeared in Polish in 1935), Woleński 1986, Pasquerella 1989, Woleński 1989, 224-243, Woleński 1991, Poli 1993. A list of writings on Kotarbiński's philosophy published in Polish is contained in Woleński 1990, 127-131.

²⁶ The formulation of (23b) is related to Wilhelm Wundt's table of ontological categories (adopted by Kotarbiński as a point of reference) consisting of four rubrics: things, states of affairs, properties and relations.

²⁷ Note, however, that Leśniewski was not a reist, at least in Kotarbiński's sense. In particular, he admitted the existence of non-material objects, for instance so-called 'after images'.

provided that the copula 'is' is taken in its fundamental meaning. This fundamental meaning is derived from Leśniewski's Ontology which regards (25) as equivalent to the conjunction of

- (26) there is some x , such that x is a ;
- (27) for any x , x is $a \rightarrow x$ is y ;
- (28) for any x and y , x is $a \wedge y$ is $a \rightarrow x$ is y .

It is important that 'is' in its fundamental meaning should be devoid of any temporal and spatial determination. Then the sentence falling under (25) is true providing that a is a singular name (that is, denoting exactly one object). In particular, (25) is false if a is a general or empty name, or if b is empty. The outlined theory of names is unicategorical because it makes no syntactic difference between proper names and predicates. The sentence

- (28) a philosopher is John

is syntactically correct under Leśniewski ontology, contrary to the grammar of first-order logic according to which (28) is simply ill-formed.

Now take the sentence

- (29) a is a thing.

If this sentence is to be true, then a must be a singular name. So the logical skeleton of Kotarbiński's reism implies that things are individual, concrete objects. For this reason, Kotarbiński sometimes used the term 'concretism' when he spoke about reism.

For the semantic dimension of reism, the distinction between genuine and apparent names (onomatoids) is especially important. Genuine names are names of things in the sense of (23a) and (24). Apparent names allegedly refer to abstract objects listed in (23b); 'allegedly' because such objects, according to reistic ontology, do not exist. Although onomatoids are at first glance similar to empty names, there is a considerable difference between them. The most important point is this. Empty names occur in perfectly meaningful (that is true or false) sentences but locutions with onomatoids are devoid of meaning. The sentence

- (30) centaurs are horses

is meaningful and false but

(31) relations are abstract objects

is neither true nor false; it is a meaningless string of words.

Apparent names are convenient for economical discussion of the world. However, sentences with onomatoids may be employed, provided that they have translations into the reistic language, where

(32) a language is reistic if and only if its sentences consist only of logical constants and genuine names.

The sentence (31) has no reasonable reistic translation. On the other hand, the sentence

(33) redness is a property of some apples

may be translated into

(34) some apples are red.

The division of names into genuine and apparent is an addition to Leśniewski's Ontology. On the other hand, this logical theory helped Kotarbiński to interpret common nouns as genuine names. To see this, note that (25) asserts

(35) the object denoted by *a* is also denoted by *b*.

Now, let *b* be a common noun, for instance 'red'. Under (35), the term 'red' refers to any red thing. Taking together the semantic and ontological dimension of reism, we obtain

(36) is a thing (an object) \leftrightarrow *a* can be denoted by a genuine name.

Onomatoids must be used with care because they are sources of hypostatisations which consist in regarding apparent entities as existing ones. This very often leads, especially in philosophy, to unending pseudo-controversies. Kotarbiński recommended the reistic therapy as a weapon against the excessive speculations of philosophers. This practical reason for reism constitutes a partial justification. Moreover, Kotarbiński claims that reism is a very natural interpretation of everyday language and experience because (a)

concrete terms precede abstract nouns in acts of language acquisition,²⁸ and (b) only bodies (in the pansomatistic sense) are entities which we encounter in our everyday experience. Kotarbiński himself did not deny that (a) and (b) provide only an inductive (even naive to some extent) justification for reism.

Both dimensions of reism, the ontological and the semantic, are mixed in *Elementy*. However, Kotarbiński distinguished them very sharply later and he even regarded semantic reism and ontological reism as two separate doctrines. This change was connected with the problems for reism raised by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz²⁹ as well those as observed by Kotarbiński himself. In particular, Ajdukiewicz pointed out that (23b) — that is, the negative part of the fundamental thesis of reism — is itself meaningless from a reistic point of view because it contains typical onomatoids, namely ‘state of affairs’, ‘property’ and ‘relation’.³⁰ Kotarbiński’s answer to Ajdukiewicz’s objection was that (23b) is basically a thesis on object language. Thus, semantic reism became the main point in the global reistic enterprise; in this perspective, ontological reism lost its importance.

Other problems for reism stem from the reistic interpretation of various special fields, above all mathematics, physics, semantics, psychology, social sciences, humanities and axiology. The main issue is this: how can one achieve a reistic interpretation of sets, fields, meanings, psyche, social groups, art or values?

Perhaps the most important problem concerns the reistic interpretation of set theory. The term ‘set’ is an apparent name; the same may be said about terms standing for concepts definable in set theory, for instance ‘number’ or ‘function’. At first, Kotarbiński hoped, following Leśniewski, that standard set theory could be substituted by mereology. However, mereology is too weak to capture all the set-theoretical means needed in mathematics. Some simple sentences of the algebra of sets can be translated into a reistic language but the problem for reism concerns those parts of set theory which require quantification over sets and their properties. This has not yet been solved by reism and some experts even doubt whether it is reistically solvable at all.

Kotarbiński was very concerned by these problems. He decided to propose reism, not as a ready theory of the world but rather as a programme: “in its

²⁸ This thesis was questioned by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in his paper “On the problem of universals” mentioned in footnote 25.

²⁹ See Ajdukiewicz review’s of Kotarbiński 1929 included in Kotarbiński 1966, 515-536 (the Polish original was published in 1930; the parts relevant for reism are reprinted in Woleński 1990, 7-21).

³⁰ This matter is extensively discussed in Lejewski 1979. In particular, Lejewski argues that (23b) can be meaningfully stated in the language based on Leśniewski’s Ontology. Also see Poli 1993.

mature form, concretism absolutely insists on its programme only. It announces with maximum vigour that it will try everywhere to eliminate apparent terms (onomatoids), it builds its hopes on its doubtless partial successes, and its hopes are far reaching — they are hopes for complete success in the future”.³¹

Kotarbiński’s reism differs in some points from that of Brentano.³² First, there is a difference between (3) and (36), since the former is a psychological thesis while the latter is a semantic one.³³ Then Brentano understands ‘to exist’ as ‘to exist now’ while for Kotarbiński, existence (‘is’ in its fundamental meaning) is completely devoid of any connection with ‘now’.

The next difference concerns particular properties of things and their kinds. Smith proposes the following comparative table³⁴

(VI)

| All things are | Brentano | Kotarbiński |
|-----------------|----------|-------------|
| Temporal | Yes | Yes |
| Energetic | No | Yes |
| Physical bodies | No | Yes |
| Unitary | No | No |

Clearly, disparities in the second and third row are rooted in Kotarbiński’s extreme materialism (pansomatism) and in Brentano’s dualism, respectively. As a pansomatist Kotarbiński had to accept a radical realism which consisted in the unconditional rejection of any sort of contents. On the other hand, Brentano only denied that they are objects of presentations; for Brentano, contents ‘are’ in the souls of persons.³⁵

³¹ Kotarbiński 1966, 435.

³² Doubtless, this is a very important difference. However, one may say that (36) maps (3) onto semantics or, conversely, that (3) maps (36) onto psychology. I regard the view that (36) is Brentanist in spirit as defensible.

³³ Smith 1990, 182.

³⁴ In my discussion of the differences between Brentano and Kotarbiński, I disregard various specific problems, for instance, those connected with Brentano’s theory of continua, boundaries, space, and time; see Smith 1990, 174-180 for remarks on this point. Note, however, that Kotarbiński left explanations of the spatial and temporal aspects of things to physics.

³⁵ See Brentano 1966a, 394.

Another difference was observed by Kotarbiński himself.³⁶ It concerns the question of how to interpret sentences with abstract terms under Brentano's view. Are they falsehoods or nonsenses? If the first interpretation of Brentano is correct, then his reism in its semantic aspect is basically different from that of Kotarbiński because the latter regards statements with apparent names as meaningless.³⁷

The last difference lies in the fact that Kotarbiński, contrary to Brentano, appeals to mathematical logic, particularly to Leśniewski's system.³⁸

I now pass to affinities between the two reistic theories. Both Brentano and Kotarbiński insist on the semantic aspects of reism, though Brentano always regarded ontological reism as at least equally important as a semantic one. Onomatoids are very similar to *Namenlarven*. Both philosophers offer the same practical and inductive arguments for reism.³⁹ They defend concretism and regard aggregates and parts of things also as things.

Brentano's and Kotarbiński's reistic ontologies are general theories of objects.⁴⁰ However, ontological theory can be formulated as formal and/or material ontology. The same concerns reism and its particular versions.⁴¹ To extract from the theories of Brentano and Kotarbiński their formal and material aspects, the concepts of formal (material) ontology must be made precise.

³⁶ In his review of Kraus mentioned in footnote 2.

³⁷ Since the second interpretation of Brentano is also defensible, I use here the conditional mood.

³⁸ Of course, nothing prevents us from using mathematical logic in reconstruction of Brentano's views. On the other hand, the attitude toward mathematical logic and its importance for philosophy may be taken as a *differentia specifica* of Brentano's school within the Brentanist tradition. In my opinion, the Lvov-Warsaw school was very strongly influenced *via* Twardowski by several of Brentano's ideas; see Woleński 1989, 301 and Woleński & Simons 1989. Nevertheless, I think that the Lvov-Warsaw school should not be regarded as a part of Brentano's school in the strict sense. For this reason, the title of this essay is "Reism in the Brentanist tradition".

³⁹ There are some differences in the arguments for reism offered by Brentano and Kotarbiński. The latter used neither the argument from univocity nor the non-propositional theory of judging nor the distinction *modo recto/modo obliquo*. Pasquerella in her paper mentioned in footnote 25 argues that Brentano's and Kotarbiński's theories of truth are similar. I think that the similarity in question is rather secondary. Although Kotarbiński employed the adverbial mode of speaking on truth (X truly thinks:...), he accepted the semantic theory of truth. Another question is which theory of truth is more consistent with reism: maybe the adverbial, because it does not require an appeal to set theory in semantics.

⁴⁰ Understanding ontology as the general theory of objects is a very characteristic feature of the Brentanist tradition (not only of Brentano's school); Kotarbiński shared this approach.

⁴¹ I proposed distinguishing reism as formal and material ontology in my 1986, 175. The same point is stressed by Smith 1990, 174-180 but both proposals differ with respect to the range of formal (material) ontology.

The most restrictive approach to formal ontology consists in its identification with the ontological interpretation of quantification theory or Leśniewski's Ontology. Take for instance the following formula of the first-order logic

$$(37) \quad Oba =_{df} \forall x(a = x)$$

which is a (possible) definition of the concept of object in the vocabulary of elementary logic; its right side is a version of Quine's famous dictum: no entity without identity. A second-order thesis

$$(38) \quad \forall x \exists F(F(x))$$

provides another example which means ontologically: every object has a property.

Now take

$$(39) \quad \forall x(Obx) \leftrightarrow \exists y(x \varepsilon y)$$

which is the definition of 'being an object' in Leśniewski's ontology and means 'for any x , x is an object if and only if x is something'.

We achieve a more extended concept of formal ontology if ontologically interpreted logic is enriched by set theory or mereology. This provides, for instance, machinery for an ontological theory of the 'part/whole' relation.⁴²

An obvious formal property of reistic objects is their concreteness. Both (37) and (39) can be taken as rendering things as *concreta*. However, (39) seems to have some advantages for reism. This formula is very closely related to the whole of Leśniewski's Ontology, while (37) is an external addition to the first-order logic. Moreover, (39) is a counterpart of (37) and (38) taken together. Note, however, that (38) is not convenient to reism because it appeals to the concept of property (or at least to sets as denotations of predicate parameters). The next advantage of Leśniewski's Ontology for reism is that identity is defined in the elementary Ontology, while to define it in standard quantification logic we must use second-order logic.

Mereology provides the machinery to handle the 'part-whole' relation as well as *collectiva* and parts of things as things; this would be rather difficult in

⁴² It is not my intention to argue here for a more or less restrictive understanding of formal ontology; personally I am rather inclined to a more restrictive one but this point is not too important in the present context. However, note that Smith 1990 understands formal ontology even more extensively than 'pure logic + set theory (mereology)'.

the standard set theory.⁴³ Moreover, mereology enables us to explain differences between atomistic and non-atomistic theories of things; atomicity or non-atomicity are further candidates for formal properties of things.

My claim is that Leśniewski's Ontology plus (perhaps) Mereology (especially based on Leśniewski's Ontology) generate a more reasonable reistic formal ontology than quantification theory does. To simplify the discussion, let us limit formal properties of things to concreteness. Thus, the reistic theories of Brentano and Kotarbiński fall under the same formal ontology, namely concretism.⁴⁴

On the other hand, both reisms differ as material ontologies. Brentano's theory is dualistic but Kotarbiński's pansomatism represents materialistic monism. If Leibniz is to be considered a reist, his theory could be described as concretism and spiritualistic pluralism.

Although reism encounters very serious difficulties, one can expect that this philosophy will be continued, like other nominalistic reductive ideologies. Several authors agree with Kotarbiński that even the partial (local, regional) successes of reism are noteworthy. I briefly list below some recent formal contributions to reism which provide evidence that this philosophical position is by no means superseded.⁴⁵

- (A) Grzegorzczuk, who proposes employing geometry without points in reism.⁴⁶ This extends the reistic interpretation of mathematics.
- (B) Hiz, who proposes a formal system capturing the concept of non-divisible thing.⁴⁷
- (C) Lejewski, who makes a serious attempt to clarify several aspects of reism with the help of Leśniewski's logic.⁴⁸
- (D) Körner, who puts Brentano's ideas into a sub-system of the first-order logic.⁴⁹

⁴³ Lewis has recently attempt to build the theory of the 'part-whole' relation within the framework of standard set theory; see his 1991. Doubtless, this is a step toward a theory in which classes have parts but, for reism, we need the following result: classes of classes form *collectiva*.

⁴⁴ Connections between Leśniewski's logic and Brentano's philosophy are noted by Simons 1984. See also Terrell 1978. Perhaps a paper "A Leśniewskian basis for Brentanian ontology" should be written.

⁴⁵ I take account only of those contributions which are intentionally connected to reism. If one omits this reservation, the whole tradition of 'calculus of individuals' could be considered as well.

⁴⁶ See Grzegorzczuk 1959 and 1990.

⁴⁷ See Hiz's paper mentioned in footnote 5.

⁴⁸ See Lejewski's papers mentioned in footnotes 25 and 30.

- (E) Wolniewicz, who proposes the reducibility of non-reistic systems to reistic bases instead of the translatability of sentences by sentences into reistic language.⁵⁰ This is similar to the elementarization of theories *via* the Craigian elimination of auxiliary terms.

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⁴⁹ See Körner 1978. Körner's formalization assumes a logic which is restricted to finite domains. This shows in my opinion the weakness of the standard first-order logic as a formal base for reism. That reism need not assume in advance that the world is finite was noted by Andrzej Grzegorzczak in the first of his papers (p. 9) mentioned in footnote 46.

⁵⁰ See Wolniewicz 1990.

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on:

see also:

reism

1.20, 2.5

THEORIES OF VALUES

The theories of values set out in the writings of Brentano and his disciples are to be framed, and then investigated, within the philosophical movement generated by the affirmation of axiological issues at the end of the last century. These issues also rose to prominence as a result of Lotzean research, and they freed the theory of values from its subordination to normative ethics, rendering it a theory of the object of evaluation in general.

It is therefore necessary to conduct comparison between the theories of values of the Brentanian school and those developed by the other important Austrian school which devoted itself to the analysis of values. I refer to the current of economic thought which sprang from the teaching of Carl Menger, one of the three marginalist schools to be established after 1871. There are many reasons why a comparative survey of this kind is necessary. Historically, the members of these two schools in the theory of values knew, appreciated and probably influenced each other (how and to what extent is the subject of my analysis). We must also bear in mind that interchange between the philosophical and economic approaches was of decisive importance within the context of the new axiological point of view. It produced a fruitful collaboration between philosophers and economists which gave a powerful impulse to both lines of inquiry. Moreover, comparison between the two Austrian schools brings the heuristic capacity of the theories of the Brentanian school under scrutiny while further clarifying them, and this will enable us to test their effective axiological generality. I shall accordingly seek to answer the question whether it is possible to incorporate economic issues into a general theory of values (the Brentanian theory) which also deals with ethical values, aesthetic

values, and so on.¹ Should this prove possible without too many problems of 'fit', the Austrian theory of economic value can be placed at the centre of a fertile network of cross-references with other axiological disciplines (psychology, law, aesthetics, etc.), and the Brentanian theory of values will have entirely demonstrated its generality.²

I shall use the expression *Brentanian school* in a restricted sense where it only comprises Brentano and those with whom he had a direct theoretical and personal relationship which is historically ascertainable. The studies of *disciples of disciples* are therefore not considered, which explains the presence of Ehrenfels (Meinong's follower) and Kraus (Marty's follower), among the authors examined below, and the absence of such writers as Hartmann, Scheler, Ingarden, and Kotarbiński. It is also for this reason that such authors as Calderoni, Perry, Prall, and Stevenson have been omitted: although they clearly operated within the Brentanian theoretical framework, they cannot be regarded as members of the *school* (in the institutional sense of the term) of either Brentano or one of his disciples.

1. THE TWO AUSTRIAN SCHOOLS IN THE THEORY OF VALUES

Let us consider first how Brentano's descriptive psychology addressed the question of value. What most attracted the attention of the Austrian economic school was Brentano's concept of value, not as belonging to objects, but as an inseparable moment of an individual evaluative act. Value resides in the subjective attitudes which qualify a content of presentation (*Vorstellung*) as pleasant. The link with the economic approach is evident:³ in fact, by assuming that value is a psychological entity connected with the satisfaction of subjective needs, economists abandoned the classical problem of the *substance* of value, together with the problem of the nature of the valued object. From the economic point of view, in fact, a valued object is merely a vehicle of satisfaction to which a particular emotion is tied.⁴

This conception of value can be coherently developed using the Brentanian notion of intentionality: the valued object, as valued *object*, is a real object in the world, but as *valued* object — and this is what interests economists — it is

¹ This was the explicit aim of the analysis conducted by the economist Böhm-Bawerk: see Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Book 3, ch. I, § 1.

² On this question see Eaton 1930; Grassl & Smith 1986.

³ See for example Böhm-Bawerk 1896.

⁴ See the subjectivist formulation that Menger gave to this problem in Menger 1871, ch. V, § 1, part. 103 and 108.

an in-existing intentional object (i.e. it exists only in the mind). Knowing and determining the value of an object therefore requires an evident inner experience involving an act of preference among different alternatives — what Marty called the *phenomenon of interest* — which emerges from the conative background, the Aristotelian *orexis*, of the subject's psychic life.⁵ As the *orexis* in Aristotle, this act of preference is to be subordinated to rational choice: the greater this subordination, the better the imputation of value to an object.

On these grounds is therefore difficult to deny the presence of a correlation between the Brentanians and Mengerians in their subjectivist definition of value from a psychological perspective. We must proceed with caution, however, if we are to avoid overrating the theoretical significance of this correlation. First, from a historical point of view, there is no evidence that Menger studied any of Brentano's works. So that in examining Menger's philosophical position, a careful interpreter like Johnston speaks, with some reason, of an influence which derives not from Brentano, but from the Herbartian philosopher Robert Zimmermann,⁶ whose science of forms was clearly, if not explicitly, echoed in Menger's classification of the economic sciences.⁷ Moreover, other philosophers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed a general theory of values in correspondence with the Austrian version of marginalism: suffice it to mention Croce⁸ and Simmel.⁹

According to Croce, economy is one of the four categories of the spirit. Specifically it is that practical-particular category which includes, together with economics in the strict sense, all activities directed towards practical success and technical efficacy (law, politics, experimental or deductive science proceeding by generalization). As the volition of the particular (i.e. of the *useful*) and the pursuit of interest, economy connects with the other spiritual categories, especially with the category comprising ethics (volition of the universal, pursuit of the good), i.e. the practical-universal category.

Croce thus developed an axiological generalization of the subjectivist theory of economic value. His view of utility as volition of the particular and of volition as a category of the spirit aligns with the attempt within the Brentanian school to give a philosophical basis to economic subjectivism, freeing it from any utilitarian (in a hedonistic sense) residue. What distinguished Croce from

⁵ Among economists this aspect was particularly important for F. Wieser: see for instance Wieser 1914, 13 ff.

⁶ See Johnston 1972, 80.

⁷ See below, § 5.

⁸ See Croce 1900, 15-26; 1946, 17, 23, 25, 51, 59, 96, 223 ff., 241 ff.; 1953, 201, 238 ff. See also Mossini 1959.

⁹ See Simmel 1900, chs. I and VI.

the Brentanians is that the latter's axiological generalization of subjectivism was psychological-descriptive, whereas Croce's was speculative-metaphysical.

Simmel also adopted a view of economic value that was significantly similar to that of the Brentanians. For Simmel, value was not an objective entity; it derived instead from an intrinsic relationship between a subject and an object. Values are only those properties which, under certain circumstances, are recognized by individuals as criteria for appreciation, and their cogency is given by their intersubjectivity. Here we discern the principal difference between Simmel, who adopted the relational criterion of intersubjectivity in order to justify cogency, and the Brentanians, who instead adopted the psychological, or at any rate intuitive, criterion of evidence.

The main tenets of Simmel's axiology can be summarized thus: (i) the objectivity of a value is resolved in its relationality; (ii) the apriorism of values is historically expressed and changeable; (iii) a value is a perspective standpoint generated by the impulsive action of a pre-theoretical element like interest which determines a selective attitude about the world. This attitude is essential to the existence of an individual and it is directed towards the fulfilment of both demands and needs; (iv) judgments of value originate from the collision between our desires and the probability of their achieving the objects; (v) like any other value, economic value, which is the paradigmatic instance, derives from the tension between a subjective aspect (needs and desires) and an objective one (the shortage of whatever satisfies our needs or desires).

Both Simmel and Croce, therefore, attempted to give an axiological interpretation to the defining elements of the subjective theory of economic value. This, on the one hand, confirms the widespread interest in the subject within European philosophical culture of this century; on the other, it warns against considering Brentano's attempt at axiological generalization — with the consequent foundational role assigned to psychology — as the only attempt to give coherent generalization to the subjective theory of economic value. If we consider the theories of value developed by Brentano, Meinong, Ehrenfels and Kraus in terms of their relationship with the marginalistic revolution, they become significant elements in the broader inquiry into the problem of value that typified European philosophy between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth; an inquiry which shared some of their fundamental assumptions.

This is therefore an attractive and historically interesting topic. Yet one must take care not to be carried away by enthusiasm and interpret Brentanians and Mengerians as belonging to the same school, when instead, and more simply, they shared an interest in themes which were prominent in European axiological debate. With the circumspection necessary, however, we cannot deny the

existence of a significant relationship between the economists of the Austrian school and the philosophers of the Brentanian school.

2. HISTORICAL SETTING¹⁰

Let us try to establish how and why this relationship developed. The first aspect to examine is the fact that, whereas one readily notes the influence of the economists on the philosophers (who often quoted the formers' works), it is more difficult to discern an influence of the philosophers on the economists. As for Brentano, his *influence of fellowship* on the Viennese economists can only be realistically perceived from 1874 onwards (the year of Brentano's inaugural lecture at the University of Vienna¹¹), while a direct influence is apparent between 1874 and 1894: we know, in fact, that in 1889 Brentano delivered an important lecture on the theory of values to the Wiener Juristische Gesellschaft¹². It is therefore true that the Austrian economists based their theory on psychological introspective principles, but theirs cannot be considered an attempt to apply Brentanian psychology to economics: after Menger, Austrian economists did not refer to psychology on the basis of their reading of Brentano, they instead referred to Brentano and to the Brentanians (especially as regards the theme of inner perception) on the basis of epistemological considerations that had already been developed. We may say that the leading representatives of the Austrian economic school certainly knew and appreciated the works of the main Brentanians; nevertheless, as economists, they did not concern themselves with discussion of their ideas.

Thus the connection that the Austrian economists established with Brentanian circles cannot be explained by the fact that they, on careful consideration, found Brentano's philosophy and psychology more convincing than other psychological theories.¹³ For more reliable explanation we must start, not with the peaks of conceptual debate, but with the historical reality of the institutional structure of the Austrian universities at the end of the last century. According to the organization of university studies at the time,

¹⁰ On the question see Johnston 1972.

¹¹ Menger 1871 had therefore already been published.

¹² In this period Menger 1883, Menger 1884, Menger 1888-9a, Menger 1888-9b; Böhm-Bawerk 1881, Böhm-Bawerk 1886, Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9; Wieser 1884, Wieser 1889, and some of Philippovitch's and Sax' fundamental writings were published.

¹³ Viceversa the Brentanians theorists of value referred themselves to the Austrian economists because they found their theory more convincing than the one worked out by other schools.

economics were taught in the Faculty of Law, and law students had also to attend a number of courses in the Faculty of Philosophy. The latter was a faculty traditionally anchored to a conservative Aristotelian framework, and in which psychology was now imposing itself, also as a consequence of Brentano's teaching, as the fundamental philosophical discipline.

The academic institutions of the Austrian Empire therefore furnished the concrete procedures according to which academic inquiry was conducted, and they provided the arena in which relationships between the economic theory of value and the philosophical theory inspired by Brentano could establish themselves. This does not explain the conceptual articulation of these relationships, but it nevertheless guarantees that we are looking in the right direction.

3. THE ECONOMIC SCHOOL¹⁴

As previously with the Brentanian philosophical school, I shall use the expression 'Austrian economic school' in a restricted sense to denote, together with C. Menger, the members of the so-called *second marginalist generation*, most notably E. Böhm-Bawerk and F. Wieser.¹⁵ These latter economists made a particularly forceful attempt to combine economic analysis with psychological investigation, and their relationships with the Brentanians are historically ascertainable. The exponents of the third generation (Mayer, Mises, Hayek, Morgenstern, Weiss, for example) — many of whom spent most of their academic careers outside Austria — instead directed their inquiries to other areas. Consequently in their case the connections between economics and psychology become increasingly less overt.

The Austrian school exerted considerable international influence until the beginning of the First World War. In Italy, its psychological framework aroused major interest at the end of the last century. Of the Italian economists most receptive to its theories were Montemartini, De Viti, De Marco, Pantaleoni, Graziani, Papi, Masci, Berardi. Calderoni,¹⁶ instead, devoted himself in particular to law, while Benedetto Croce tried, as we have seen, to revive the psychological school by examining its methodological and axiological implications. Thereafter, however, and despite Croce's opposition, the influence of Pareto on the Italian universities became paramount and the proponents of the psychological school were pushed to one side.

¹⁴ For the basic theoretical notions the reader is referred to the appendix.

¹⁵ As well as authors such as Sax, Zuckerkandl, Engländer, Philippovitch, Auspitz, Lieben.

¹⁶ On the relationships between Calderoni, the Austrian economic school and the Brentanian school, see Grassl 1986.

In England, interest in the Austrians was overwhelmed by Marshallian theory, despite Smart's¹⁷ efforts to the contrary. However, the presence of Hayek for a number years as a teacher at the *London School of Economics* must have had some effect, since two of his pupils, Hicks and Shackle, have been responsible for recent attempts to revive the Austrian logical framework.¹⁸

Austrian economic theory was most influential in Sweden and the U.S.A. The author who probably gave the best formulation to the Austrian doctrines of value and capital was the Swede Knut Wicksell,¹⁹ whose theories in some respects anticipated those of J.M. Keynes. At work in the United States at the end of the last century were J.B. Clark and I. Fisher; economists whose relationship with Austrian theories, although undeniable, was not particularly close. Nevertheless, Clark exerted a certain influence on the branches of the Austrian school founded by Mises and Hayek.

Historically, the Austrian theory of value belonged a tradition of thought which began with Aristotle and then passed through the scholastics' embryonic theory of value²⁰ and the formulations of certain Renaissance authors²¹. The tradition was resumed in the eighteenth century by Galiani in Italy and Cantillon in England — the latter being the first systematically to apply a deductive method in analysis of economic processes — and it culminated in the immediate precursor of the Austrian economists, H.H. Gossen.

The restriction of the Austrian school to the authors listed above may invite criticism because it excludes Mises, the economist whom many commentators contend gave best development to the Austrian logical framework. From the epistemological point of view, his exclusion is justified by the fact that the exponents of the first two generations formulated their theories to include some reference to the mental evaluative activity of economic agents: which, for me, is a circumstance of major importance.²² Mises' praxeology, by contrast, rejected any assumption concerning the psychological structures of economic agents or their motivational systems: the subject matter of economics (including the activity of the economic agent), he maintained, was merely theoretical, and not empirical-observational. Moreover, the relationships identified by economics between means (in general) and ends (in general) are of logical-formal type. Mises' praxeology was not a tool with which to interpret

¹⁷ See Smart 1891.

¹⁸ See Hicks 1970; Shackle 1972.

¹⁹ See especially Wicksell 1893.

²⁰ On this topic see Meoli 1978, chs. I and II.

²¹ Especially B. Davanzati: see Schumpeter 1954, 1086.

²² See appendix.

economic reality but a guide for the modifying action of economic policy:²³ it analysed the laws of ideal rational behaviour, whose empirical verifiability was of entirely secondary importance.

Having thus provided preliminary clarification of the subject-matter of my analysis, I may now descend into *medias res*.

4. THE PHILOSOPHICAL STANDPOINT: FRANZ BRENTANO

Brentano's theory of value is a branch of descriptive psychology which propounds an a priori theory of the acts of valuation. Of the few Brentanian texts which set out his theory of value the most important are *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis*²⁴ and the posthumously published notes for his lectures delivered between 1876 and 1894.²⁵ The methodological standpoint adopted is empirical, the assumption being that all concepts originate from *intuitive presentations*. Numerous commentators, especially neo-Kantian theorists of values, have considered this statement as asserting a form of introspectivism and as postulating a coincidence between consciousness and its own contents. This, in fact, is not the case, although the psychology of Brentano was certainly not experimental. Critical philosophy, in fact, did not accept Brentano's definition of the psychic phenomenon,²⁶ and particularly his distinction between psychic and physical phenomena. The psychic phenomenon is a tending towards an object, but, in itself, it can be an object only of an immediately evident inner perception: it is the act of presentation, not its content. We could talk of introspectionism if this distinction did not obtain; that is, if the psychic phenomenon were an object not only of inner perception, but also of inner observation, in the same way as a physical phenomenon with respect to external perception and observation. However this (and the possibility of inner observation) was explicitly ruled out by Brentano. His psychology assumed that psychic phenomena are only those presentations (in the sense of presenting rather than of presented) perceived with immediate evidence and the phenomena based on such presentations. Accordingly, we may say that the subject matter of Brentano's descriptive psychology consists of psychic phenomena in

²³ Similar ideas were also advanced by Hayek (especially in his American writings). Hayek in many respects followed the same theoretical itinerary as Mises after they had both studied under Böhm-Bawerk.

²⁴ Brentano 1889.

²⁵ Brentano 1952.

²⁶ See in particular Brentano 1874, Book 2, ch. I.

their relationship with inner perception, and therefore in their totality (because this relationship is the feature shared by all psychic phenomena).

The charge of introspectionism thus misses its mark, because it concerns instead a specific version of intuitionism which attributes the psyche with the capacity to perceive internally and evidently psychic phenomena as directed towards objects. This faculty links psychic phenomena back to the phenomena of presentation and somehow standardizes them according to particular forms which derive from the modes of intending objects (we might say that Brentanian psychology is concerned with classes, or standardizations, of psychic phenomena reduced to their essence, i.e. to their intentionality apprehended through an evident inner perception). From the standpoint of the theory of values, Brentano was therefore no more introspectivist than other intuitionists such as Moore or Prichard. The point at issue is whether and how psychic phenomena take concrete shape into intersubjective cultural forms, but this does not seem to be the question asked by those charging Brentano with introspectivism.

Let us return to Brentano's theory of values. Its specific subject matter is the third class of the mental phenomena classified by Brentano's descriptive psychology. This class comprises the emotional acts of interest, which relate to the Aristotelian problem of the *orexis* or the medieval problem of the *voluntas sive affectus*. As we know, the other two classes comprise presentations and judgments. In Brentano's classification, both judgments and interests presuppose presentations as their own subject, while it is not clear if interests *always* presuppose judgments.

The basic statements of this theory can be summarized thus:

- (i) There are two dimensions of emotion, i.e. love (positive interest) and hate (negative interest).
- (ii) Someone may desire something as an end in itself or as a means. This distinction — which provides the basis for the differentiation between a primary and an instrumental good (where the latter implies the former as its foundation) — assigns the problem of economic value to the field of inquiry into instrumental goods; a field which requires as its own basis the psychological-descriptive consideration of primary goods. Correspondingly, the judgments of instrumental value typical of economics require the *non-deniability* of judgments of non-instrumental value. These latter, although they do not pertain to economics, are to be assumed as evident principles, much like those of logic and mathematics. Brentano consequently rejected the ethical relativism characteristic, for instance, of Simmel, since relativism would be acceptable only if the realm of instrumental goods/values were not founded on the psychic realm of primary goods/values.

- (iii) Emotional acts such as interests can be distinguished, like judgments, between correct and incorrect. If I wish as an end another person's misfortune, I have an incorrect emotion. The contrary happens if I desire as an end the other person's good. Both judgments and interests respond to a Cartesian criterion of evidence; therefore the principle of contradiction is valid in both realms. In fact, we have no doubt concerning the correctness of a judgment when what is judged is transparently evident and is therefore certainly true. Likewise we have no doubt that it is correct to love something when the object of love is transparently evident in the sphere of emotion and volition, and is therefore certainly good. Subjectivism consequently does not imply arbitrariness, but attention to certain psychological or intentional standardized attitudes which can be correct or incorrect, where any judgment on primary values is always evident and hence apodictic and correct.
- (iv) The correctness or otherwise of an emotional phenomenon has the same evidence of correctness or non-correctness as an arithmetical operation. On this basis, we may define primary good/evil as that which is correct to love/hate as an end in itself. Furthermore, we may define as intrinsically better whatever it is correct to prefer as an end rather than something else. Brentano's analysis of *better* and *worse* reveals the distinctive characteristics of his theory of values because it enables us to distinguish it from the theory of judgments. Unlike the judgment, the interest admits to degrees of intensity: the adjective *good*, as opposed to *true*, is scalar or gradable. The polarity good/bad thus comprises intermediate possibilities and it does not obey — as the polarity true/false instead does — the law of the excluded middle.

The scalarity of *good* focuses our attention on the behaviour of the adjective *better* and highlights the concept of preference and the act of preferring, of which we possess direct and immediate knowledge. Brentano maintained that if something is (intrinsically) *better* than something else, then it is (always) *correct* to prefer it, and that this correctness is directly experienced by the subject who exercises this preference.²⁷

According to these four points, the Brentanian theory of value is: (a) a theory of primary value, because any act of 'valuation as a means' always entails an act of 'valuation as an end', but not the other way round; (b) an objective theory, because it requires that valuations, like judgments and beliefs, should be either correct or incorrect; (c) a non-predicative theory, because it

²⁷ This idea was later developed with reference to economic science by Kraus (see below, § 9).

interprets the terms *good*, *bad*, *better* as syncategorematic terms when they are used in connection with primary values.²⁸

In order to complete this description of Brentano's theory, we must finally examine the various forms in which the acts of interest may be present, according to their tending towards an object.

- (a) The first form concerns sensuous pleasure/displeasure; an aspect which links Brentano's theory of values to his theory of perception and its distinction between the *act* and the *object* of perception. Pleasure and pain, being *emotions*, are favourable or contrary attitudes towards particular perceptive objects, i.e. the objects of *Spürsinn* or that common sense which is able to unify visual and auditory sensations. More precisely, pleasure and pain are emotions whose object is an act of perception.
- (b) The second form concerns non-sensuous pleasure/displeasure. Here too, the difference between act and object is fundamental. Consider a judgment like 'x is (dis)pleased that *p*', which involves an inner state of evidence. In this case, it is not enough to say that the object of (dis)pleasure is *p*. For if *p* is a proposition about a particular event *f* in the world, we should also say that the object of (dis)pleasure is *f*. And this would put us in an extremely complicated situation if *f* is an *expected* fact, or if it is simply *believed* to be true. In this case, *f* would be the object of (dis)pleasure not because it is a fact of the world but because *it fulfils an expectation*. Conversely, and assuming that *f*, not *p*, is the object of (dis)pleasure, we are obliged to recognise that: (i) the expectation of (dis)pleasure tends anyway towards an *f* in the world; (ii) *f*, as object of (dis)pleasure, always appears in a context of expectations. Therefore the intentional object has a twofold nature. First, it is a psychic state (the pleasantness of *f* should it occur): because we directly and evidently know this psychic state, and not the material characteristics of *f*, we can consider the object, in its aspect of intentional psychic state (of *act*) of the subject, to be the direct object of (dis)pleasure of the subject himself. Second, the intentional object of this psychic state is a fact, which thus represents the indirect object of (dis)pleasure.²⁹
- (c) The third form consists of the desire/aversion duality. In this case, the two psychic acts (desiring and being averse) cannot be separated. I desire something only when I am in a state of aversion towards some current perception of non-enjoyment. The object of desire is the means whereby the perception constituting the object of aversion can be removed. Among the various meanings given to interest by Brentano, it is principally this

²⁸ See Kraus 1937, 171-2.

²⁹ See Chisholm 1986, 187-9.

latter one — or some analogous connection between interest and desire — that appears in the writings of the Austrian economists, also as a result of Ehrenfels' influence. The distinction between sensuous and non-sensuous interest, with its linking theme of expectation and the involvement, in support of emotion, of the judgment and the capacity of representation, can be usefully employed in interpretation of Böhm-Bawerk's theory of interest — which, of all the *technical* issues addressed by the Austrian economists, is probably the one that most closely relates to psychological inquiry.

5. THE ECONOMIC APPROACH: CARL Menger

In his *Grundsätze*, Menger emphasised two aspects of economics: a subjective aspect which focuses on the individual action of a subject who uses his goods and resources in order to satisfy his needs to the fullest extent possible; and an objective aspect which addresses the totality of available goods and resources.³⁰ These two aspects are not symmetrical: Menger in fact stressed that “from the *objective* point of view economics is the totality of both goods and work (one's own or someone else's) which one or more people possess or think they will possess, according to the natural or legal conditions in which they are, so as to achieve, following certain dispositions, the satisfaction of their own needs”.³¹ Thus in the real economic system, *sinolus* of the subjective and objective aspect, it is the former, and as a consequence the behaviour of an agent, which imposes its perspective and orientation on the whole of economic science. The methodological implications of this orientation were developed in the *Untersuchungen* (1883), where Menger declared that economics must adopt the abstract approach. Its subject matter, he maintained, is not concrete phenomena located in space and time — which are instead the object of individual knowledge — but the form (the type) assumed by phenomena recurring in different times and spaces, and their reciprocal recurrent relationships. Hence there are at least two forms of economic knowledge: theoretical-formal knowledge and individual knowledge. The range of economic enquiry therefore comprises: (a) economic history and statistics, on which individual knowledge of phenomena depends; (b) theoretical economics, whose subject matter is the general form of phenomena; (c) applied economics, which deals with the operational criteria of agents under general and changing conditions.³² Menger

³⁰ See Menger 1871, 59-64.

³¹ Menger 1871, 60.

³² See Menger 1883, Book 1, ch. 1, concerning the various aspects of research in the field of national economy.

was principally interested in theoretical economics, a discipline which comes naturally close to psychological inquiry because it investigates the subjective aspect of real economic systems. The basic premise is that a real economic system, as the subject matter of a theory (and not of history or statistics), presupposes a *conscious* behaviour or attitude in the economic agent.³³ This premise has a degree of intuitive validity analogous to that of mathematical propositions. Consequently, the postulates and fundamental categories of theoretical economics must be provided with intuitive evidence so that economics can become a completely aprioristic discipline. Menger thus envisages a methodological apriorism according to which types are intelligible in evident manner to anyone familiar with their real instances (historical phenomena) and able to exploit this familiarity to lay the basis for a coherent theory. In general, we may say that the task of economic laws is to state the structural connections between the world of existing objects (goods) and the complexions among these objects produced by the subject, who therefore exercises a preference among different but related objects.³⁴ Thus economic laws are (a priori non-tautological) propositions which tell us something about the world by virtue of our familiarity with it and of the evidence in the presentation of some of its facts.³⁵

B. Smith³⁶ has recently insisted on the methodological value of this apriorism: in his opinion, the methodology underlying Menger's approach is based on a theory of part/whole relationships which is very similar to Husserl's. In general, Menger, with his methodological apriorism, sought to conduct the same descriptive operation in economics that Brentano had accomplished in psychology; a parallelism which may have originated from an epistemological reference to Aristotle which was common to both Menger and Brentano.³⁷

The first feature of Mengerian methodological apriorism is its adoption of a compositive method: economic phenomena are combined into structured wholes — types — the elements of which are reciprocally interdependent, and on the basis of which laws are formulated. This aggregate must underlie, more than the presence of some objects rather than others, the presence of an appropriate intention towards those objects and of an appropriate tendency

³³ See Menger 1871, 60-2.

³⁴ See Jaffe 1965, v. II, 3.

³⁵ A conception which considers economic laws to be non-representative, except for a revocable convention, of economic phenomena rejects this theme of *familiarity* and affirms that economic laws do not make any substantial contribution to knowledge about the economic world. This was the conclusion reached by Mises in 1949.

³⁶ Smith 1986.

³⁷ See Menger 1883, Appendix 7, in which he examines the relationship between the individual and the state in Aristotle. On this topic see also Kraus 1905a, Kraus 1905b, Kraus 1937, Kauder 1953, Kauder 1957.

towards the realization of what is intended: goods, in this sense, are goods (i.e. they possess an economic value) only in the presence of an appropriate evaluative act, which in turn depends upon individuals' subjective intentions and beliefs. This is the methodological basis for the central importance of demand in the world envisaged by Menger and his disciples.

In order to function as a component of an aprioristic methodology, the compositive method must then be correlated with a causal-genetic method of explanation, which assumes that types and typical relations are the logical origins or essences of phenomena, and that phenomena are instances of types. Explanation of a certain phenomenon therefore starts with the typological description of a pure situation in which it is not present in order to deduce the appearance of the phenomenon itself and, as a consequence, its typical characteristics.³⁸ Hence, for example, the value of goods should be explained starting from conditions in which there is no value, but only simple acts of valuation.

Value is therefore a problem for theoretical economics which has to do with the forms and the laws, the types and the typical relations of economic phenomena in their non-arbitrary subjective aspect.³⁹ It is a phenomonic form which is regularly present, objectified in certain goods, in the succession of economic phenomena. For a brief technical definition of the concepts of value, goods and needs, the reader is referred to the appendix. What I wish to stress here is that the causal relationship identified by Menger between needs and goods induced him to draw up a classification of needs (and their corresponding goods) which was identical to Brentano's classification of values, in that Menger based his classification on the differing importance of goods for individuals and according to different needs (individual maps of utility). There are therefore needs which are primary, unitary and without shares to which one should renounce (they thus relate to primary goods, and by this intention primary values are generated) and instrumental needs which can be compared with each other and which are saturable at different levels (they thus relate to instrumental goods, and by this intention instrumental values are generated). Also Menger addresses the question of economic value with reference to the latter type of needs and their degree of satisfaction.⁴⁰ It is here that the principle of marginal utility finds its origin and function.

The distinction between primary and instrumental needs — and the related problem of the *psychological status* of utility maps (which must, in fact, be known to the person, since otherwise s/he would be unable to make any correct

³⁸ See Menger 1883, e.g. book 1, ch. 2, concerning the errors which result from failure to recognize the formal nature of theoretical economics.

³⁹ See Menger 1871, 107.

⁴⁰ Menger 1871, 105.

valuation) highlights two interesting points of 'cross-pollination' between the philosophical and economic approaches which will become evident in the following examination of the theories of Meinong, Ehrenfels and Wieser.

6. ATTEMPT AT A SYNTHESIS — 1: ALEXIUS MEINONG

The most interesting theory of values produced by Brentano's disciples is probably Meinong's and his endeavour to combine the parallelisms between Brentanism and economic theory by investigating whether psychology could not only provide an explanation for economic behaviour but also, indeed, constitute the foundation of all economics.

In 1872-3 Meinong regularly attended Menger's lectures and subsequently declared that they had provided him with his first stimulus to elaborate a theory of value, on which Brentano's lesson (after 1875) will graft.⁴¹ Meinong's interest in the psychological foundation of value theory can already be discerned in his Vienna lectures of 1884-5, published in 1894, and on which Menger's influence is evident.⁴² However, Meinong only gave thorough formulation to his theory of value in *Über emotionale Präsentation*;⁴³ a work in which his *Gegenstandstheorie* is fully operational. Finally, in his last unfinished work,⁴⁴ which was originally regarded as an *ersatz* version of the *Untersuchungen*, Meinong tried to found a general doctrine of value on the objectivist ontological framework developed in his *Gegenstandstheorie* and stressing the predominance of the objective aspect of value over the subjective one. Thus, after 1894, Meinong's *Gegenstandstheorie* induced him to distance himself from the subjectivist doctrines of the Austrian economists.

However, if we set aside the evolution of Meinong's theory of value for the moment, and seek to identify the constant aspects of his theory, we may say that the constituent elements of values are: (i) the *object*, i.e. whatever has a certain value and without which no value can be given; (ii) the *subject*, i.e. the individual who, on the basis of his own dispositions, evaluates and whose presence is necessary; (iii) the *magnitude*, i.e. the aspect by means of which different values can be compared according to a plus or a minus and which thus enables preferences to be expressed. This is probably the most delicate point in Meinong's theory and in addressing it one must necessarily refer to the evolution of Meinong's thought: (iii*) in the *Untersuchungen* Meinong

⁴¹ See Meinong 1968-78, VIII, 5.

⁴² Meinong 1894 (now in Meinong 1968-78, III, 1-244).

⁴³ Meinong 1917 (now in Meinong 1969-78, III, 283-476).

⁴⁴ Meinong 1923 (now in Meinong 1968-78, III, 469-656).

considered the magnitude of value to be a function of the intensity of the corresponding evaluative feeling,⁴⁵ by which he meant that corresponding to an increase in intensity should be an increase in magnitude. We know, moreover, that at this stage of the development of his theory Meinong's interest was directed towards definition in general terms of the concept of value derived from economics: hence, following the economists' manner of dealing with the matter, he considered the magnitude of the value of an object to be inversely proportional to its replaceability;⁴⁶ (iii**) in "Über Werthaltung und Wert"⁴⁷ his position changed: evaluative feeling and value are two *continua*, the natures of which are too different for a biunivocal correspondence to be established between them. This happens particularly because some elements such as custom, habit, can intervene in the value feeling, modifying our disposition towards our object, and thus the intensity of feeling. As a consequence, we may conclude that the magnitude of value depends not only on the intensity of the valuation of the existence of a (habitually) present object, but also on the intensity of the determination of a disvalue by the non-existence of the object. Meinong progressively strengthened this distinction until the *Grundlegung*.

The three constitutive elements of a value are based on the assumption that the foundations of value theory (also economic) are not the subject matter of economics, but of psychology. This idea was also shared by Böhm-Bawerk, in whose opinion psychological factors are the *operational causes* of economic life. Which is why theoretical economics should concern itself with psychological factors, rather than with experience and factual observation.⁴⁸ Consequently, value cannot be explained by means of concepts like utility, need, cost, labour and so on, because these concepts already presuppose value.⁴⁹ Also this assumption was progressively strengthened by Meinong as he accentuated his objectivistic ontological framework. In his later thought, he stressed that economic value only concerns that human activity known as economic activity:⁵⁰ economic values are derived values⁵¹ and they relate to the personal (subjective) aspect of value, which varies with variations in the state of the evaluating subject and is thus to be methodologically distinguished from the impersonal (objective) aspect, i.e. from what persists in the valued object.⁵²

⁴⁵ See Meinong 1894, 74.

⁴⁶ Meinong 1894, 7. For more specifications see Appendix.

⁴⁷ Meinong 1895.

⁴⁸ See Böhm-Bawerk 1896.

⁴⁹ See Meinong 1894, 3-4.

⁵⁰ *Wirtschaftlich*. See Meinong 1923, 7.

⁵¹ Meinong 1923, 7 ff.

⁵² Here too one notes a correspondence between Meinong's and Böhm-Bawerk's thought: see for example Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Book 3, ch. I, § 1.

This reference to personality, however, should not induce us to identify value with the satisfaction of needs, otherwise everything which enables us to recover from disease would be a value; and this would absurdly exclude as without value everything we need and already possess or which is already present. Need is simply a particular aspect of value which implies a more general aspect: namely the utility of whatever possesses value.⁵³

But neither is the identification of value with utility legitimate. In fact, utility, defined non-hedonistically, always implies reference to an experience of value which establishes the criterion according to which the utility or otherwise of a situation is identifiable⁵⁴. This experience involves a relationship without intellectual mediation between the subject and the value object.⁵⁵ It is an elementary *Erlebnis*, characterized by immediate evidence, whose modes of manifestation are to be clarified and analysed by theoretical reflection. Meinong calls this *emotional presentation*, a form which is not reducible to the cognitive presentation (*intellektuelle Präsentation*) and which is able to arouse the feelings and desires by which we characterize the objects presented to us in an ethical or aesthetic sense.⁵⁶

According to Meinong, the basic experiences of value, i.e. the most significant aspect of the emotional presentation, and of value as a whole, are feelings. As we have seen, these are the basis of both desires and needs (and not the opposite); that is, they constitute their logical precedent,⁵⁷ which means that valuation is a *feeling*⁵⁸ before it is a desire.

It might be thought that things, because of their existence, arouse this feeling by virtue of a causal relationship. But this type of relationship cannot be decisive, as for the valuation of non-existing things.⁵⁹ Indeed, the relationship between the value object and the value feeling, in which the object is present emotionally, is that of judgment, a knowledge of the object as object of valuation. By virtue of this correlation, the judgment of value exhibits a double relation: on the one hand it depends on the evaluating subject; on the other, it depends on an objective element endowed with certain qualities and able to impose itself on the evaluating subject. The qualities of the object are independent of any psychic act, but the object itself is not a value object if a subject in whose sentimental life the object acquires importance does not exist.⁶⁰ Value can thus

⁵³ See Meinong 1923, 19.

⁵⁴ See Meinong 1894, 10-3.

⁵⁵ Meinong 1894, 14-5.

⁵⁶ See Meinong 1917, 32-3.

⁵⁷ See Meinong 1923, 19.

⁵⁸ *Gefühl*. See Meinong 1894, 15-6.

⁵⁹ Meinong 1894, 17.

⁶⁰ Meinong 1894, § 10.

only become *value for us* within a sentimental subjective experience, but it imposes itself as a quality of objects, one able to persist even if we have no experience of it: it is a potentiality of the object (its valuability), which becomes real only when it is placed in relation to an effectively evaluating subject.⁶¹

In general, though not always, feelings therefore presuppose judgments. Such judgments/presuppositions, however, do not always stand in the same relationship to their corresponding feelings. There are *main judgments* (*Haupturteilen*), which affirm the existence or the presence of something which cannot be absent in the valuation, and *concomitant judgments* (*Nebenurteilen*), which affirm some characteristics of what is affirmed in a main judgment. It is the main judgment which provides the linkage between the value feeling and the value object,⁶² and this clarifies how, in Meinong's opinion, a value judgment is a *judgment of existence*.

If judgments are presupposed, a feeling is the presentation of an object so that we can retrieve from it something more than what is retrievable in an intellectual apprehension. This means that the object bearing a value (the objective object) must be intellectually grasped, and it is to be distinguished from the actual object of the value feeling (the content). This distinction, which is reminiscent of Twardowski's distinction between object and content, provided Meinong with his starting point in development of his own objectivist theory of values. Although the content, in fact, is mentalistic in nature, the objective object exists, or can exist, independently of the thinking and judging subject, and only the main judgments of value can refer to it. The content is related to the objective object by a relation of representation which is guaranteed not by some resemblance, but by a logical symmetry, i.e. an equal possibility of variation between objective object and content.

The difference between the content and the objective object — which introduces the relationship between the subjective and the objective aspect of value — connects with the difference between valuation and value⁶³, where the former is a psychic fact and the latter a quality of something real. We find here one of the central themes of Brentanian theories of value: the connection between value and valuation when they occur.⁶⁴ As a durable quality of a thing, a value is independent of the actual evaluation of the subject. On the other hand, a value feeling too can occur without value if a totally absent object is valued (this is the case of counterfactual evaluations). In order to solve the question, we must first distinguish between true and fictitious values. This distinction, like that between true and false, relates back to judgments/presup-

⁶¹ See Meinong 1923, 31-65.

⁶² See Meinong 1894, 21. For the entire discussion on this topic, see 14-35.

⁶³ See Meinong 1923, 31-65.

⁶⁴ This theme is well developed in Meinong 1917.

positions. As in the case of main judgments/presuppositions, their truthfulness — that is *the fact* of the existence or non-existence of an object — cannot be doubted. According to this evidential criterion, the value that a main judgment attributes as a quality to an object of valuation is always true. If under hypnosis I enjoy drinking a glass of vinegar because it tastes like champagne, the error does not stem from the existence of an object that gives me enjoyment, but from some qualities that are assigned to it; it therefore lies not in the main judgment but in the concomitant ones. The more complicated and numerous the concomitant judgments, the greater the possibility of error.⁶⁵ Briefly, Meinong's thesis concerning valuations directed towards something real is that if there are false judgments/presuppositions, valuation reveals a purely subjective value, otherwise it reveals both a subjective and objective value. Therefore valuation *is constitutive of purely subjective, or fictitious, value*.

The objective objects of experiences of values thus have an existence which goes beyond the acts of feeling and desire directed towards them. On this basis, assuming the axiological inadequacy of the subjective theory of value/utility, and correlating evaluative propositions with factual ones (both are founded on the presentation of an object),⁶⁶ Meinong organized his epistemological objectivism in the domain of the values theory radicalized by Mally with his thesis that we possess a *knowledge by acquaintance* of values without the intercession of representative entities.⁶⁷ This thesis is attended by the predominance — in the experience of value — of the emotional over the intellectual, and it is therefore to be understood as a development, in an objectivistic and anti-psychologistic sense, of Meinong's theory of emotional presentation.

7. ATTEMPT AT A SYNTHESIS — 2: CHRISTIAN VON EHRENFELS

Ehrenfels' encounter with economic thought and his effort to conjugate economics, psychology and a philosophical theory of values was not a direct approach to Brentano's and Menger's doctrines, but acceptance of Meinong's theory as formulated in 1894: the elaboration of an economic value theory as a special branch of a general value theory founded on the psychology of feeling and desire. Ehrenfels was already moving in this direction in his *Habilitations-schrift*,⁶⁸ but he set out the fundamental features of his value theory between

⁶⁵ See Meinong 1894, 75-81.

⁶⁶ See Meinong 1923, 634.

⁶⁷ See Mally 1926.

⁶⁸ Ehrenfels 1887.

1891 and 1898.⁶⁹ He later returned to the problem in 1907,⁷⁰ within the context of a rather unusual evolution in his ideas.

Ehrenfels' position is rigorously subjectivistic and asserts the priority of the personal aspect of value over the impersonal one. Value is a characteristic relationship between an object and a subject which *becomes manifest either in an effective desire* or, if the subject is not convinced of the existence of the object, in a virtual one.⁷¹ Any experience of value therefore implies a desire: and it is here that we discern the divergences between Meinong's and Ehrenfels' theories.

The conflict between Meinong and Ehrenfels centred on the Brentanian fusion between the affective (feeling) and the conative (desire) aspects of the experience of value. We know that already in 1894 Meinong placed feelings, instead of desires (which are too specific in that they relate only to the future), among the fundamental experiences of value. Ehrenfels' contrary thesis was that if objects are valued according to the feelings they arouse, non-existing objects cannot be valued. In partially accepting this observation, Meinong formulated his idea in a counterfactual way: when we evaluate the (absent) things that we desire, we consider them in terms of the feeling that they would arouse if they really existed. But in his *System* Ehrenfels, too, under the influence of his teacher, was induced to formulate his idea (that the object is valued insofar as it is desired) in a counterfactual manner (the object is valued insofar as it would be desirable if it really did not exist).

The relevance of this debate becomes clearer if we place it in relation to Böhm-Bawerk's approach to the problem of valuation of objects which do not presently exist. Broadly speaking, the problem is whether we desire something because we value it (Meinong) or whether we value something because we desire it (Ehrenfels). The answer provided by Böhm-Bawerk's theory of capital comes closer to Ehrenfels' than to Meinong's position, and emphasises Böhm-Bawerk's psychological theory founded on the centrality of a particular mental act which consists in the cognitive anticipation of the characteristics and intensity of future emotions. This mental act is an essential part of the individual's decision to invest capital and thereby to accept future remuneration in place of present remuneration.⁷² Valuation is a judgment which asserts that the existence/possession of goods *recognized to be* both useful and scarce affords a present *or future* advantage to the subject.

⁶⁹ The starting point was a series of lectures delivered in 1891 at the University of Vienna, published as a series of articles. See Ehrenfels 1893-4 and Ehrenfels 1897-8, both republished in Ehrenfels 1983.

⁷⁰ Ehrenfels 1907.

⁷¹ See Ehrenfels 1897-8, Book 1, 65.

⁷² See Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Book 4, ch. 1.

By founding value on desire, Ehrenfels placed desire in close relation to the economic notion of utility, defined as the capacity to satisfy needs. He was thus able to employ — more than Meinong — the economic concept of marginal utility as the basis for a general theory of value. By linking desire and marginal utility, Ehrenfels thought that he could also arrive at a quantitative determination of value by means of a special *law of the relative enhancement of happiness*.⁷³ According to this law, if the actual occurrence of striving increases the state of happiness in comparison with non-striving, the striving can be quantitatively determined as the difference between the two states of happiness.

However, this alleged centrality of desire does not answer Meinong's question of the relationship between feeling and desire, which is to be understood in psychological terms. On considering this statement in the first volume of his *System*, Ehrenfels defined feeling as whatever induces a desire and determines its intensity and direction, so that any change of value gives rise to a change in the disposition of feeling corresponding to it. Ehrenfels then went on to investigate the psychological causes of, and influences on, the formation of values and of change in them. He substantially assumed the concept of value proposed by Böhm-Bawerk: namely that value is what renders goods functional to individual welfare, and it is to be determined according to the intensity of the feeling of (dis)pleasure that accompanies its consumption or absence.⁷⁴ To be stressed here is the correlation between Ehrenfels' generalization in an axiological sense of Böhm-Bawerk's concept of value, and Böhm-Bawerk's psychology-based answer to the question of the magnitude of value.

This is not the sole point of contact between the thought of Ehrenfels and Böhm-Bawerk. There is another which concerns the way in which — again through the utility/desire connection — the distinction between primary and instrumental goods is explained. In *Kapital und Kapitalzins* this distinction is applied to the problem of the time of production in order to justify the existence of capital as an independent factor of production. In Böhm-Bawerk's account,⁷⁵ capitalist production is nothing but production which follows 'indirect' processes. It is a form of production which involves numerous intermediate steps before 'first class' consumer goods are obtained; and as such it must pass through temporal stages. Capital is simply the totality of the intermediate products created at each stage of the indirect process. In other words, it is the manifestation of the role of time lapse in the productive process.

This temporal delay in the satisfaction of needs which stems from the choice of the indirect process implies the subordination of immediate values to mediate ones, of present goods to future ones, even if generally present goods

⁷³ See Fabian & Simons 1986, 73.

⁷⁴ See notes 1 and 42; moreover Böhm-Bawerk 1885, 19.

⁷⁵ Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Book 1, ch. II.

have a subjective value, and therefore an objective exchange-value and a price, higher than those of future goods of equal type and quantity.⁷⁶ Interest is the return on a reversal of the choices between present and future in order to achieve greater efficiency of production from the entrepreneur's point of view, or better consumption capacity from the saver's point of view. This reversal of choice also involves a reversal of the psychological causes which compel us to set more value on present goods (nearer to enjoyment) than on future ones. Considering the former as the object of sensuous interest and the latter as the object of non-sensuous interest, we may identify the presence of Brentanian values theory in the Böhm-Bawerkian theory of interest.⁷⁷ Moreover, since the temporal gap between immediate and deferred consumption is longer, and the required effort is higher, we can also connect Böhm-Bawerk's theory of interest as a return on capital to Ehrenfels' law of relative enhancement of happiness, and consequently consider interest to be the quantitative determination of the intensity of a striving. Ehrenfels' axiological synthesis thus links with Böhm-Bawerk's theory of interest.

8. DEVELOPMENTS IN ECONOMICS — 1: EUGEN VON BÖHM-BAWERK

Böhm-Bawerk addressed three issues in particular: (a) criticism of the labour theory of value; (b) his theory of the average period of production which, framed in a subjective value theory by (c) his theory of interest, gives rise to a model of economic processes founded on the generalization of the principle of marginal valuation and called 'Austrian theory of capital'.

The essential aim of his model is to conduct analysis of capital independently of analysis of distribution: an independence which is necessary for the causal-genetic method, more than being a device to avoid circularity of reasoning. If, in fact, distribution implies a fixed system of values (in terms of retribution and exchange-value), the indirect process of production, which helps to determine this system, is logically antecedent to it, and therefore involves *only* acts of direct valuation of goods and of compared valuation between goods at hand and future ones.

Böhm-Bawerk's theory is that capital can be reduced to the totality of the original resources, labour and land, used at different times to produce the means of production by which capital is represented.⁷⁸ Production may thus be called capitalist because a proportion of available labour and land is devoted

⁷⁶ Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Book 4, ch. II.

⁷⁷ See above, § 4.

⁷⁸ See Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Book 3, ch. I, § 2.

not to the direct production of consumer goods but to production of the means of production. We thus obtain a representation of the 'degree of capitalism' in an economic system by weighing the quantities of labour embodied in capital goods against their periods of allocation: Böhm-Bawerk called this measure of existing capital the *average period of production*.⁷⁹ Since capital is the totality of intermediate products produced at each stage of the long indirect process,⁸⁰ it is twofold in nature: it represents a physical fact as well as a relationship; it is both the available capital stock *and* a factor of production. But as a *factor of production* capital can only represent a technical relationship which is impossible to postulate as known, because if it were really known, it would be measurable, and if it were measurable it would require the intervention of a measure of value, i.e. a single rate of production for all capital goods. But if such intervention actually took place, then capital, as a factor of production, could not be taken as given according to the system of values and retributions that it should actually help to determine. Wicksell sought to solve the problem by considering capital only in the first form, thus inviting the Cambridge school's criticism that, since the global value of capital changes with variation in the distributive shares, it cannot determine them in its turn: a criticism which, even at its highest technical level, has axiological implications for the priority assigned to the valuation on value (personal or impersonal) in the theory of capital and distribution.⁸¹

This is not the only problem: if the structure of capital is a physical fact, as Wicksell stressed, it must be understood both as a physically homogeneous factor, whose elements differ only in temporal terms, and as a factor whose products must be all of the same kind, or quality, and which differ only quantitatively. Here we have an illustration of reality which cannot be utilized⁸² and, moreover, if it is impossible to measure capital independently of distribution, the same applies to capital as a homogeneous entity.

However, we may leave this problem aside for the moment, and consider Böhm-Bawerk's fundamental assumption that *capital is time*. The importance of time in Böhm-Bawerk's theory of capital stems from its role in explanation of the origin of interest; an explanation which rests on the different valuation of present and future goods. This phenomenon Böhm-Bawerk explained on the basis of three causes: two of which were psychological (superevaluation of present goods; subevaluation of future goods because of a scarcity of imagination and will) and one cause which was technical (present goods allow capitalist production to be undertaken and therefore yield more consumer goods).

⁷⁹ Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Book 2, ch. I.

⁸⁰ Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Book 1, ch. II.

⁸¹ The most stringent criticism was probably Sraffa 1960, but see also Garegnani 1960, 123-85. For a historical and technical reconstruction of the debate, see Harcourt 1972.

⁸² See Schumpeter 1954, 909.

Böhm-Bawerk's analysis was taken up by Wicksell, although he simplified it considerably by eliminating the two psychological causes and only maintaining the technical one. In doing so, however, he also removed an important component of Böhm-Bawerk's theory, namely its assumption of uncertainty as a source of profits.

Fisher's theory of interest theory also drew directly on Böhm-Bawerk's analysis. Compared with Wicksell, however, Fisher simplified Böhm-Bawerk's account by taking its second psychological cause, which he defined as *impatience*,⁸³ to be the fundamental cause of interest. It is impatience which induces every individual to evaluate present goods in comparison to future ones by means of a rate of temporal preference whose level depends mainly on the size of income and on its distribution in time.

Böhm-Bawerk's interest theory therefore did not give rise to univocal effects. If we want to maintain the centrality of the psychological explanation, and hence the correlation between Böhm-Bawerk's theory and Ehrenfels' generalization, we should start with analysis of the axiological implications of Fisher's formulation, bearing in mind that Fisher's reference psychological theory seems to be James's rather than Brentano's. Thus, however, a theory of capital which seems hard to accept is truncated, and with it the idea that a psychological value theory founded on the centrality of desire and need can be used to build a model of economic processes comprising the quantity of available resources, production techniques, the structure of consumer needs, and the initial distribution of resources. The results are, instead, the system of exchange-values (*simultaneously* with the returns on resources), the amount of resources used to produce consumer goods, and the amount of these goods produced and exchanged.

9. ATTEMPT AT A SYNTHESIS — 3: OSKAR KRAUS

The third scholar to have devoted himself to unifying the theories of the two axiological schools was Oskar Kraus.

A pupil of Marty and Wieser in Prague, Kraus was younger than Ehrenfels by thirteen years and nineteen years younger than Meinong. He had therefore been active since 1894, and was working at a time when the schools based on Brentano's teaching on the one hand, and Menger's on the other, had become internationally established. Moreover, Kraus's teachers were among those principally responsible for the spread and development of Brentano's thought

⁸³ See Fisher 1930 (for ex. 62).

(Marty) and of Menger's thought (Wieser). For this reason, Kraus was probably more insistent than his colleagues in Graz on Brentanian orthodoxy.

A further difference between Kraus and Meinong (and Ehrenfels too) was that his interest was directed less towards establishing a possible psychological foundation for economics (which was nevertheless an important goal) than towards clarification of the methodological aspects of economics which, in Kraus's opinion, stemmed from a tradition that began with Aristotle and culminated in Brentano.

Kraus's interest in the history and methodology of economic theories was already evident in his *Habilitationsschrift*,⁸⁴ and some years previously in a text which identified the basic elements of the new economic theory in Menger's concept of marginal utility. It was this concept that enabled economists to introduce the methods of descriptive psychology (although Kraus criticised Menger for the inadequacy of his reference psychology) into their science.⁸⁵ Kraus's thesis was that economic value is instrumental. This in itself was not new, but the novel feature of his theory was that preference (insofar as the concept was developed by Brentano's descriptive psychology), and not utility, was the foundation of economic value. Scarcity and utility were in fact not adequate explanations of value because they did not imply an advantage or a disadvantage of a hypothetical loss; this was instead implied by the concept of preference to which they lead. From an economic point of view, evaluation of goods involves a judgment that we cannot forgo them without disadvantages.

One of the most interesting aspects of this criticism of the concept of marginal utility is that it links with Fisher's reformulation of Böhm-Bawerk's interest theory, and with the Fisherian abandonment of the principle of utility in favour of the principle of preference. From this point of view Kraus's theory provides a good basis for analysis of the axiological implications of Fisher's formulation outlined above.

Kraus's ideas were taken seriously by Böhm-Bawerk, who explicitly referred to them in the third edition of *Positive Theorie des Kapitals*, and above all by Engländer, who was the Austrian economist perhaps most sensitive to the influence of the Brentanian philosophical school. It is worth pausing for a moment to consider Engländer. As a lecturer in Prague and a disciple of Wieser and Zuckerkandl, Engländer was strongly influenced by Marty's works. He sought to employ Brentano's psychology in economic inquiry, on the principle that many of the basic concepts of economics are psychological in nature. This did not mean that Engländer believed that economics was applied psychology, as Wieser maintained, only that psychology was an indi-

⁸⁴ Kraus 1901.

⁸⁵ Kraus 1894.

spensable auxiliary science for economics: a discipline able to explain the motivations that determine the essence of value in a real economic system. From an economic point of view, Engländer's investigation of prices and of their relationship with values is particularly interesting, although I shall here restrict discussion to only one of his theses. Contrary to Wieser, Engländer drew a sharp distinction between subjective values and prices, whether these are the effective prices of goods or the prices deemed appropriate to pay for them. This indicates that, in this field, adoption of a Brentanian axiological framework does not predetermine any technical result in the economic theory of values.⁸⁶

In 1905 Kraus published his two historical studies of Aristotle in which he emphasised the Aristotelian derivation of Menger's method by juxtaposing Böhm-Bawerk with Aristotle's practical science. For Kraus, Aristotelianism was the element that differentiated between the Austrian marginalist school and the English and Lausanne schools. In particular, the well known distinction between primary and instrumental goods is Aristotelian: the former generate ethical or aesthetic valuations, the latter practical valuations (including economic ones). Also Aristotelian is the distinction between the use-value and the exchange-value of instrumental goods, with the priority given to the former over the latter. Hence Kraus regarded Aristotle as the precursor both of the value theory based on the marginal utility of goods and of the principle that goods are valuable only if they are scarce.

Between 1908 and 1914 Kraus published "Zur Lehre von den Bedürfnissen", a monograph on Gossen, and "Die Grundlagen der Werttheorie".⁸⁷ In these works Kraus, displaying complete Brentanian orthodoxy, argued for the dependence of judgments of value on emotional valuations. But the priority of valuation over value has a broader meaning here than a simple repetition of Brentanian orthodoxy: it is, in fact, taken to be the decisive *trait-d'union* between the philosophical and the economic approaches, especially in the light of the results set out in Wieser's first book.⁸⁸

Wieser's text is of considerable interest since, according to its date of publication, it is the first systematic attempt by an Austrian economist (five years before publication of Brentano's book on values) to provide conceptual clarification of the subjective theory of value.

Wieser analyses the connection between the value of goods, subjective estimates of value, and the satisfaction of needs. He concludes that value is founded on the subjective interest that *homo economicus* directs towards the goods he considers useful and important for the satisfaction of his needs. The basic thesis is that exchange-value theory is to be derived from a price theory

⁸⁶ See Engländer 1919. On his personality, see Fabian & Simons 1986, 86-8.

⁸⁷ Kraus 1908, 1910 and 1914.

⁸⁸ Wieser 1884.

concerning individual exchanges or barter, i.e. from the natural value theory, the role of which is to clarify *in vitro* the presence and the function of a subjective valuation in the behaviour of the economic agent. Thus Wieser sought to be coherent with the principle that an economic value theory must contain *an adequate theory of the act of valuation*.

As technical instruments for construction of this theory Wieser elaborated the concepts of imputation and complementarity. Whereas, according to Menger, the value of instrumental (productive) goods is determined by that of the consumer goods they produce (which raises numerous problems of superevaluation in the case of complementarity between different instrumental goods), Wieser maintained that instrumental goods derive their value from produced consumer goods. However, since instrumental goods may produce consumer goods with different marginal utilities, the final degree of utility⁸⁹ of instrumental goods is to be determined on the basis of the final degree of utility of the consumer goods belonging, as a result, to the genetic group of the instrumental goods that produce them in the smallest quantity. The marginal utility of the marginal product determines, therefore, the value of instrumental goods according to their productive contribution. 'Imputation' is this derivation of the values of instrumental goods from the values of consumer goods. It is not therefore the value of costs that determines value/utility, as in Menger, but utility, which *in itself* determines the value of costs.⁹⁰

The idea shared by both Wieser and Kraus is therefore that valuation constitutes the essence of economic value and that it is represented by certain mental relationships between the subject and economic goods: this is why we can define the doctrine of value as an applied psychology.⁹¹ The corollary to this thesis is that an economist can discover the essence of the phenomenon of value only if he is familiar with everyday practical economics, i.e. if he has *an evident inner experience* of whatever characterizes a fact as economic. It is not clear whether Wieser was thinking of an inner observation or of an inner perception (to tell the truth, it is not clear whether Wieser considered this distinction at all). However, this aspect of Wieser's epistemological framework, be it classifiable as introspectionism or not, is a crucial component of his epistemology, with all the problems that derive from it: namely the criteria with which to establish the intersubjective reliability of judgments occurring in economic theories.

It is not difficult to find analogous, though more sophisticated, positions set out in Kraus's theoretical *summa* of the issue.⁹² Kraus claimed that the objects

⁸⁹ That is the utility function.

⁹⁰ A similar solution is set out in Böhm-Bawerk 1884-9, Excursus VII.

⁹¹ Wieser 1884, 39.

⁹² Kraus 1937.

of value are only the objects of preference feelings; but such feelings (and consequently judgments of value) add no further quality to the objects. His refusal to envisage the possibility of the existence of absolute values (i.e. independently of the subject) led him to interpret primary values as immediate values which are immanent in a state of consciousness: in a presentation, in a judgment, or in an emotion. Therefore, in the same way as the feeling of value, the judgment of value is evident, in that it relies on an object of preference. And the subordination of the emotion, which is more closely connected with current consumption, to the judgment, which is more closely connected with future consumption, is nothing but the effect of the greater evidence of future goods as objects of preference. Thus Kraus's identification of the object of value with the object of preference (that is, valuing = preferring), includes as much Böhm-Bawerk's intuition of the role of time (and of expectation) in valuation as Wieser's reformulation of the concept of value/utility through the notion of imputation: an object of preference is a final, unitary, evident object which determines the value of the means suitable to obtain it. The idea is developed by Kraus in an axiological sense, to the point that he considers the domain of values to be that of justified preferences, which in their turn belong to the field of practical reason. In the context of justified preference, and in the presence of *axioms (evidences) of value*, we can also go on quantitatively summing or deducting values. The general principle of practical rationality which operates in this domain is that the correct choice is choice of the best obtainable target: which is a principle of *material* rationality (because it must consider the *objects* of correct valuations, and hence the theory of value is the theory of good), and which is also *formal* (because it must consider *correctness*, and hence the theory of value is the theory of duty).

10. DEVELOPMENTS IN ECONOMICS — 2: FRIEDRICH VON WIESER

This is an appropriate moment to look more closely at Weiser's value theory. Its starting point is Menger's idea that marginal utility is the necessary and sufficient unifying principle for explanation of both the prices of consumer goods and the distribution of income among the means of production. Wieser's outstanding achievement was to have ingeniously improved this idea by incorporating, via his imputation theory, subjective value theory into a general theory of cost and distribution,⁹³ and to have provided a first systematic report on the direction in which monetary theory would develop. Under Wieser's account, the first aim of a monetary theory is to express the common sense of

⁹³ See Wieser 1889, part. 70-9.

economic agents in economic systems *à la* Robinson Crusoe, where each agent performs, for his own practical purposes, a subconscious process of imputation that enables him/her to value correctly both the consumer goods and the instrumental goods which combine in the production of consumer goods.

Since Wieser's theory is rigorously individualistic, the exchange and creation of prices cannot involve interpersonal comparisons of utility: what is compared is only the order of subjective valuations. On the problem of the measurability of utility, Wieser thus argued against the proponents of measurability and of the cardinal concept of utility, and sustained the non-measurability and the ordinal concept of utility. In fact, Wieser assumed that consumers were able to give a subjective judgment of comparison, but they were unable either to measure utility or to make interpersonal comparisons.

A subjective value theory used in analysis of the evaluative behaviour of consumers should consequently be constructed before and independently of a production theory. But since consumer behaviour is influenced by the level of disposable income, which depends on the consumers' position in production, a risk of circular reasoning arises which can only be avoided by accepting — as an analytical presupposition — the highly restrictive hypothesis that the distribution of income can be taken as given. This assumption constitutes the widest gap between the classical and the marginalist logical frameworks: whereas, in fact, the classicals sought to analyse variations in distributive shares within a dynamic context, the marginalists took for granted that the problem of the most efficient allocation of *given* resources was central, since efficiency was measured by consumer satisfaction, and therefore by the setting up of the values of goods. Thus, for the latter the question of the distribution of incomes was absorbed by the analytically primary problem of price formation, and the incomes of the productive factors were taken as prices, determined as all prices are by market-forces, i.e. by the desires and valuations of economic agents. Within the Austrian tradition, Mayer has strongly criticised this logical framework, which compels one to reason at a level of abstraction which is very improbable in comparison to the actual reality of economic subjects. In Mayer's opinion, in fact, the level of consumer income helps to determine the extent to which the various needs of an economic subject are satisfied.

In addition to this restriction of validity, we cannot fail to notice the difficulties raised by this theoretical perspective: in fact, when we attempt to render its results representative of economic events, we must presuppose a situation of barter or, equivalently, of perfect competition, in which direct comparison is made, not among different values, but among valuations; a system which, if it worked perfectly, would assure those highly ideal results that would ensue if goods and factors were valued as Crusoe would value them. Under this hypothesis, any annoying discrepancy between use-values and

exchange-values would become irrelevant, and the value of goods would tend to coincide with the valuation given by the consumer.

The causal-genetic hypothesis of barter as the logically original situation relative to the real economic fact to be explained is a characteristic of the Austrian methodological framework. We find it, for instance, in Böhm-Bawerk's interest theory, which starts by assuming an oversimplified scheme in which the rates of interest and wages are simultaneously determined and, in their turn, determine the organic composition of capital. If further complicating elements are then added, but with money still only regarded as a (substantially irrelevant) technical instrument which sometimes gets jammed, the interest rate continues to be determined independently of any monetary cause. An analogous method is set out in Hayek⁹⁴ and it generally typifies Austrian money theories from Wieser onwards. But when the question of the role of money, and thence of the effective explanatory relationship between the economic model of barter and the real monetary economy, is confronted, the difficulty of the Wieserian point of view becomes manifest: this was an unavoidable question for Wieser when he attempted a theory of money.⁹⁵

Wicksell, again, was the first economist to have clearly identified this problem. On the one hand, the facts of value and of distribution must be assumed as independent of money, so that by dealing with the logically antecedent situation, we can avoid reference to money. On the other hand, however, by complicating the model, money is a disturbing factor in comparison with the original situation, and hence we must define how money should work in order to leave the real processes of the model of the original barter uninfluenced. Wicksell's solution rests upon the hypothesis of neutral money, a solution which was accepted by Hayek but criticised, for example, by Schumpeter, in whose opinion money cannot be considered a mere veil spread over the phenomena that really matter.⁹⁶ A similar point was made even more radically by Sraffa, the author of a critique of Austrian theory of money with notable axiological implications. Sraffa's criticism was aimed at Wieser's attempt to deduce a theory of the objective exchange-values of money from its subjective exchange-values (the deduction, therefore, of the value from the valuation). In a celebrated article,⁹⁷ Sraffa attacked two fundamental components of Wieser's theory: the notion that supply curves can be drawn in the same way as demand curves, on the basis of the principle of marginal utility; and the notion that any economic agent has maps of utility that control his/her act of valuation and by means of which the objective exchange-value of

⁹⁴ See Hayek 1931.

⁹⁵ Starting from Wieser 1904.

⁹⁶ See Schumpeter 1954, 1088-9.

⁹⁷ Sraffa 1925.

money (and thus prices) can be deduced. Sraffa objected that reference to introspection cannot constitute scientific proof of the existence of utility maps any more than it constitutes scientific proof of the existence of the soul. Utility maps are instead mere mental constructs devised in order to provide a basis for the subjective theory of value.⁹⁸ They cannot be identified independently of empirical observation of consumer behaviour, which must be deduced anyway, in Wieser's opinion, from these same maps. This is why the notion of marginal utility is not an adequate principle with which to explain price formation if it does not presuppose that consumers always *tend* to behave rationally from the standpoint of subjective economic theory; a presupposition, in fact, that is present in Wieser's deductive and aprioristic epistemology. However, beyond any further consideration, it is certain that the method of imputation assumed by Wieser as a criterion of economic rationality seems to be a rather unreliable description of the mental processes of economic agents.

11. THE AUSTRIAN MODEL

I have sought to show that the attempt to found economics deductively on a psychological conception of value produced dubious results which are widely questioned in economics today. It seems that the original endeavour to render economics into a sort of applied psychology was unsuccessful. Let us try to understand the implications of this partial failure to synthesise economic and philosophical theory, which was the main test for the axiological generality of Brentanian theories.

The issues addressed in the foregoing discussion, including those concerning the possibility of translating economic axiology into a logic of preferences, seem to confirm Rescher's opinion that "axiology as the project of a unified philosophy of value cannot be adjudged as impressively successful... Nevertheless, at least two successes must be credited to axiology, as far as philosophy is concerned: (1) It has established a central place in the arena of philosophical concern for the clarification of conception of value and the study of phenomenology of evaluation. (2) It has initiated inquiry into some of the technical sectors of the value field, such as the theory of value measurement and the elaboration of a formal theory of preference".⁹⁹

Rescher's opinion, in spite of its acknowledgment of the value of philosophical axiology, is forthright, adequately motivated and precludes

⁹⁸ Therefore the subjective theories founded on the value/utility have much better claim to being called a logic than a psychology of values. See Schumpeter 1954, 1058.

⁹⁹ See Rescher 1969, 59-60.

further debate in the field of the philosophical theory of values. Nevertheless, I doubt its cogency, at least as regards the problem I have examined. Let us review the reasons why attempts at a synthesis between Austrian economic theory and Brentanian value theory failed, in order to understand whether this failure was due to the inadequacy of the economic theory, of the philosophical theory or of the programme itself of axiological synthesis.

Schumpeter¹⁰⁰ declared that one of the greatest faults of Austrian economists was their over-emphasis of the psychic dimension: they believed that they were teaching much more about economic reality than was actually the case. The rigorously subjective and deductive framework of their theory managed to produce an acceptable scheme, complete in itself, of economic statics founded on value/utility, but certainly not a general theory; and it failed precisely when the presence of dynamic factors was greater. With this criticism, Schumpeter highlights the main weakness of the Austrian economic school, namely its assumption of marginal utility as the principle unifying economic theory because it expresses a psychologically ascertainable criterion of individual behavioural rationality. This weakness concerns both the definition of what is economic (compared with what is non-economic) and the definition of what is economically rational. The inadequacy of this criterion, justified by introspective consideration of consumer psychology, can be grasped if we think of the assumptions necessary for the model based the criterion to work. These assumptions require strong hypotheses on the characteristics of the economic system to be represented, and which postulate that any *real element* that interferes with *theoretical hypotheses*, for example mechanisms managing monetary flows, is a perturbation and therefore, as Mises and Hayek above all deduced, eliminated or drastically reduced. The model comprises the following features:

- (i) The first characteristic is timelessness (in spite of Böhm-Bawerk's interest in the time-factor), according to which economic events and behaviours occur in a dimension which does not allow for change
- (ii) The second characteristic, connected with the first, is the concept of *stationary state*. Shackle, who was certainly no opponent of the Austrian school, pointed out the flaws in this assumption. While wholly accepting the Austrian assertion that *capital is time* (time being both the unit of measurement *and* the origin of capital), Shackle noted that the Austrians had persisted with the stationary state as their framework and had transformed the dynamic problem of time (time is always novel) into one of

¹⁰⁰ Schumpeter 1954, 919.

comparative statics,¹⁰¹ a criticism already brought against them by Mayer,¹⁰² who raised many of the issues subsequently taken up by Shackle.

- (iii) Perfect competition. This is perhaps the model's most critical hypothesis: Wicksell had already pointed out that marginalist theory depends on the extent to which the fundamental hypothesis of free competition holds true.¹⁰³ Morgenstern, who was closely influenced by the Austrian methodological framework, defined free competition as a pathological borderline-case of possible economic organization, one distant from any known reality.¹⁰⁴
- (iv) Ready flexibility of the prices for goods and productive services.
- (v) Perfect mobility of the production factors.
- (vi) Coincidence between private and social costs. These last three hypotheses are particularly unrealistic corollaries of the first three.
- (vii) Perfect knowledge of the workings of economic mechanisms. This hypothesis is necessary in order to preserve free competition under conditions of turbulence (stemming principally from monetary shocks). As regards this aspect, and conducting critical examination of theories which consider money to be an accidental element of the economic system which derives from Robinson Crusoe valuations, Shackle emphasises that the non-deducibility of the objective exchange-value of money from its subjective exchange-value (i.e. the individuals' ignorance of how purchasing powers are established) is the core of the activity which exploits ignorance and deals with expectations of future prices: namely speculation. The presence of money is therefore an essential part of the rationality of the economic agent.¹⁰⁵ Perfect knowledge, or the perfect distribution of information, moreover, implies (a) that information, which is essential for the rational behaviour of an individual, cannot depend on another individual or on membership of some social group, (b) that the economic system is dominated by timeless pre-reconciliations of individual behaviour.¹⁰⁶

This model can therefore only represent the world after it has expunged uncertainty, change, the dynamicity of structures, not merely individual strategies of action, instability, the decisions of the institutional and economic

¹⁰¹ Shackle 1972, 305-6.

¹⁰² In Mayer 1937.

¹⁰³ Wicksell 1900.

¹⁰⁴ See Morgenstern 1972b.

¹⁰⁵ Shackle 1972, 12.

¹⁰⁶ See Hayek 1937.

authorities, i.e more or less the world itself, which is later re-introduced only as a possible perturbation in the model.

Furthermore, more than other economists, the members of the Austrian school became aware of a problem in the representative capacity of their theory and sought out possible solutions. I do not refer here to the inquiries conducted by Mises and Hayek, although Hayek — in my opinion with greater philosophical precision than Mises — recognized that the Austrian logical framework suffered from major representational problems. These he tried to solve, from “Economics and Knowledge” onwards, although with results that many considered to be unsatisfactory. In Mises’s praxeology, by contrast, the recognition of problems in the psychological foundation of economics¹⁰⁷ led to their removal (there is no relationship between economics and psychology) and to the removal of any other problem bound up with the representational task of the theory. In this way, praxeology conveys, besides to its extreme consequences, the tendency of various reformulations of subjective economics which looks mainly at the formal aspects of the theory. The common elements of the theory of rational choice and of economics are therefore emphasized.¹⁰⁸

The inquiries to which I refer are, instead, those conducted by Wicksell, Mayer and Morgenstern, whose collaboration with Neumann gave origin to games theory,¹⁰⁹ one of principal attempts to find a way out of the *impasse* in which Austrian economics found itself.

Drawing this connection between a highly sophisticated mathematical theory like games theory and the Austrian school (whose founders notoriously avoided any advanced mathematization) may seem strange. But Morgenstern himself, whose reference to the Austrian school was evident even before his collaboration with Neumann,¹¹⁰ pointed to games theory as the formal instrument able to give correct formulation to particularly significant aspects of the Austrian doctrine and to solve a number of theoretical problems left open by Austrian marginalism.¹¹¹

And it was Morgenstern again who identified,¹¹² beyond the applications of games theory to specific problems, its epistemological relevance in breaking the short circuit of the psychologically grounded criterion of economic rationality. In fact, on the basis of the restrictive assumptions imposed, the model requires that there should be no essential interactions between the behaviour of economic subjects and the knowledge they possess of the real

¹⁰⁷ Already completed in Mises 1928, 32-47.

¹⁰⁸ One of the best examples of this tendency is Samuelson 1947.

¹⁰⁹ See Neumann & Morgenstern 1944.

¹¹⁰ See Morgenstern 1934 and 1936.

¹¹¹ See Morgenstern 1948, 1950, 1972a and 1972b.

¹¹² In Morgenstern 1972a.

economic system, i.e. between the domains of facts and theories. In other words, the model rules out that a modification in knowledge can induce modifications in behaviour aimed at the maximum possible satisfaction of needs. There consequently arises the hypothesis of perfect knowledge and of rational behaviour.

Nevertheless, we cannot deny the influence exerted by the distribution of the available kind of theory and *its degree of acceptance*¹¹³ on the behaviour of an individual. Games theory should be able to provide a formal explanation for this *feedback*, called *back-coupling*, between theory and its subject matter. However, consideration of *back-coupling* in these terms also requires redefinition of what is meant by 'economic phenomenon'. It entails, in fact, that economic reality is a (non-independent) *part* of a social reality that is also *always* political, legal, moral, ideological; and that social reality, in its turn, is part of material reality in its broadest sense. What fails, in this case, is the alleged capacity of the economic fact to found itself on the structure of the needs and desires of subjects; a structure, this, which is assumed to be the cause of, or reason for, the behaviour of economic subjects and which represents the subject matter of a theory. The role that acceptance of theories assumes in explanation of economic behaviour suggests that psychology can perform the function assigned to it by the Austrian economists only if, by developing into social psychology, it becomes part of a theory of ideologies: of their genesis, conceptual stabilization and behavioural efficacy. Rossi-Landi is the author who, as far as I know, has devoted most effort to elaboration of such a theory,¹¹⁴ one of the central notions of which might be the *material apriori* developed by Husserl in his lectures on the theory of value.¹¹⁵

What is then to be questioned from an epistemological point of view is the removal, by the unilateral use of the subjective theory of values, of the social structure from the economic system, which is restricted to the individual and isolated behaviour of agents whose criteria of rationality are to be identified within the context of a general theory of action. In this connection, Shackle too considers that theory of value, as marginal utility, "in supposing that reason, and a consultation of their own desires, would provide men with all necessary guidance for their economic choices, tacitly assumed that the basic knowledge, on which reason could operate, was available to them". Shackle includes in such basic knowledge "knowledge of other men's intentions", which "should be pre-reconciled, should logically co-exist and exhibit mutual and systematic coherence. But such logical co-validity, in the nature of things, implies and requires in effect simultaneity in time as well as simultaneity in logic". This is

¹¹³ See also Hayek 1937.

¹¹⁴ In Rossi-Landi 1978.

¹¹⁵ Husserl 1988, part. lect. of 1914. On the notion of material apriori, see also Smith 1986.

why “the Austrian theory does not live in this conceptual world but in the unreal one of an *arbitrarily* stationary process”.¹¹⁶

Therefore, we cannot hope to find a general rationality of behaviour by an economic agent which does not require a specific structure from which it can emerge. From this point of view, studies on economic anthropology from Karl Polanyi onwards represent a healthy antidote to the persistent epistemological naiveties of *economics* as a general theory of action. These studies have shown, in fact, that:

- (i) We cannot start from individuals and from the general form of oriented behaviour when analysing the rational content of systems and of economic agents (as Mises’ praxeological school instead does, because every concept which cannot be clearly attributed to the behaviour of individuals should be banned from economics).
- (ii) We cannot deduce any scientific knowledge from observation of the existence of a general form of behaviour.
- (iii) If we define the economic phenomenon to be behaviour intended to maximize scarce means, when a scale of purposes functional to the satisfaction of needs is given, then the economic phenomenon cannot be analysed on the basis of economics alone, because it is involved in the functioning of non-economic structures which partially determine it, for example by acting on the formation of a particular structure of needs (of a purpose-aim hierarchy) among the members of a community.

In other words, economic behaviour is a particular set of activities directed towards the production, distribution and consumption of material objects, but it is also a particular aspect of the whole range of non-economic activities: this is why *economic behaviour does not incorporate the globality of its sense and of its purpose, but only a part of it*.

Given this restriction of validity, the marginalist schools analysed numerous problems, and with a certain acuteness when they prescribed the norms to be observed by those wishing to behave in an optimal way. But this amounts to nothing more than saying that marginalist models, taken in isolation, restricted themselves to problems of management. We may therefore assert that although the endeavour to found the principle of marginal utility on Brentanian psychology, and to render it into a (or even *the*) fundamental axiological principle, opened up a rather rich field of inquiry, it did not achieve the results that were hoped. In fact it compelled the most sensible economists either to abandon its psychological basis while maintaining the principle of utility (Wicksell), or to

¹¹⁶ Shackle 1972, 329-31.

abandon the principle of utility while maintaining its psychological basis (Fisher).

If we acknowledge this outcome as far as the economic theory is concerned, it has consequences on the value theories of the Brentanian school. Consequences which compel us to re-examine the axiological generality of those theories with regard to at least three issues: their assumption of the marginal utility of an object as the element characterizing its value; the subordination of value to the act of personal valuation; the introspective specificity of valuation.

The first issue refers to the enthusiasm with which Meinong, Ehrenfels and Kraus initially received Menger's definition of value/utility and considered it the basis for a possible general value theory. This initial position was then weakened and finally dropped by Kraus and, more radically, by Meinong, although Ehrenfels persisted with it and articulated it into the principle that desire is the essence of value. A first matter for discussion, therefore, is Ehrenfels' version of the value theory, which was then developed by the American neo-realists, and, later, his position in comparison with Meinong's. Should we wish also to pass historical judgment, I think that Brentano's position is closer to Meinong's theory of values more than to Ehrenfels'. Grassl has recently tried to demonstrate the axiological generality of the Ehrenfelsian position.¹¹⁷ I believe, however, that his demonstration concerns not so much the axiological generality of Ehrenfels' theory as its possible use in solving a series of specific problems regarding human behaviour. And this is obviously different.

Passing to the second point, the rigorous subordination of value to valuation, i.e. of impersonal values to personal ones, as Ehrenfels and Kraus thought, could not be extended in a theoretically effective way to the domain of economics. The fact is that, by reasoning in this manner, we deal with values which are essentially *shared values*, or in any case values which are not reducible to mere acts of personal valuation. From this point of view, Simmel's axiological generalization is correct. Among the authors I have considered, Meinong undertook the most interesting inquiry into the objectivity of value. While Simmel principally developed the aspect of the *genesis* of objective values, Meinong was mainly concerned with their *description*, albeit with interesting genetic indications about perception. Only by adequately developing both aspects, I believe, can we obtain a sufficiently general theory of value.

¹¹⁷ Grassl 1986, 163-75.

12. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS: NICOLAI HARTMANN AND EDMUND HUSSERL

If we use the expression *Brentanian tradition* in a flexible way so that it also includes the multiple ramifications produced by Brentano's disciples, of these latter the thinker who in my opinion best developed his own axiological investigations in this direction was N. Hartmann,¹¹⁸ whose thought in some respects resembles the 'second' Meinong and of which I wish to recall the notion of *objective spirit* as the 'realm' of values. It is thus worth making brief mention the characteristics of his theory.

Hartmann starts by drawing a distinction between consciousness and spirit which has an immediate correlate in the distinction between valuation and value. If we consider consciousness to be a psychic act, or as the condition of all psychic acts, then the spirit is a reflection on consciousness, and therefore it is *based on* (*aufruht*) consciousness without being reduced to it, because spiritual contents possess an objective supertemporality that psychic acts do not. Translating this argument into more directly axiological terms, we can say that value, being an objective product of spirit, is based on the (ontically inferior) level of valuation, i.e. of the psychic being, which in its turn is based on the organic level, and both of them on the material level. Interpreting Hartmann, we may say that the criterion which establishes the difference among the various levels is of a categorial kind; that is, different levels require different categories. In this organized stratification, each level is real and present in the level below (without being reduced to it) and thence it is real in the material level.

It is clear that *being based on* (*aufrufen*) cannot be interpreted as depending, because we cannot describe the upper stratum within the lower one (here lies — in my opinion — Simmel's and Ehrenfels' symmetrical mistake). Between psychic being and spiritual being, between valuation and value, there is a relationship of *overstructuring* (*Überbau*), in the sense that values are only fulfilled through the valuations of a personal spirit; but a person has a spiritual existence because of his belonging to a spiritual realm constituted by autonomous norms and objective contents, in which he grows and in whose patrimony he is rooted. Feelings or desires are not even valuations, but simply psychic acts: they become valuations because from time to time they acquire an ethical, legal, aesthetic meaning and so on. Hence valuation is a choice, or a series of choices, according to the freedom that the realm of values permits, while axiology is a science which deals with the aspects and the essence of the objective spirit in its autonomy.

¹¹⁸ See Hartmann 1926 and 1933, part. chs. 11-15 and 19-25.

There are two important aspects here: (a) my interest in Hartmann does not focus on which theory of psychic phenomena is able to sustain a theory of value, and it therefore not directly concerned with the problem of inner observation vs. inner perception. The question is instead the way in which psychic phenomena take concrete shape in intersubjective cultural forms. (b) As a consequence of (a), it follows that *the problem of value is not under the competence of psychology*, at whatever level of elaboration.

This brings me to the last issue addressed in this essay. The foregoing discussion has shown that the most evident shortcoming of the Brentanian theories of values considered is that they locate themselves at the categorial level of the psychic being. From this point of view, it is of little importance whether our categorial frame is intuitionistic (founded on the concept of inner perception) or introspectionistic (founded on the concept of inner observation), although at the level of the psychic act the criterion of evidence is incomparably more effective than the criterion of introspection.

At this point, brief discussion of Husserl's *Lectures on ethics and theory of value* is enlightening. It may seem odd that only now has mention been made of the axiological reflections of one of the most important 'direct scholars' of Brentano. The choice can be justified by the following considerations: (a) these reflections have been only recently published and therefore, in the period considered by this essay, they only circulated indirectly through the writings of scholars like Lessing,¹¹⁹ whom Husserl openly accused of plagiarism; (b) Husserl did not address the problem of economic value and did not interact with the Austrian economists, so that, in comparison with the debate considered above, his position is not particularly significant. Nevertheless, and perhaps because of his marginal position, Husserl correctly identified the limit of the Brentanian axiological framework in the very aspect on which the economists' attention focused most closely, namely inner perception.

In his lectures of 1902, Husserl formulated two theses of major importance. First that the judgments and the concepts of value are reflections on feelings, that is, on phenomena concerning the psychic being; a thesis, as we have seen, also well developed by Hartmann. Second that this reflection cannot be interpreted as an inner perception because, otherwise, it would be impossible to go beyond the simple judgments of perception and the inductive generalization of events related to feeling. Moreover, if values are reduced to inductive generalization, then their rigorous general validity and their necessity are lost. It is therefore true that the origin of values lies in the psychic act, but values are

¹¹⁹ See Lessing 1908.

more than simple inductions: they are apriori laws rooted in the conceptual essence of the correlative psychic acts.¹²⁰

The symmetry between Husserl's and Hartmann's is clear, except that, in Husserl, the impossibility of basing a theory of value on the categorial level of the psychic being generates, not a theory of the objective spirit, but the systematic structure of a formal axiology which includes the laws of apriori motivation and the theory of the reasonable consequence within a homogeneous sphere of acts and among different spheres of acts. In fact, just as logical laws are based on the conceptual essence of the acts of thought, so the laws of value are based on the conceptual essence of valuing feelings, and the phenomenology of the really immanent process of valuation corresponds to the pure theory of values. Husserl's purpose seems to be that of elaborating, in analogy with the critique of the theoretical pure reason, a critique of the axiological pure reason which reduces the psychic phenomena of valuation to their eidetic essence, depriving them of any naturalistic reference and transforming them into what Scheler and Hartmann would define as spiritual acts.

The difference between Brentano and Meinong on the one hand, and Husserl (and Hartmann) on the other, is that the former attribute the characters of value directly to acts, while Husserl, with his formal axiology, attributes them to the intentional modes of constitution of the object. Intentional acts, feelings, emotions, are not simply rays projected onto certain objects, they constitute the objects themselves, with their structures and their connection laws. The valued object is based upon the object which perception tends towards, but differs from it because value is included in the (phenomenological) constitution of the object; it is a constituent mark of the object as *noema*, and it is therefore included in the phenomenological description of the object constitution.

This is not the place to elaborate an axiology *à la* Husserl or Hartmann.¹²¹ Mention of these philosophers have been useful in highlighting a categorial mistake in the axiologies I have considered. This mistake, which is also present in the Austrian theories of economic value, was responsible for the failure of the project to construct a (psychologically founded) general value theory, and it consisted in the assumption that the categories of value are psychological categories. One consequence of this mistake is the idea that values belong to a common experience (of which the source is not comprehensible) which is, evidently or via introspection, recognizable. Examination of the use of this paradigm in economics has shown that it fails to explain many and crucial aspects of the complex experience of value. An argument available for use

¹²⁰ See Husserl 1988, part. 392, note 3.

¹²¹ See Dappiano 1994.

against this self-restriction to the level of the psychic is analogous to the private language argument. This is not to imply that there is no privacy or psychicism in the experience of value — this would be nonsensical — but that experiences of value become relevant (also from the personal point of view) and originate behaviours only by leaving their intimate privacy and placing themselves in an (at least virtual) interactive public space in which the mode of being of the individual is not reducible to psychological categories.

With Brentano and Meinong, the psychological approach achieved interesting results as regards the phenomenology of the experience of value, and independently of any objectual or behavioural instance, by focusing on important aspects such as evidence, intentionality, and intuitivity. However, they are results that, in themselves, neither allow axiological generalizations nor furnish indications for a motivational investigation of the (economic, aesthetic, ethical, political, and so on) behaviour of individuals unless they are used in the context of a theory of ideologies, i.e. a theory whose subject matter is the way in which evaluative experience is constituted and organized into the objectivated forms of a culture. Now that the interesting phase of mutual influence between the economic and philosophical schools of value has concluded, it is an area in which theories of value that wish to maintain their Brentanian inheritance can begin again to demonstrate their axiological soundness.

13. APPENDIX. THE SUBJECTIVISTIC FRAMEWORK IN ECONOMICS

1. *Needs*

Definition: A need is any state of dissatisfaction which individuals feels and to which they wish to put an end, or else it is a state of satisfaction which individuals wish to prolong.

Classification:

- a. Primary/secondary needs: the former concern the most impelling necessities in human life and they are not interchangeable; the latter are satisfied only after fulfilment of primary needs and they are interchangeable within more or less strict limits.
- b. Inelastic/elastic needs: the former have persisted for a long time but are rapidly satisfied whenever we possess adequate means to do so. These are usually primary needs. The latter can be temporarily suppressed and

postponed, but they are satisfied more slowly and gradually. These are usually secondary needs.

2. *Goods*

Definition: Goods are the means to satisfy needs.

Classification:

- a. Durable/non-durable goods: the former can be used to satisfy the same need repeatedly; the latter can satisfy a certain need only once, that is, they are totally consumed in one use only.
- b. Fungible/complementary goods: the former (also called 'converging upon the usage') can replace each other in the satisfaction of a certain need; the latter are able to satisfy a need only if used jointly.
- c. Present/future goods: the former are immediately available to the economic subject; the latter will be available only at a later time.
- d. Direct/indirect goods: the former may directly satisfy a certain need without being transformed; the latter satisfy a need only through mediation.

3. *Value/utility*

Definition 1: The value of goods represents their *relative scarcity*.

Definition 2: The utility of goods is their ability to satisfy one or more human needs.

Specifications:

- a. The value of goods is determined subjectively by the intensity of the need; objectively by the available amount of goods which can satisfy such need.
- b. The differing degrees of utility of goods are the effect of their relationship with subjects using them for particular purposes.
- c. The utility of goods is a psychic entity, a subjective appreciation, because it depends on the intensity of the needs to be satisfied: it is the expression of the subjective aspect of value.
- d. Value/utility originates from comparison between a minimal amount of goods and the intensity of the need satisfied by this same amount. If this amount is the final one (before the saturation of the need, or before its highest possible satisfaction), the valuation of the goods is based on their degree of utility. Since any subsequent amount of consumed goods is appreciated less than the previous one, goods in large quantities and which

reach or come close to saturation of a need have a low value/utility, while goods whose availability is scarce have a high value/utility (the marginal utility principle).

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on:

see also:

act / object / content
value / ethics

4.4, 8
1.15, 4.7, 5.3-4

FROM KANT TO BRENTANO

1. INTRODUCTION

In a book devoted to the school of Brentano, an essay bearing the above title may arouse perplexity, if not irritation, among the majority of orthodox Brentanians. We well know that Brentano was a declared anti-Kantian (*kein Zurück zu Kant!*)¹ and we are fully aware of the scholasticism that derived from his position among most of his closest followers — particularly those who edited his works — and in the ensuing literature.² Brentano's reception in Italy, however, seems to have been less unequivocal on the matter. While he was in Florence, Calò and Rossi conducted a close analysis of the theory of thetic judgment and emphasised its affinities with Kantian doctrine.³ And even within Brentano's school itself, his disciples and annotators sometimes stressed the 'curious' resemblance between some of his theses and Kant's.⁴

Indeed, some of Brentano's most outstanding pupils, as well as some of the movements directly influenced by his thought, broke significantly away from his anti-Kantianism. One need only mention Husserl — who made explicit reference to Kant on several occasions — or certain aspects of the 'theory of production' developed by a group of Meinong's disciples in Graz (in particular

¹ Brentano 1968b, 25-6.

² Consider Kraus, Kastil, and Mayer-Hillebrand.

³ According to de Ruggero, for example, Brentano was a neo-Kantian even though he did not know it and would not have wanted to be: De Ruggero 1923, I, 105-108. On the relation between Brentano and Kantianism, see Calò 1898; Rossi 1926; Croce 1905, 337; Modenato 1979, 58-9; Santucci 1987; Melandri 1969, 32-5.

⁴ Kastil in Brentano 1976, n. 408; Chisholm in Brentano 1985, Preface, 2, where the affinity between the two philosophers in relation to external perception in *Psychologie* 1 is evident.

Benussi⁵), or again *Gestalt* psychology in Berlin⁶ and the school founded by Stumpf, another of Brentano's pupils. Kantian references are particularly evident in the work of Twardowski, yet another Brentanian and founder of the logical philosophical school of Lvov-Warsaw.⁷ Twardowski's book of 1894, which drew explicitly on Kantian theory, played a major role in the genesis of Husserl's theory of intentionality.⁸

In sum, we cannot contend that anti-Kantianism was a feature common to all the scholars and movements that drew their inspiration from Brentano.

However, apart from such historical-biographical considerations, the point at issue is essentially a theoretical one. Broadly speaking, the anti-Kantianism of the Brentanians was most marked among those interested in descriptive analysis, whereas affinities with transcendental theory were more evident among those who conducted genetic analysis.⁹

The theme of 'a return to Kant' may therefore help us to focus on various problems within the school of Brentano. If the topics of temporal continuum, of presentation, of the modification of consciousness, of the intentional object, and in general of systematic theory of objects, as well as a general interest in the foundations of logic, were the central concerns of Brentano and his school, they were also topics which related to themes of transcendental philosophy.

More specifically, my thesis is that both Kant's and Brentano's theories were framed in metaphysical terms. What is typically metaphysical in Kant, namely his analysis of the conditions of the pure thinkable in any object in general, became the framework for Brentano's descriptive psychology, and its analysis of the nature of objects within an ontology of the mind.¹⁰

⁵ Here I am specifically referring to the question of inner time: Benussi 1913, 1904, 303-448. Note that, after his initial agreement with Meinong, Benussi came to adopt a Husserlian position. On Benussi see Stucchi 1992.

⁶ Kant may be considered one of the precursors *in general* of Gestalt: see Metzger 1941, Intr., § 2 and Appendix to ch. 1, 19; Köhler 1938; Bozzi 1988, 33-53.

⁷ On Twardowski see the entry in this volume. On his Kantianism see also Albertazzi 1989c.

⁸ On the relationship between Twardowski and Husserl see Schuhmann 1993. The influence of Kant is apparent in another leading exponent of Twardowski's school, K. Ajdukiewicz: Ajdukiewicz 1977, 140-155. On this see Albertazzi 1991b and Poli 1995.

⁹ On the distinction between 'genetic' and 'descriptive' see the entry 'Husserl' in this volume. For the sake of clarity, one should, from an ontological-formal point of view, keep descriptive and genetic analysis very distinct. On the theoretical importance of this distinction see Albertazzi 1989a, Introduction and Conclusions.

¹⁰ The opinion that metaphysics and not psychology was the central point of Brentano's interest is shared by Werner. Put better, Brentano tried to establish philosophical psychology (which he took to be a theory of knowledge) as the basis of metaphysics. Werner 1930, 22 ff; and Albertazzi 1989b, 7-65.

The starting point for the analyses of Brentano and his school was the Kantian concept of presentation (*Vorstellung*).¹¹ In fact, a key issue addressed by all of the thinkers examined here was what occurs in the minimum temporal extension in which psychic activity takes place. The problem they set themselves was to explain how these psychic moments constitute both consciousness and the meanings of our mental acts.

Depending on the solution proposed — for instance, as regards the number of presentations possible in the minimum temporal moment — different interpretations were given to the problem and different ontologies were constructed. The solution that at a moment-now only one presentation is possible provided a descriptive and analytical interpretation of the facts of consciousness and made it possible to justify a reist ontology like Brentano's. The answer that at any moment-now an indefinite number of presentations is, in principle, possible, stressed the genetic aspect of mental facts and of those of consciousness, and gave rise to a stratified and regional ontology like Husserl's.

My argument focuses on the structure of the three deductions of categories set out by Kant in the first edition of his *Critique of pure reason* (1781) and modified in the second edition (1787). Specifically, of these three deductions, the metaphysical (or descriptive) deduction is present in Brentano. The subjective (or genetic) deduction is only to be found in some aspects of his theory of the temporal continuum and, as Kastil noted, constituted a 'transcendental aesthetics' (at least for a certain period of Brentano's life).¹² The subjective, metaphysical and transcendental deductions, however, are all present, at different levels, in Husserl's phenomenology.

It must be stressed, however, that these themes of transcendental philosophy, which also pertain to Brentano's descriptive psychology, *do not* coincide with the developments of German idealism.

¹¹ I translate *Vorstellung* as 'presentation' rather than 'representation' in order to emphasise the sense given to the term by Brentano: presentation denotes the intentional character of consciousness as it directs itself towards an internal object. This concept was common to all of Austrian philosophy in this period. See Bolzano 1837, Zimmermann 1860, Brentano 1971a, Höfler & Meinong 1890, Twardowski 1894, Cornelius 1899, Husserl 1900. Note, however, that presentation, which Brentano first conceived as an autonomous class of psychic phenomena, later included a form of recognition or of judgment. See Brentano 1987, 25-31. On the importance of this question, which might have led to a radical revision of the inner structure of descriptive psychology, see Brandl 1987, 19-23 and Albertazzi 1991c. On the concept of presentation in general see Knüfer 1911.

¹² Of particular relevance here is a series of works dictated by Brentano towards the end of his life and published posthumously, where the affinity with Kant's doctrine of inner sense is evident. Cf. Brentano 1976: "What we can learn on space and time from the mistakes of philosophers in conflict with each other", 230, no. 143. On this topic see section 13 below.

2. WHAT IS 'TRANSCENDENTAL'?

The term 'transcendental' applies to those concepts of *non-empirical origin* which represent the characteristics that any object must possess in order to be thought and therefore presented to consciousness: in this sense, the property of pure thinkability of objects is transcendental in that it comprises those minimum conditions which any object must fulfil in order to be considered an object.

The term 'a priori' applies more specifically to the property of pure thinkability of objects (that is, of the transcendental) according to their particular species. In this sense, the a priori stands prior to the constitution of different regional ontologies.

These definitions will become clearer if one bears in mind that: (i) thinkable is not the same as cognitive; (ii) the realm of the transcendental is larger than that of the a priori; (iii) there is both a genetic aspect to the transcendental (which concerns the objectivity of thought) and a logical-descriptive aspect (which concerns its product, the objectual realm of thought); (iv) the transcendental is not unique but qualitatively multiform, because of its peculiar nature as a spatial and temporal category.

All this entails that transcendental logic is one of the foundations of formal logic, although in actual fact the relationship between formal and transcendental logic has never been made clear by the interpreters of Kant's critique. This lack of clarity is probably also due to the numerous problems raised by the discrepancies between the two editions of *Critique of pure reason*.

As we know, the first edition of 1781 contained several parts¹³ which were omitted from the second edition of 1787. It is also well known that the idealistic developments of Kantian theory by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and also Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, were based on the first edition.¹⁴ This does not mean, however, that reading the first edition *necessarily* leads to an idealistic interpretation of Kantianism.¹⁵

The first point I wish to make is that there is a *second* theoretical reading — a phenomenological one — of the first edition. Husserl, in fact, stated that he had relied on the first edition of *Critique of pure reason*.¹⁶ Secondly, Kant's

¹³ Like the second and third section on the deduction of the pure concepts of intellect and the paralogisms of pure reason.

¹⁴ See also Kojève's, Löwith's, Goldmann's interpretations of it.

¹⁵ This interpretation, in fact, was an enduring influence on the role of transcendental logic both as a problem internal to Kantianism and as a theoretical problem in itself. This is evidenced in the criticisms which neo-Kantians, neopositivists and the proponents of symbolic logic in general have brought against Kant: Whitehead 1946, 13; Scholz 1931, 55; Neurath 1935, 35.

¹⁶ Husserl 1966. On the entire question see Albertazzi 1989a.

critique — that is, its specific conception of logic and experience — is better understood from a phenomenological point of view. In particular, the relationship between formal *and* transcendental logic becomes the connection of fields which are effectively complementary. At bottom, it has to do with the relationship between metaphysics and formal ontology.¹⁷ For the above reasons, Kantianism — or those theses of Kantianism which are present in the first edition of *Critique of pure reason* — incorporates, in my opinion, a large number of Brentanian themes.

It is customary to distinguish between the Kant of the pre-*Critique* period¹⁸ — when his logic still reflected the ontological structures of the real *à la* Leibniz — and his writings of the *Critique* period in which the value, the nature and the possibility itself of the reason were under scrutiny prior to analysis of the correspondence between logical structures and ontology.

Kant changed from one point of view to the other in the decade 1760-70, when he addressed the question of the *unity of consciousness*.¹⁹ In those years the *act* of thought became the basis and the reference for Kant's theory of the judgment. In *Critique of pure reason* he wrote that the judgment is concerned with the relations among presentation, within the consciousness that unifies them.²⁰ The fundamental categories of his new theory of judgment were *act*, *unity of consciousness* and *evidence*.²¹

As regards the relationship between pure formal and transcendental logic, Kant often stressed their *co-extension*.²²

Given that both transcendental logic and pure formal logic do not refer to particular types of objects, it should be made clear that, within the Kantian

¹⁷ This is also Barone's basic thesis: see his 1965.

¹⁸ Kant 1770 and Kant 1775.

¹⁹ See Kant's correspondence with Mark Herz and the *Duisburger Nachlaß* in Haering 1910.

²⁰ The unity of consciousness is also called apperception. On the concept of apperception (pure and empirical) see Kant 1781, *Transcendental Logic*, *Analytics of Concepts*, § 16. In Kant presentation and judgment are connected. Brentano discussed this point during his period in Italy: see Brandl 1979.

²¹ On metaphysics as a framework for inquiry into the 'characteristics notes' of objects as their universal properties see Kant 1763. Note that, according to Kant, a 'characteristic note' is what constitutes part of the knowledge we have of an entity. In Brentanian terms, the characteristic note of an object is one of its partial presentations which provides the basis for knowledge of the entire presentation. This is particularly evident in Twardowski, who draws on Kant and on Trendelenburg's logical investigations: Trendelenburg 1870, II, 225; on Husserl's criticisms of Brentano's doctrine of intentionality see Husserl 1913-21, vol. II, 5th Logical investigation.

²² This is a key point: co-extension deals with pure formal and transcendental logic but not with applied formal logic, which refers to the contents of intuition and which, because it changes its empirical reference, cannot therefore be unchangeable. Because both Trendelenburg and Ueberweg chose to ignore Kant's repeated affirmation of the co-extension of the two logics, their interpretations lapsed into error.

scheme of things, the former examines the (*transcendental*) *object in general*, while the latter analyses the *general object*.²³ It is important to specify the meaning of these two definitions carefully, since they play a crucial role in the overall architecture of the *Critique* and, at least partially, of Brentanianism, as we shall see.

3. THE (TRANSCENDENTAL) 'OBJECT IN GENERAL' AND THE 'GENERAL OBJECT'

In the *Critique*, the validity of knowledge depends on whether presentations refer to an object which itself is not a presentation.²⁴ This object, Kant wrote, must be conceived of as 'something in general'. In the Kant of the pre-*Critique* period and in his first edition of *Critique of pure reason* of 1781, this object is called the 'transcendental object' or X.²⁵ Proof that Kant was already aware of the problem of the transcendental object before he wrote the *Critique* is provided by a fragment of *Nachlaß*, dated by Adickes to the years 1772-5,²⁶ in which he posed the following question: what is the foundation (*Grund*)²⁷ for the relationship between the presentation and the object of presentation? Kant provided an answer by defining this foundation as whatever unifies a priori our presentations into a law, and which presents a thing (*Sache*) as it is, prior to all its possible modes of appearing. This object he also called the 'transcendental object': that something which constitutes the *metaphysical foundation*.²⁸

Kant also stressed that the transcendental object must not be confused with the 'thing in itself' of classical realism, because the transcendental object is indissolubly bound up with the presence of the *act* (*actus*) of presentation. Kant never altered his position on this point. He remarked, in fact, again in *Opus*

²³ This is Steckelmacher's thesis in his 1879.

²⁴ The fundamental category of Kant's entire doctrine is the category of *possibility*: see Veca 1969.

²⁵ The other labels that Kant gave to this object are: 'non-empirical object', 'something in general', 'correlate of the unity of apperception', and also 'that which confers objectual relation on all empirical objects'.

²⁶ Eric Adickes also reviewed Marty's *Was ist Philosophie*, which examined the relations between psychology and philosophy, and declared that Kant's account was correct, even though its solution was illusory: *Deutsche Literatur Zeitung* 22 (1899), 855-857.

²⁷ Because Kant's interest was always metaphysical, his doctrine of ground (*Grund*) must be interpreted according to the rules of classical ontology. It differs from the latter in the nature of the foundation provided by Kantianism: the operations of thought, in fact, constitute the thinkability of the real. When defining concept, therefore, the aspects of cognitive *content* and of cognitive *ground* must be borne in mind. On the question of metaphysics and ontology from Wolff to Twardowski see Poli 1992.

²⁸ See below section 12.

postumum, that the distinction between the concept of thing-in-itself and thing as a phenomenon is not objective, but subjective. The thing-in-itself is not a different object, but a different relation (*respectus*) of the presentation of the same object.²⁹ Kant's concept of the 'thing in itself' — as Lange, one of the Kantian critics, never tired of pointing out — is only a limiting concept (*Grenzbegriff*).³⁰ Kant in fact stated that the noumenon is a problematic concept, a limiting concept which circumscribes the claims of the sensibility.³¹ This point also constitutes the nucleus of the problem of a transcendental philosophy in general.³²

4. THE THREE CATEGORICAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE TWO EDITIONS OF *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*

In 1781 Kant returned to the question of the transcendental object. In the first edition of *Critique* he set out three deductions of the categories, which he called 'pure concepts of intellect'. The basic difference between the two editions of *Critique of pure reason* rests, in fact, on the role played by Kant's different deductions (subjective, metaphysical, objective) of the categories.

By *pure concept* of the intellect Kant meant a concept which "is not drawn from experience, but which instead originates in the intellect" as regards both its content and its form. Kant added that "if there are pure intellectual concepts... it must be metaphysics that investigates them".³⁴

Generally speaking, the first edition of *Critique of pure reason* is more markedly metaphysical than the second edition, which omits some aspects of

²⁹ Kant 1936-8, Introduction, V. On this topic see Massolo 1948, Introduction, and Salvucci 1963, chs. 2, 3.

³⁰ Lange 1862.

³¹ Kant's notion of transcendental object provoked fierce criticism. Nevertheless, for example, the concept of 'triangle in general' as expounded in *Critique of pure reason* is closely connected both to the Cartesian idea of 'essence of triangle' and to Locke's concept of 'general triangle': Kant 1781, Transcendental Logic, Appendix.

³² It is no coincidence, in fact, that the neo-Kantians developed only the formal component of Kantian logic and that this was also vehemently criticized by subsequent formal logicians.

³³ Kant 1800, ch. 1, § 3.

³⁴ Kant 1800. On the concept of metaphysics or *philosophia transcendentalis* in Kant see Vuillemin 1955, 121. On the concept of transcendental philosophy in Brentano see his lectures delivered at Würzburg, "An apologetics against scepticism", which preceded his lectures on ontology.

the deduction of the categories and concentrates on just one of them: the category which establishes the *validity* of our knowledge.³⁵

We now turn to examination of what Kant sought to achieve by carrying out these various deductions. The subjective deduction of the categories answers the question: how is thought possible? Kant's analysis of the *passive synthesis* of experience was an attempt to solve the question from the point of view of its *origin*.

The metaphysical deduction answers the question: what are the limits of our knowledge? In other words, it seeks to establish whether categories as pure a priori concepts exist and to specify the original properties of pure reason.³⁶ Thus Kant set out to analyse the nature of consciousness at its various levels and to explain its workings: that is, to define its acts and contents.

The transcendental deduction answers the question: what *objective validity* do the categories have for our knowledge?

The fundamental problem addressed by both the editions of the *Critique* was whether or not the categories, as the pure concepts of intellect, have their *ground in sensibility* and specifically in the transcendental faculty of *imagination*. The second edition of 1787 exacerbated the sensibility-intellect dualism³⁷ by conceiving the categories as logical functions of intellect, apart from and unrelated to sensibility. In consequence, all those passages in the first edition which dealt with the *genetic*³⁸ aspect of categorical deduction were omitted. That is to say, Kant eliminated those parts of the first edition which expounded the subjective deduction based on the pure intuitions of space and time (especially time); he eliminated the metaphysical deduction; and he eliminated

³⁵ By validity (*Geltung*) is meant the subsistence (*bestehen*) of scientific truths in themselves. The notion was later developed by the neo-Kantians.

³⁶ The metaphysical deduction is omitted from the second edition. On the history of the metaphysical deduction and the problem of deduction in general in Kant see De Vleschaeuer 1934, I, 188 ff., and De Vleschaeuer 1939.

³⁷ This was due to his failure to deal with questions arising from the subjective (or synoptic) synthesis of imagination, that is, the subjective deduction. The aspect left unresolved was the nature and the processes of inner sense (time) as pure a priori intuition. In 1871 inner sense was explained in genetic terms in the subjective deduction and in descriptive terms in the metaphysical deduction. On the question of time see Scholz 1956, 9-69; Gent 1965, 19-24, and Holmes 1955-6, 240-4.

³⁸ In his *Logik* Kant used the term 'genetic' for definitions, writing that a definition is genetic when it gives us a concept through which the object may be presented as a priori and concrete: Kant 1800, § 106. For instance, mathematical definitions, according to Kant, are all genetic, that is, synthetic, factual and constructive.

the theoretical edifice of the transcendental object.³⁹ All that was left, and this should be stressed, was the transcendental deduction.⁴⁰

It should now be clear that: (i) the task of the three deductions was explicitly *also* the specific subject-matter of transcendental logic; (ii) transcendental logic as a whole refers to the realm of metaphysics.

It is important to realize that Kant found himself trapped in a theoretical impasse — the nature of consciousness and of its acts — which forced him to abandon part of his theory and to concentrate solely on the question of the categorical validity of empirical knowledge; a validity which ensures the objectivity of science. Transcendental logic, in this context, as the formal model of metaphysics, concerned itself with the possibility or impossibility of deducing the nature of consciousness in all its forms, including self-consciousness. The relationship between formal logic and transcendental logic was central to most of the debate that followed Kant, from the post- to the Neokantians, including Trendelenburg, Brentano's teacher, and Ueberweg⁴¹, one of the late nineteenth-century masters of German philosophy.⁴²

5. 'BACK TO KANT'

At the end of the nineteenth century, the development of the thought of Brentano and his school coincided with vigorous debate on Kant. And, apart from the scholastic fringes of German idealism, the slogan 'back to Kant' had a specific connotation in the parallel dispute between the psychological and natural sciences. The reinstatement of Kant, in fact, was widely advocated by philosophers of such diverse theoretical persuasions as Liebmann, Lange, Adickes, Zeller, Vahinger, Bona-Meyer, and also by scientists and physiologists like Helmholtz.⁴³

³⁹ Note that the expression 'metaphysical deduction' appears only once in the edition of 1787 (Transcendental Logic, Analytics of Concepts, § 26) and refers to certain passages in the first edition which were omitted from the second.

⁴⁰ It is of fundamental theoretical importance to understand how Kant's criticism developed. As we have seen, the idealistic elaboration of Kant's criticism drew on the edition in 1781, whereas most of subsequent Kantianism, like neo-Kantianism, was based on the edition of 1787.

⁴¹ Ueberweg 1857. Both Trendelenburg and Ueberweg interpreted Kant's formal logic as a doctrine of analytic a priori judgments, assigning the realm of synthetic a priori judgments to transcendental logic. Barone has pointed out that this interpretation was first advanced in Jäsche's Introduction to Kant's *Logik*: Barone 1965, 334, no. 8.

⁴² For a general review of the question see Mangione 1970, § 5, 176-182, and 192 ff.

⁴³ Liebmann 1865; Lange 1866; Zeller 1879; Adickes 1887; Helmholtz 1867; Vahinger 1991; Bona-Meyer 1870. On this see also Ueberweg 1907; Köhnke 1984, 1986.

It should also be noted that this renewed interest in Kant in various fields of inquiry was almost invariably based on his theories expounded in the second edition of *Critique of pure reason* of 1787, or on the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. For the time being, the first edition of *Critique of pure reason* was dismissed as a legacy from idealistic speculation.⁴⁴

The revival in Kantian studies encompassed a broad spectrum of interests — philological, historical, gnoseological and scientific in the strict sense. Certainly its most significant product was neo-Kantianism, although this, too, was a movement which cannot be given precise definition.⁴⁵

Except for the philological research conducted, amongst others, by Adickes (which in any case provided the theoretical revival of Kantian studies with its subject-matter), this renewed interest in Kant concerned above all the doctrine of the a priori, the concept of the transcendental and, as a consequence, the relationship between formal and transcendental logic.

Helmholtz, for example, sought to give a physiological interpretation to the a priori,⁴⁶ while Lange developed a theory which conceived it as a normative construct in scientific investigation.⁴⁷ The leading theoreticians of neo-Kantianism, Natorp and Cohen, contributed an epistemological and descriptive interpretation of the transcendental whereby the unity of consciousness (the so-called 'I think') from a *function* of pure thought became a *systematic corpus of scientific doctrines* — physics very often — which generated an ontology with a markedly epistemological bias.

The linguistic interest that neo-Kantianism inherited from the Humboldtians via Lazarus's and Steinthal's *Völkerpsychologie*⁴⁸ was also evident in Cassirer: language became the tool with which to eliminate the sensibility/intellect dualism that Kant's theory of knowledge had left unresolved.⁴⁹ Other exponents of this Kantian revival were, in different ways, scientists and historians of science such as Dingler, Koyré and Duhem.

⁴⁴ On this see the next section. The *Kritik der Urteilskraft* was a major influence on the Humboldtians and central to the interpretation of Kantianism given by Fries.

⁴⁵ Among its most outstanding exponents were Cohen, Natorp, Rickert, Windelband, Cassirer and Simmel.

⁴⁶ Helmholtz 1902.

⁴⁷ Lange 1862, ch.1.

⁴⁸ Steinthal 1850 and 1851. Cohen wrote at length on *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* before he broke with Lazarus after his review of Lazarus's book *Das Problem der Jüdischen Sittenlehre*.

⁴⁹ Cassirer 1906, 1923 and 1910.

6. PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC: CASSIRER'S POINT OF VIEW⁵⁰

Post-Kantianism originated in a series of attempts to explain what Kantianism actually was.

More than anyone else, it was Cassirer who showed the peculiarity and the fundamental difficulty of Kant's criticism from a conceptual point of view. A central principle of the *Critique* was that the concept of *object* (*Gegenstand*) lost the crucial role that it had played in the traditional theory of knowledge. It was replaced by the question of the *form of knowledge* that determines its objectivity. Yet to express this state of affairs, Cassirer pointed out, Kantianism had to use *linguistic expressions* which by their very nature designate something quite different: namely, *things* and relations among things.⁵¹ Cassirer's interpretation is well known: Kant's complex vocabulary and his concepts such as 'thing in itself', 'noumenon', 'a priori' represented an attempt to *symbolize* new concepts for which a suitable terminology had not yet been developed. The real dilemma of Kantianism was that it sought to describe the formal structure of experience independently of its intuitive contents and of the linguistic expressions into which it is organized.

The basic difference between aesthetics and analytics, therefore, was that the former — because it lacked the vocabulary — was unable to characterize the concept of object (*Gegenstand*). That is, it was unable to *say* what it was, whereas analytics explained the concept by resorting to categorical deduction. In this case, however, it was already a *presented-object* (*Objekt*) expressible as a content of thought. It comes as no surprise, therefore, to find that only the reflecting judgment in the *Kritik der Urteilkraft*, was able to state a congruence between the so-called object 'in itself' and our cognitive faculties.

My concern here is to present the interpretations of Kantianism developed by Benecke, Erdmann, Sigwart, Wundt, and Trendelenburg, and which came near to Brentano's theory.

The starting point is Karl Leonard Reinhold's insight that Kant's criticism was closely related *also* to the problems of a philosophical psychology, and that the innovative nature of metaphysical deduction lay in its emphasis on the existence of *forms* (*Gestalten*) of consciousness such as 'presentation', 'essence', 'concept' and so on. On the nature of *presentation* (*Vorstellung*), which Reinhold considered to be the theoretical crux of Kantianism, he wrote: "the first question is a logical one and concerns the laws that constitute not the nature of the thing that possesses a cognitive faculty, but the nature of the

⁵⁰ Cassirer 1906, vol. 3, ch. 5. Another scholar providing useful information on the passage from Kant to Brentano is Herbart. On Herbart see Asmus 1968-70, Träger 1982 and Schmidt 1985.

⁵¹ Cassirer 1906, 21.

simple cognitive faculty; that is to say, it concerns the conditions by virtue of which knowledge is made possible and which, considered all together, are called the cognitive faculty and which in the cognitive faculty must necessarily be given. The second question is a *metaphysical* one; it concerns the laws that constitute the nature of a thing; that is to say, the conditions by virtue of which an object different from the mere cognitive faculty is possible. We can establish whether or not this object is knowable, and to what extent, only after we have studied the simple cognitive faculty and identified its limits".⁵² There are many phenomenological features to Reinhold's *Elementarphilosophie*, which set out to *describe* the elementary facts of consciousness or presentations (*Vorstellungen*).⁵³

Reinhold identified the realm of consciousness (and of self-consciousness) — the qualitative contents of psychic experience — with the Kantian a priori.⁵⁴

It should be stressed that Reinhold's interpretation of Kantianism, an interpretation founded on analysis of the concept of presentation,⁵⁵ was based on topics that Kant had already explored in the first edition of the *Critique*, when he considered the subjective and metaphysical deductions of the categories.

On the basis of his analysis of presentation, Reinhold claimed the non-deducibility of the concepts of subject and object — which became a relation within the unitary content of consciousness. As a consequence, matter and form became different characters of presentation. In particular, matter is the *qualitative* difference among presentations, and form is the *order* and the *connection* of the contents of consciousness.⁵⁶

Cassirer observed that the subsequent development of Reinhold's theory was in part concerned with the difficulties involved in the concept of 'thing in itself', which was ultimately considered as the empty object (*nihil negativum*) of the Kantian critique.⁵⁷ This aspect too, I believe, is extremely significant. In

⁵² Reinhold 1789, 205; Kant 1781, Transcendental dialectic, B and C. In Husserl these features become the categories of meaning and the pure objectual categories.

⁵³ Reinhold used *Vorstellung* in the same way as Husserl used *Erlebniss*. Reinhold's elementary philosophy, as Husserl himself pointed out, was an attempt to analyse the internal conditions of the act of presentation; it thus sought to construct a theory of phenomenologically-based knowledge. Moreover it was Reinhold, not Husserl, who first used the expression 'philosophy as a rigorous science'. On this see Schuhmann 1971, 44, no. 2. On the similarity between Reinhold and Husserl see Funke 1958, 576, no. 56.

⁵⁴ Reinhold 1790, II, 1 ff.

⁵⁵ Reinhold 1790, I, 255 ff.

⁵⁶ Compare Kant's conception with that of Husserl: Husserl 1966. See also on this topic Albertazzi 1989a, ch. 2.

⁵⁷ Cassirer 1906, 77 ff. Observe that the concept of 'material character' in Fries, which probably derived from Kant's *nihil negativum*, was very similar to Husserl's notion of the hyletic datum, as the initial semiological index of both the passive synthesis of experience and

fact, as well as being one of the most subtle and crucial concepts of Kantianism, the problem of the object in general — which provided presentation with its material foundation — is present also in Twardowski's analysis.⁵⁸

There was a second interpretation of Kant which drew on both the first edition of *Critique* and Kant's pre-critical texts;⁵⁹ one, however, which did not lead to an idealistic conclusion. This interpretation we owe to Jacob Friederich Fries, who, starting from inner experience, emphasised the psychological features of the Kantian critique.⁶⁰

Fries pursued the same line of argument as Reinhold, claiming that Kantianism was founded on a *purely descriptive analysis of the facts of consciousness*. His analysis, moreover, in terms of Kant's distinction of 1763 had a metaphysical meaning and an analytical character.

In his *Untersuchungen über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral*, Kant distinguished the mathematical method from philosophical method by pointing out that: "we can arrive at any general concept by two routes: either through the arbitrary connection of concepts, or through the isolation of those elements of knowledge that have been clarified by subdivision".⁶¹ Mathematics, according to Kant, follows the first route, philosophy the second, because it deals with concepts that are already given, albeit in a confused and indeterminate way.

There is therefore, Kant maintained, a basic procedure that should be followed in metaphysics: first we must identify those *elements* of its subject-matter of which we are immediately sure, even before they have been clearly defined; then we must name the immediate judgments of the object of which we are immediately sure by means of its 'characteristic notes'. Moreover, the method to be used in metaphysics is that of the natural sciences. Kant wrote: "we must proceed in the same way in metaphysics, by means of a reliable inner

the inner consciousness of time. For the origin of the problem in Kant see Kant 1763. On the subject of the object in general, in the appendix to Transcendental Logic Kant wrote: "we think something in general and determine it, on the one hand, sensibly; but we also distinguish the general object represented in abstracto from this mode of intuiting it; hence a way is left open to us to determine it sensibly through thought, which is a *simple logical form without content*, although it seems to us a mode in which the object exists in itself (noumenon), regardless of intuition, which is restricted by our senses": Kant 1781, Appendix to Transcendental Logic. My emphasis. Here Meinong's concept of subsistence (*bestehen*) could be easily used to describe the type of existence that characterizes the noumenon.

⁵⁸ On the relation between Kant's *ens imaginarium* and Twardowski's general object see Albertazzi 1989c and the entry 'Twardowski' above. Reinhold 1970, vol. I, § 17. This aspect too was later developed by Husserl in his theory of noema: Husserl 1913, I, sect. IV. On this see Albertazzi 1989d and 1991.

⁵⁹ Above all Kant 1764.

⁶⁰ Reinecke 1907, 417-425; Elsenhans 1906.

⁶¹ Kant 1764, § 1.

experience, that is, by means of an evident and immediate consciousness, we must search for those notes which are assuredly to be found in the concept of a general quality, and although we do not know the entire being of the object, we can nevertheless use these notes to derive many elements of the thing".⁶² Fries accepted Kant's argument and declared that metaphysics, because of the way in which its first principles were deduced, reasoned by induction from the particular to the universal. The Kantian apparatus used by Fries was that of metaphysical deduction. Indeed, the induction cited by Fries as the method for metaphysics was not the kind of induction that inspects a plurality of individual cases to infer a general law. Instead, as Cassirer noted, "it was the analysis of a typical case to show within it an universal element as its presupposition... Consciousness is analysed in one specific and concrete fundamental form, such as the pure consciousness of space or the pure consciousness of the object, and resolved into its necessary constitutive conditions".⁶³

It should be mentioned that one of the most orthodox Brentanians, Alfred Kastil, made a careful study of Fries's psychological metaphysics.⁶⁴ One should also bear in mind that Fries's work provided Husserl's with one of his first introductions to philosophy.⁶⁵ At least two components of Fries' philosophy passed to his successors (Nelson, Apelt and Benecke), and later re-emerged in Brentanism:⁶⁶ his *descriptive method* based on an analytic explanation of the elements of consciousness, and his *metaphysical conception* based on a philosophical psychology⁶⁷ which adopted a method similar to that of the natural sciences. What is noteworthy is that these aspects of Kantianism pertain to metaphysical deduction and, partially, to subjective deduction. In fact, all the

⁶² Kant 1764, Second Meditation. This is apparently the true meaning of 'analytic' in Brentano: the evident, but general and confused recognition of the presentation. From this point of view, we cannot subscribe to Kant's view that the analytic does not enlarge knowledge.

⁶³ Fries 1824, § 21. Cassirer 1906, vol. 3, 586. This is not a question of an "internal experimental physics", as Cassirer notes, but of a phenomenological analysis and a pure eidetic vision of essence. See also Husserl 1913, vol. I, § 1 and 1911. Husserl read Fries's *Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft* in 1904 and based an important article on the analysis set out therein. On this see Schuhmann 1977, 82. On the concept of inductive method in Brentano see Brentano 1971a, ch. 2.

⁶⁴ Kastil 1912. The question more generally concerns the problem of belief, a theme that Brentano took from Hume, Mill and Reid, for whom a conviction of truth is always implicit in perception.

⁶⁵ As Schuhmann reports, in 1889 Husserl was working on Fries' text, *Die mathematische Naturphilosophie nach philosophischer Methode bearbeitet*. Cf. Schuhmann 1977, 24, 82.

⁶⁶ This is not to deny, of course, the importance of positivism in Brentano's elaboration of his method. As for Husserl, he repeatedly read Apelt's *Metaphysik* in the years 1904-5, especially chapter V, which he considered 'highly noteworthy': Schuhmann 1977, 35, 79, 95. On the polemic on psychologism see Husserl 1901, Prolegomena.

⁶⁷ Brentano 1971a.

neo-Kantians who based their interpretations of Kant on transcendental deduction — that is, those who relied on the edition of 1789 — were deeply averse to the psychological approach of Fries, Nelson and Apelt, which they labelled as anthropomorphic *tout court*.⁶⁸ Those who relied on the notion of *validity* were uninterested in either the use of descriptive methods in psychology or in the problem of evidence.

7. BRENTANO *VERSUS* KANT

In order to sustain Brentano's anti-Kantianism, orthodox Brentanians may quote those passages where he clearly states his opposition to Kantian doctrine. I list some of the best known of these passages:

1. In the sixth of his *Habilitationsthesen* Brentano set out a proof of the existence of God as 'creating intelligence'; this was a physical-teleological proof which he intended to be a direct confutation of Kantian theory.⁶⁹
2. As regards philosophical method, the fourth of Brentano's *Habilitationsthesen* declared: *vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est*.⁷⁰ Brentano described idealistic speculation in philosophy, from Kant to Schopenhauer, as a non-natural method founded on will: he called these philosophers *Schriftsteller von Macht*.⁷¹
3. In Brentano's theory of the four phases of philosophy, the third phase — that of the thinkers and movements who sought to counteract scepticism — included neoplatonism, neopythagorism, medieval mysticism, Lullo, Cusano, Kant and German idealism. There is a curiosity here: in accusing Kant of dogmatism, Brentano associated his Kantianism with Reid's 'common-sense' philosophy. In a letter Brentano wrote to Salvadori in 1916 during his sojourn in Italy, he stated that he had finally remedied an 'oversight' by reading Wolff and Reid, whom he now appreciated very much.⁷²

⁶⁸ Cohen 1883 and 1871 and Natorp 1921. On Nelson see in particular Cassirer 1906.

⁶⁹ Brentano 1866.

⁷⁰ Brentano 1983, 136. This method, according to Brentano, was also to be applied in metaphysical investigations: Brentano 1968e, note no. 1 by Kraus, 167.

⁷¹ Brentano 1968a: "Über Schellings Philosophie", 108. However, as already noted, it was Kant's firm intention to introduce the method of the exact sciences, in particular physics, into philosophical inquiry.

⁷² Brentano 1968b, 132 and 1980, 86. Brentano read Reid's works late in his life, as he reports in a letter from Zürich to Salvadori: Brentano to Salvadori, letter of 20.10.1916, in Albertazzi & Poli 1993.

4. On the crucial theoretical issue of defining a phenomenon, Brentano stated that this was not to be understood as the Kantian phenomenon manifesting the noumenon, the thing-in-itself which our knowledge cannot grasp. A phenomenon was instead a fact, in the manner defined by the theories of Comte and the positivists.⁷³
5. On emotions, Brentano contradicted Kant by claiming that emotions and will belonged to the same class of psychic phenomena, and that they stood in the same intentional relation to an object.⁷⁴
6. Brentano denied the existence of synthetic a priori judgments.⁷⁵
7. Brentano rejected Windelband's claim that Kant's influence extended as far as the nineteenth century by analysing and criticising Kant's theory of truth. Brentano concentrated on two passages in Kant: one in the Transcendental Dialectic which states that truth and error pertain to the judgment — that is, to the relation between the object and our intellect; the other in the introduction to Transcendental Logic, where Kant presents his theory of the correspondence of knowledge with its object. By criticizing the definition of 'phenomenon' given by Kant himself, Brentano affirmed that the unification of manifold content in a certain experience entailed the unity of consciousness.⁷⁶ (Although this was Kant's thesis of 1781.)
8. The most important aspect of the relationship between Kant and Brentano, however, is the problem of time as an inner sense, to which I give detailed treatment in section 10 below.

8. BRENTANO AND KANT

The relationship between the theories of Kant and Brentano, however, is a much more complex matter than Brentano's interpretation of Kantian texts alone. As we have seen, central to the relationship was the theoretical question of subjective and metaphysical deductions.⁷⁷ Accordingly, in order to show the theoretical affinity between certain elements of Brentano and Kantianism, there are certain questions that should be analysed in detail.

⁷³ Brentano 1968b, 113 and Brentano 1971a, I.I, 111, 14.

⁷⁴ Brentano 1971b, 83, Appendix, 155. However, as we have seen, the 'thing in itself' was for Kant merely a limiting concept.

⁷⁵ On this see Körner 1987, 11-19.

⁷⁶ Modenato 1979, 146-7.

⁷⁷ Most of the *Opus postumum* shows that the problems omitted in the 1787 edition, such as the concept of 'thing-in-itself' as a correlate to the unity of consciousness, continued to preoccupy Kant. See for example the appendix on "Realized space", convolute VII and "The space and the 'I think'", convolute VIII. On this see Lehmann 1961 and Daval 1965.

Kant's subjective synthesis of 1781 was, as we have seen, an attempt to show that space and time (the pure a priori forms of sensibility) and sense data share a common basis in transcendental imagination.⁷⁸ By transcendental imagination Kant meant a faculty able to make a priori reference to the possible objects of our experience — that is, independently of these objects' perceptible presence at any given moment.

Genetically, the subjective synthesis divides into three phases, of which the first provides the basis for the others.

The first phase of *intuition* involves modification of our inner sense by something external which is sensed or felt: perception has yet to take place, therefore. Kant called this the moment of *apprehending the manifold in intuition through inner sense*.

Kant distinguished between two kinds of intuition, of which the first kind involved *extensive quantity* (here presentation of the parts precedes that of the whole) and the second *intensive quantity* (here the whole is apprehended before its parts).⁷⁹ Extensive magnitudes (intuitions) and intensive magnitudes (the unitary form of presentations) are founded on continuous quantity, of which no part is the smallest.

Whatever the origin of modifications, they always belong to inner sense as *modifications or affections of the soul*.⁸⁰

Presentation is instantaneous and as such constitutes an unity distinct from any subsequent ones. It is the operation of inner sense that arranges the presentation into the pattern of succession and continuity which ensures that a coherent experience is formed.

Inner sense is therefore the formal condition under which phenomena can be sensed as wholes and felt as modifications of the mind. Note, however, that in order to be intuited this material must in some way be organized by imagination,⁸¹ which therefore acts as the intermediary between sensibility and the intellect.

⁷⁸ It is interesting to note that Carnap described the topological properties of space as Kantian a priori: Carnap 1922, 63-7 and Carnap 1924-5, 106.

⁷⁹ The formal presentation of unity — that is, the aspect of intuition that involves intensive quality — coincides with the *nihil negativum*: Kant 1781, Transcendental logic, Appendix. Note that the theoretical problem is the perception of subsequent data simultaneously with the moment-now of presentation.

⁸⁰ Kant used the term *Gemüth*, which at the end of the 18th century meant the unity and totality of psychic life (sensible, emotional, spiritual). Thus far Kant's position embraced a concept similar to that of *passio*, which Brentano expounded in Brentano 1968d, 13. For the use of the term *Gemüth* see Brentano 1971b: "Einteilung der Seelentätigkeiten in Vorstellungen, Urteile und Phänomene der Liebe und des Hasses".

⁸¹ The theory, and this should be stressed, is similar in many respects to Aristotle's set out in *De anima*, especially in Book 3.

The second phase of subjective synthesis is the *reproduction of the intuitive presentation* which, as we have seen, has been felt as a determination or modification of internal sense.

Once again, for Kant it is imagination that reproduces the intuitive presentation in memory. Imagination is also able to present an absent object to consciousness: a process which comes about, according to Kant, when the intellect acts directly on sensibility.⁸² Imagination is thus inner sense.

The third phase involves the conceptual recognition of the intuitive presentation.⁸³ This is a crucial point because it concerns both the intuited matter and the unifying function of such matter: the concept, therefore, includes both the *content* (matter) and the *act* (form) of thought.

Awareness of the unity of this synthesis as a whole, according to Kant, brings with it the awareness of the unity of consciousness. Here too, Kant clarifies what he means from a critical point of view by *object of presentation*: this is a *something in general within our consciousness* which constitutes only the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of manifold presentations. It is this third phase of subjective synthesis, therefore, which explains the existence of apperception as a formal unity of consciousness — or consciousness of the unity of the function of thought which unifies the manifold according to a rule.⁸⁴

In conclusion, the subjective synthesis tells us that phenomena are given to us immediately and that they have a transcendent foundation. Moreover, it tells us that ‘in themselves’ phenomena are merely modifications of the inner sense — presentations — even though they continue to refer to something objective. This something, of which we cannot have a direct intuition, is therefore not identifiable as an empirical object; it is what Kant calls ‘something in general’.⁸⁵ The subjective synthesis finally tells us that presentation is conceptually *recognized*, and that there is a form of judgment implicit in presentation.

⁸² Once again there are evident similarities with the conceptual structure of Aristotle’s *De anima*, particularly with the relation between *nous pathetikos* and *nous poietikos* — that is, the actualization by the intellect of sensible matter already organized by imagination. See Kant 1781, *Analytics of concepts*, § 24.

⁸³ Kant expressed himself in terms of a ‘recognition in the concept’.

⁸⁴ Kant 1781, *Deduction of the pure concepts of the intellect*, sect. 2, 3.

⁸⁵ We must bear in mind the role played by the imagination in the *Principles of intellect*. At the productive level — that is, in its functions of synthesis — imagination unites intuition and category *in a certain mode*; this is the level of *transcendental bodies*: Kant 1781, *Transcendental logic*, ch. 2. Kant’s theory of modification therefore applied to the field of transcendental; that is to say, to the ways in which intuitions are presented in unitary form to consciousness.

9. THE DOCTRINE OF MODES

Comparison between Brentanism and transcendental philosophy can be developed from different points of view. However, if we proceed chronologically, we may take as our starting point Brentano's first writings on Aristotle, in which a central issue was the relationship between logic, metaphysics and psychology.

The whole of Brentano's doctrine rests on the nature of psychic phenomena as modifications of our consciousness. On the nature of these modifications — that is, whether they are modifications of the object of presentation, modifications of judgment's contents or simply different ways in which the object is presented in inner perception — Brentano often changed his mind.⁸⁶

Brentano's doctrine of modes is linked to the question of the continuum of consciousness and is therefore closely connected to his Aristotelism.⁸⁷ Brentano develops these points in the first two of his major works: *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seiendes nach Aristoteles* (1862) and *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* (1867).

Concerning the relation between *nous pathetikos* and *nous poietikos* in Aristotle, Brentano argued that *nous pathetikos* was to be taken as the imagination⁸⁸ — a 'weak sensation' to which the intellective function of the *nous poietikos* was applied. This interpretation has several points of contact with the theses of Kant's subjective deduction: the concept of *modification* is, in fact, Aristotelian for both of them, and for both of them *imagination* is an intermediary between sensibility and intellect; the original intermediary which somehow orders and connects the presentations in consciousness. Moreover, the active intellect actualizes a 'matter' which is already a 'product' of imagination and not a mere datum of sensation. At least in *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, which analyses Aristotle's *De Anima*, Brentano's inquiry is still genetic in character and not yet systematically descriptive.

Brentano's passage to *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874) marks a breakthrough in his investigations and a change towards descriptive analysis. In *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, Brentano sets out the cardinal points of his theory — the concept of intentionality, the evidence of inner perception and the object of such perception — and he combines his Aristotelian inheritance with his Cartesian and Scholastic ones.

⁸⁶ Brentano 1976. The disputes between Brentano and Marty are revealing: see Brentano's *Nachlaß* and in particular "Polemisches gegen Marty" (T1), "Martys Lehre von der Zeit und meine Lehre von der Zeit" (T13), "Gegen Martys Zeitslehre" (T19), "Marty, Zeit", (T45).

⁸⁷ On this topic see the entry 'Brentano' in this volume.

⁸⁸ Brentano 1867, 202. Brentano's interpretation was criticised by Cassirer 1932, 170. On the question see Seidl 1971.

Paradoxically, the closest affinities between Kant and Brentano lie in their theories of the nature of the primary and secondary objects of inner perception and, more in general, in the special character of the intentional relation.⁸⁹

Moreover, as we shall see, the passages in Kant where he describes the third phase of subjective synthesis display many points of similarity with what we can call 'inner perception in the widest sense' in Brentano.⁹⁰

We may begin with the definition of phenomenon, which is the cornerstone of Brentano's psychognosis. Although it is true that Brentano states that phenomena are *facts* rather than *manifestations* of the thing-in-itself, 'in a Kantian sense', it is also true that his description of what phenomena actually are is very akin to Kant's.

In 1874 Brentano called sensible primary objects 'physical phenomena', thereby contrasting them to 'psychic phenomena' and defining them, like Aristotle, as *idion aisteton*. A physical phenomenon is, for example, a specific colour like blue, or a noise, or a sensation of heat, or a certain taste.⁹¹ A psychic phenomenon, on the other hand, is an act and it is characterized by intentionality,⁹² so that listening to a sound, seeing a coloured object, feeling warmth or cold, thinking a general concept, in short, every kind of psychic presentation is a psychic phenomenon.⁹³ Every psychic act in the consciousness, Brentano declared, is accompanied by something that constitutes the intentional object of the act in question (as its physical phenomenon).⁹⁴

Physical objects are given to our consciousness in the same way as intentional mental objects, even though they are not identical with psychic phenomena

⁸⁹ Brentano 1971a, 1, 11; Brentano 1969, 14 and Brentano 1968d, 53.

⁹⁰ Werner 1930, ch. 3.

⁹¹ Brentano 1971a, 13, 112. See also Brentano 1977, 31. On this see Chisholm 1882 and George 1982.

⁹² Brentano 1867, 102. On this see Melandri 1978, 51-9.

⁹³ Brentano 1971, 2, ch. 1. Brentano distinguished psychic activities into three classes, presentations, judgments and emotions; a distinction which he maintained in all the works published in his lifetime, albeit with some modifications. The *Nachlaß*, by contrast, he radically transformed in the early years of this century by incorporating a form of recognition into the presentation: Brentano 1987 and Brandl 1987.

⁹⁴ The thesis of intentionality was a constant component of Brentano's descriptive psychology, despite some variations: Brentano 1969 and Brentano 1968d, 53. On this see Spiegelberg 1936; Vanni-Rovighi 1960; Hedwig 1978. On the nature of the act in Brentano's school see Mulligan & Smith 1986 and Ryle 1970. Note that Brentano's analysis of the nature of psychic activities also involves a theory of intensive bodies. In the early Brentano, according to the theses presented in *Psychologie* 1, all psychic activities are given to consciousness with a certain degree of intensity, which varies according to whether they are presentations, judgments or emotions: Brentano 1971a, ch. 6. In these passages Brentano also addresses the question of intensive bodies in relation to Kant, Herbart and Wundt. He later altered his position in Brentano 1971b, 66 and in Brentano 1979, 68, where he denied that conceptual thought had intensity and attributed it only to the realm of sensations.

tout court.⁹⁵ They are objects which are psychically given, not physical phenomena in the strict sense directly given as such.⁹⁶ In particular, physical phenomena are characterized by their *qualitative* nature and by their *extension*. Brentano's emphasis on the presence of local features in sensible intuitions led him to adopt a nativist position⁹⁷ according to which sensation always contains a qualitative and spatial determination.

Even though Brentano modified his theory over the years,⁹⁸ the qualitative-extensional determination of physical phenomena remained an invariable constant in his thought.⁹⁹

However, the entire question of phenomena, and of physical phenomena as well, was closely related to the nature of inner sense (Kant) and of the continuum of consciousness (Brentano). From the 1890s onwards¹⁰⁰ Brentano's last studies on space, time and continuum persuaded him that physical phenomena, too, are given to us with absolute *temporal* determinations.¹⁰¹ During the period that Brentano spent in Florence, he no longer attributed temporal modes to the object of presentation, as he had done in the first version of his theory, but to the modes of presentation of consciousness.

Some of Brentano's writings on the continuum — specifically those of the years 1914 and 1915 which deal with the psychic present and presentation — are particularly interesting from our point of view. In fact, as Kastil notes, "they manifest a certain affinity with Kant's doctrine, in the sense that he assigns time to the sphere of inner sense".¹⁰² Brentano himself, in a dictated work of these years, stated that "Kant himself was unable to establish whether it is true that whatever we perceive of temporal differences is perceived by inner sense and only by inner sense. For the differences we perceive are not differences in the object, but in the way (*Empfindungsweise*) in which we have external sensations, and this could not be understood without inner perception".¹⁰³

Kastil observes that it was precisely for this reason that Brentano did not attribute motion and rest to the objects of external sensations. In another

⁹⁵ Brentano 1968d, 44; Brentano 1971a, 130; Brentano 1955, 177.

⁹⁶ Brentano 1968d, 59.

⁹⁷ Brentano 1979, 57.

⁹⁸ Brentano 1968d, 64. See Smith 1989.

⁹⁹ As regards the tridimensionality of phenomena given only in two dimensions (the surface of a figure, for instance) to sensible intuitions, the differences in presentation are to be attributed to the intervention of psychic phenomena. In the last period of Brentano's reist theory, therefore, the determinations of phenomena are determinations learnt only in a relative, never absolute, way: Brentano 1968d, 66.

¹⁰⁰ Stumpf 1919, 136.

¹⁰¹ Werner 1930, ch. 3, 71. Brentano 1976, TS 7, 185-216.

¹⁰² Brentano 1976, Kastil's note no. 143.

¹⁰³ Brentano 1968, 52.

dictation of these years, "Of phenomenal time", Brentano states that the modes of presentation and their modes of recognition are only objects of inner perception, therefore it follows that time must somehow lie within the sphere of inner sense.

Only by recognizing that the relative differences among objects are sufficient for the intuition of what is spatial was Brentano able to assume *material* temporal differences among objects.¹⁰⁴ This might have provided a solution to the problem of inner perception. Firstly, 'thing' in the late theory of Brentano must be identified with the temporal, not with the spatial nor with the corporeal.¹⁰⁵ Once again, the affinity here is with the theses that Kant expounded in 1781, not with those of 1787 and even less with those of neo-Kantianism.

10. PERCEPTION AND APPERCEPTION

The connections between Kant and Brentano concern also the nature of inner perception: whether this is individual or general, confused or distinct.

As his theory developed, Brentano distinguished between a first kind of inner perception (evident, but confused and general) as described in *Psychologie* 1, and a second kind (individual, arising from comparison, abstraction and judgment) related to apperception (*Apperzeption*) and which he described in *Psychologie* 2 and 3.¹⁰⁶

In fact, however, Brentano drew even more distinctions. In 1874, he differentiated between two kinds of object in the intentional relation: the *primary* object (which may be a physical phenomenon like a sound) and the *secondary object* (my awareness of hearing the sound). This distinction is merely conceptual, obtained by abstraction because there exists one and only one psychic phenomenon. The act of perception, Brentano states, is given *simultaneously* to the intentional object as a secondary relation of consciousness.¹⁰⁷

Brentano's account raises a number of difficulties concerning the ways in which the object is given. He does not make clear, for example, whether the object is presented 'formally' and then recognized 'objectively' on a second

¹⁰⁴ Albertazzi 1993.

¹⁰⁵ Kastil 1951, 168.

¹⁰⁶ According to Kant, comparison, abstraction and reflection are *acts* of pure logic.

¹⁰⁷ Brentano wrote: "we grasp the thinking self on the same evidence with which we recognize that a thought generally comes about": Brentano 1867, 131, 138. In order to compare this with Kant's position see Kant 1781, Paralogisms of pure reason.

level; above all, he does not explain the dynamic relationship between primary perception, where act and content are only 'placed in relation', and secondary perception, where act and object are 'identified with evidence'.

From Brentano's lectures of the 1880s onwards, and also in the 1911 edition of *Psychologie 2*, the secondary object is not only the single object of the secondary relation but, within the psychic act, it comprises all the modes of relation.¹⁰⁸

Brentano now distinguishes between two kinds of inner perception. The first is inner perception in the strict sense — that is, primary consciousness of the intentional object — which is always accompanied by a secondary consciousness of the act. Inner perception cannot be observed and it is tied to instantaneous perception, to the moment-now. Inner perception in the strict sense is evident, it refers to an object which is perceived as a whole, but it is confused and general, it is not distinguished into its parts and it cannot be subjected to inner observation (*innere Beobachtung*).

If we trace the development of Brentano's analyses of the continua during his residence in Italy, we may interpret this kind of internal perception as *perception relative to the extended present* which yields the material determinations of substance. In fact, if the temporal modes pertain to presentation, even to sensible presentation — which is what Brentano's studies of the categories seem to show — then primary sensible perception is always tied to the recognition of the objects that we apprehend in presentation.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, there are no presentations which do not involve recognition — and this endorses the position of Aristotle and Kant.¹¹⁰ It is evident that Brentano's theory of presentation and of judgment underwent substantial changes in this period.

The second kind of inner perception now identified by Brentano involves the determination of the secondary object by a clear and distinct apprehension through what Brentano calls an *act of apperception*.¹¹¹ This is the inner perception 'in the broad sense' which results from a complex psychic activity of comparing (*Vergleichen*), noticing (*Bemerken*) and distinguishing (*Unterscheiden*).¹¹² When a perception is endowed with extreme clarity, wrote Brentano, what one has is a plurality of knowledges. He defined inner

¹⁰⁸ Brentano 1971b, 138.

¹⁰⁹ Brentano 1952, Brentano to Marty, 22. 5. 1905.

¹¹⁰ Brentano 1987, "Von der Natur der Vorstellung" (1903), 25-31 and MS Ps 37, nr. 512113.

¹¹¹ Kraus's introduction to Brentano 1979. Brentano 1971b, Appendix, 140, and Brentano 1968d, dictation of January 1901, § 4, 34.

¹¹² Brentano 1968d, 17 and Brentano 1968d, 27, 33. On this transcendental aspect of Brentano's philosophy see Baumgartner 1989, 29.

perception in the broad sense as “a clear and distinct apperception of the relations among individual parts”.¹¹³ This second kind of perception, in fact, also makes it possible to apprehend the individual parts of a whole of presentation.¹¹⁴

11. INNER SENSE AND INTENTIONAL MODIFICATIONS

Despite Brentano's various versions of the intentional modification of consciousness and its objects, there were certain components of his theory that never changed:

1. His nativist position: for Brentano, every sensation is *originally determined both spatially and temporally*,¹¹⁵ and nativism is a substantially Kantian conception.
2. The perceived object (the object which is felt, seen, and so on) is modified in consciousness according to ‘intensity and fullness’. Intensive bodies are therefore the content of presentations in the continuum of consciousness; a notion to be found in both Kant's and Fries's theories of intensive bodies.
3. Temporal modifications, which Brentano attributed to the object of sensation in the initial version of his theory of time, are no longer modifications of the object, but intentional modifications — modifications of our ways of relating to the inner object. They are also *absolute* (temporal) *determinations* of physical phenomena. This is equivalent to Kant's position — regarding absolute determinations — to the effect that inner sense sense logically precedes external sense. This thesis of Brentano's, therefore, is also substantially Kantian.¹¹⁶ The sequence of the object of external intuition within consciousness, in fact, is not constituted by a continuous change in the object, but by a continuous change in the temporal modes of consciousness in which it is presented.
4. Brentano's doctrine of proteresthesis¹¹⁷ describes the activity of the imagination or fantasy in associating initial presentations with a continuous

¹¹³ Brentano 1968d, 33.

¹¹⁴ Brentano 1968d, 61.

¹¹⁵ Brentano 1979, 54; Brentano 1968c, 114; Brentano 1971a, 138. On this see Eisenmeyer, 476.

¹¹⁶ Kraus 1919, 41. On these problems see Albertazzi 1991c.

¹¹⁷ By proteresthesis (*Proteresthase*) Brentano meant the activity of the mind which gives origin to our experience of time. Proteresthesis, which is an act of the imagination, is an original association by means of which the presentation of the object of sensation is

series of presentations in consciousness that give it temporal character. This part of Brentano's theory, too, has many affinities with the role played by imagination in Kant's subjective synthesis — and the similarity to its second phase, the unitary reproduction of intuition in memory, is unequivocal.¹¹⁸ It is probably no coincidence that Brentano's lecture on space and time was first published in 1920 in *Kantstudien*.¹¹⁹

We should not forget, moreover, that of the members of Brentano's school, Marty as well as Husserl developed a doctrine of time, space and the continuum. The interesting feature here is that although Marty certainly based his theory on the thought of Brentano, he departed from it in his classification of the various kinds of judgment — in which he included eternal truths. It is also noteworthy that Marty's writings on time, which closely reflected Kant's conceptions on the same subject, criticised Brentano's handling of the genetic aspect of the question, and came nearer to a transcendental treatment of it.¹²⁰ Husserl's did likewise.

12. SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGMENTS

One of the best known aspects of the controversy between Brentano and Kant is their differing accounts of the nature of analytic and synthetic a priori judgments.

It should first be pointed out that, as regards the theory of knowledge, both Kant and Brentano were influenced by Descartes and Locke. For Brentano, a concept is descriptive when it can be applied both to internal and external perception — that is, when it describes a content of experience. The validity of these descriptive concepts is given by the self-evidence of the judgments that describe internal perception.

According to Kant, by contrast, the validity of the descriptive concepts of experience depends on a particular set of concepts which confer objectivity on

immediately associated with a continuous series of presentations which modify it according to the features of the past. As such, *proteresthesis* should not be confused with memory.

¹¹⁸ This concept is developed in Husserl's lectures on the inner awareness of time, in Marty 1916, in Ehrenfels 1890 and in Meinong 1899, as well as some years later by Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

¹¹⁹ Brentano 1976 (1920). On this see also Kraus 1930 and Volpi 1989.

¹²⁰ This is especially the case of the reflective presentations which make us aware of temporal differences: Marty 1916, 215 ff. On this see Simons 1990.

subjective descriptive judgments: these concepts, the ‘categories’, constitute the “necessary conditions of objective knowledge”.

Synthetic a priori judgments are propositions which apply conditions of possibility to our experience.

Brentano’s objections to Kant’s position on the nature of judgments are mainly set out in *Versuch über die Erkenntnis*.¹²¹ As regards the nature of analytic a priori judgments, Brentano accused Kant of misinterpreting their meaning by calling them judgments of clarification rather than judgments that extend our knowledge. However, as Körner notes, Brentano misunderstood Kant on this point: in fact, when Kant describes analytic judgments, he is talking about them in a logical sense, whereas Brentano describes about them in a psychological one. Secondly, Brentano was mistaken to treat mathematical axioms as analytic axioms which are logically valid.¹²² This question remained unresolved from a general epistemological point of view. Like Kant, moreover, Brentano had devoted much study to the principles of geometry, arithmetic and continuum. However, whereas Brentano considered these principles to be analytic, Kant conceived them as synthetic a priori. As we know, much of subsequent criticism of Kant took the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries to be proof of Kant’s erroneous view of the univocity of the axioms of geometry. The point is, however, that when Kant referred to these principles, he was referring to pure intuitions of space and time in a categorical sense, and therefore prior to their possible application to the field of intuition.

When axioms are applied to the field of intuition, they of course pertain to Euclidean geometry; but there is nothing to say that non-Euclidean geometries, as idealized forms of space, are excluded by the Kantian apparatus. Quite the reverse, as Beth has pointed out.¹²³

13. THEORY OF JUDGMENT

There are no specific studies of Brentano’s logic apart those by Hillebrand and Rossi, and a few other papers.¹²⁴ Of the latter, some belong to Brentano’s Italian period, others have been written by contemporary logicians.¹²⁵ In

¹²¹ Kastil 1951, ch. 7.

¹²² Körner 1987, 15.

¹²³ Beth 1961, 6 ff.

¹²⁴ Hillebrand 1891 and Rossi 1926.

¹²⁵ Simons 1984 and 1987; Terrell 1978; Poli 1993.

general, however, attempts to clarify Brentano's logic have concentrated entirely on his idiogenetic theory of judgment.¹²⁶

If we examine the question more carefully, Brentano's theory of thetic judgment and of double judgment sheds significant light on anaphoric predication; and it also provides a satisfactory account of the nature of pronouns, of proper names and of rigid designation — that is, of those notions which traditional logic was criticised for being unable to explain. What is surprising, however, is that Brentano's logic should be traditional in character with a strong ontological commitment. For the sake of brevity, I shall only briefly examine certain aspects of his position, which came extraordinarily close to Kant's notion of synthetic a priori judgments.

In his lectures on logic delivered in 1870-71 Brentano introduced the presuppositions of his logic — which, like all traditional logic, was a theory of judgment. In 1874, however, he developed an innovative conception of judgment in opposition to the traditional one¹²⁷ by stating that judgments are a particular class of psychic phenomena, together with presentations and emotions. Judging means accepting something as true or rejecting something as false: judgment, therefore, is only one way in which the object is presented to consciousness. Moreover, the object of presentation that we accept or reject is a whole in the Aristotelian sense of a substance with its accidents.

A very clear example of Brentano's theory is provided by subjectless sentences such as 'it is raining'¹²⁸ — where we simply deny or affirm a fact on the basis of only one presentation and not, as the traditional theory of judgment contended, by associating various presentations. Brentano's term for this type of judgment was 'thetic', and he asserted that it was the basis of all categorical judgments.¹²⁹

Brentano distinguished between thetic and synthetic judgments (categorical or predicative) and between simple and double judgments. Synthetic, or predicative, judgments are the traditional judgments of the form a, e, i, o.

In thetic judgments, by contrast, there is no predication: a thetic judgment only involves recognition of something (matter) according to a positive or negative function ('there is', 'there is not') which operates as a functor.

¹²⁶ See Poli 1993. The term 'idiogenetic' (*idion genos*) was coined by Hillebrand, who applied it to Brentano's theory because it considered the judgment to be a particular species of psychic phenomena. Other theories are called 'allogenetic' (*allo genos*) because they consider the judgment to be made up of psychic elements of another kind.

¹²⁷ Brentano examined the question in his lectures on logic published by F. Mayer-Hillebrand: Brentano 1956. On Brentano's logic see Rothenberg 1962.

¹²⁸ Brentano 1883.

¹²⁹ Brentano 1971b and Brentano 1956.

Affinities with Kantian logic are also evident in Brentano's definition of axiom. For Kant, as for Brentano, an axiom is an intuitive and immediately evident truth. Moreover, not all axioms are formal for Brentano — although they are analytic for Brentano and synthetic for Kant. There are also various points of contact between their two theories in the notion of the consciousness of conjunction — which Brentano takes to be an operation: not a logical *product*, as in modern logic, but a *sum* of characteristic notes. This is once again a Kantian concept. No less important is the fact that the Kantian distinction between assertive, hypothetical and disjunctive judgments — of which the first constitute the subject-matter of the second¹³⁰ but whose *form* is essentially different — integrates perfectly well with Brentano's theory of the double judgment.¹³¹

14. THE BRENTANIANS' POINT OF VIEW: CARL STUMPF

The ambiguities present in Brentano's thought with respect to Kantian theory — ambiguities which seem largely due to his failure to distinguish between the two editions of the *Critique* — can also be found in the criticisms brought against Kant's thought by many orthodox Brentanians. A case in point is Carl Stumpf.

In his celebrated article of 1892, "Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie",¹³² Stumpf, one of the most outstanding of Brentano's pupils, gave a clear exposition of the Brentanians' view of Kantianism. Two points need making here. First that Stumpf was well aware that the two editions of *Critique of pure reason* constituted an unresolved theoretical problem.¹³³ Second that neo-Kantianism (or critical idealism) developed from the second edition and sought to deny the aspects of philosophical psychology in the *Critique*.¹³⁴ Stumpf was also aware that the fundamental ideas of Kant's critical philosophy, which originated in the years between 1770 and 1780, had a robust psychological

¹³⁰ Categorical judgments constitute the subject-matter of disjunctive and hypothetical judgments. However, they are not strictly reducible to these because, as we have seen, for Kant, "the three species of judgment are based on logical functions of intellect which are different in their essence and must be therefore examined according to their specific difference": Kant 1800, General doctrine of elements, ch. 1, § 24.

¹³¹ Note that synthetic a priori judgments are judgments of *form*: Körner 1987, § 5.

¹³² Stumpf 1892.

¹³³ Stumpf 1892, 468.

¹³⁴ Riehl 1867-87, I, 8.

basis,¹³⁵ and that the main source of difficulty in interpreting Kant's texts lay in his definition of the relation between psychology and theory of knowledge. However, what Stumpf as well as many other Kantian critics overlooked was the distinction among the three deductions — subjective, metaphysical and transcendental — which they collapsed into an all-embracing 'transcendental deduction of categories';¹³⁶ an error that caused much of the confusion in Stumpf's analysis.

This is all the more important because Stumpf paid particularly close attention to the subjective synthesis of 1781 and criticised the obscurity of some of its concepts. His analysis proceeded as follows.

As regards the first phase of the subjective synthesis, the apprehension of the manifold in intuition, Kant spoke of an original associability or '*affinity*' among phenomena; as regards its third phase, recognition of the manifold of the intuition in the concept, Kant called the X the '*formal unity*' of consciousness. Now, in his analysis of these passages, Stumpf failed to realize that the categories originated in spatial-temporal forms, and as a consequence he misunderstood a wide range of theoretical problems. As I have repeatedly stressed, the X of the third phase of the subjective synthesis of 1781, which Kant defined as the formal unity of consciousness, was in fact neither the 'thing-in-itself' nor the category of substance,¹³⁷ as Stumpf claimed, but the original structure of the categories of substance, identity and causality within the consciousness.¹³⁸

There were two reasons for Stumpf's misinterpretation. First he failed to understand the nature of subjective deduction, which he endeavoured to interpret *either* as an analysis of theory of knowledge *or* as a psychological analysis. Second he overlooked the two different aspects of Kant's inquiry: the first relative to the functions of thought, the other relative to its products, and respectively the genetic and the descriptive aspects of the transcendental investigation. These two major flaws in Stumpf's analysis are evident, for example, in the passages where he examines form and matter, thought and content.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ The thesis of Kant's heavy reliance on psychology was also propounded in an article by Windelband in *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* 1, 221 ff.

¹³⁶ Stumpf 1892, 478 ff.

¹³⁷ Cohen 1871, 142.

¹³⁸ This point was only fully understood by Husserl; see his 1966b.

¹³⁹ Stumpf 1892, 481 ff.

The most serious charge brought by Stumpf against Kant was that he had 'neglected' psychology;¹⁴⁰ an accusation which he rested principally on the meaning that Kant ascribed to the concepts of form and matter.

The passages in which Stumpf criticises Kant are of considerable interest, because they deal with the nature of sensation and with the doctrine of intensive bodies — from its first formulation by Tetens's contemporaries like Platner, through Lotze's theory of spatial-temporal localization, to the experimental psychology of his time. However, Stumpf's analysis faltered at precisely its crucial theoretical point: he did not believe that Kant's conception of the origin of space and time could be considered nativist, because "nicht darauf komme es Kant an, wie Raum, Zeit, Causalität in uns entstehen, sondern was sie für die wissenschaftlichen gebrauch leisten oder bedeuten. Daher kümmere es Ihn gar nicht, ob sie angeborenen sind oder nicht".¹⁴¹ This, as I have endeavoured to explain in this essay, was totally to ignore the effort made by Kant (regardless of whether it was successful or not) in the edition of 1781; the edition in which we find the subjective deduction to which Stumpf referred. Stumpf's position on Kantianism, moreover, was representative of the position of the many other pupils of Brentano who failed to consider the arguments set out in the first edition of *Critique of pure reason*. It was Husserl who, as the member of Brentano's school most clearly aware of the problem, sought to find a solution to it.

15. PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS

Brentano always was very clear about the fundamental difference between metaphysics and psychology: psychology is a science and as such, after clarifying and describing its objects, that is, psychic facts, has the task of finding their laws;¹⁴² metaphysics seeks to clarify the ultimate foundation of facts,¹⁴³ from the point of view of both the theory of truth and the conception of the universe.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ Stumpf 1892, 493. Note that the psychological schools of Graz and Berlin developed their theories of the psychology of vision and hearing in relation to a theory of knowledge. Consider Meinong, Ameseder, Höfler, Benussi, Wertheimer, Koffka, Köhler, and yet others.

¹⁴¹ Stumpf 1892, 492.

¹⁴² Brentano 1971b, 185. According to Brentano, psychology also had the practical task of influencing politics and society: Brentano 1925, 373.

¹⁴³ Brentano 1968e, 96 and Brentano 1968d, 126, no. 1, 127. It was the task of metaphysics to influence human behaviour and decisions: "Religion und Philosophie", 376.

¹⁴⁴ We must also bear in mind that Brentano's metaphysics had a strong religious orientation: the search for a proof for God's existence, in fact, was a constant theme. This is

From *Psychologie des Aristoteles* (1867)¹⁴⁵ onwards it is apparent that Brentano held psychology to be the foundation of logic and philosophy.¹⁴⁶ In the years between publication of *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* (1862) and 1900, his field of inquiry narrowed to the Aristotelian thesis of *ens tamquam verum* and came to show a strongly realistic bias.

Brentano's philosophy began to change radically after 1905 as he developed his reist theories, which owed a great deal to his analysis of language and to his constant correspondence with Marty.¹⁴⁷ Brentano made two fundamental changes to the metaphysical apparatus of his theory: the concept of real became the essential category of thought, and the subject who knows with evidence became the ultimate foundation of all knowledge.

The reism of Brentano's later years, however, signified neither an abandonment of his underlying Aristotelianism — as is clear from his investigations of space, time and continuum — nor an abandonment of metaphysics: on the contrary, as Kraus notes, his last years passed “far away from the world, plunged into the deepest metaphysical problems”.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, in *Psychologie* 3 Brentano's reist theory came close to solving the problem of the specification of being: being is thing, and presentation relates to perception which is evident in the moment-now.

This ‘Copernican revolution’ in Brentano's¹⁴⁹ thought of the first years of this century mainly consisted in even greater emphasis on the gnoseological character of his inquiry — an emphasis, though, which was a constant feature of his psychology — although this never meant that he abandoned either his metaphysical interests or his endeavour to found a theory of truth.¹⁵⁰

It must also be said that, in general, ever since the theoretical apparatus constructed in *Psychologie* 1, the relationship between psychology and the theory of knowledge had been made quite distinct, and that in any case it was a

also evident in his lectures on psychology delivered in 1870-1. Stumpf 1919, 106 and Margolius 1929, 55.

¹⁴⁵ Note that it was this work by Brentano's that exerted the greatest influence on Heidegger: Heidegger 1969, 81.

¹⁴⁶ Brentano 1867, 1. The same applies to ethics and aesthetics: Brentano 1969.

¹⁴⁷ Brentano 1985; Marty 1908. On the relationship between Brentano and Marty, see Smith 1988.

¹⁴⁸ Kraus 1919, 84. To be verified, although very plausible, is the influence of Vailati's theories and of Italian pragmatism on the nominalism of Brentano's later thought: see Albertazzi 1991.

¹⁴⁹ This is also Werner's thesis 1930, 26 and that of Kraus 1929, 133 ff.

¹⁵⁰ Margolius 1929, 79.

feature typical of the period.¹⁵¹ We should not forget, however, that Brentano regarded his *Psychologie* 3 as an introduction to metaphysics.¹⁵² His failure to make this clear, I believe, is one of the reasons why Brentanians have paid less attention to *Psychologie* 3 compared with *Psychologie* 1 and 2. Yet it is in *Psychologie* 3, with its markedly metaphysical structure, that the relationship between Brentano's thought and certain Kantian themes is most evident, and the same applies to the common basis shared by Brentano's descriptive psychology, Meinong's theory of objects and Husserl's phenomenology — even if Kraus has argued forcefully to the contrary.¹⁵³

16. CONCLUSIONS

From a theoretical point of view, despite the received wisdom that has induced so many of this century's philosophers and scientists to dismiss Kant, and despite Brentano's own opinion of Kantianism in general, it is precisely the thought of Brentano and its development by his followers that offers us an opportunity to re-assess the importance of some of the themes addressed by transcendental philosophy.

As regards the relationship between Kant and Brentano in particular, I shall conclude my analysis by making the following points.

1. Brentano, like Kant, was principally interested in metaphysics, not directly in psychology or logic: throughout his life metaphysics was his central concern.
2. On the specific question of the relationship between psychology, the theory of knowledge and metaphysics, Brentano showed thematic affinities with Kant from his earliest works onwards. As we have seen, Brentano explored the metaphysical problem of the identification of being on the basis of an ontological, categorical and psychological analysis which, in 1862, pivoted on the notion of the categories as essential concepts. One of the first findings of his analysis was that the basic components of theoretical psychology — which in Brentano's account functioned as a theory of knowledge — were form, function and essential concept. Brentano then, in 1867, went on to develop the thesis that the imagination acts as an

¹⁵¹ Stumpf 1892, 508 and Moog 1922, 161. Inner perception, though for different reasons, was also regarded as the foundation of all sciences by the psychologists Erdmann and Beneke, by Ueberweg, and by Bergmann and Cornelius.

¹⁵² Brentano 1968d, 1 ff., 127 no. 1., 135 no. 1.

¹⁵³ Kraus, Introduction to Brentano 1971b.

intermediary between the *nous poietikos*, the pure intellectual function, and the *nous pathetikos*, which yields the matter of sensation modified by internal perception. A third stage in his analysis was the differentiation of the features of the psychic phenomenon into act, object (1874) and intentional content (1911). All the major concepts developed by Brentano, therefore, can be accommodated by a transcendental philosophy.

3. Turning to the opposition between descriptive and genetic method, although Brentano stressed that his psychognosis was a descriptive analysis of consciousness, we have seen that it was also characterized by genetic inquiry and its consequent methodology: as testified by *Psychologie des Aristoteles*, *Psychologie* 2 and 3 and *Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit und Kontinuum*.

Why, one wonders, was this so? The answer is that Brentano resorted to genetic method when his subject-matter required it. One can undertake a psychological description in the formal sense which classifies the facts, the elements of psychic life and the laws that govern them; one can write an ontological description, and draw up a list of the pure objectual categories of reality to which the categories of meaning correspond, by conducting an analysis which treats formal ontology and formal logic as complementary; but one cannot describe the perceptive continuum or the functions of thought as such (that is, the act) or the pure categorical concepts within the framework of formal ontology. Here, in fact, we are dealing with *Gestalten* (note that both Kant and the Brentanians used this term) of a material-formal nature which pertain to the functions of thought in all its *forms*: fantasy, imagination, abstraction, comparison, observation, idealization and their formal *products*.

4. Finally, of the three Kantian deductions elaborated in the first edition of *Critique*, the second belongs within the framework of the interests and aims of Brentano's descriptive psychology. As for the subjective deduction, however, although Brentano employed a similar concept, particularly in his doctrine of the intensive qualities and in his analysis of the temporal continuum, he never managed to develop it to a level where it could stand on its own as a full-fledged theory. Thus, in a certain sense, Brentano's thought also found itself in a Kantian impasse.

Whatever the case may be, Brentano's philosophical psychology, which he intended to be a theory of knowledge and the foundation of metaphysics, and which in my opinion shares many aspects with a transcendental philosophy, by no means entailed the idealistic reduction of the objects he described to mere data of consciousness.

17. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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