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CARING FOR THE SOUL OF EUROPE:

GLOBALISATION'S CHALLENGE TO EUROPE AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF JAN PATOČKA

I would like to speak (briefly) today about Europe, the main question I want to address is what could a word like "Europe" mean today, in a globalized world? Another way to phrase this question could be: is there any relevance to speaking about Europe beyond the scope of the nation-state, an idea which has dominated much of the discourse on European politics for nearly two centuries, but which is now in its twilight years. Globalization poses a challenge to us, not just to the idea of the European nation-state, which I think it has already rendered impotent, but also to the very possibility of politics and political community. The challenge for us who wish to preserve the sphere of the political is to construct a political discourse in a globalized world, after the demise of the nation-state. I think that a reflection upon Europe can help us to do this.

Of course we are in a very appropriate location to open a discussion about Europe, its beginnings and its future, we sit here (in Samos) on the very borders of Europe, or of the European Union, which has come to embody, for better or worse, the current state of Europe. But as Greeks know very well, borders are fluid things, even the borders of Europe, especially in this region. In a sense the question of Europe will be decided in places like this, on the borders. We have to ask ourselves if Europe can continue to expand, and how far. Is there a limit to "Europe" in a globalized world, and if so where, and if not, then what does "Europe" mean?

I would like to discuss these questions in the framework of the philosophy of Jan Patočka, a Czech philosopher and phenomenologist who committed a great deal of his writing to the question of Europe. And that is the second reason why we are in a very appropriate place to discuss the idea of Europe. Patočka arrived at his notion of Europe through combining his reading of Greek

philosophy, namely Heraclitus, Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle, with a phenomenological analysis.

Perhaps most importantly, Patočka's idea of Europe is very much linked to his understanding of history, as I will try to explain, and Europe for Patočka was the seat (though not necessarily in a geographical context) of "history" in a proper sense. To understand the rather paradoxical manner in which Patočka uses the terms "historical" and "pre-historical" we must see that the horizon of meaning built around the practices we normally associate with the term historical such as the recording of history in annals, the general passage of historical events into narrative form, and the transmission and reactivation of this narrative through the various institutions of collective memory, in fact represent for Patočka what he calls "pre-historical life", in which the privileged signifiers and the institutions they support remain unquestioned or pre-given. In such cases the meaning of events is derived from a narrative about them rather than from the events themselves, allowing the narrative meaning of events to become relatively context independent, giving it permanence across time and space (HE 28).¹ It is the phenomenon of collective memory and specifically the support it finds in writing that constitutes this framework of narrative identity. The past is then preserved as something essential to the "successful comportment" of the community. But Patočka viewed this as having a primarily conservative and stratifying role.

The "Historical" or what Patočka also calls the "shaking" entails the continual upheaval of the pre-historical meaning-horizon, it opens us up to the radical contingency of human life, and thus to what Patočka calls "historical" in the proper sense. Patočka's hope for the future of Europe and of humanity lies in the creation of a community of people who are in constant touch with the true or historical nature of human existence. This "historical" life is for Patočka always a life of risk, of constant danger, a life without a firm ground of meaning, one that realizes the ever-present possibility of not being, of the individual and the community. For this reason he relates the "shaken" life to the life of the guardians in Plato's *Republic*, he writes:

To live the life of the guardians meant to risk one's life at every moment, so in domestic conflicts and in conflicts the community could not avoid, you have to imagine that the community could not exist otherwise than by a constant maximization of all the strength of all the citizens (PE 206)?

The question I want to ask here, and to answer in the affirmative, is if the processes that we group under the term globalization, i.e., the expansion of economic markets, networks and systems of communication onto an international

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scale, disproportionate to the expansion of democratic public institutions by which citizenry can exercise some degree of control over the surrounding social world, can be considered as a "shaking" in Patočka's sense. I think that with relative confidence we can say that the solid meaning foundation provided by narrative identity grouped around the idea(s) of the European nation-state is no longer functioning as a reference point for action in the surrounding social world.³

The symptom of this transformation or rupture in the relation between narrative-national imaginary on the one hand, and experience itself on the other, is a breakdown in the traditional bonds of solidarity between inhabitants which were legitimized, strengthened, and maintained by the narrative structure of a national-imaginary, a substrata of cultural symbolism, which forms the idea of a people and transforms the state into a nation-state making civil solidarity and political mobilization possible. This also correlates to an increasing distance or alienation between citizenry and the loci of power in both an institutional (real) and imaginary sense.

In a properly historical community the historical and the pre-historical can co-exist. However, it is at the moments of rupture of the transmission and continuation of tradition, i.e., the extreme problematizing of various aspects, as well as of the whole of our being, the moments that constitute the "shaking", so the very moment when the historical is most apparent to us, that the pre-historical presents itself again in its most potent form, as a safe haven into which we may withdraw away from the uncertainty of the problematic nature of the historical.

This retreat from the historical at the moment of its very emergence occurs today in two ways, on the one hand the continuous movement of globalization: the establishment of and integration into more and more efficient networks and systems at the expense of traditional lifeworlds, which corresponds to a loss of political and economic sovereignty and autonomy.⁴ On the other hand, the retreat can entail the re-assertion of the old mythological framework of the national community as *ethnos* resulting in the xenophobic and nationalist politics resurgent in Europe today. In fact, as Jürgen Habermas points out, it is the combination of the two reactions that currently poses the greatest threat to the establishment of a European public sphere today. The European national-imaginary, in its last gasp of oxygen, reacts forcefully by reasserting its identity and sovereignty against that which is its last hope: the establishment of a public sphere, and decision making institutions beyond the scope of the nation-state.

The essential point I wish to make here is that the processes grouped under the term globalization constitute a shift or upheaval in meaning-horizon, i.e., they have created a situation wherein the experience of a political or social space no

longer corresponds with its traditional meaning-horizon, and hence the horizon ceases to be functional or serve as a reference point for action. In the case of Europe, we refer to a meaning-horizon which places the concept of the nation-state or the national imaginary at its center. The result of such a conflict is exactly what Patočka calls the experience of "shaking", the loss of a "homeworld" or the experience of feeling at home in a particular meaning-horizon.

I. "Looking-In"

If the challenge to the European political sphere posed by the transformations we call globalization, can be understood as a "shaking", or problematizing of being, in the sense that Patočka uses, a clearing away of established forms of meaning, how then can Patočka's conception of Europe help to articulate a response to this challenge?

The central point that I wish to take from Patočka with regard to this question is that he identifies Europe, not with a geographical area or with a specific culture of rationality (as had his teacher Husserl) but rather with a specific practice, one that he locates first in Democritus and then in Plato, and Aristotle: care for the soul.⁵ The question of care for the soul is in this context transformed by Patočka into a phenomenological problem. Specifically it lies in the relation to the whole that is engendered in phenomenality itself. Every manifesting or appearing of a phenomenon brings with it a horizon, the showing of non-apparent things, the boundaries of which are unclear. The immediate manifesting takes us to more and more distant things, which while unknown to us still bring with them an awareness that they are there. Eventually this horizontal aspect of phenomenality encompasses all that there is, not in the manner of a direct presentation, but still in the mode of manifesting, such that we may say that the whole world manifests itself to us (*PE* 18).

We can take three things from this: firstly, in what manifests itself we always have in some way the whole. Secondly, manifesting itself equally points to some kind of whole i.e., existence shows itself in phenomenality. And thirdly that the question of care for the soul can be summarized by asking how it is that the whole shows itself to us? The soul is understood here as that in man which is capable of truth. Truth in turn is given a phenomenological definition by Patočka as the manner in which things manifest themselves.⁶ And so the soul is finally rendered as the space of manifesting or appearing, Patočka writes: "the soul stands at the boundary between the visible and the invisible" (*PE* 187).

So care for the soul is transformed into a problematizing or attention to the way the whole manifests itself, what Patočka calls “looking-in” (PE 35).⁷ This then is what Patočka argues has formed the essence of Europe: the problematizing of the way the whole manifests itself.⁸ A geographical or cultural (in a traditional sense) definition of Europe is thus obliterated, which allows Patočka to claim Europe no longer exists and probably never will again. When Patočka speaks of the three phases of Europe: Greece, Rome, and the Western Christian Empire it is only to suggest that these three societies contained something of this essence, which ultimately escaped them all. And when we speak of Europe today it is only to suggest most audaciously that a *metanoia* might occur, that individuals might come together, such that this essence might (in)form a politics to come.

If Europe is care for the soul, then care for Europe, must mean a care for caring, to ensure the possibility (within political discourse) of “looking-in”, or calling into question the way the whole manifests itself. Patočka placed his hope for the future of Europe and indeed of humanity in the creation of a community of carers. This idea of a community of carers is Patočka’s ideal vision of the *polis*, but one figure in particular is given a central role in the formation of this community. This is the figure of the foreigner or what Patočka calls “le bouc émissaire”.⁹

Traditionally, according to Patočka, the *polis* is both problematized and relieved of the burden of otherness, of the alien, by the figure of “le bouc émissaire”, an outsider onto which a society transfers its own sins and who allows for a sort of sublimation of the threat (*Unheimlich*) of the radical contingency of life. But for Patočka this figure will play a key role in the construction of a new *polis*, one built on “looking-in” rather than on the solid ground of tradition. In the pre-historical world of the city founded on myth “le bouc émissaire” represents the other of two worlds, which join to form one. On the one hand is the world represented by the word “home”, it is what is near, true, everyday, what we are in daily contact with, and what Patočka says gives us a firm rooting in the ground. On the other hand is that world and that history represented by “le bouc émissaire”, quite literally the foreign or foreigner. Patočka uses the Czech word *Cezina* meaning foreign land (PE.45). This figure represents a proto-history that lurks beneath the firm ground of tradition, a dark, foreign, and hostile place inhabited by horror and madness – something unspoken. In the pre-historic world these two form one world. The problem of the relation between the two is the problem of pre-historic (mythical) life. The city provides the firm ground and the walls by which to protect its citizens and “le bouc émissaire” becomes the visible signifier of the dark underbelly of the city, such that he becomes an outlet for the sins of the city, the sign of that which cannot be integrated. In more straightforward and

modern political terms we can say that the “bouc émissaire”, or the refugee, de-centers or de-stabilizes the (modern) *polis* by breaking up the identity between man and citizen, and by doing so throws into question the original fiction of sovereignty, exposing the contingency of our political and social existence.

For Patočka this outsider figure is also the role of the philosopher. It is Socrates who pays the price for the Athenians’ hypocrisy. It is the philosopher who by simple conversation exposes the two-faced nature and the confusion that underlies Athenian society (in Plato’s time). In a sense we can say that he tears down the wall that separates the home-world from its dark underbelly, and for that he is accused of heresy and is sentenced to death. But of course this act of heresy is exactly what Patočka is talking about when he speaks of care for the soul of the city.

It is in the properly historical community that the figure of “le bouc émissaire” or later the philosopher is elevated to the vanguard of the community, but the kernel of this theme already existed in the mythological foundations of the pre-historical world, specifically in the myth of man as the blind wanderer (what today we might indeed call the refugee) as exemplified in the myths of Gilgamesh and Enkidu, Oedipus, and Adam. All of these myths carry with them the same meaning according to Patočka: that man is a creature of truth but that truth is also his damnation. It is out of this most fundamental problem, this ordinary distress that care for the soul is formulated as a response. We can also see here another theme taking shape in Patočka’s thinking about Europe: where is Europe (quite literally) embodied? Blind wanderer – bouc émissaire – refugee.

The significance of these lectures on Plato and Europe, which I have just tried to explain the central themes of, is that Patočka tries to locate the essence of Europe in a specific practice which he calls “looking-in”, or care for the soul, based on his reading of Greek philosophy. As a political concept he argues that this practice, this caring for the soul in terms of thinking about how a community should be, not how it was, in other words, the problematizing of its foundations, made a brief appearance in the Athenian *polis*, and soon disappeared, but it persisted as a kernel in various forms throughout European political history.

However, there was another discovery made in the Athenian *polis*, one that is not discussed explicitly in the lecture series *Plato and Europe*, but which emerges as the central theme in Patočka’s last work the *Heretical Essays in the History of Philosophy*. In these later essays it is the Heraclitean dictum that at the root of all things is *polemos* and *eris*, and not Plato’s notion of care for the soul, whose legacy is privileged with regard to Europe.¹⁰ *Polemos*, Patočka writes, is at the same time what constitutes the *polis* and the “primordial insight” that makes

philosophy possible. Rather than being a destructive force, it is, he argues, a creator of unity, and the only mode today that offers hope for the future.

II. The politics of perception.

What could this Heraclitean turn mean in terms of today's European politics? A community is formed by borders, by the designation whether spatial, temporal (historical), or otherwise, of its frontiers, it is only in this way that it can be seen who and what is in, and who is outside of the community.¹¹ In this we can say that a border is a condition of visibility. But something is overlooked in this statement, a community is not merely formed by its borders, it is its borders. The nature of life in a community is that of life on a border. Whether the borders are static or fluid or somewhere in-between as is the case with most concrete communities, especially when they are in close proximity to others, against whom they define themselves, a community is defined and is lived as this tension. The special nature of the democratic *polis* is that this tension gives rise to a situation where something emerges above the opposed parties, a space wherein action occurs, and through which the borders are continuously shaped and reshaped. Patočka here turns to Heraclitus, when he writes: "Heraclitus speaks of that which is 'common to all', which 'nourishes' the *polis* in its general functioning and particular decisions" (HE 42). This common grounding that nourishes the *polis*, is the continuous conflict of the border (as an ontological not necessarily political term). This experience of conflict (*polemos*) unites conflicting parties in that in this border region they are one, they hold the same position as defining themselves against each other and so also with each other. This insight, Patočka argues, allows us truly to see into the nature of things, "to see that things cannot but be at once common and conflicted" (HE 42). To try to articulate this border experience means for Patočka to find a manner of institutionalizing what lies beneath positive signification, or what belies the myth of positive signification, a deep well of silence, or of conflict, wherein we define ourselves against others and so meaning emerges at the borders of words, of significations, and of communities. This was the marvel of the Greek *polis* for Patočka, that it conceived action in such a way as to make this common law appear, to reveal the whole as *polemos*, a constant shifting.

This law of the *polis* is co-extensive with the principle of freedom. Humans can only act in such a way that *polemos*, "the flash of being out of the night of the world" (HE 43), appears to them if they are free. This is obvious: "night"

Patočka's opposite to the acceptance of the rule of the day, or of pre-given meaning can only appear in a space where conflict can occur, and conflict in the political sense requires freedom. This is also the condition under which history in the proper sense of the shaking of pre-given meaning can emerge, the construction of a *polis* on the "basis of the law of the world" (ibid.). It is only in such a community that the future of Europe, and indeed of humanity lies. Patočka speaks of a *solidarity of the shaken* that emerges not from common interest or sympathy, because these may be far from the situation, but rather a solidarity of those who understand the law of *polemos* as the appearance of the whole, who understand the primacy of night over day, and of the silence of speech. This is why Patočka tells us that the question of human social being is in the first place a phenomenological question, because it is a question of how our communities appear to us. So the solidarity that Patočka speaks of is a solidarity of those who understand life on the border. Or we could say that to be shaken is to redraw borders in place of old ones that no longer function, specifically it is to draw borders across spaces of meaning that had previously been circumscribed. Traditionally in democratic societies, the border has been that non-democratic space of exception, which ensures the sovereignty of the state, the suspension of a meaning-horizon so that it may be preserved. However with a shifting of borders from the outside to the middle of our political spaces the need arises to democratize these 'invisible spaces'.

Why is solidarity so important here? There are two reasons: one is that the experience of being shaken, of waking-up to the night is too intense, it drives the solitary individual into a retreat into the light, into the pre-historical of pre-given meaning; the other is that the solidarity of being with others is part in parcel of the essence of *polemos* as it is conceived here in the first place. The first border that we live within is a bodily one, which separates us from others and from the world, yet which constitutes us at the same time, our identity emerges only from this space between oneself and another and oneself and the world. Patočka says as much in the final lines of the *Heraclitean Essays* when he writes:

[The free] are the ones who understand that *polemos* is nothing one-sided, that is does not divide but unites, that adversaries are only seemingly whole, that in reality they belong to each other in the common shaking of the everyday, that they have thus touched that which lasts in everything and forever because it is the source of all being and is this divine. (HE 136)

What I want to say about Europe is obvious by now. If care for the soul leads us to see that *polemos* is that which is common to all things, and if we can characterize this experience of the appearance of this "divine law" as the appearance of life on the border, as I have tried to do, then Europe itself must

also appear as a border, a space out of which new or "wild" meaning can emerge out of the meeting or divergence of old meanings, the border region.

In conclusion I will limit myself to two last points: With regard to Europe, I think that Europe must take on this role of a border that cuts across by continuing to expand, continuously incorporating the periphery, a periphery which is not only found at the edges of Europe: Turkey, Algeria, Congo, the Balkans etc., but a periphery that cuts right to the center of Europe, a periphery which we find in the hearts of Paris, London, Berlin. So the first part of the idea is that Europe should keep expanding, it is essentially the ongoing construction of a polis, of a political entity to match the size of the economic market, whose concerns and interests have become predominant. It is the re-assertion of the political in a new form, the post or supra-national. This is also the assertion of two other significant elements: (1) The 'European project' as it was originally envisioned by Robert Schuman (one of the original architects of the European Union), as an institution that would render another European war impossible because the conflicting parties, particularly France and Germany, would be too intermingled economically and politically.¹² This idea extends Schuman's vision beyond the traditional historical boundaries of Europe into the current zones of conflict, including the growing escalation of what Patocka called the conflict between the "blessed haves" and those dying of hunger (*HE* 132), which we find at Europe's (outer as well as interior) periphery. (2) Secondly this idea is an (perhaps heretical to his original intentions) institution of Patocka's original conception of the task of the "Solidarity of the Shaken", which whispers "no!" to the mobilization towards war or "the measures which make the state of war permanent" (*HE* 135).

The second part of the idea is that the borders which cut right through the heart of Europe, the peripheries which exist on the interior must be made visible. This can be done in part through the idea of a deterritorialized democracy that links political inclusion not to membership in (defunct) national communities, but to residence, and participation in an experiential landscape, as opposed to a narrative national-imaginary.¹³ This idea complements the notion of care for the soul within the *polis* in that it renders visible one element which de-centers the traditional meaning-horizon of the community, and which brings the whole into question. It also allows for the creative and continuous re-casting of that whole in the space of political conflict, and in doing so creates a political space more faithful to the space of experience. There is much more to say here, and there are many problems and difficulties with these ideas, but I think that they represent not only an attempt to concretize the idea of Europe as care for the soul but also

a response to the challenge that globalization poses to the European political scene and to politics in general.

A final word goes to a very brief indication of how I think we should go about investigating a question that I touched upon at the beginning of this paper: what possibility is there for the creation of a new form of community here in Europe, what hope do we have to institutionalize the solidarity of the shaken? I have tried here to paint a picture of Europe as a special sort of border, one that cuts across rather than circumscribes, so that it is the space of the creation of new meaning, not the guarantor of old. I think that the question of a people of Europe must follow the same path. We must ask what would it mean to be a people of the border, to provide a safe home for our blind wanderings. Hannah Arendt famously said that the refugee was the avant-garde, and of course the refugee is the inhabitant of the border *par excellence*.¹⁴ In giving a place to the refugee, to the stranger, allowing her a border, to render herself visible within Europe, we make a place for ourselves, we blind wanderers, we refugees, we people of Europe?

NOTES

1. Patocka, Jan, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed. James Dodd (Chicago: Open Court, 1996) abbreviated as *HE*
2. Patocka, Jan, *Plato and Europe*, trans. Petr Lom (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002) abbreviated as *PE*
3. If we to follow Habermas' analysis we can answer the question of why the dramatic increase in systems and networks of communication and economic interdependency has precluded thus far the emergence of a global public sphere (which would serve to cultivate the cultural symbolism necessary to constitute a 'people', a 'people of Europe' for example) by noting that the maintenance and strengthening of both public and private spheres has depended on the ability of national politics to have an effect on national economies, providing a real economic correlate to the sense of solidarity and responsibility toward both other citizens and the geographical and spiritual space of the nation itself. Habermas quotes J.M. Guéhenno in describing the diminished capacity of the citizen in the globalized or post-narrative era: "the citizen of the imperial age of networks defines himself less and less by his participation in the exercise of sovereignty [which came as a result of integration into the national imaginary] and more and more by the possibility he has to act in a framework in which the procedures obey clear and predictable rules." Cf. Habermas, Jürgen, *The Inclusion of the Other*, ed. C. Cronis and P. De Greiff (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), p. 125
4. One such example of this would be the lowering of corporate tax rates in Germany to historically low levels to try to stop the migration of jobs to cheaper labour markets, with a resulting negative effect on the social security system. If we continue to follow Habermas' analysis we can agree with his comment that, "for the present a politics still operating within

- the framework of the nation-state limits itself to adapting its own society in the least costly way to the systemic imperatives and side effects of a global dynamic that operates largely free from political constraints." Habermas, Jürgen, *The Post-National Constellation*, trans. Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 124
5. We can broadly generalize what Patočka takes from these three thinkers as a movement towards the most general, the eternal, the foundations of being.
 6. "If truth is the manner in which things manifest themselves, of how they are, how is manifested the very nature of things, then naturally these human peaks, this fundamental possibility of man, [truth], coincides with the problem of manifesting." (PE 26).
 7. "...precisely because [the soul] is concerned about truth, [it] poses, the question: how, why does existence in its entirety, manifest itself, how, why does it show itself?" (PE 27).
 8. "The problem of manifesting and manifestation – is from the beginning the ground of all reflection of European Peoples reflecting on their situation in particular guise" (PE 42).
 9. Patočka uses the French term, and it is left untranslated in the English translation of *Plato and Europe*, the closest rendering of "bouc emmissaire" in English would be "scapegoat", following the translator I have also left it in the French, in part also because the English term "scapegoat" fails to capture the full meaning that Patočka intends with the term "bouc emmissaire".
 10. Patočka makes specific reference to Herclitus' fragment 80, his translation is however somewhat unorthodox, he writes "we need to know that *Polemos* is what is common, and that conflict is the right, and that everything takes place through *eris* and its impetus" (HE 80). Another English rendering of the fragment is "One should see that war is common and justice is strife (*dikē* = *eris*), and that everything is happening according to strife and necessity." Sweet, Dennis, *Herclitus: translation and analysis*. Lanham, University Press of America, 1995
 11. "The spirit of the polis is one of unity in battle, in battle. One cannot be a citizen – polites – except in a community of some against others, and the conflict itself gives rise to the tenor of the life of the polis" (HE 41-42)
 12. On 9 May 1950 then French foreign minister Robert Schuman made a statement exactly to this effect. Cf. Pinder, John, *The Building of the European Union* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 3
 13. One such scheme in Amsterdam, allows non-Dutch citizens to gain the status of *stadshurger* or citizen of the city, allowing for political participation by non-citizens. Similar initiatives have been attempted in Berlin, Hamburg, and Schleswig-Holstein but were struck down by the German constitutional court. Weiler, Joseph, "Does Europe need a constitution?" Demos, Telos and the German Maasricht decision" *European Law Journal* 1995 1:3: 219-258. In Denmark and Sweden third country nationals can vote and run as candidates in local and regional elections.
 14. Cf. Arendt's short essays from 1943 "We Refugees".

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TOWARDS ECOLINGUISTIC CULTURE: THE DIALECTIC OF LANGUAGE AND ECOLOGY IN CLASSICAL GREEK AND THE ECOLINGUISTICS READER

Introduction

The essay is a preliminary attempt to outline ecolinguistics as a branch of human knowledge and to indicate possible paths for future development through the phenomenology of language, within the framework of general and applied linguistics, philosophy in general and that of the mind.

The Ecolinguistics Reader has been chosen as an in-depth, competent foundation for the purposes of discussion, thereby satisfying the essentiality of accurate information and a sound theoretical base: a need exacerbated through the confines imposed by the required brevity. The concept of critique is here understood not as negation, but rather as a balanced evaluation, aimed at a positive accumulation and elaboration of new knowledge on the matter. The first priority is given not to ecology, but language *per se* as the essence of humanity. The aim of the investigation is to show the historical relevance of ecolinguistics as a relatively new paradigm in the development of linguistics as a whole.

The 'roots' and 'crown' of ecolinguistics

It is assumed that an analysis should commence from the foundation, or roots, of the concept. We need to explore the father of ecolinguistics Einar Haugen's (1972:325) personal understanding of the term 'ecology of language'. It was defined as "the study of interactions between any given language and its environment", and "[t]he true environment of a language is the society that uses it as one of its codes".

That equation ENVIRONMENT=SOCIETY has significantly shifted nowadays to another one: ENVIRONMENT=NATURE. The approach of Halliday in 1990 in Thessaloniki (cited by A. Fill in *Reader*: 43), which